Story of the War in South Africa Part 6

On the evening of January 16 this brigade, the 4th, under Lyttelton, covered by the naval batteries, crossed at Potgieter's Drift, and established itself in kopjes a mile north of the river. The movement was a feint on the Brakfontein Road, and was continued the following days to draw attention from the true attack by Warren. The latter crossed on the 17th at Trichardt's, occupied the hills on the north side commanding the ford, and pushed the cavalry as far as Acton Homes, which they entered without serious opposition, but were soon after withdrawn. That night and the 18th the wagon train pa.s.sed over, and on the 19th two brigades advanced farther and occupied some hills on the right.

During the 19th Warren made up his mind that the plan "recommended" him was not practicable without modification, and, after consulting his princ.i.p.al subordinates, telegraphed that evening to Buller as follows: "I find there are only two roads north of the Tugela by which we could possibly get from Trichardt's Drift to Potgieter's-one by Acton Homes, the other by Fair View and Rosalie. The first I reject as too long; the second is a very difficult road for a large number of wagons unless the enemy is thoroughly cleared out. I am, therefore, going to adopt some special arrangement which will involve my stay at Venter's Laager for two or three days. I will send in for further supplies and report progress." Explained by other remarks of Warren's in his despatches, this appears to mean that the easier road by Acton Homes was thought by him too long for his division to traverse with the food they could carry in their haversacks, and that it was therefore necessary to take the shorter, which leaves the main road three miles from Trichardt's, and strikes directly over the range, pa.s.sing north, and within three miles, of Spion Kop. To do this the men would carry four days' rations, and the wagons be returned south of the Tugela. First of all, however, the positions in front must be captured, including Spion Kop.

The above telegram was the only report made at this period by Warren to his superior. Various operations went on during the next three days, presumably pursuant of the purpose stated in Warren's subsequent account of his proceedings-"We must first capture the position in front of us." The estimate of their effect by Buller, who was at the scene on the 21st and 22nd, is best given in the words of his report to Lord Roberts. "I went over to Sir C. Warren on the 23rd. I pointed out to him that I had no further report and no intimation of the special arrangements foreshadowed by his telegram of the 19th, that for four days he had kept his men exposed to sh.e.l.l and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill, that the position admitted of no second line, and the supports were ma.s.sed close behind the firing line in indefensible formations, and that a panic or sudden charge might send the whole lot in disorder down the hill at any moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to be prolonged, and that he must either attack or I should withdraw his force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance from his left." This last phrase does not make certain whether Buller's judgment coincided with that of Warren concerning the impracticability of the Acton Homes route, but it seems to indicate that it did not.

Warren replied that he had intended to a.s.sault Spion Kop the night before, but had not done so because the general told off for the work wished first to reconnoitre the ground. It was decided that the attack should be made that night, and General Woodgate was detailed for the command at Buller's "suggestion"-or, to use Warren's words, "the Commander-in-Chief desired."

The a.s.sault was made that night and was entirely successful, the British gaining possession of the summit and remaining there all next day. It was found, however, that the Boers had guns in position on neighbouring heights within effective range. It was possible also for the Boer riflemen, with their extraordinary apt.i.tudes for stalking, to maintain a perpetual fire from well-covered positions; whereas, to whatever cause attributable, there does not seem to have been a well-organised plan to provide artificially and rapidly the shelter which the flat bare tops of South African mountains do not naturally extend. General Woodgate was mortally wounded at 10 A.M. Reinforcements were then on the way, and when his fall was reported, General c.o.ke, with two fresh regiments, was sent to a.s.sume command. He heliographed down at 2 P.M. that unless the enemy's guns could be silenced the men could not hold the place under another day's sh.e.l.ling. Some hours later, at 9.30 P.M., he was called down to make a personal report of the conditions.

Towards nightfall Warren made arrangements to send up two naval 12-pounders, a mountain battery, and a heavy working party under engineer direction to organise field protection-a provision that should have formed part of the original plan-elaborated through four days of operations. Before these reached the summit, and in ignorance that they were on the way, Colonel Thorneycroft, left in command by c.o.ke's departure, decided that the position was untenable, and soon after 9.30 P.M. evacuated it. Upon this Sir Redvers Buller commented: "Preparations for the second day's defence should have been organised during the day, and have been commenced at nightfall. As this was not done I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion." From this judgment Lord Roberts dissented vigorously. "I am of opinion that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft's a.s.sumption of responsibility and authority was wholly inexcusable. During the night the enemy's fire could not have been formidable, and ... it would not have taken more than two or three hours at most to communicate by messenger with General c.o.ke or Sir C. Warren, and to receive a reply. General c.o.ke appears to have left Spion Kop at 9.30 P.M. for the purpose of consulting with Sir Charles Warren, and up to that hour the idea of a withdrawal had not been entertained. Yet, almost immediately after General c.o.ke's departure Colonel Thorneycroft issued an order, without reference to superior authority, which upset the whole plan of operations, and rendered unavailing the sacrifices which had already been made to carry it into effect." In face of this severe, and in the author's judgment merited, condemnation, it would be less than just not to quote also Lord Roberts' further words. "Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft appears to have behaved in a very gallant manner throughout the day, and it was doubtless due in great measure to his exertions and example that the troops continued to hold the summit until directed to retire."

On the morning of the 25th, seeing that Spion Kop was no longer held, Buller a.s.sumed command in person, and began to withdraw to the south of the Tugela. This movement was completed on the 27th, the troops reaching their new camps by 10 A.M. of that day.

Thus, unfortunately, ended in failure an expedition concerning which Lord Roberts wrote, "The attempt was well devised, and I agree with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that it ought to have succeeded." He continues, "That it failed may, in some measure, be due to the difficulties of the ground, and the commanding positions held by the enemy, probably also to errors of judgment and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But, whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed to the disinclination of the officer in supreme command to a.s.sert his authority and see that what he thought best was done, and also to the unwarrantable and needless a.s.sumption of responsibility by a subordinate officer."

It would be presumptuous and unbecoming in an officer not of the land service to express an opinion upon the difficulties of detail encountered in the various operations of this week's work. But the points selected for criticism in the expressions of Lord Roberts just quoted belong to the fundamentals, common to both military professions. The generous wish of Sir Redvers Buller to leave his subordinate untrammelled discretion in the management of an operation intrusted to him, was pushed to an extreme, and was maintained, as is plainly evidenced by his own dispatch, after confidence was shaken. The situation was one familiar, on a smaller scale, to every officer who has ever had command. It is difficult at times to draw the line between fussy interference and reasonable superintendence; yet more difficult to determine the moment when a subordinate must be subjected to the mortification of virtual supersession in the control of a matter that has been committed to him. But these are, after all, only instances of embarra.s.sments common to life, which increase in degree and in number as one mounts the ladder. Whatever may be said in favour of the fullest discretion to a subordinate out of signal distance-and very much indeed must be said for this-nothing can relieve a commander-in-chief only four miles distant of the responsibility, not for his own reputation-a small matter-but for his country's interests, in directing according to his own judgment the great operations of a campaign. However honourable to generosity, it is certainly carrying self-abnegation to an indefensible extreme to leave the decision of attack or withdrawal, of movement by direct attack or by flanking-"by the left"-to a junior, when one's self is on the spot, in actual conversation.

The action of Colonel Thorneycroft in withdrawing raises also the mooted question of when and how the a.s.sumption of responsibility in disobeying orders-express or implied, general or particular-is to be justified; a matter on which much unenlightened nonsense has lately been spoken and written in the United States. No general rule, indeed, can be laid down, but this much may surely be re-affirmed-that the justification of so serious a step must ever rest, not on the officer's opinion that he was doing right, but upon the fact, demonstrated to military judgment by the existing conditions, that he was right. Colonel Thorneycroft's intentions were doubtless of the best; the writer cannot but believe that Lord Roberts's sentence will be endorsed by the professions, for the reasons he himself gives.

After the withdrawal across Trichardt's Drift, a week was allowed for repose after the seven days' fighting just undergone. The attempt to reach Ladysmith was then renewed, taking the road by Potgieter's Drift to Brakfontein. It was decided first to get possession of Vaal Krantz, a height three or four miles east of Spion Kop, to the right of the road. The movement began on February 5th, under the immediate direction of Sir Redvers Buller. The same day Vaal Krantz was carried and occupied; but Buller was disappointed in the advantage he hoped from it. He reported that "it was necessary after seizing Vaal Krantz to entrench it as the pivot of further operations, but I found after trying for two days that, owing to the nature of the ground, this was not practicable; it was also exposed to fire from heavy guns which fired from positions by which our artillery was dominated."

As the projected advance depended upon the tenure of Vaal Krantz, and this could not be a.s.sured under the circ.u.mstances, the attempt had to be abandoned. On the evening of February 7 the British army again retired south of the Tugela, and thence returned to the camps at Chieveley, facing Colenso.

In the operations about Spion Kop from January 17-24, the British losses were: killed, officers 27, men 245; wounded, officers 53, men 1,050; missing and prisoners, officers 7, men 351. Total, 87 officers, 1646 men.

At Vaal Krantz, February 5-7, the losses were: killed, officers 2, men 23; wounded, officers 18, men 326; missing, men 5. Total, 20 officers, 354 men.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RELIEF OF KIMBERLEY AND OF LADYSMITH, AND THE SURRENDER OF CRONJE

The month of February, 1900, which opened with the reverse at Vaal Krantz, proved to be the culminating period of the war. During its course, the tide, which had been running strongly against the British, turned decisively in their favour. Before it closed, Kimberley and Ladysmith had been relieved and Cronje forced to surrender.

After the affair at Magersfontein, December 11, Methuen and Cronje remained confronting one another. The British strengthened themselves upon the line of the Modder, by the railroad; the Boers, from the kopjes of Spytfontein, some three miles to the northward, gradually extended their works east and west until in both directions their flanks rested upon the river. Sh.e.l.ling by guns of long range was carried on intermittingly by both parties, and there were small affairs from time to time, but nothing on a large scale occurred.

After his arrival on January 10, Lord Roberts spent three weeks in Cape Town arranging for his campaign. On the 6th of February he left, accompanied by Lord Kitchener, and on the 9th was at the Modder Camp. On the 11th began the movement which resulted four days later in the relief of Kimberley, and on the 27th of the month in the surrender of Cronje. For these objects, and at this time, 44,000 troops of all arms had been collected near the Modder.

It is needless to say that preparation had preceded execution by more than the two or three days elapsing between Roberts' arrival and the start. At Cape Town he had had interviews with General French, summoned there for that purpose. During January the constant arrival of troops from all quarters at the Modder Camp gave the impression of a purpose to resume the frontal attack and to force the way to Kimberley through Magersfontein; an impression which, produced on the mind of the Boer leader, was itself part of the necessary preparation. On the 3rd of February, General Hector MacDonald, with a brigade of Highlanders, had moved north-west, towards Koodoosberg, where he arrived on the 7th. The movement was in sufficient force to attract the attention of the Boers, and appeared the more plausible because of the disturbed condition of the district; which, although British, was full of Boer partisans showing signs of restlessness. A similar expedition, but less numerous, under Colonel Pilcher, had gone out early in January, capturing forty rebels. While otherwise useful, it seems probably that MacDonald's enterprise was intended chiefly to fasten the enemy's attention in a false direction. On the 8th he was recalled by Methuen, acting under orders from headquarters.

The great projected operation was to turn the eastern left flank of Cronje's position, seizing important drifts, or fords, on the Riet and Modder Rivers by a secret and rapid circuit of cavalry, which should hold them until they were secured by slower moving infantry following on the track. When the last and chief of these, Klip Drift on the Modder, some twenty miles east of Magersfontein, was held by an infantry division, the cavalry's flank would be secured and its advance would then be pressed to Kimberley. While the movement was in progress, Methuen in his old lines on the Modder would hold the enemy in his positions by a demonstration of force seemingly not reduced. If the undertaking were successful, superior British numbers would be planted across the line of Cronje's communications with Bloemfontein, and the cavalry on his rear to intercept retreat in ma.s.s to the north. To this turning operation were a.s.signed three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry; the latter was under General French, called from the Naauwport district for this purpose. The infantry divisions were the 6th, General Kelly-Kenny; the 7th, General Tucker; and the 9th, General Colvile. The total force thus engaged in the invasion of the Orange Free State was 34,000; 23,000 infantry and 11,000 mounted men. They were accompanied by 98 pieces of artillery, and by supplies in 700 wagons, drawn by 9,000 mules and oxen.

French's division, three brigades, 4,800 men, accompanied by seven batteries of horse artillery, left Modder River Camp at 3 A.M. Sunday, February 11th. Diverging slightly from the railroad, they marched due south-away from the enemy-seventeen miles to Ramdam, which is about ten miles east of Graspan Station. At sunrise they were out of sight of the empty tents, standing deceitfully behind them. At noon Ramdam was reached, and the division halted till 3 A.M. of the 12th, when it again marched due east for a ford called Waterval Drift, on the Riet River, which it will be remembered is a tributary of the Modder, flowing from south-east to north-west. Reaching there soon after sunrise, the ford was found to be held by a party of the enemy. Covering his change of purpose by a feint upon this position, French swung the rest of his division to the right, and with slight loss forced a pa.s.sage at De Kiel's Drift, apparently somewhat higher up. That evening he held both sides of the Riet, the enemy having retreated. During the night Kitchener came up with a division of infantry which had made its journey in part by rail, and with which arrived also supply trains, whose slow movement would have delayed unduly the progress of the horse division.

Owing to delays in distributing provisions and fodder, French could not start again until 11.30 A.M. The loss of the five early hours, says an eye-witness, cost 100 horses, which died or failed in the march that day. The goal now was Klip Drift, about twenty-five miles distant. Pa.s.sing well east of Jacobsdal, suffering intensely from heat and thirst, the division sighted the Modder when still eight miles away. All were much spent, the artillery horses could scarcely drag their pieces, and there was a showing of opposition on the right front; but French, despite the general exhaustion, decided to drive on without halting, lest the enemy, recovering from their surprise, should concentrate to oppose his pa.s.sage. Thus hastening, the Boers, taken unready, were routed. At 5.35 P.M. French reported back to Roberts, who received the message at De Kiel's Drift, that he had occupied the hills on the north of the river, capturing three of the enemy's laagers with supplies, while Gordon with his brigade had seized Rondeval Drift, four miles west, with a second drift between it and Klip, and two more laagers. Control of both sides of the Modder, and power to operate on either bank freely, were thus a.s.sured, provided the infantry followed in time.

That night, February 13-14, the cavalry rested on the north bank, holding the adjacent kopjes, and there remained during the succeeding day, waiting for the infantry. Throughout the 14th the Boers made constant hara.s.sing demonstrations, disturbing the rest of the weary men and horses. "But no attack was driven home. 'Could the Boers learn to attack, they would be a formidable foe,' the General once observed. Directly we moved out the attack failed."[32] Kitchener in person arrived at midnight, and the 6th Division, "very tired," at early morning of the 15th. The defence of the position was then turned over to Kelly-Kenny, "leaving French free to act,"[33] and the cavalry, reinforced by several new regiments from the westward, which raised its numbers to near 10,000,[34] prepared for the final rush to Kimberley, some twenty-five miles away.

A few miles from Klip Drift, towards Kimberley, lay an enclosed plain, five miles long by three wide, where a number of Boers were waiting to contest progress. The kopjes controlling entrance had been secured by the British, but the transit had to be forced. The enemy were in position on hills in front, and flanking the lines of advance. Measures were taken to cover the flanks with artillery, and to clear them while pressing forward, otherwise the Boer positions were carried by a charge. "The whole division was set in motion. For nearly five miles in perfect order they galloped on, until the head of the plain was reached. It was a thrilling time, never to be forgotten. Our guns held the enemy on our left, while the 9th and 16th Lancers had cleared the ground on the right. About two miles from the head of the plain the main body was halted to allow the guns from the left to rejoin us, but Broadwood's brigade continued the gallop to the very top of the pa.s.s on the left, and the 12th Lancers dismounted and held the kopjes in front. The right front was held by the Household Composite and Gordon's Lancers."[35]

After a brief stop to re-a.s.semble the march was resumed. Just beyond the head of the plain the chimneys of the mine works at Kimberley became visible-still ten miles distant. Cronje, by this aware of the direction and purpose of the movement, tried to intercept the advance at a place called Benaauwheidfontein Farm, four miles from the town, but he was just too late to occupy the commanding positions. Brus.h.i.+ng aside the inadequate force opposing him, French pa.s.sed on, and about 7 P.M. entered the place, joining hands with the long besieged. Kimberley was relieved, and the British cavalry established on Cronje's rear.

The general situation that evening, Thursday, February 15, was as follows: Methuen at Magersfontein, in front of Cronje; the 7th Infantry Division at Jacobsdal, ten miles to the south-east; the 6th holding the Klip and Rondeval Drifts on the Modder, twenty miles east of the Boer army; the 9th near Jacobsdal, in reserve, ready to move where most needed. Lord Roberts himself was at Jacobsdal, whence his telegrams were dated on the 16th and 17th. Kitchener remained at Klip Drift.

Cronje, who had not believed that the British could make so rapid a march, or take so large a force far from the railroad, saw that not only had he been outwitted and his position become untenable, but that there was no time to lose if he hoped to escape at all. As French slipped by him into Kimberley, he sent word to the camp to get the trains at once in movement, and to start east towards Bloemfontein. This direction of retreat has been criticised,[36] and it has been argued that he should have tried to retire to the northward, away from the British divisions already east of him. In this direction a certain proportion of his army did break out. It is to be remembered, however, that not only was Bloemfontein the capital of the Free State, and, therefore, not lightly to be sacrificed, but that his movement was concentric, having regard to Joubert and the bulk of the Boer forces elsewhere. Not only so, but French was north of him; and as it turned out it was French, in virtue of the superior mobility of his cavalry, who headed him off to the eastward, giving time for the British infantry to come up. The trains went with Cronje, and apparently it was his unwillingness to drop them, rather than the direction of his retreat, that lost him. Because men not so enc.u.mbered escaped north, it cannot be certainly concluded that he could by the same course have saved his trains.

Be it as it may, Friday morning the 16th found the Boer lines at Magersfontein empty. The presence of British divisions south of the Modder compelled Cronje to take a course north of it. Except for the drifts, the river thus protected his flank; and if he could, by diverging sufficiently, slip undetected past Klip Drift, leaving the easternmost of the British divisions-Kelly-Kenny-in his rear, he might reach the point he aimed at, Koodoosrand Drift, twenty-four miles north-east of Klip Drift, cross there, and so reach the direct road from Jacobsdal to Bloemfontein. This effected, the British would have a stern chase, proverbially long, and in this instance certainly fruitless.

Cronje nearly succeeded. Early on Friday morning the British at Klip Drift saw north of them a great cloud of dust, moving eastward. It was the Boer convoy, in rear of which doubtless was their army. Kitchener sent out mounted infantry to get to the north of the retreating force, while a brigade of foot was directed to keep along the river's bank. Word was sent at once to French in Kimberley, who was employing that day in clearing the country north of the town. The field telegraph being cut by the enemy, he received Kitchener's message late at night. This, after stating Cronje's movements, added that if he, "with all available horses and guns, could head him, and prevent him from crossing the river, the infantry from Klip Drift would press on and annihilate or take the whole force prisoners."[37]

French left at 3.30 A.M. with one brigade and three batteries, the others to follow as they could with their worn-out animals. The enemy had a long start, but from Kitchener's message it was evident that their march would be steadily hara.s.sed and delayed by the frequent necessity of fighting, of resting at times, and by the slow movement of the ox-team. Using utmost speed, at 11 A.M. French's detachment saw the trees lining the Modder's banks, upon which its route had been converging. On the left a fairly large body of men were perceived moving east. A line of hills between these and the British force concealed the latter, who were nearer the river. The horses were ordered to water while the general and staff rode forward to reconnoitre. Reaching a favourable height, they saw, 4,000 yards away, the leading wagons of the Boer convoy just descending to Koodoosrand Drift, where a road from the northward crosses to Petrusberg, on the Jacobsdal-Bloemfontein highway. The batteries were summoned up, being cautioned to move at a walk, lest their dust should draw attention, and at 12.15 P.M. the first shot was fired which told Cronje that at the very last moment, with safety apparently grasped, his pa.s.sage was about to be disputed.

The Boer general, who for a day and a half had been fighting a constant succession of rearguard actions with Kitchener's infantry, took his measures promptly to meet this new dilemma. He first tried to seize positions of command which would give him control of the ford. In this French was the quicker, and headed him. He then turned his column to the right to a ford called Wolveskraal Drift, four miles below, west of Koodoosrand, and the same distance above Paardeberg Drift, from which his defence has received its name. At Wolveskraal he "laagered" his trains on the north bank of the river, postponing crossing to next day. Either he felt sure that the British infantry, marching afoot, could not come up in time to stop him, or else, unable to reconcile himself to cutting loose from his guns and his wagons, he determined to risk all on the chance of saving them. French, unsupported, could only answer for Koodoosrand.

The decision was critical, and proved fatal. The British 6th Division pressed on untiring after nightfall, aiming to reach Paardeberg, but, missing the precise point, they pa.s.sed on and halted a mile and a half below Wolveskraal, nearly opposite the ford Cronje intended to use. Though all unknowing, they had taken a commanding position to head him, as French had at Koodoosrand. Behind them was the mounted infantry, which had crossed back from the north side, and also the 9th Division. Before daybreak both these had halted on the south side, at Paardeberg.

When Cronje camped on the afternoon of the 17th, the only chance left him was to cross at once to Wolveskraal, abandoning his guns and wagons. On the morning of the 18th no chance was left, except by outside help, which could come only from the eastward, probably only from Joubert before Ladysmith. Realising this, and to gain time for such a.s.sistance to arrive, he took up a defensive position based upon the bed of the Modder.

In broad outline his dispositions were as follows. The bed of the river, which lies nearly east and west, is from fifty to one hundred yards wide and about thirty deep, in soil that lends itself easily to the spade. On both sides, for a mile above and below Wolveskraal Drift, the edges of the banks were trenched, and at either end of these trenches traverses, thrown forward at right angles, served to strengthen against enfilading attack. North of the river, some cannon were placed in advanced works, three-quarters of a mile from the rifle pits, between which and the river, in the open, was the "laager" of ammunition and other wagons. The river trenches described const.i.tuted the nucleus and backbone of the Boer defences, but in his first dispositions Cronje occupied the bed of the stream down to Paardeberg, seeking thus to push back as far as possible from his intended crossing the force which he supposed had yet to come up from that quarter. The Boers that surrendered numbered 4,100 men. It may be supposed, therefore, that there were from 4,500 to 5,000 present at the first.

South of the river is gra.s.sy plain, at its widest 3,000 yards, shelving gently to the bank. Beyond it there is a rise of fifty feet in the ground. Behind this plain, on the morning of Sunday, February 18, the British had in position the 6th Division and of the 9th the 19th Brigade, besides three regiments of Highlanders. The mounted infantry, that had been pursuing the day before on the north bank, now occupied the river-bed west of Cronje's lines. The artillery present was three batteries-two field and one howitzer-with a single naval gun. On the north bank at daybreak was French's cavalry brigade, which was slightly reinforced during the day, and his horse artillery.

Soon after daybreak fighting began, the Boers opening fire at the west end of their line upon the mounted infantry. The latter replying succeeded in driving the enemy a quarter of a mile up stream. While this was occurring the British began a frontal attack in line from the south-the 6th Division on the right, the 9th on the left, the advance of the infantry line being supported by the batteries, placed 2,000 yards south-east of the Boer laager. French's horse artillery also opened from the north bank. As usual in frontal attacks upon a well-entrenched resolute enemy, the loss of the a.s.sailants greatly exceeded the results obtained. By an eye-witness the action was likened to Methuens at the Modder.[38] The fire of the batteries, however, was extremely destructive to the Boer laager, causing several explosions, and great distress to the enemy could not but ensue from this injury to their only base.

The frontal attack was supplemented later by efforts directed upon the flanks. Three regiments-one a Canadian-of the 19th Brigade at 9 A.M. crossed at Paardeberg, and thence fought their way a mile up-stream-east-on the north bank. Here they were stopped, and had to extend their line to the northward; after which, by short and desperate rushes, they continued to add by driblets to the ground so far gained. This was strictly a flank attack, and not only shortened by so much the Boer front, but enabled the a.s.sailants to enfilade their line in part. The attempt was imitated on the eastern flank by the mounted infantry which, after the arrival of the foot divisions, had moved east from Paardeberg and established themselves on the Boers' eastern flank at Koodoosrand Drift. These crossed at this point at about noon and fought west. An hour later they were supported by the two right-east-regiments of the British line, which by a rush reached the river below Koodoosrand, where a number crossed. These moved west in two parties, in mutual support on either bank.

The frontal attack and the flank movements so far stated summarize the details of this action. Support was sent from time to time as occasion demanded and opportunity offered, especially to the flanking parties. The net result of the day was that Cronje's force, from a development of four miles, was shortened in to two, the British holding the river banks above and below that stretch, with considerable part of their force placed perpendicularly to the river across both the Boer flanks, yet bound together in mutual support by the main body, extended along the southern slope, ready to reinforce in either direction. The flanking parties began immediately to entrench, their lines running, as already intimated, perpendicular to the Boer front, and facing the transverse works which the latter had erected as a protection against enfilading.

The British loss this day is variously estimated from 1,100 to 1,250. The official accounts do not particularise, but give as the total casualties, February 16-27, killed 255, wounded 1,209, missing 70. The propriety of the frontal attack has been much doubted. The question is one of expediency, upon which the author does not presume to give a certain opinion. It may be remembered that the Boer position had been hastily a.s.sumed, under conditions not long foreseen, and therefore quite possibly not very solid. The fact could be tested only by trial. So severe an a.s.sault unquestionably tends to benumb the victim, and to make less probable his escape, quite independent of his actual loss. Moreover, the flanking gains, which ultimately hastened and determined the inevitable surrender, could scarcely have been secured except under the stress of the frontal attack.

The next day, February 19, Lord Roberts arrived at Paardeberg, and with him the 7th Infantry Division. A reconnaissance, the following afternoon, satisfied him that a.s.sault would be attended by very heavy loss. He, therefore, ordered a bombardment, at a range of about 2,000 yards, by between forty-five and fifty guns. Of these, rather more than half were on the northern bank and in enfilading positions. The ground upon which this tremendous fire played was some two miles long by a half-mile wide. The character of the injury is best told by the report of an eye-witness of the conditions. "Nothing could be done but crouch in the trenches and wait till dusk prevented a further attack, while wagon after wagon in the laager caught fire and burned away into a heap of sc.r.a.p iron surrounded by wood ashes. The desolation produced was fearful, and it soon became impossible to make any reply. The losses inflicted upon the horses were the turning point of the siege. So enormous a proportion (estimated by some at 75 per cent.) of the horses, for which no protection could be made, were lost, that any dash for freedom by night was impossible and the condition of the laager rapidly became so foul, that that alone, apart from the want of food, would have compelled an early surrender. There was no opportunity of getting rid of the vast number of dead animals; burial was impossible, and the low state of the river prevented them from sending them down stream for several days; all they could do was to drag them to leeward of their camp. Meanwhile decomposition set in, and the absolute need of clean air caused a serious rebellion in the camp, most of the 4,000 men demanding that surrender should be made at once. When on Sunday, the 25th, the flood brought down past our lines an unending series of dead animals that cannot have been less than 1,500 or 2,000, the desperate straits of the enemy were apparent indeed."

This benumbing concentrated gun fire of February 20 was not repeated. The British Commander-in-Chief thenceforth satisfied himself with hemming in the enemy, under a steady pressure, the result of which could not be doubtful. A few days more or less were not to be counted against the husbanding of his soldiers' lives, in conditions also of comparative rest, favourable to a recuperation sorely needed by men and horses. The last arrived 7th Division entrenched itself on both sides of the river-a cheval, as the French phrase runs-to the eastward of and perpendicular to Cronje's lines, barring the way against attempts to break out towards Bloemfontein, and against the approach of aid from that quarter. The troops were further occupied by the Boer reinforcements, from Natal, and elsewhere, which began to cl.u.s.ter round the scene, seeking to help the beleaguered army. Several smart actions were fought, but all attempts at relief were vain.

The approach of Majuba Day-February 27-appears to have influenced both parties, hastening the issue. The Boers, huddled in the narrow and loathsome bed of the river, with senses sickened by the disgusting acc.u.mulations of filth and decay inevitable in the circ.u.mstances, clamoured for deliverance even at the cost of surrender. Cronje, obstinately bent to prolong to the utmost the chance of succour, is reported to have promised at last to surrender on the 28th, but by no means on the date ill.u.s.trated by a boasted Boer victory. On the other hand, it is said that Roberts was urged to effect the consummation on that day, in grateful expiation of the disaster that had ever since rankled in British remembrance. One of his brigadiers, Hector MacDonald, now lying wounded, had been present at the earlier humiliation, and recalled the date to the Commander-in-Chief. However it be, a plan was adopted which brought about the desired coincidence. Ever since the 18th, the detachment of which the Canadian Regiment formed part had held the position then gained on the north bank, on the enemy's west flank. There it occupied a trench, running 700 yards north from the river. In the early hours of February 27, long before daybreak, three companies of the Canadians, acting under specific orders, quitted the trench and moved towards the enemy, followed close at heel by fifty engineer troops. In their silent advance they approached to eighty yards of the Boer traverse trench before discovered. Then a heavy and continuous fire burst forth, lasting for fifteen minutes without intermission. The Canadians lying down replied, while the engineers close behind them dug, till a trench 100 yards long, and giving good cover, ran from the bank to the north. Into it, when finished, the Canadians retired.

The game was won. To quote Roberts' telegram, "At 3 A.M. to-day a most das.h.i.+ng advance made by the Canadian Regiment and some engineers, supported by the 1st Gordon Highlanders and 2nd Shrops.h.i.+res, resulted in our gaining a point some 600 yards nearer the enemy, and within eighty yards of his trenches. This apparently clinched matters." The new position, which pa.s.sed the power of the Boers to force, enfiladed securely their rifle-trenches along the river, and took in rear the advanced works to the north. At daylight of Majuba Day, Cronje sent Roberts a letter saying that he surrendered unconditionally.

Briefly summarized, this achievement of the British Army was the dislodgment of an inferior force from an extremely formidable position-at Magersfontein-at the least loss to the victors, by a secret and rapid flank march, followed by a swift pursuit, ending in the enforced surrender of a portion that sought escape in flight. Incidentally, Kimberley was relieved. Such effects, by such use of superior numbers, without which they cannot be accomplished, are always the object of war, which aims not at fighting, but at results. To estimate duly the operation, regard must be had to the impediments to movement, the overcoming of which gave success. The larger force, to compa.s.s its object, had to reach secretly and rapidly positions which interposed decisively between the inferior and its line of communications and retreat. To do this secretly, a large circuit must be made; that is, a road must be taken far beyond the enemy's ken, therefore much longer than that he himself would traverse to pa.s.s the same decisive points and thereby evade interception. The question is one of exterior and interior lines, and therefore of speed. Speed in a country without resources, and especially when opposed to an enemy notoriously mobile, means not only hard legging and much privation, but very high organisation of transport, to insure even a bare sufficiency of support.

By virtue of the interior line, notwithstanding the rapidity with which Roberts' men and horses moved, Cronje got past the decisive points; but for French he might have escaped. His success in this changed instantly the whole direction of the British operation. Trains directed upon one expectation had to be diverted elsewhere, which means not the mere turning round of waggons, but the reversal of a complicated machinery working at high pressure; perhaps rather the redistribution of parts in an engine while in actual operation. That the transport system under this extreme test stood the strain without dislocation, though with necessarily lessened output, is as creditable as the patient fort.i.tude of the hosts, who lacking full food and water, toiled uncomplainingly in pursuit, under the burning sun, not knowing but that after all their labour would be in vain.

The final, and successful, operations of Sir Redvers Buller for the relief of Ladysmith were almost exactly coincident, in beginning and in duration, with those of Lord Roberts which ended in the surrender of Cronje. There was even a certain close approach to synchronism in dates of the more conspicuous incidents in each.

On the 11th of February, when the departure of French began Roberts' turning movement, Buller's force was again a.s.sembled at Chieveley. The following day the direction of his next effort was indicated by the occupation of Hussar Hill, south of Hlangwane Hill, which it will be remembered lies near the Tugela, its crest about three-fourths of a mile east of the bend which the river makes just below Colenso, and after which it holds a northerly course for two or three miles before again running east.

This north and south stretch, as before said, divided the Boer military line of the Tugela. Since the battle of Colenso all their positions had been strengthened, especially the eastern portion south of the river, previously comparatively neglected; and continuous entrenchments now extended from Hlangwane east for three miles to a treeless height named Green Hill. East of this, again, and connected with it, is a range called Monte Cristo, which runs north-west to the Tugela. This district south of the river, and between it and the entrenchments just mentioned, is for the most part rugged and intricate, but less so than the region west of Colenso and north of the stream.

The occupation of Hussar Hill on February 12 was for reconnaissance only. The force was afterwards withdrawn. On the 14th the real movement began. Hussar Hill was again taken, and from that day the operations, though varying in activity, were continuous until the 18th, when, after two days of heavy fighting from hill to hill, the British succeeded in gaining possession of Green Hill, their ultimate object, upon the enemy's left flank. The Boers then evacuated Hlangwane, which was occupied on the 19th by the British. The positions of the Boers south of the Tugela and east of the bend had thus all fallen, weakening their left flank, at the same moment that Roberts, arriving at Paardeberg, found Cronje hemmed in the bed of the Modder.