Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt Part 16

Wright, etc.... At first we were all rather stiff.... However, Wright broke it up by asking Bright _a propos of boots_, who it was that caused the bombardment of Alexandria. Whereupon Bright broke in denouncing the war strongly and the injustice of keeping Arabi a prisoner in Ceylon. He also explained that Beauchamp Seymour had telegraphed to ask permission to bombard some time before but had been refused. At last it was Chamberlain who had insisted on his being allowed to do it....

Hartington, Bright said, had not urged it."

[21] The allusions to an expected Mohammedan rising in India, here and elsewhere quoted from my diary, seem now, in the light of events, somewhat exaggerated. They were, however, justified by the ideas prevalent at the time; and the dread of a general conflagration in the East is perhaps the best excuse that can be made for our Government's action in pressing on in July an immediate violent solution of its difficulty in Egypt.

CHAPTER XVI

THE CAMPAIGN OF TEL-EL-KEBIR

It now remains for me to give an account of the chief incidents of the brief campaign in which for two months native Egypt stood up in arms against her English enemy. No true description of it will be found in the works of any English writer, and still less are the French versions of the story true. The reign of terror, which under the protection of the English garrison for a year or more followed the re-establishment of the Khedive and the Turco-Circa.s.sian _regime_ at Cairo, effectually stopped the mouths of native Egyptians as to what had happened there during the Khedive's absence, and though a momentary light was shed on the facts by the publicity of Arabi's trial, no organ of the vernacular press was found bold enough to allude to them otherwise than according to the official version; while later, when under French protection the organs of native opinion had gained courage, time had been given for certain legends to grow up which still to a large extent influence the educated Egyptian mind.

The first point to make clear, for it is denaturalized in the Blue Books and has been ignored by all English writers, is the essentially National character of the defence offered by native Egypt to the English invasion. The official version, of course, is that it was the army alone that offered resistance to Seymour's impossible demands at the time of the bombardment, and afterwards to Wolseley's land invasion. This was merely a continuance of the diplomatic fiction which had been built up at the Foreign Office to excuse its determination to intervene in financial interests, and may be read in its most grotesque form of untruth in Lord Dufferin's opening speech to the European Conference at Constantinople. According to the English Amba.s.sador, Egypt--and this was before the bombardment--was in a state of anarchy, where neither life nor property was secure and where ma.s.sacres were taking place, through the action of the army headed by Arabi and other mutinous colonels, which was making it impossible to carry on the government or secure order and financial stability. How gross an exaggeration this statement of the political case was, and how it had been gradually put together on a basis of lies and inventions, I have already sufficiently shown. What needs still to be explained is the precise share of responsibility for the acceptance of Seymour's challenge to the artillery duel at Alexandria, which commenced the war, a.s.signable to Arabi, on whom the whole of it has been unjustly laid.[22]

That Arabi had been, from the date of the publication of the Joint Note of 6th January, a chief advocate of self-reliance and preparedness for war is undoubted, but at the same time he had always been for conciliation, if possible, rather than war. Resistance had always been his political platform, but on it he by no means stood alone, and the arrival of the fleets at Alexandria in May had immensely strengthened his position with all sections of civilian opinion. With the example of Tunis before Mohammedan eyes it was indeed impossible not to see what was being prepared for Egypt by the European Powers, the creation of a fict.i.tious condition of anarchy and rebellion which should justify intervention for the protection of the life and property of Europeans, the seizure by persuasion or constraint of the person of the ruler on the plea that he needed protection from his rebellious subjects, and the forced acceptance by him of a military protectorate. This had been effected by the French army in Tunis. It was to be repeated now exactly on the same lines by the English in Egypt. Egyptian patriotism, therefore, was not difficult to persuade that at last, with the dire alternative before them, it was a less ign.o.ble fate to yield after a defeat than at once, at the first summons.

Arabi's voice was an important element in the decision arrived at on the 10th of July to reject the admiral's demands, but it had no need of his insistence and still less of being imposed by menace. All the members of the general Council convened to consider the answer declared themselves equally of opinion that it was beyond the legal power of the Khedive to yield any portion of Egyptian territory to the demand of a foreign commander without striking a blow or at least without direct orders to that effect having been received from the Sultan. Nor was the Khedive himself of any other opinion. It included many representative men besides the members of the Government--and the spectacle was witnessed of all alike pressing the view that the forts must be defended, and of the Khedive taking a specially prominent part in the patriotic talk and being supported in it by Sultan's representative, Dervish Pasha. No Moslem present, not even Sultan Pasha, who had definitely thrown in his lot with the English, dared make the public declaration that another answer than refusal was possible to Seymour's demands.

Arabi, as the result of their unanimous decision, received from the Khedive precise orders as Minister of War and Marine to prepare the forts for action and to reply with their artillery as soon as the English fleet should have opened fire, while urgent instructions the same evening, of the 10th, were sent to the Under-Secretary of War at Cairo to proclaim throughout the provinces that war had been resolved on, and to hasten the calling in of the reserves and the formation of new battalions of recruits. It may be said that the Khedive was insincere in the warlike att.i.tude he adopted at the Council. Of course he was insincere. No public action of his life showed Tewfik otherwise than a double dealer. In all probability both he and Sultan Pasha, who had spoken in the same sense, had agreed to make this show of patriotism so as to cover themselves with public opinion in case it should so happen that the forts should prove stronger than the fleets, nor must it be forgotten that the Sultan's envoys were present at the Council, and the avowed policy of the English Government at the moment was still to get the Sultan to intervene. Tewfik, therefore, as usual was playing for the double chance, and was resolved clearly on one thing only, to side with the strongest party.

There is a curious despatch in the Blue Books which shows what he said to his English advisers. As early as the 6th of July he was made acquainted with Seymour's intention to bombard, and had apparently been urged to place himself for safety on board one of the English s.h.i.+ps. But this did not suit his personal fears or the waiting game he was resolved on, and he sent to Colvin to acquaint him with what his plan was in regard to his safety during the firing. He could not do otherwise--so we read--than remain in Egypt. He could not desert those who had stood by him faithfully in the crisis, or abandon Egypt _when attacked by a foreign Power_, merely, as it would be said, to secure his personal safety. He would, therefore, retire to a palace on the Mahmoudieh Ca.n.a.l with Dervish Pasha. And he remarked that the more rapidly the whole affair was conducted, the less would be the danger to himself personally. And this was the program he adhered to, except that he finally decided on retiring, not to the Mahmoudieh Palace, but to his country palace at Ramleh, eight miles farther from Alexandria, as a still safer place from the chance firing of Seymour's guns.

Shortly after the war I had a curious confirmation of Tewfik's indecision from no less authoritative a source than Lord Charles Beresford, who had commanded the Condor at the bombardment and had acted as Provost-Marshal in Alexandria after it, and who told me that in a moment of unusual frankness the Khedive had one day explained to him the reason of his remaining ash.o.r.e during the fight, as being nothing else than his extreme perplexity as to which of the combatants would prove the better fighter. The general belief in Egypt had been that the English s.h.i.+ps would be sunk, and he had been in a state of panic doubt all day at Ramleh, running every half hour to the roof of the palace to see how it fared with them. It was only when he discovered in the evening that they remained intact, while the forts had been silenced, that he finally made up his mind to place himself under Seymour's protection. Beresford's experience of the weeks he had then spent at Alexandria, I may explain, had given him a profound contempt of Tewfik, and a certain sympathy with Arabi and the fellahin who had carried on the war in spite of their prince's defection.

Be this, however, as it may, the conduct of the Khedive at the Council and the fact that he had given his name to the orders issued for a war _a outrance_ imposed a perfectly legal aspect on the subsequent National defence, and invalidated, according to all Mohammedan rule and practice, the Khedive's counter orders when he had pa.s.sed over to the enemy's side. This must be remembered if we are rightly to understand the Nationalists' legal case, and the view taken of the position by plain patriotic minds when their prince's perfidy gradually became known. The Mohammedan view about war is a simple one. When blows have been struck and war publicly announced by the Chief of the State, it is his duty and the duty of all his people to continue it until some definite victory has been achieved or reverse sustained. A prince made captive during the war by the enemy is by the fact incapacitated from giving any further valid orders, and _a fortiori_ a prince who has turned traitor; and it was in this light that Tewfik was considered by his subjects until brought back by the force of English arms as their restored, but unloved lord to Cairo. Nothing of this aspect of the case will, of course, be found in any English narrative, but, in place of it, absurd laudations of a prince to be admired as "loyal" for the sole illogical reason that he showed himself loyal to England and served her through the war as her unashamed accomplice. But I will return to these matters later.

A second point which it is necessary should be insisted on is the proper apportionment of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order throughout Egypt, and for the strategical conduct of the war, between Arabi and the other Nationalist leaders who worked with him during those eventful two months. The facts as I have been able to ascertain them are these. With regard to the government of the country, as soon as it was clearly demonstrated at Cairo that the Khedive could be no longer looked upon as Chief of the State, exercising freely his right of issuing orders, a General Council was a.s.sembled to consider the position of affairs and decide what should be done. In this the lead was taken by the religious and other civilian dignitaries, rather than by the military element. Arabi was not himself present at the general meeting, being absent with the army at Kafr Dawar, nor did he once during the war pay any visit to Cairo or intervene personally in the management of affairs there. The Council, however, was very fully attended, there being present, besides the great religious sheykhs, the Turkish Grand Cadi, the Grand Mufti, the Sheykh el Islam, and the heads of the four orthodox sects. All the most representative Moslems of the country were there, including four princes of the Viceregal House who had openly espoused the National cause, many of the provincial Governors who had been expressly summoned to Cairo for the occasion, and the chief country Notables, and also, representing the non-Mussulman population, the Patriarch of the Copts and the Chief Rabbi. The Council was, therefore, fully ent.i.tled to any claim of validity in its decisions which universality can give, for it comprised all sections of political opinion and cla.s.s divergency. Many of the chief men were of Circa.s.sian origin, but endowed with sufficient patriotism as Moslems to see that, now it had come to fighting against a European invader, no honest choice was left but to defend Egypt against him irrespective of party feuds.

It was, accordingly, resolved by the Council, without a dissentient voice, that the Khedive was no longer in a position legally to command, and that his decrees, while he remained in English hands, were from that very fact invalid. Tewfik's first announcement of his new att.i.tude had been to dismiss Arabi from his post of Minister of War. The Council resolved that Arabi should be maintained in it, and instructed him as such to continue the defence of the country. A permanent Council, or rather it should perhaps be called "Committee of Defence," was named to a.s.sist him in his work, and this under the able presidency of Yakub Pasha Sami, the Under-Secretary for War, continued throughout the campaign to organize the details of recruitment, provisioning and the supply of military material. Similarly, with regard to the civil administration of the country it was resolved that in the absence of Ragheb and the other Ministers at Alexandria--for these had been detained more or less under compulsion by the Khedive and his English guard--the business of government should be carried on by the separate departments without any change in the ordinary routine, nor did this lead to the smallest confusion, seeing that the Ragheb Ministry had never been a working one. Indeed, the Administration gained considerable in efficiency, and it may safely be said that no Egyptian Government was ever better managed in its details than was the National one during the campaign. The Ministry of the Interior fell to the charge of the Under-Secretary, Ibrahim Bey Fawsi, and the police, in its most important section, to Ismal Eff. Jawdat, both very able administrators, who, in spite of the excitement of the time, succeeded in maintaining perfect order throughout the country. Two or three Circa.s.sian Mudirs, who had sought to ingratiate themselves with Tewfik by imitating Omar Lutfi and inciting to disturbance, were by them arrested and detained in prison to the end of the war, and after this no further rioting occurred. Such Europeans as remained at Cairo were carefully protected, and all who wished to leave were forwarded under police escort to Port Sad.

Nothing could have been more untrue than Lord Dufferin's repeated a.s.sertions at the Conference at Constantinople that ma.s.sacres of Christians were occurring daily in Egypt. And so, too, with the other departments. There was no interruption in the regular gathering in of the taxes, or in the regular distribution of civil expenditure. At the end of the war the Treasury showed a perfectly clean balance, without the smallest deficit, when its coffers were delivered over to the Khedive's officers after Tel-el-Kebir. No smallest sum had been extracted and the books were in their usual order. The ordinary course of justice had been regularly maintained, and there was no visible sign of the country having pa.s.sed through any unusual crisis. Four months'

provision for the army remained in the magazines of the War Office when Wolseley took possession of them.

As to Arabi, his position continued to be essentially a political one, and it was as Minister of War that he worked with the supreme direction of the forces and as popular leader till Wolseley's advance on Tel-el-Kebir hurried him suddenly from the scene. His great prestige with the country sheykhs and the fellahin of the Delta made it easy for him to inspire these with enthusiasm for the war, and at his pleading supplies flowed in gratuitously from all sides, and also volunteers for the army. In this respect he proved himself of great service to the national defence, and he was probably well advised in making no attempt from first to last to take any personal part in handling troops in the field. His abstention on this head has been attributed by his detractors to physical cowardice, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there was some truth in this. Arabi was too pure and unadulterated a fellah to have any of the strong fighting instincts which are found in some races but are conspicuously absent in his own. His courage was of another kind than that which prompts to daring action in war, and in spite of his soldier's training he had never been present at any actual battle. He was probably conscious of his deficiency on this head as he certainly was of his complete lack of all the higher scientific knowledge which modern warfare requires. He was absolutely without military education of a modern type, or experience beyond that of the common barrack-yard routine, and he would, I imagine, have been quite unable to manoeuvre a division had he been called upon to do so even on parade. The true explanation, however, of his personal inaction, I think, is that Arabi, being for the moment practically Head of the State, was not expected to lead the army in person. This does not, however, excuse him altogether in my eyes, nor has it excused him in those of his fellow countrymen who rightly blame him for not having personally crossed swords with the enemy, at least in the last days of the campaign.

With regard to the actual military operations I do not profess to have full knowledge, but nevertheless will venture a short account of them as I have been able to obtain them from Egyptian, and not English, sources.

My admirable correspondent, Sabunji, had unfortunately left Egypt with the other fugitives just before the bombardment, and I remained without knowledge of what was pa.s.sing in the country till the end of the war.

Nor do the doc.u.ments of the trial throw much light on this. What I have been able to learn has been gathered piecemeal in after years from those who took part in them, and accounts of this kind are never very accurate as to dates or figures. The only European present with the army was that excellent Swiss patriot and friend to Egyptian freedom, John Ninet, who was in a position to know much of what went on, as he spent the first month of the war with Arabi at Kafr Dawar, helping him with his foreign correspondence; and with Ninet I have had many talks. But his enthusiastic character injures him as a quiet safe historical witness, and the book he published in 1884 is so carelessly written and so controversial in its style that it is impossible for one to have full confidence in regard to the details he records. Moreover, Ninet had ceased to be at headquarters before the real campaign began, having remained on at Kafr Dawar when these were transferred to Tel-el-Kebir.

Such knowledge as I have of the war I will nevertheless briefly give.

On the day of the bombardment the Egyptian artillerymen fought well, and for a far greater number of hours than either Sir Beauchamp Seymour or any of his officers had thought possible. They were, however, at a terrible disadvantage through the antiquated character of the forts they were called upon to defend. These dated from the reign of Mohammed Ali and were faced as the fas.h.i.+on had then been with stone, a most dangerous material for their defenders when exposed to modern sh.e.l.l fire, as the stone work splinters and so increases the explosive effect of the hostile missiles. The defect had not been foreseen even by so able an engineer as was Mahmud Fehmi, and the loss among the defenders was great. The total Egyptian garrison of Alexandria is given in the Blue Books as from 8,500 to 9,500 men, and this figure corresponds fairly well with native accounts, while a thousand has been named as the number of the killed and wounded. If the figures are anything near correctness the proportion is a very large one. The honour of the garrison was in any case amply saved, and was the beginning of a reaction of opinion against the war in England which in the following weeks became more and more p.r.o.nounced. Arabi's part in the defence was as on subsequent occasions not a prominent one. He remained during the day at the Ministry of Marine which is not far from Ras-el-Tin and so within the range of the enemy's fire, but he made no personal inspection of the defences until the bombardment was over, and contented himself with being at hand to receive the news of the fight and give the necessary orders. In the evening he went to Ramleh to announce the result to the Khedive, where Tewfik, to hide his satisfaction, made a fool's quarrel with him because he had not brought with him a detailed report of the day's fight _in writing_.

It is difficult to understand that Arabi should not have seen which way the Khedive's mind was already set. In all probability he did so, and the danger there was of treachery, for in the morning he sent a strong guard nominally for the Khedive's protection, but really to keep him under surveillance, with a message informing him that as Seymour threatened a renewal of the bombardment he should have to withdraw the garrison, and inviting him to retire with them beyond range of the English guns and so to Cairo. Arabi without doubt ought to have gone himself a second time to see that the invitation was not on any pretext evaded and have carried Tewfik, if necessary, by force as a prisoner away with him, for the example of the Bey of Tunis was before him, and he had sufficient experience of the Khedive's craft to make it impossible to trust anything to his honour. Arabi's negligence in this matter was a fatal error. Arabi was, however, apparently too occupied that morning in arranging the military evacuation to give the time necessary for another visit to Ramleh, and in the course of the afternoon, by dint, according to Tewfik's account to his English friends, of _baks.h.i.+sh_ and a liberal distribution of orders, he managed to slip away from his guards to Alexandria in the train sent to convey him to Cairo, and there placed himself, without any more disguise, under Seymour's protection. He carried away with him, too, as all were in the same train, both Dervish and his Ministers, and so secured them as in some measure partners of his treachery. Once at Ras-el-Tin with a guard of seventy English bluejackets the whole party were practically prisoners. Dervish, five days later, having a swift steam yacht of his own, and having received peremptory orders from Constantinople, put an end to the disgrace for himself of the situation, and managed to evade the English fleet which tried to stop him. But Ragheb and his fellow Ministers, hopelessly compromised, ended by accepting the situation and remained on at Ras-el-Tin as Tewfik's servants till such time as having served their purpose as a simulacre of legal government, they had to make room for a stronger and more decidedly English administration.

Arabi, in the meanwhile, ignorant how he had been befooled, was wholly engrossed in the business of withdrawing the troops from their position of danger, and taking up a new and better line of defence at Kafr Dawar.

The choice of this very strong post upon the Cairo railway, lying as it does flanked by the shallow lake of Mariut and a series of marshes, was due, I believe, to Mahmud Fehmi's engineering skill, and Arabi could not have done better than he did by adopting it as the site of his new camp.

It lay well beyond the reach of Seymour's guns, and could not be approached by a hostile army, except along the narrow causeway of the railway line, and so was practically impregnable from the side of Alexandria, while on the land side all the Delta lay open to the troops, with its inexhaustible supplies and free communication with Cairo. Here the Egyptian army was able to hold its own against the English successfully for nearly five weeks, repulsing all attacks, and even hara.s.sing the enemy with counter attacks almost to the gates of Alexandria. Had there been no other gate of entry into Egypt than Kafr Dawar the National game would have been won.

With regard to the burning of Alexandria I have never been able to make up my mind exactly what part, if any, the Egyptian army took in it.

Arabi has always persistently denied having ordered it, and an act of such great energy stands so completely at variance with the rest of his all too supine conduct of the war that I think it may be fairly dismissed as improbable. At the same time it is equally clear that he could not but regard it as a fortunate circ.u.mstance, for without it it is very doubtful whether he could have made good his retreat to Kafr Dawar. His army was a beaten army, and though not exactly demoralized might easily have become so, had even a very small force been landed from the fleet to hold the railway line and bar their retreat. It certainly was in the English plan to entrap the army if possible, and only the unexpected valour of the defence, and perhaps the _ruse_ of the white flag seems to have prevented some attempt at a landing with this purpose from being made by Seymour. As it was, the burning of Alexandria made it possible for Arabi to establish himself quietly at Kafr Dawar and gain those few days' breathing time needed by his army to recover completely its _morale_.

Ninet, who was present at the whole affair, attributes the conflagration primarily to Seymour's sh.e.l.ls, and this is probably a correct account, for without it it would be difficult to account for the panic which on the 12th of July, made the whole population of Alexandria abandon their homes and fly from the city. Had the artillery attack been restricted, as was pretended, to the forts this hardly would have been the case, and it is quite certain that it was not so restricted. Whether by intention or by mistake the city received its share of the sh.e.l.l fire, and Ninet speaks as an eyewitness in regard to its destructive effect. At the same time it is equally certain that the conflagration was increased, and especially in the European quarter, with purpose and intention, and that this was the work to some extent of the rearguard of the army, which left Alexandria in a state of disorder and shared in the plunder, already begun by the Bedouins of the city. Nor is it less certain that Suliman Pasha Sami, who commanded the rearguard, was called to account in no way by Arabi for what his men had done. I do not consider the question of any great importance as affecting the moral aspect of the case, it being clearly a military measure which any commander would be justified in adopting, thus to cover his retreat and make useless, as far as in him lay, the enemy's base of operations on sh.o.r.e.

Historically, however, it is of importance, and I therefore say that on a balance of evidence I am of opinion that the retreating army had its share in it, not in consequence of any order, but as an act of disorder.

As there was a strong wind blowing at the time, the conflagration soon spread, and by midnight the whole city was in a blaze. The fact, however, in no way lessens the prime responsibility of our Government for the destruction, every detail of which, but for the gross miscalculation of our agents, might have been easily foreseen and ought certainly to have been provided for.

Once established at Kafr Dawar, which was occupied on the 13th, the Egyptian army was in clover and could wait events. Arabi established his headquarters at Genjis Osman, one station farther on in the direction of Cairo, and Mahmud Fehmi laid out the lines of defence, and all worked heartily and confidence was restored. The ma.s.s of the Alexandrian fugitives were gradually despatched by train to the interior, where for awhile they gave great trouble, being in a state of fanatical anger and despair, and ready to revenge their troubles on any European or native Christian who might cross their path. At Tantah especially, where the Circa.s.sian Mudir, Ibrahim Adhem, was an adherent of the Khedive, and who knew that disturbances between Mohammedans and Christians had been looked on favourably by the Court, something which was almost a ma.s.sacre occurred, and but for the timely intervention of the great local magnate and friend of Arabi's, Ahmed Bey Minshawi, who put it down in spite of the Governor with a band of his fellah adherents, the disorder might have spread to other places. But the Mudir was summarily arrested and sent a prisoner to Cairo, as were two other Mudirs equally untrustworthy, and the trouble ended, nor was internal peace again disturbed during the whole of the war.

On the evening of the 14th, a first communication reached Arabi from the Khedive, the text of which is given by Ninet, but which will not be found in the Blue Books. It is a valuable doc.u.ment, dictated evidently by Colvin or some other of Tewfik's English advisers, as it is based in every phrase on the English official view of the situation. It begins by stating the cause of the quarrel, that the bombardment was the simple consequence of a refusal to comply with the English admiral's demand for the dismantling of the forts, and that he, the admiral, had no intention of imposing a state of war on Egypt, that he now wished to renew friendly relations with the country, and was ready to hand back the city to any Egyptian army which should be disciplined and obedient, and in default of such to Ottoman troops. In order to make the necessary arrangements for their transfer, the Khedive invites his Minister of War to return at once to Ras-el-Tin, there to confer with Ragheb Pasha and the rest of his colleagues, and in the meanwhile to suspend all warlike preparations, now become useless. We know from the Blue Books that this friendly invitation to Arabi was merely a trap to lure him back into English reach, and so secure his person, for on the 15th Cartwright telegraphs to Granville, "The Khedive has summoned him [Arabi] here. If he comes he will be arrested, if not, declared an outlaw." The incident shows how entirely Tewfik had already made himself the unresisting mouthpiece of English policy, and how entirely the English Government had adopted as its own the treacherous methods of the Ottoman Government in dealing with "rebels." Arabi's answer was to remind the Khedive that it was His Highness himself and Dervish Pasha who had urged that the admiral's demands should be rejected and that his menaces, if followed by acts, should be answered with war; that as a matter of fact a state of war existed, and that until the British fleet should have left Alexandria it was impossible that the army could return to the city. The refusal was followed a few days later by the receipt, at Kafr Dawar, of a number of printed proclamations bearing the Khedive's signature, in which it was announced to the various Mudirs, Notables, and others whom it might concern, that Arabi, having refused to obey the Khedive's order to go to Alexandria and confer with him, he was deprived of his functions as Minister of War. It was the publication of these three doc.u.ments at Cairo, whither Arabi forwarded them, that led to the summoning of the Great National Council already described, with the result we have seen.

The month that followed was one full of hope and enthusiasm for the Egyptians. Relieved by his strange defection to the enemy from all doubt as to their allegiance to the Khedive, the citizens and country Notables were able to display their patriotism without disguise, and the whole country was aware that it was a war now in which, as Moslems, they were concerned no less than a war for liberty. With the ma.s.s of the fellahin so deeply in debt, it was understood besides as a war against their Greek creditors, and there is no doubt that this was the chief motive power that sent volunteers to the standard, and that unloosed the purse strings of the Notables. A very few days proved that in establis.h.i.+ng the army at Kafr Dawar a wise choice had been made, for the English, under General Alison who had landed with several thousand men, though often attacking it, were always repulsed, and it was fondly hoped that the resistance might thus be indefinitely prolonged.

At Genjis Osman, Arabi, now the chief personage in the state, though still holding rank only as War Minister, held daily a kind of court, to which the provincial magnates, the Cairo Ulema, and the great merchants thronged. A huge tent, formerly belonging to the Viceroy Sad, received them, Sad's widow having presented it to her husband's once A. D. C. as a national offering, while Nazli Hanum and others of the princely ladies showed also their enthusiasm by gifts to the hero of the day.[23] It cannot be denied that Arabi's head was somewhat turned by these flatteries, and that they were the occasion of military jealousies which proved detrimental to the cause when soon after the pinch came. If Arabi should succeed in repelling the English attack to the point of their having to come to terms with him, it was felt that he would remain master of Egypt; and officers far better educated than himself, and with a better knowledge of the art of war, and who knew Arabi for what he was--a very poor soldier--felt aggrieved at the thought of his future fortunes and his present pre-eminence. Arabi himself was doubtless quite unaware of this, and in his dreamy way followed where fortune led him, and with an ever-growing superst.i.tious belief in his high destiny and his providential mission as saviour of his people. His religious tastes led him to surround himself especially with holy men, and much of the time which he should have given to the secular duty of organizing the defence was wasted with them in chaunts and recitations. This seems to have been continued by him to the very end. What his ultimate military plan was it is difficult to determine. According to Ninet his calculation was that if he could prolong the resistance for a few months, Europe would be obliged to come to terms with him. The Conference was sitting at Constantinople, and the Sultan was being urged on all sides to intervene, and the worst that could happen was that Ottoman troops would be landed, who were as likely as not to fraternize with his own. He knew himself to be regarded throughout the Mohammedan world as the champion of Islam, for the pilgrims just returning from Mecca had brought the news, and it would be difficult for the Sultan to take real part with England against him. He had, too, a remnant of his trust in Gladstone, and of the traditional belief in Englishmen's sympathy with liberty, which he believed might still prevail if only the truth could be brought home to them by the spectacle of Egyptian patriotism--dreams, of course, and most delusive ones, but shared in by many others, and not altogether inexcusable, considering the events of the past six months.

Nevertheless, on the 16th August, Wolseley, with the first instalments of the British land expedition, disembarked at Alexandria, and, as it was not to be supposed that he would confine himself to the thankless task of bombarding the impregnable lines of Kafr Dawar, it became urgent with the military committee sitting at Cairo to decide on providing new lines of defence on the far more easily a.s.sailable side of the Suez Ca.n.a.l. An Eastern army under Ali Fehmi was consequently got together at Cairo, which occupied the Ca.n.a.l in force; and the lines of Tel-el-Kebir, which, in spite of the warning I had sent through Sheykh Mohammed Abdu in April, had never been more than traced, began to be dug in earnest.

It became also a question of imminent importance to block the Suez Ca.n.a.l towards its northern extremity, lest British s.h.i.+ps should be beforehand with the defence and should land at Ismalia. The opinion was unanimous among the military chiefs that this was a strategic necessity, and that at any cost of quarrel with the French Ca.n.a.l authorities it should be done. Arabi, however--and this was his second great mistake--could not make up his mind to the act. His hesitation was due to French influence.

M. de Lesseps had arrived at Alexandria towards the end of July and, having learned something of the English design of using the Ca.n.a.l for an attack on Egypt, became alarmed for its safety, and he had gone on to Port Sad and set himself to work to prevent, as far as in him lay, this design by appealing to Arabi's sense of honour. De Lesseps was a man of great self-confidence, and believed himself able, by the mere fact of his presence, to intimidate our Government, and represented that the Ca.n.a.l was neutral ground and excluded from the operations of belligerents. After the war, when I was carrying on the defence of Arabi, I wrote to M. de Lesseps to obtain from him what evidence he might be able to give in the prisoner's favour as a humanitarian and friend of progress, and he placed in my possession copies of the letters he had received from Arabi in relation to this matter, though not of those he had himself written.[24] From this it is clear how Arabi was misled.

After some preliminary correspondence, we find Arabi on the 4th of August giving his decision plainly. Several English men-of-war, under the command of Admiral Hewett, were in the Ca.n.a.l between Ismalia and Suez, and Lesseps had written to complain that they were giving orders and issuing proclamations to the inhabitants on sh.o.r.e. Their right to do this Arabi repudiates, saying, that it is by direction of the Council that he sends him the answer, and adds, apparently in reply to some further appeal made to him personally by Lesseps, to respect the Ca.n.a.l's neutrality: "As I scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Ca.n.a.l, especially in consideration of its being so remarkable a work, and one in connection with which your Excellency's name will live in history, I have the honour to inform you that the Egyptian Government will not violate that neutrality, except at the last extremity, and only in the case of the English having committed some act of hostility at Ismalia, Port Sad, or some other point of the Ca.n.a.l." Here the principle is clearly and well laid down, but the weak point of it is to be perceived in its leaving to the enemy to commit the first act of hostility instead of forestalling and preventing him.

Nevertheless we have Ninet's a.s.surance, which has been confirmed to me from other quarters, that every preparation was made secretly for the blocking of the Ca.n.a.l at a certain point between Ismalia and Port Sad, and that it was only due to Arabi's extreme personal unwillingness to sign the final order that, in opposition to the opinion of all his colleagues in the Council, the hour of grace was allowed to slip by.

Lesseps, on the arrival of the British fleet at Port Sad conveying Wolseley and the army, had sent Arabi a last bombastical telegram, which Ninet quotes as follows: "Ne faites aucune tentative pour intercepter mon Ca.n.a.l. Je suis la. Ne craignez rien de ce cote. Il ne se debarquera pas un seul soldat anglais sans etre accompagne d'un soldat francais. Je reponds de tout." This occasioned a final council of war at Kafr Dawar on the 20th at which all but Arabi were resolved to disregard Lesseps' message. Arabi, however, suffered himself to be deceived still by the boast about the French troops, and argued against it, and though orders were given that evening for the "temporary" destruction of the Ca.n.a.l, the delay caused by the discussion had already been fatal, and Wolseley had steamed through the Ca.n.a.l before they had been executed.

Arabi's weakness in this matter is a most serious blot on his strategic fame, and stamps him also with political inefficiency. Wolseley alluding, long after, to it in a speech made by him in connection with the proposed Channel Tunnel between England and France, said: "If Arabi had blocked the Ca.n.a.l, as he intended to do, we should be still at the present moment on the high seas blockading Egypt. Twenty-four hours delay saved us."

The date of Wolseley's occupation of Ismalia was the 21st of August, and from this point the defence of Egypt entered into a new and practically hopeless phase, though the campaign was not so wholly a walk over for the English as has been pretended. The British army was over 30,000 strong, and though probably of no great fighting value had it been opposed to European troops, was sufficient to deal with the scanty forces at Arabi's command. The whole strength at Kafr Dawar had never been more than 8,000 regulars, with 80 Krupp guns, nor in all Egypt could it be counted at more than 13,000 disciplined men, while the new levies got together within a month were unfit as yet for any service except that of manual labour at the trenches. Wolseley, therefore, had a comparatively easy job before him when once he found himself ash.o.r.e with no obstacle between him and Cairo, except the unfinished lines of Tel-el-Kebir. The English intelligence department had, however, to make a.s.surance doubly sure, already taken secret measures for success of a kind which is always employed in modern warfare but never avowed, and which it is right that I should here put on record, having by a curious accident the details of the most important of them in my possession.

That Wolseley's advance was helped by bribery has always been indignantly denied by English writers, but it is time the truth should be authoritatively told.

The attack on Egypt from the side of the Suez Ca.n.a.l had been resolved on by our War Office and Admiralty early in the year, and it was determined about the middle of June to prepare the way betimes by a large operation of bribery, especially among the Eastern Bedouins. The credit of the particular _modus operandi_ belongs personally to Lord Northbrook, who, as I heard at the time of its first supposed success from Gregory, took a special pride in it, and the more so because it was based upon a hint I had originally thrown out, with no thought when I did so that it might be ever seriously acted upon or used against any who were to be my friends. It will be remembered that in the spring of 1881 I had travelled through the desert east of the Ca.n.a.l, and had interested myself in certain unfortunate Sheykhs of the Teyyaha and Terrabin tribes held in captivity at Jerusalem, and that in order to persuade our Emba.s.sy at Constantinople to solicit their release I had represented that it might one day be found of importance to have these Bedouins friendly to England. Lord Northbrook had heard of this, and, now that I was in such disfavour with the Government, thought it would be amusing to "hoist me with my own petard," and by using my name in addition to more solid inducements to get the help of these Arabs against Arabi.

At that time hardly any Englishman could speak a word of Arabic, and it was difficult to discover an emissary capable and willing to undertake the job. Northbrook consequently called into his counsels the then professor of Oriental languages at Cambridge, Edward Palmer, a distinguished Arabic scholar, who also had some personal acquaintance with the district intended to be operated in, as he had been connected at one time with the Palestine Exploration Society. Palmer was then living in London, an impecunious man, making a poor living by journalism, and weighted in his struggle for life by a recent marriage.

When, therefore, on the 24th of June he received an invitation, through Captain Gill, R. E., of the Intelligence Department, to breakfast the next morning with Lord Northbrook at the Admiralty, and was met there with an offer from Lord Northbrook that he should undertake the task, represented to him as an honourable and patriotic one, of ascertaining the bribable character of the Bedouins east of the Ca.n.a.l, and securing their services for the British Army, and with it the further offer of 500 down for preliminary expenses, and promises of large pecuniary reward in case of success, poor Palmer did not hesitate and agreed to start at once. Just before his departure, however, on the 26th, he called on me, representing himself to be on his way to Alexandria, where he had been appointed correspondent of the "Standard" newspaper, and asking introductions to my Nationalist friends there for whom he felt, he said, a strong sympathy and would favour in his writings. This, of course, was a cover to his real business, as to which he was silent, and inclined me to granting his request, and, though I did not trust his countenance, which was far from sincere, I gave him introductions to Sabunji and one or two others, though not, I think, to Arabi.

Palmer's true programme traced out for him at the Admiralty was to go first to Alexandria, where he was to discuss his plans with Admiral Seymour, and then without delay to proceed to Jaffa where he should a.s.sume an Eastern disguise and visit the desert south and west of Gaza, and put himself into communication with precisely those Teyyaha and Terrabin tribes whose interests I had espoused eighteen months before.

His journals, portions of which have been published, are on this point very instructive. In them the details of his arrangement with Lord Northbrook are constantly alluded to. He describes going on board Admiral Seymour's yacht at Alexandria, where he was told to proceed at once to the desert and begin work, the Admiral giving him "a revolver, a rifle, and plenty of cartridges," and where he finds it "expected there will be war at once, and perhaps it may begin tomorrow." "I am glad," he says, "there is really to be fighting, because, though I shall be a long way off, I shall be able to get a great deal of good out of it and do something towards winning it for our side...." The Admiral said to me he "congratulated the country on finding so able a man to undertake such a difficult task." Palmer also sees "Sir Sidney Auckland [_sic_] the political agent"; and we learn later in the journal that the Admiral told him Alexandria was to be bombarded soon. Then he goes, much elated, in the Admiral's steam launch, on board the steamer for Jaffa, with the British flag flying, and "two sailors to carry the gun and revolver."

At Jaffa he lodges with the British Consul, the Jew Shapira, who sends his son down to Gaza to help his preparations for the desert journey and find an Arab to go with him, and he buys himself Arab dress and other things he may require. He laments the heat and the difficulty of his mission, but consoles himself with dreams of rich rewards and possible honours. On the 15th, just before leaving for the desert, he hears secretly of the bombardment, and decides to go through to Suez where he writes for a s.h.i.+p's boat to take him off at a safe place.

On the 16th he sees a number of the Terrabin tribe: "They were very curious to know who I was and what I wanted. My man said I was a Syrian officer on the way to Egypt. Of course I am dressed in full costume like a Mohammedan Arab of the towns. I found out more about them than they did about me. I now know where to find and get at every Sheykh in the desert, and I have already got the Teyyaha, the most warlike and strongest of them all, ready to do anything for me. When I come back I shall be able to raise 40,000 men. It was very lucky that I knew such an influential tribe.... I get on capitally with my mission, and am longing to get instructions from Suez and know if our troops have landed. I did not expect to find out as much as I have done this first trip. I think our fortune will be made." On the 18th "I had an exciting time, having met the great Sheykh of the Arabs hereabouts. I, however, quite got him to accept my views."

And again, 19th July, "It is wonderful how I get on with them. I have got hold of some of the very men Arabi Pasha has been trying in vain to get over to his side, and when they are wanted I can have every Bedawi at my call from Suez to Gaza.... Of course I know nothing of what has been done in Egypt since I left, except that Alexandria was bombarded as the Admiral told me it would be soon. But I hear from the Arabs that the Egyptian military party are still in arms, so I suppose our troops must have landed by now." On the 20th "The Sheykh, who is the brother of Suliman, is the one who engages all the Arabs not to attack the caravan of pilgrims which goes to Mecca every year from Egypt, so that he is the _very man_ I wanted. He has sworn by the most solemn Arab oath that, if I want him to, he will guarantee the safety of the Ca.n.a.l even against Arabi Pasha, and he says that if I can get three Sheykhs out of prison, which I hope to do through Constantinople and our Amba.s.sador, all the Arabs will rise and join me like one man."

On the 21st, "I am anxious to get to Suez, because I have done all I wanted by way of preliminaries, and as soon as I can get precise instructions I can settle with the Arabs in a fortnight or three weeks and get the whole thing over. As it is, the Bedouins will keep quite quiet and will not join Arabi, but will wait for me to give them the word what they are to do. They look upon Abdallah Effendi, which is what they call me, as a very grand personage indeed!" On the 22nd, "I hear from a Bedouin, who has just come on from Egypt, that Arabi Pasha has got 2,000 hors.e.m.e.n from the Nile Bedouins and brought them to the Ca.n.a.l.

But when they get to Suez they will soon go back, for my men know them, and if fair means won't do I shall send 10,000 of the Teyyaha and Terrabin fighting men to drive them back. I have got the man who supplies the pilgrims with camels on my side, too, and as I have promised my big Sheykh 500 for himself, he will do anything for me. I am very glad that the war has actually come to a crisis because now I shall really have to do my big task, and _I am certain of success_. I shall know almost directly what I am to get. Lord Northbrook told me I was to have the 500 for this first trip, and that as soon as I began negotiations with the Arabs they would enter on a fresh arrangement with me. I shall save at least 280 out of this, which is not a bad month's work!... I don't think they can give me less than 2,000 or 3,000 for the whole job...." And again on the 26th, "I find it is possible to get to the s.h.i.+ps near Suez, and I start to-morrow, and hope to be on board in four or five days. I have been so successful that I shall write for more money, saying I have been obliged to spend all mine on presents--a few hundred pounds is a great deal to us and nothing to the Government, who would, I know, have given thousands for what I have already done--of course I shall make the most of the difficulties and they have been really great. I will send you a hundred or so as soon as I get the chance from Suez.... I have had to give away a great deal, but have still nearly 300 left after paying my journey to Suez! That is better than newspaper work, 300 in a month!" "I have had a great ceremony to-day, eating bread and salt with the Sheykhs in token of protecting each other to the death!" On the 28th, "I have got the great Sheykh of the Haiwath Arabs with me now, and get on capitally with him. In fact I have been most wonderfully successful throughout. I have been sitting out in the moonlight repeating Arabic poetry to the old man till I have quite won his heart."

At last Palmer reaches Suez, August 1. "I am safe on board the P. and O.

boat," he writes, "and have got your letter. I got here by going to a part of the coast above Suez, and got on board at midnight. It cost me a lot of money, nearly 10, but I escaped the Egyptian sentries. The troops are coming on Thursday, and this is Tuesday!... I have just seen the Admiral. He is delighted with the result of my work and has telegraphed to Lord Northbrook. He had three boat crews watching the coast for me, but I got here by myself." August 2, "I am off again to the desert for a short trip in about two days. I have been asked to go to the coast and cut the telegraph wires and burn the poles on the desert line so as to cut off Arabi's communications with Turkey! Captain Gill arrived at Port Said yesterday and will be here this morning.

Yesterday I had a most interesting day. I called on the captains of all the men-of-war and met with a most pleasant reception. They all insisted upon my drinking iced champagne with them, and in the evening the Admiral gave a dinner party on board the flags.h.i.+p in my honour. It was a beautiful dinner and I did not get back to my s.h.i.+p until one this morning." August 4, "On Monday I was ordered to accompany the commanding officer and take Suez. We landed with three guns and 500 men. The Egyptian soldiers ran away, so we had no fighting to do. I was in the first boat which landed. We then made the Governor give us up the town and 50,000 which he had, and we took possession. The day before yesterday Lord Northbrook telegraphed to the Admiral to congratulate me on my safe arrival, and informing me that I was appointed 'Interpreter in Chief to Her Majesty's Forces in Egypt,' and placed on the Admiral's Staff. I am here [Suez] in great state at the hotel at Government expense, and have all my meals with the Admiral. I am going up to Ismalia the day after to-morrow on a gunboat, and the Admiral here said, 'Don't let the other Admiral keep you--you are on the books of the "Euryalus," his flags.h.i.+p.' I have got a staff of about forty men working under me. The Admiral told me the other night that I was sure of the Egyptian medal and the 'Star of India.' They won't let me go to the desert, for the present at least, as they want me here.... I am one of the Chief Officers of the Expedition and an awful swell. The 72nd regiment are coming to-morrow and I have got to see about camels for them.... The pay is to be what I suggest, but I haven't settled it yet."

And then suddenly the splendid climax, "Captain Gill has just come, and placed twenty thousand pounds at my disposal for the Arabs."