The Day of Sir Wilfrid Laurier Part 12

As regards the Empire, to secure full unity by allowing the greatest diversity and the fullest liberty of self-government in all its parts.

As regards property, to make it secure by divesting it from injustice.

As regards political authority, to make it stable by resting it on the broadest possible basis of popular responsibility.

As regards religion, to remove it from the odium of alliance with political disabilities.

As regards trade, to make it world-wide by opening our own markets here at home to everybody.

And, finally, as regards the liberty of the individual citizen, to make it a reality instead of a sham, by universal education and by an ever-rising standard of humane conditions both in the factory and the home.

We have now to review briefly the discussions which went on during these years in {283} respect to the political relations of the different states of the Empire. Broadly speaking, two schools or tendencies existed. One favoured the retention of the powers of self-government already acquired by the Dominions and the taking up of still further duties, while at the same time aiming at full co-operation and harmony in matters of essential common interest. The other, declaring that the tendency towards self-government had already gone too far and would if continued lead to the disruption of the Empire, advocated setting up some central council or parliament with legislative and executive control over the whole Empire, within limitations more or less wide. One stood for a free alliance and co-operation, the other for organic or federal union and centralization. These two theories of empire did not, in Canada, become party creeds; but, on the whole, Liberals were sympathetic with free alliance, while centralization drew most of its support from Conservative ranks. On some issues, however, there was an approach to unanimity, and on others the division cut across party lines.

In domestic affairs self-government was almost entirely won. Some survivals of the {284} old colonial subordination remained in the formal inability of Canadians to amend their own const.i.tution and in the appeal from the decisions of Canadian courts to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council--limitations which had been wholly or mainly removed in the case of the newer Commonwealth of Australia. But the long-contested control over copyright was finally conceded, and the Hutton and Dundonald incidents led to the clearer recognition that if imperial officers entered the military service of the Dominion they were, precisely as in the United Kingdom, under the control of the responsible civil ministers. The provision that the commander of the militia must be a British officer was dropped in the revision of the Militia Act in 1904. In the words of Mr, now Sir Robert, Borden in 1902, words which became increasingly true as years went by; 'Step by step the colonies have advanced towards the position of virtual independence so far as their internal affairs are concerned, and in all the important instances the claim has been made by Canada, has been resisted at first by the imperial statesmen, and finally has been conceded, and has proved of advantage both to the Mother Country and to the colonies.'

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In foreign affairs self-government came more slowly, in the face of greater opposition, but still steadily and surely. Its coming was more imperceptible; in fact, many Canadians continued to believe that they had no voice in the control of foreign policy, and made on this very ground a strong plea either for setting up some central authority in which they would have representation, or else for declining to take any part in imperial wars because they had not and could not have a real voice in imperial policy.

This belief was well founded, so far as concerned part of the field of foreign affairs, but it failed to recognize the striking advance made in other areas. We were like M. Jourdain of Moliere's comedy, who was surprised to find that he had been talking prose all his life without knowing it. We had been carrying on a steadily increasing part of our foreign affairs without consciously labelling them as such. For to-day foreign affairs are largely commercial affairs, questions of trade and tariff, of immigration and transportation, of fishery or power or navigation rights. And it is largely with contiguous countries that the most important questions arise. Now, as has been seen from the review of relations with {286} the United States and other foreign countries in an earlier chapter, Canada had come to have all but complete control of such affairs.

In 1909, following Australia's example, Canada established a department of External Affairs for 'the conduct and management of international or intercolonial negotiations, so far as they may appertain to the government of Canada.' In introducing this measure Sir Wilfrid declared: 'All governments have found it necessary to have a department whose only business will be to deal with relations with foreign countries.... We have now reached a standard as a nation which necessitates the establishment of a Department of External Affairs.'

On Sir Robert Borden's accession to power one of his first steps was to increase the importance of this department by giving it a minister as well as a deputy, attaching the portfolio to the office of the prime minister. For other purposes special envoys were sent, as when Mr Fielding negotiated trade relations in France and in the United States, or Mr Lemieux arranged a compromise with the government of j.a.pan upon the immigration issue. In these cases the British amba.s.sador was nominally a.s.sociated with the Canadian envoy. Even this formal {287} limitation was lacking in the case of the conventions effected with France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, and Italy in 1909-10, by negotiation with their consuls in Ottawa. Finally, in the Waterways Treaty with the United States, the international status of Canada was for the first time formally recognized in the provision that the decision to submit to arbitration matters other than those regarding boundary waters should be made on the one hand by the President and Senate of the United States, and on the other by the Governor-General in Council, the Cabinet of the Dominion.

At the close of this period, then, every phase of our foreign relations so far as they concerned the United States, and an increasingly large share of our foreign relations with other powers, were under Canadian control. It remained true, however, that Canada had no voice in determining peace and war. In other words, it was with Britain's neighbours, rather than with Canada's neighbours, that any serious war was most likely to come. Diplomatic policy and the momentous issue of peace or war in Europe or Asia were determined by the British Cabinet.

In this field alone equality was as yet to seek. The {288} consistent upholder of Dominion autonomy contended that here, too, power and responsibility would come in the same measure as military and naval preparation and partic.i.p.ation in British wars. Just as Canada secured a voice in her foreign commercial relations as soon as her trade interests and industrial development gave her commercial weight, so a share in the last word of diplomacy might be expected to come almost automatically as Dominion and Commonwealth built up military and naval forces, or took part in oversea wars.

In this conception the Crown became the chief visible link of Empire.

Autonomists believed that 'His Majesty's Government' should remain a manifold power. 'We all claim to be His Majesty's Government,'

declared Sir Wilfrid at the Conference of 1907. The Government at Sydney was as much His Majesty's as the Government at Westminster. The Canadian Privy Council was as much His Majesty's as the Privy Council of the United Kingdom. The tendency in the Dominions had been to magnify the powers of the king, who was equally their king, and to lessen the powers of the parliament elected in the United Kingdom. In fact the Crown became, if the metaphor is not too homely for such great {289} affairs, a siphon which transferred power from His Majesty's Government in the old land to His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions.

It was, however, not enough to have independent control. It was equally necessary, as the other half of the policy of co-operation, to provide means for securing united and effective action. These were provided in many forms. High commissioners and agents-general became increasingly important as amba.s.sadors to London. Departments of External Affairs ensured more constant and systematic intercourse.

Special conferences, such as the Naval Conference of 1909 in London, or the several exchanges of visits between the Australian and the New Zealand ministers, kept the different states in touch with each other.

But by far the most important agency was the Colonial or Imperial Conference, now a definitely established body, in which Dominions and Kingdom met on equal footing, exchanged views, and received new light on each other's problems. Thus the question of co-operation between the Five Nations became much like the problem which faces any allies, such as those of the Triple Entente, save that in the case of the British Empire the alliance is not transitory and a {290} common king gives a central rallying-point. Nowhere has this free form of unity, as unique in political annals as the British Empire itself, received clearer expression than in the words of Edward Blake in the British House of Commons in 1900:

For many years I for my part have looked to conference, to delegation, to correspondence, to negotiation, to quasi-diplomatic methods, subject always to the action of free parliaments here and elsewhere, as the only feasible way of working the quasi-federal union between the Empire and the sister nations of Canada and Australia. A quarter of a century past I dreamed the dream of imperial parliamentary federation, but many years ago I came to the conclusion that we had pa.s.sed the turning that could lead to that terminus, if ever, indeed, there was a practicable road. We have too long and too extensively gone on the lines of separate action here and elsewhere to go back now. Never forget--you have the lesson here to-day--that the good will on which you depend is due to local freedom, and would not survive its limitation.

But to many this trend of affairs was far from satisfactory. They urged that Canada should retrace her steps and take the turning that led to imperial parliamentary federation. This agitation was carried on chiefly in private circles and through the press. One organization after another--British Empire League, {291} Pollock Committee, Round Table--undertook earnest and devoted campaigns of education, which, if they did not attain precisely the end sought, at least made towards clearer thinking and against pa.s.sive colonialism. Occasionally the question was raised in parliament. Typical of such debates was that of March 13, 1905, when Colonel, now General Sir Sam, Hughes moved a resolution in favour of parliamentary federation. Mr Borden refrained from either opposing or approving the motion, but, as did other members of his party, made it a starting-point for a speech in favour of imperial preference. Sir Wilfrid Laurier declared:

I do not think that it would be possible to find in any of the self-governing colonies any desire or any intention to part with any of the powers which they have at the present time. At present we are proud to say and to believe that the relations of the British Empire, within all its parts, are absolutely satisfactory.... It is not in accordance with the traditions of British history, it is not in accordance with the traditions of the Anglo-Saxon race, to make any change in their inst.i.tutions until these inst.i.tutions have been proved insufficient or defective in some way.... The British Empire to-day is composed of nations, all bearing allegiance to the same sovereign.

At the Conference of 1907 it was proposed {292} that the Colonial Conference be changed into an Imperial Council. This suggestion met support from various quarters, but was blocked by Sir Wilfrid's firm opposition. He agreed heartily that the Conference should be styled Imperial rather than Colonial, but, backed by all his colleagues, opposed any attempt to turn the Conference into a Council, with independent powers and an overwhelming representation from the United Kingdom. In fact the Conference was established more firmly than ever on a basis of equality. The prime minister of the United Kingdom, rather than the colonial secretary, became the special representative of his country, and the Conference was declared to be 'between His Majesty's Government and His Governments of the self-governing Dominions overseas.'

[Ill.u.s.tration: SIR WILFRID LAURIER IN ENGLAND, 1911

_Left to right_--General Louis Botha, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Mr. Asquith, Sir Joseph Ward

_Children standing_--Doris Harcourt, Olivia Harcourt

_Children seated_--Barbara Harcourt, Anthony Asquith]

At this Conference, perhaps more significant than anything that was said or done was the presence of General Botha as prime minister of the self-governing colony of the Transvaal. It was only five years since Botha, as commander-in-chief of the Boers who had held out to the last, had laid down his arms. Now he sat in the highest councils of the Empire, saying little, studying his fellow-ministers and the common problems, and impressing all by {293} his strong common sense and his frank loyalty. His presence there was due to the courage and confidence which had been displayed by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.

One of the first steps taken by Campbell-Bannerman's Ministry in 1906 had been to grant to the Transvaal full and immediate self-government without any intervening period of half-freedom. The policy had been a bold one. To a German empire-framer it would have appeared incredible folly. The king had remonstrated against it, the leader of the Opposition had termed it dangerous and reckless, Mr Kipling had hurled sonnets against it. But the Government had stood firm, with the result here seen, and with still greater justification to follow. In this and the following Conference General Botha manifested a special regard for his Canadian colleague, like himself a leader from a minority race.

Undoubtedly Wilfrid Laurier's example, Canada's example, counted much in making clear to Louis Botha the path which led to loyal and lasting co-operation.

The centralization policy found a new champion at the Conference of 1911.

Sir Joseph Ward, Mr Seddon's successor as prime minister of New Zealand, {294} submitted some months in advance a proposal for an Imperial Council of State advisory to the British Government, and then, having meantime been persuaded to go the whole road, made a speech in favour of a central parliament. The proposal met with still less favour than before. British, Australian, South African, Newfoundland, and Canadian prime ministers joined in p.r.o.nouncing it unworkable and undesirable. 'The proposal seems to me to be absolutely impracticable,' declared Sir Wilfrid Laurier. 'It is not a practical scheme; our present system of responsible government has not broken down,' agreed Premier Fisher of Australia. 'The creation of some body with centralized authority over the whole Empire would be a step entirely antagonistic to the policy of Great Britain which has been so successful in the past, and which has undoubtedly made the Empire what it is to-day. It is the policy of decentralization which has made the Empire--the power granted to its various peoples to govern themselves,'

added Premier Botha of South Africa. 'Any scheme of representation--no matter what you may call it, parliament or council--of the overseas Dominions must [give them] so very small a representation that it would be {295} practically of no value,' said Premier Morris of Newfoundland.

Mr Asquith summed up:

We cannot, with the traditions and history of the British Empire behind us, either from the point of view of the United Kingdom, or from the point of view of our self-governing Dominions, a.s.sent for a moment to proposals which are so fatal to the very fundamental conditions on which our empire has been built up and carried on.... It would impair, if not altogether destroy, the authority of the United Kingdom in such grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the maintenance of peace, or the declaration of war, and, indeed, all those relations with foreign powers, necessarily of the most delicate character, which are now in the hands of the Imperial Government, subject to its responsibility to the Imperial Parliament.

That authority cannot be shared, and the co-existence side by side with the Cabinet of the United Kingdom of this proposed body--it does not matter by what name you call it for the moment--clothed with the functions and the jurisdiction which Sir Joseph Ward proposed to invest it with, would, in our judgment, be absolutely fatal to our present system of responsible government.... So far as the Dominions are concerned, this new machine could impose upon the Dominions by the voice of a body in which they would be in a standing minority (that is part of the case), in a small minority, indeed, a policy of which they might all disapprove, a policy which in most cases would involve expenditure, and an expenditure which would have to {296} be met by the imposition on a dissentient community of taxation by its own government.

Mr Asquith's statement that 'that authority cannot be shared' has sometimes been taken to mean that the United Kingdom could not and would not admit the Dominions to a share in the control of foreign policy. As the context and later action showed, however, it was to sharing control with a new super-parliament that the prime minister of the United Kingdom, in common with the prime ministers of every Dominion except New Zealand, expressed his opposition. Later in the Conference a further, if far from final, step was taken towards sharing control with the Dominions. Upon Mr Fisher's demand that the Dominions should be consulted in international agreements such as the Declaration of London and the conventions of the Hague Conference, it was agreed unanimously that, at further Hague Conferences and elsewhere when time and subject-matter permitted, this would be done. Sir Wilfrid Laurier agreed with this proposal, though stating his view that in such negotiations the United Kingdom should be given a free hand. Some greater share in foreign policy, most nationalists and {297} imperialists alike agreed, the Dominions must possess. The real question was, whether they should seek it through a central body in which they would have a minority representation, and whose functions it was impossible to define without serious infringement of the existing powers of the Dominions, or whether they were to secure it along the line so long pursued, of independence in what was overwhelmingly the prime concern of each separate state, plus co-operation in what was distinctly of common interest.

Hardly had preferential trade as a mooted topic receded into the background when the question of Canada's share in the defence of the Empire came to the front and took on a new urgency and a new interest.

The forces of Canada for land defence had been made much more effective since the twentieth century began. The permanent militia had been largely increased; engineer, medical, army-service, and ordnance corps had been organized or extended; rifle a.s.sociations and cadet corps had been encouraged; new artillery armament had been provided; reserves of ammunition and equipment had been built up; a central training-camp had {298} been established; the period and discipline of the annual drill had been increased; the administration had been thoroughly reorganized.

In 1911 over six times as much was spent upon the militia as in 1896.

Though the service was still very far from ideal efficiency, there was no question that it had been greatly improved.

In Canada as in the other Dominions the problem of bringing the military forces into relation with the forces of other parts of the Empire was solved without any sacrifice of the principle of self-government in command or administration. After 1902 little was heard of the proposal to give the British War Office control over a section of the troops of each Dominion. Matters moved rather in the direction of co-operative action. In 1907 it was arranged that each of the larger Dominions should organize a General Staff to act in close touch and to exchange officers with the newly reorganized Imperial General Staff. It followed that equipment and administration became largely uniform. In 1909, and again in 1911, further steps were taken to secure effective co-operation between the General Staffs.

Naval defence proved a harder problem to {299} solve. A beginning was made. The fishery-cruiser service was extended. In 1905 the Dominion took over the garrisons at the naval bases of Halifax and Esquimalt.

The minister of Marine, Mr Prefontaine, took some steps towards the organization of a Naval Reserve, but with his death (1905) the movement ceased. The belief in Britain's unquestioned supremacy, a reluctance to enter 'the vortex of European militarism,' the survival of pa.s.sive colonialism, kept the vast majority of Canadians indifferent. And, though a persistent minority of enthusiasts called on the country to awake, the unwillingness of the British authorities to sanction Dominion action along national lines blocked the most promising path.

By much effort all the self-governing colonies except Canada had been induced to send annual cheques to the Admiralty. But the total amount was negligible, and no permanent results had been achieved. After fifteen years of contribution not a single Australian had been trained as a sailor. At last, opinion in the Commonwealth took decided shape and demanded immediate national action--demanded the creation of a Royal Australian Navy.

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Heretofore Canada had blazed the trail that led from colonialism to nationhood. Now Australia took the lead. The reasons were clear.

Canada's chief neighbour was the United States--on the whole, not a militarist country--and there was little fear of military aggression.

But commercial intercourse with this neighbour, along a frontier of three thousand miles, was close and constant, making it necessary for Canada to take into her own hands the control of commercial relations.

Australia had no such overshadowing commercial relations with any power, but had neighbours in the Pacific--the colonies of aggressive European states, first France and later Germany, and the teeming and awakening powers of Asia--which gave urgency to the question of defence. A Commonwealth which ruled a dependency of its own, in Papua, and shared dominion of the world's second greatest island with imperial Germany (nowhere except in this anomalous, precedent-defying British Empire could any one have dreamt of 'the colony of a colony'), could not long remain indifferent to naval defence. For twenty years discussion of the issue had gone on in Australia, clarifying and precipitating opinion. It was no wonder that Canada, which tried to {301} concentrate the same discussion into four or five years, years of great economic pressure, proved more confused in opinion and less unanimous in action.

At the Conference of 1907 the Admiralty modified its former policy and suggested that instead of a money contribution any Dominion might 'provide for local service in the imperial squadrons the smaller vessels that are useful for defence against possible raids or for co-operation with a squadron.' The prime minister of Australia, Mr Deakin, welcomed the proposal as a step forward, but on his return to Australia it was still found impossible to reconcile the national aspirations of the Commonwealth and the desire of the Admiralty to control all s.h.i.+ps, however provided, and no definite action followed.