The Life of Yakoob Beg Part 3

The Chinese were on several occasions, as we have seen, threatened in Eastern Turkestan by the pretensions of the Khojas, and the secret or open machinations of Khokand. But they had at all times triumphed over every combination of circ.u.mstances, so long as they themselves were united. The temporary success of Jehangir Khan was obliterated by the excesses which characterized his occupation of the country, and by the energy and large display of force, with which the Chinese pacified the state on his flight; and the last, under Wali Khan, can scarcely be dignified by any other appellation than that of a marauding incursion.

But a great and important change had occurred in the few years that had elapsed since 1859. The Chinese no longer presented a collected force to the onslaught of an a.s.sailant. In every quarter of their empire, victorious rebels had established themselves, and had detracted in an immeasurable degree from the effective strength of the Government. A Mahomedan ruler swayed over the Panthays, in Yunnan, from his capital at Ta-li-foo; the Taepings round Nankin were at the summit of their career, just before the appearance of Colonel Gordon, when, in 1862, a fresh danger broke out in the provinces of Kansuh and Shensi. From a remote period there had been extensive Mussulman settlements in these provinces, and so early as the seventeenth century they had been the cause of trouble to the great Kanghi. The Emperor Keen-Lung, indeed, at one time attempted to settle the question for ever by ordering the ma.s.sacre of every Mahomedan over fifteen years of age. Even this sweeping measure did not have the desired effect, and whether persecution was the means or not of giving vitality to the cause, it is certain that they had become more numerous, more resolute, and more confident in their own superiority to the other Chinese by the middle of the present century. These Mahomedans were known as Tungani, Dungani, or Dungans, while the Buddhist Chinese are spoken of as Khitay. Many writers are not satisfied with this simple explanation of the name Tungani, and will have it that they were a distinct race, who were either transported to China at some period of Chinese conquest, or were compelled to seek refuge there by some advancing barbarian horde. They even a.s.sert that they can trace the name and origin of this people to a tribe dwelling in the country of the lower waters of the Amoor; but while there is complete uncertainty on the subject it seems simpler to accept the signification that the word Tungani conveys to the Chinese, and that is Mahomedan. We know, for certain, that these people had resided in Kansuh and its neighbouring province for centuries--that they were remarkable for a superiority in strength and activity over the Khitay, and that they possessed the virtues of sobriety and honesty.

They were also not infected by the disease of opium smoking, and we should imagine them to have been a quiet, contented, and agreeable people at their most prosperous period. Their physical superiority to the Khitay would probably be owing to their abstention from "bang" and opium, and we need not suppose that they were the descendants of a stronger race, who had issued from the frigid north, when we have an explanation so much simpler and more natural at hand. They were found by their Khitay rulers to form excellent soldiers, policemen, and other Government servants, such as carriers, &c. In this last employment many found their way to Hamil, thence to Turfan and Urumtsi, and their numbers were increased by discharged soldiers, who remained as military settlers sooner than return to Kansuh. In the course of a few generations their numbers became much greater, until, at last, in the cities we have named, they formed the majority of the inhabitants. In Kuldja, too, they were very numerous, but south of the Tian Shan they do not seem to have advanced westward of Kucha in any great force. At Aksu the Andijan influence, supreme in Western Kashgar, presented an impa.s.sable barrier to the Tungani, who, it must be remembered, had no sympathy with Khokand. The Tungani were, therefore, Mahomedan subjects of China, originating in Kansuh, but who had also, in the course of time, spread westward into Chinese Turkestan and Jungaria. They were employed in the service of the country without restriction, nor can we find that they were subjected to any unfair usage, after the measures taken against them in the earlier days of Keen-Lung. They may not have been as highly favoured as the Sobo tribes, and they may have been subjected to some ridicule in Kansuh; but in Jungaria they were on an equality with all the other Chinese, and immeasurably better placed in the political scale than the Andijanis or Tarantchis. The Chinese had just grounds for believing that no danger to their rule in Eastern Turkestan or Jungaria would ever be caused by the Tungani, and it is not easy to explain how their reasonable antic.i.p.ations were falsified. The Tungani were fervent, if not the most orthodox in form of, Mahomedans, and it would appear that they were not free from a belief in their own superiority to the Khitay. This feeling was fostered by the "mollahs,"

or priests, who became very active within the Chinese dominions, when these had been extended by conquest into the heart of Asia. As if in retaliation for a Khitay conquest the Mahomedan religion was undermining the outworks of its rival's power slowly, but surely. The impulse given to trade by the security and patronage that accompanied Chinese rule was, at least from a purely Chinese point of view, neutralized as an advantage by the admission into the empire of energetic and eloquent preachers of the superior merits of Mahomedanism. It required many generations before the effect of their efforts became perceptible, and it was not until the power of China fell into an extraordinary decline--a decline which many thought, with some show of reason, was to herald the fall, but which later events have seemed to make but the prelude to a more vigorous life than ever--that these Mahomedan missionaries among the Tungani knew that the time to reap what they had sown with patience and persistency was at hand. It is impossible not to connect this event in some degree with that unaccountable revival of fanaticism among Mahomedans, which has produced so many important events during the last thirty years, and of which we are now witnessing some of the most striking results.

In 1862, a riot occurred in a small village of Kansuh; it was suppressed with some loss of life, and people were beginning to suppose that it possessed no significance, when a disturbance broke out on a large scale at Houchow, or Salara. The Tungani had risen, and the unfortunate unarmed Khitay were ma.s.sacred right and left. The rising soon a.s.sumed the proportions of a civil war, and the infection spread to the neighbouring province of Shensi. Then ensued scenes of the most atrocious barbarity. The Khitay, who all their lives had lived at peace and as neighbours with the Tungani, were butchered without mercy. The Mahomedan priests seized all the governing power into their own hands, and set their followers the example of unscrupulous ferocity. The movement, even if we make allowance for the difficulties besetting the government in other regions, must be considered to have been attended by unexpected success. It can only be accounted for by the supposition that the Khitay were taken completely by surprise, and realized neither the extent nor the nature of the danger to which they were exposed. Before the end of 1862, a Tungan government was established in Kansuh, and its jurisdiction was for a time acknowledged in Shensi. The priests formed an administration amongst themselves, and set themselves to the task of consolidating what they had won, and of preparing for the time when the Chinese should come for vengeance. The events happening in Kansuh were naturally of interest to the Tungani in the country lying beyond it, and it was not long before the example set them was followed in Hamil, Turfan, Urumtsi, Manas, and other cities of that district. The same success attended the movement here as in Kansuh. The Chinese power was subverted, the Khitay ma.s.sacred with greater circ.u.mstances of cruelty, if possible, and a new Tungan state was formed in those cities. Each district retained a nominal independence, under the heads.h.i.+p of a priest, or body of priests, or of one of the native Tungan princes, and then the movement spread with irresistible strides to Karashar, Kucha, and Aksu. There it stopped, and south of the Tian Shan the Tungan revolt proper never extended west of Aksu.

In Altyshahr and Kuldja for some months longer the Chinese maintained the external show of power, but all their communications with China were cut off, and neither in numbers nor resources had they sufficient means to cope with the Tungani unaided. They would have accomplished as much as could have been expected from them if they succeeded in keeping possession of that which they still occupied. The Tungan element in Kucha and Aksu was not predominant. It had to share power with the Khojas, and, as we shall see later on, the Khojas of these two cities seized the governing power for themselves. It was the appearance of the Tungan sedition in these cities, which occupy a middle relation to the purely Chinese cities of Hamil and Urumtsi, and the almost totally Khokandian cities of Yarkand and Kashgar, that roused the Kashgari to a full appreciation of the importance to themselves of this movement, and the Chinese garrisons and settlers to an equally just realization of their own danger. The Kashgari, not free from the fanaticism of all their co-religionists, and naturally elated at the successes of the Tungani, forgot, with their well proved fickleness, all the benefits they had received from the Chinese, and waited eagerly for a favourable opportunity to come for them to imitate the example set them by their eastern neighbours. Nor had they long to wait, although it was not from them that came the first spark that lighted the firebrand of civil war and anarchy throughout the length and breadth of Altyshahr.

It will be remembered that the Khokandian government had the right to nominate in each city, where they received dues on Mahomedan merchandise, an agent or tax-collector to look after the proper levy of the tax. In some of the larger cities this official would require a considerable staff of a.s.sistants, and thus a certain number of skilled Khokandian officials were permanently located on Kashgarian or Chinese territory. After the failure of the expedition of Wali Khan, in which these officials seem to have disappeared, either having become merged in the body of his partisans or sacrificed during the ma.s.sacres of that time, a fresh batch of Khokandians was installed, and occupied, in a legal sense, the same position as their predecessors. It would appear, however, that the natural result of their aid to Wali Khan followed, and that the Chinese Ambans regarded their presence with scarcely concealed dislike, and proclaimed that these Khokandian tax-gatherers were devoting more of their attention to the propagation of heretical religious and political doctrines than to the collection of dues on silk and other articles of commerce. It would require but the slightest untoward circ.u.mstance to fan this ill-feeling into the most insatiate hatred and hostility. The danger was rendered the more serious when the Chinese Ambans perceived for the first time that the sympathies of a large portion of their Tungan soldiery were estranged from them. It was doubtful whether the Tungan regiments could be relied on against a fresh Khoja revolt, and it was certain that they would not combine in any repression of the Mahomedan religion, even though the sufferers should only be Andijanis. Such was the state of the public mind in Altyshahr in 1862, when the Tungani revolted and obtained success in Kansuh and Shensi.

As early as 1859 the hostility of the Chinese Ambans to the Andijani tax-collectors received a forcible ill.u.s.tration in the town of Yarkand.

At that time Afridun w.a.n.g was governor, and, whether there was any personal enmity at the root of the action or not, he found little difficulty in convincing both himself and the other Chinese residents that the Andijani agent had been stirring up discontent against them in the town. Accordingly, as self-preservation is the first law of nature, this Khokandian official, with his attendant, was arrested and executed.

There may have been some foundation for the accusations made by Afridun w.a.n.g against his rival: more probably there was none; but on referring the matter to the Viceroy of Ili for decision it was decided that the governor should be removed. The Khokandian government sent fresh agents, and it is not stated that any reparation was given to the families of the sufferers. From this it would appear that the post of tax-collector in Altyshahr for His Highness the Khan of Khokand was not a very desirable position. Afridun w.a.n.g retired to his native town of Turfan, where, three years later on, he contributed more than any one else to the success of the Tungan movement. His policy, if anti-Khokandian, was pro-Mahomedan or Tungan, and his case is very typical of the nature of this rising. In Turfan he continued to be one of the chief men, until, six years later on, it fell to the Athalik Ghazi.

His successor in the governors.h.i.+p of Yarkand did not interfere with the Khokandian officials, but for this moderation he made up by the exactions he committed on the residents, more particularly on the Mahomedan portion of them. His extortions and cruelties had the effect as much of disgusting his own followers as of rousing a spirit of opposition among the oppressed. It was while things were in this uncertain state at Yarkand that the governor received secret notice of the Tungan revolt in Kansuh, and he at once perceived that, when this important intelligence became known, not only would his own Tungan troops become more openly mutinous, but that the Khojas might seize the opportunity to a.s.sert their claim to the country once more. In this special case, in addition to the general apprehension that would be felt by any Chinese governor at the aspect of affairs, there was personal fear for the unjustifiable acts of his government, and the Amban, in his trepidation, resolved on the most strenuous precautions to avert the danger from himself. He summoned a council of war of his Buddhist lieutenants, and stated the exact position to them; how the Tungan portion of their forces could not be depended on; how the Tungan settlers would join them; and how the Andijani agents would do their utmost to unite in one cause against themselves all those who followed the teaching of Islam; and how all these events, which before were possible, had been rendered probable by the Tungan successes in the east. He dwelt on the fact that no time was to be lost in the execution of such precautions as they thought necessary; that at any moment the news might arrive, and then they would be in a minority; and he did not attempt to conceal the purport of his address--that he was in favour of sharp measures, of going to the root of the evil at once, and of ma.s.sacring every Mussulman in the town. The council of war was not prepared to endorse such a violent proceeding without careful consideration. There were many dissentients, and the meeting was adjourned. It rea.s.sembled, and, on this occasion, although the supporters of more moderate measures had decreased, it adjourned once more before deciding. The danger evidently appeared more appalling to the governor than to his subordinates; perhaps also there was some personal dislike for their chief even among his Khitay following. At the second meeting they seemed, indeed, more willing to acquiesce in his proposed strong measures, and this may have been caused by their observation of the state of public opinion in the interval. But even then no final decision could be arrived at, and the Khitay never had a chance after that of making any defence in Yarkand. The Tungan troops were not long in hearing, through their chief officer, Mah Dalay, that there was a plot on foot among the Khitay to disarm, or, as others said, to ma.s.sacre them, and they then learnt of the Mahomedan revolt in China and along the road thither. They immediately determined to be beforehand with the Amban and his lukewarm council, and no weak hesitation marred the execution of their plot, as it had that of the Chinese governor.

The Khitay troops, unarmed, were surprised during the night, and cut down without quarter, and the small body of survivors sought refuge in the Yangyshahr fort. This was in August, 1863, and no fewer than 7,000 Khitay soldiers are computed to have fallen on this single occasion. The Tungan troops were thereupon joined by the townspeople, and the question then to be decided was, who was to be supreme, the Tungani or the Andijan-Kashgari Mahomedans. The former were simply an unlettered and rather savage soldiery; the latter possessed keen intellects for manipulating a fanatical people, and for improvising an administration of a superficial character. The balance of power was evenly distributed until reinforcements arrived from Aksu and Kucha to the anti-Tungan party. Two Khojas who had been banished from Kucha, for endeavouring to promote their own interests in the name of Khokand, had fled to Aksu, where they met the same fate. In this latter flight many of similar principles joined them, so that when they reached Yarkand they had a numerous force at their back. The Khojas in the first place joined their forces to the Tungani, to storm the remaining Khitay in the Yangyshahr.

The Khitay after a gallant resistance perceived that further opposition was impossible. Then occurred one of those deeds, which, if Europe instead of Asia had been the scene, would have been handed down to posterity as a rare example of military devotion and courage, but which, although not unique even in the annals of the campaign we are entering upon, having occurred in little-known Eastern Turkestan, is not realized as an event that has actually taken place. It is a myth of the myth-land to which it belongs. And yet, when we read how the Amban summoned all his officers to his chamber, where he sat in state surrounded by his wives, his family, and his servants; how all were silent, and yet sedate and prepared; how, at the given signal that all were present, and that the foe was at the gate, the aged warrior dropped his lighted pipe into the mine beneath; how the exulting foe won after all but a barren triumph; and how the Khitay taught the natives that if they had forgotten how to conquer they had not how to die, we feel that there is an under-current throughout the story, that, apart from the admiration it must command, has claims to our own special sympathy. The Chinese, as we did in India in the dark hours of 1857, a.s.serted their superiority over the semi-barbarous races under their sway, even when all hopes of a recovery seemed to be abandoned. After the fall of the citadel the Khoja element was supreme in Yarkand, and a priest named Abderrahman was set up as king.

The other cities of Altyshahr promptly followed the example of Yarkand, and the Chinese power was completely subverted on all hands. The Khitay were ma.s.sacred whenever they fell into the hands of the Mahomedans, and the only places that still held out were the citadels, notably the Yangyshahr of Kashgar. The inhabitants of this city appear to have been unable to keep their advantage over the Chinese, for they appealed to the Kirghiz to come in and a.s.sist them. These nomads, under their chief, Sadic Beg, were nothing loth to join in expelling the Chinese, as such a change could only increase their advantages by subst.i.tuting an unsettled for a settled government. Siege was accordingly laid to the citadel of Kashgar, but the irregular troops of the new allies were unable to make any impression on the fort, defended as it was by a large Khitay garrison. If the Chinese commander had a.s.sumed a more active policy, he might have destroyed his opponents, but he was waiting for the arrival of reinforcements, which he expected before many months. In not relying solely on his own resources he proved himself unable to read the changed signs of the time; if, indeed, he was not already meditating that surrender, which he ultimately concluded with Yakoob Beg. Sadic Beg, finding himself unable to take the fort, and knowing that it was uncertain how long the Kashgari would remain friendly to himself, resolved to play the part of king-maker, and sent the emba.s.sy to Tashkent for a Khoja to come and rule Kashgar, only he omitted to say that Kashgar was not conquered.

We can now return to Buzurg Khan and his commander-in-chief. When they left Tashkent they had only a following of six, among whom were Abdulla, Pansad; Mahomed Kuli, Shahawal; and Khoja Kulan, Hudaychi. All of these played a very prominent part under Yakoob Beg. From Tashkent they went to Khokand, where their numbers rose to sixty-eight. Here the final preparations were made, and during the first days of January, 1865, this band of adventurers crossed the Khokand frontier into Eastern Turkestan.

The mountain forts seem to have been deserted, for no opposition was encountered in the pa.s.sage of the Terek defile. Several small bodies of troops joined them, and they reached Mingyol in the neighbourhood of Kashgar with increased numbers and confidence. Sadic Beg had conceived a more sanguine view of his situation by this time, and half repented that he had invited the Khojas in at all, more particularly when he found that the Khoja had a following of his own, and a skilled commander and minister in Yakoob Beg. He then strove to dissuade Buzurg Khan from proceeding further with an enterprise fraught with great peril, for he represented the Chinese as sure to return, when summary vengeance would be exacted. But his arguments were unavailing. Either Buzurg Khan or his adviser, Yakoob Beg, was deaf to all entreaty. The enterprise they had embarked on must be continued to the bitter end. They could not think of returning to Khokand with nothing accomplished, with the stigma attaching to them of a retreat when there had been no foe. Sadic Beg could not but submit with the best grace possible; and Buzurg Khan was accordingly placed on the throne of his ancestors.

In his "_orda_" or palace he administered justice and received the congratulations of his own followers and of the Andijani townspeople.

The court rules were drawn up on the model of those in use in Khokand, and while the expedition had but established itself, in an uncertain manner, in one city it was thought necessary that etiquette should be as strictly defined and enforced as if all this were taking place in a brilliant and luxurious capital. In a few days Sadic Beg, on finding that he played but a secondary part, revolted, and set himself up as ruler at Yangy Hissar. It was now that Yakoob Beg came to the front, and a.s.sumed the control of affairs until the fall of the contemptible Buzurg. With great difficulty after the desertion of their Kirghiz allies was a force of 3,000 men collected around the new Khoja in Kashgar. Sadic Beg advanced on the capital with a much larger army, and Yakoob Beg had for a time to remain on the defensive. Each day, however, brought in recruits to his camp, while, the army of the Kirghiz leader presenting no object of sympathy to the people, his rival's remained stationary, if it did not decrease. An encounter at last commenced between the two forces which was made general by the intrepidity of Abdulla. The Kirghiz levies of Sadic were unable to withstand the vigorous charges that were led against them, and broke after a short combat into headlong flight. In the mountains the Kirghiz gathered around their chieftain in force, and, hovering on the northern districts of Kashgar, presented a danger that must be removed by Yakoob Beg before he could advance farther. His troops were therefore directed to proceed against the Kirghiz in their fastnesses, and it was not long before the Kirghiz, driven into a corner, turned at bay on their pursuer. The forces on either side were about equal, some 5,000 men in either army.

But, as is customary in the East, the Kirghiz army put forth a champion, Suranchi by name, who had obtained great renown for his extraordinary height and strength. The challenge did not remain unanswered, for Abdulla stepped forward to the encounter. The fight, though furious, was short, and the smaller Khokandian warrior was victorious over his more ponderous antagonist. The Kirghiz power after this reverse was broken up, and Sadic Beg took refuge with Alim Kuli at Tashkent. Yakoob Beg's first campaign against the Kirghiz, who had sworn alliance with him, and by whose invitation he was present in Kashgar, had thus ended victoriously, and he was now able to resume the main purpose of conquering Kashgar. Having rendered Kashgar secure from surprise on the north, and leaving a force to maintain their hold on it, and to keep in check the Khitay garrison, Buzurg and Yakoob proceeded south to occupy Yangy Hissar. The town was occupied without difficulty, but an attempt to storm the citadel in which the Khitay had taken refuge was repulsed with loss. Sending Buzurg Khan back to Kashgar, Yakoob Beg resolved to go on to Yarkand and endeavour to bring that city under their immediate influence.

At this period he loudly proclaimed that there should be no differences among the Tungani, or Mahomedans, in their war with the Buddhists, and that Khojas and Tungani had but one interest in common. As we have seen, the Tungan disturbances broke out first in Yarkand of any city of Altyshahr, and accordingly an earlier settlement founded on a compromise had been attained there, than was the case in its northern neighbours, Kashgar and Yangy Hissar, where an ambitious Kirghiz chief had sought to carve a kingdom for himself. After Abderrahman Khoja had been made king or ruler in Yarkand, and after the Khitay had been destroyed with their citadel, a fresh arrangement was agreed upon between the Tungani and the Khoja party. By its terms the Tungani maintained possession of the citadel, and the Khojas held jurisdiction in the city. Neither of them would be disposed to view with any friendly eye the appearance of a claimant to supremacy in the person of a Khoja sovereign of the whole country, and it was as the representative of such a person that Yakoob Beg resolved to visit Yarkand. His march was delayed as much as possible, and it was not without some difficulty that he at last obtained admittance with his small following into the city. Yakoob Beg was naturally incensed at this inimical treatment from his fellow-religionists, and he soon set himself to the task of humbling the dominant Khojas of Yarkand. During a street riot that was probably instigated by the wily Khokandian, the leading Khojas were seized, and their followers expelled from the city. With a force of only a few hundred men, Yakoob Beg had established himself as master in the largest city of the country; his success on this occasion was very temporary. As ill fortune would have it for him, a fresh army of 2,000 men from Kucha had arrived at Tagharchi, and, there joined by the forces from Yarkand and the neighbourhood, presented a very formidable appearance. They marched on the city at once with complete confidence in their superior numbers, and Yakoob Beg, always in favour of the boldest course, marched out to meet them. In a skirmish, however, the detachment under Abdulla was badly cut up owing to the rashness of that officer, and Yakoob Beg at once recognized the necessity for a prompt retreat. During the following night he made a forced march and arrived the next day at Yangy Hissar with no very great loss in men, but without any baggage whatever.

The enterprise to Yarkand then appeared in its true light as a rash venture.

The Khitay in the fort of Yangy Hissar still held out, and Yakoob Beg resolved to overcome them before he attempted any fresh enterprise. He called up reinforcements from Kashgar, and pressed the siege with renewed vigour, and alter strictly environing it for forty days the garrison surrendered. Although Yakoob Beg himself seemed desirous of showing moderation to the prisoners, more than 2,000 Chinese were ma.s.sacred. During all these petty events, which had not produced even the results of past Khoja enterprises, there had been discontent and division within, as well as opposition from without. At this time a fresh danger was appearing on the horizon. A Badaks.h.i.+ army was advancing with hostile intent on Sirikul, and although Yakoob Beg disregarded its approach while he pressed on the works against the citadel of Yangy Hissar, when that fort fell it attracted his attention once more. The Khitay garrison in the Yangyshahr of Kashgar was also a source of danger to the newly founded dynasty, and, although its inactivity had continued for a long period, it was uncertain at what moment it might pa.s.s off. We can only account for the extraordinary lethargy of the Chinese commander by supposing that he was in complete ignorance of what was pa.s.sing in the country. At many moments it must seem to an observer of the facts that the Chinese governor, who had under him 6,000 or 7,000 disciplined troops, could have crushed all the opposition of such heterogeneous crowds as those fighting under or against Yakoob Beg were up to this time. With the destruction of the Yangy Hissar garrison the prospects of Yakoob Beg greatly improved, and less opportunity was left to the Chinese governor for a.s.suming the offensive, than when he possessed an ally in so close a position as Yangy Hissar. Yakoob Beg also resolved to press the Khitay still more in this their last stronghold, and before he encountered other opponents to crush the Khitay, as he already had the Kirghiz. At this point Sadic Beg reappears in Kashgar at the head of a Kirghiz force to oppose Yakoob Beg, and for a moment it seemed as if he were to have better fortune on this occasion. But Abdulla, the most trusted as well as the most courageous of Yakoob Beg's lieutenants, collected such forces as he could, boldly threw himself in his path, and, having routed Sadic in a sanguinary engagement, prepared to press that unfortunate chieftain into flight or ruin. Yakoob Beg, in want of allies and soldiers however, interfered and suggested an alliance instead of a war _a outrance_. The thwarted Sadic was only too glad to get off on such favourable terms, and joined his forces to those of his late enemy now besieging the Khitay with renewed vigour. This merciful termination of a difficulty, that might have become serious had it not been cured in time, was a performance very creditable in a diplomatic sense to Yakoob Beg. In a small way it may be compared with Frederick the Great's action at Pirna, where he received the services of 40,000 Saxon troops. But, perhaps, still more remarkable was the manner in which Yakoob Beg averted the danger from the Badaks.h.i.+ army. The Badaks.h.i.+, like their kinsmen the Afghans, may be considered, _caeteris paribus_, to be superior soldiers, on account of their larger build and more active habits, to other Asiatics, so that Yakoob Beg with his half-disciplined followers would have had some difficulty and must have incurred considerable loss in overcoming these new invaders. He made overtures to them, and the Badaks.h.i.+, seeing that he was likely to give them exciting and profitable employment, entered into negotiations with him. The result was that they took service under him; and Yakoob Beg for the first time found himself at the head of a large army, composed of Khokand, Kashgar, Kirghiz, and Badakshan levies. It was fortunate for himself that he had been able to arrange his affairs so satisfactorily, for a fresh danger was approaching from the east.

The reader may have observed that we have said little of Buzurg Khan during the operations of the campaign up to this point. Indeed, there is little or nothing to say of the movements of that prince, for he had been mainly stationary at Kashgar, where he pa.s.sed his time in his harem, or besotted under the use of drugs. Yakoob Beg had from the very commencement come to the front as responsible chief, and as events progressed the people and the army came to look upon him as their future ruler. But Yakoob Beg, it would seem, was really in earnest in supporting the Khoja prince, for on several occasions not only did he give Buzurg the most salutary advice, but he also compelled him to take an active part in the public business. Such fits of action were most distasteful to the effeminate prince, and he always returned with renewed zest to the illicit pleasures in which he indulged. One of the occasions on which Yakoob Beg endeavoured to instil into his sovereign some idea of the responsibilities of his office was this invasion by the Khoja-Tungani power of Altyshahr. Early in the summer a large force, estimated at 40,000 men, collected by the cities of Aksu, Kucha, and Turfan, appeared at Maralbas.h.i.+, whence it equally threatened Kashgar or protected Yarkand. Yakoob Beg's utmost efforts, if we are to credit the native report, only availed to bring some 2,500 men into the field; but it is more reasonable to suppose, that, with his Kirghiz, Kipchak, and Badaks.h.i.+ auxiliaries, he had many more troops under him, perhaps 12,500 instead of 2,500 men. Be the exact numbers of the forces what they may, however, it is certain that he was greatly outnumbered by the invader, and that the diverse elements of his army detracted very much from its effective strength. The Tungan army advanced from Maralbas.h.i.+ on Yangy Hissar, where Yakoob Beg had concentrated his army. He had drawn Buzurg Khan and such of the court followers as he could from their ignominious inaction in the capital to encounter the dangers and risks of a field of battle. Both sides were eager for the encounter, which took place in the neighbourhood of Yangy Hissar. The tactical disposition made by Yakoob Beg of his forces was such as would command the approval of skilled officers, and, having done all that mortal man could do to insure the result, he commended himself and his cause to Allah. The battle was long and stoutly contested. During hours it was impossible to say to which side the balance of victory was inclining; at last the Kirghiz troops, half-hearted in their fighting, were driven from the field, and the Badaks.h.i.+ division, which had up to that moment stubbornly held its ground, immediately followed the shameful example thus set it. There now only remained the division under the immediate orders of Yakoob Beg to withstand the onset of a whole army victorious in two different quarters of the field. The situation, on which the fate of the whole enterprise depended, might have filled the boldest heart with momentary despair.

Yakoob Beg had, however, so braced himself to the effort, that no more than ordinary emotion was permitted to betray the disturbed mind within, and with the exclamation that "Victory is the gift of G.o.d," he inspired his soldiery to continue the fight throughout the afternoon. The enemy, dismayed at the dauntless courage shown by this mere handful of men, and having incurred great loss in his effort to crush them, drew off his weakened forces towards evening; and Yakoob Beg, boldly seizing the opportunity for a.s.suming the offensive, drove them from the field in disorder and with considerable loss. In addition to the loss in killed and wounded, more than 1,000 Tungan soldiers enlisted under the standard of Yakoob Beg, and that general found himself on the morrow of one of his greatest battles, with a greater force under his command than he had just before it commenced. This great triumph gave fresh l.u.s.tre to the Khoja family, and redounded to the military renown of Yakoob Beg. Nor should it be forgotten that on this occasion he showed that he possessed, besides military genius of some merit, qualities of an estimable character. For the first time in the annals of these wars the prisoners were treated with some consideration. For some reason or other this victory was not followed up, and the defeated Kucha army retired on Maralbas.h.i.+, which it continued to hold for some months longer. The indirect results of this victory were scarcely less important, however, than the immediate and direct consequences of it.

Buzurg Khan, who had been present at this battle, was among the first to seek refuge in flight; and when he received intelligence of the final success his satisfaction was almost eclipsed by his personal chagrin and mortification. Up to this event he had been content to let Yakoob Beg act the king so long as he could indulge undisturbed in his debaucheries; but from this date there became mingled with his wounded vanity a conviction that Yakoob Beg was becoming so powerful and so popular that he might prove a dangerous subject. The weak-minded prince then permitted himself to be made the tool of every rival that the success of Yakoob Beg had raised up for himself either in the court or in the camp, and listened to tales brought him of his lieutenant's plots, when the conspirators most to be feared by himself were the ambitious chieftains in whose power he was placing his person and his crown. After the defeat of the Kucha army, the ruling parties in Yarkand thought it would be wise to come to terms with their victorious and aggressive neighbour, and accordingly an emba.s.sy was despatched to Yangy Hissar by the Khojas of Yarkand to tender their submission to the sovereign of Kashgar, and to ask to be favoured by the nomination of a city governor, who would be agreeable to Buzurg Khan and his vizier, Yakoob Beg. It is suggestive to watch how the name of the vizier occupies almost as prominent place in all their addresses as that of his master. The Tungan governor in the Yarkand Yangyshahr, not to be behindhand in his wors.h.i.+p of the rising sun, immediately sent a similar expression of obedience to Kashgar.

The course of events once more takes us back to Kashgar, where the Chinese still held the citadel against all comers. But with each fresh success of Yakoob Beg over his numerous opponents, and with the spread of the Tungan power into Jungaria, hope almost completely deserted the unfortunate Khitay, who, in this solitary fort, alone maintained the name of Chinese authority. Treason, within the walls, was now to aid the efforts from without. Kho Dalay, the superior officer in the citadel, although not the commandant, came to an arrangement with Yakoob Beg, by which honourable terms were conceded to the garrison; and 3,000 Khitay troops surrendered and settled in Kashgar. They were required to acknowledge formally the supremacy of the Khoja, and to make a profession of Islamism. But they were never really interfered with in the observance of their own rites among themselves, and had nothing to complain of in their duty. They were called after their recantation "Yangy Mussulmans," or "New Mussulmans." These were the last Khitay troops who surrendered to the new conquerors, and with them every vestige of Chinese authority disappeared from every part of Jungaria and Eastern Turkestan. Even among this garrison, reduced by a long siege and its attendant deprivations to despair, there was a small minority who preferred death to the dishonour involved in surrender. Chang Tay, the commandant, refused to be any party to the arrangement made between Kho Dalay and Yakoob Beg. When the day approached for the entry of the Kashgarian army, this resolute Amban withdrew to his palace, and having collected his family and dependents around him blew them all up with the explosion of a mine that he had constructed underneath. In the confusion that arose from this incident, the enemy broke into the fort, and it was not for some hours that Yakoob Beg succeeded in obtaining control over them once more. During that interval of insubordination many Khitay were murdered, but not without resistance. Kho Dalay and almost 3,000 men remained to take service in the conquering army, as already explained.

The new alliance was cemented by the marriage of Yakoob Beg to the beautiful daughter of Kho Dalay, by whom he has had several children, too young as yet to take any part in public affairs. Perhaps Yakoob Beg's moderation to the Khitay is to be explained by this circ.u.mstance, and it is certain that down to the very end his Khitay wife exercised great influence over her husband.

This was in September, 1865, nine months after his first arrival in Altyshahr, and in that period he had worked, if not very rapidly, with considerable thoroughness. The Khitay destroyed, the Kirghiz subdued, and the Tungan influence checked in its aggression against Western Kashgar, such was the tale of his achievements. Several battles and sieges successfully brought to an issue, and a numerous army formed out of the diverse fragments of conquered and conquerors. Personally, too, Yakoob Beg had done much towards preparing the public mind for the a.s.sumption of power by himself, and the reigning chief had done still more by his neglect of duty and abandonment to pleasure. Buzurg Khan might stand for the typical _roi faineant_, and Yakoob Beg was a more than ordinarily resolute and determined _maire du palais_.

The citadel of Kashgar had not long surrendered when messengers arrived, reporting the near approach of a large body of men from Khokand, but who they were, or with what intention they came, none knew. These were the unsuccessful conspirators against Khudayar Khan, who, after the death of Alim Kuli, had obtained his power once more; and these having been driven out of Khokand by his armies, were compelled to seek refuge in Kashgar. Yakoob Beg sent them the laconic message, while they were hovering on the frontier, that "if they came as friends, they were welcome; if as foes, he was ready to fight them." Until the arrival of this declaration there appears to have been some hesitation among the Khokandians what to do, as some were wis.h.i.+ng to attempt the conquest of Kashgar in their own interests; but when so clear a statement was sent them by Yakoob Beg, and when they learnt more definitely of the permanence of his success, they threw off their reserve and joined the confederacy of Kashgar. In the meanwhile fresh disturbances were breaking out in Yarkand, and thither he proceeded in the later months of 1865 to quell them, taking Buzurg Khan with him. On his arrival before the town both the Khojas and the Tungani hastened to profess the greatest desire to fulfil his wishes, although they kept him outside their gates. It is probable that neither party could have offered any prolonged resistance to him, had they not been encouraged to do so by Buzurg Khan. That prince had for some time been fretting against the iron will of his lieutenant, and, now, in an ill humour at being carried from his amus.e.m.e.nts and idleness at Kashgar to suffer the deprivations of a camp life before Yarkand, broke loose from all control, and plotted in his own camp, and in the enemy's, to free himself from his troublesome general. The plot among the Tungan soldiery had a.s.sumed alarming proportions, and all was ready to put an end to the career of Yakoob, when it was fortunately discovered by his faithful friend Abdulla. Precautions were taken, and the plot in the camp was effectually thwarted; but Yakoob Beg was not strong enough then to show his resentment. This danger was only removed to give place to another.

The Tungani soldiers in Yakoob's service now opened up communications with their kinsmen in the Yangy-Shahr, and they formed the following plan to destroy the remaining portion of the Kashgarian forces. The garrison was to simulate a desire to yield into the hands of Yakoob Beg both their own persons and the fort, and when he, unsuspecting any covert design, should be lulled into a false sense of security, the Tungani in his service could join the Tungani in the fort in making a night attack on the other forces. The plan promised well. Yakoob Beg was deceived by the friendly overtures of the Tungani, and relaxed his precautions, and, during the night that was to precede the surrender of the Tungani, the conspirators marched out of the fort, and being joined, as had been arranged, by the other confederates, surprised Yakoob Beg and his immediate followers. A desperate resistance was offered by the half-armed men, but the Tungani were victorious, and Yakoob Beg had much difficulty in collecting around him on the morrow a few hundred soldiers. Among those, however, was Abdulla and some of his more trusted companions. The Kirghiz under Sadic Beg could not be trusted, and it seemed that that chief was still inclined to play for his own hand. At this, the most critical period of his life, Yakoob Beg's tact and resolution were most conspicuous. When he was surrounded on every hand by hostile factions, and could count on the fidelity of scarce five hundred men, he triumphed over every obstacle, and rose omnipotent over the petty jealousies and dissensions of those who sought to crush him.

Buzurg Khan seized the moment of this disaster to draw off into a separate camp with a large body of troops and all the Kirghiz, and it is very possible, as has been a.s.serted, that he instigated the successful Tungan _coup_. There is no evidence that he did, and I am personally of opinion that it originated among the Tungani themselves, and that Buzurg Khan only rejoiced at its occurrence, as he would have done at any other reverse to Yakoob. The position now was as follows:--In the citadel were the victorious Tungani, and in the town they shared the distribution of power with the townspeople. Outside in one part was Buzurg Khan, with a force that was equivocal in its sympathies, and that might at any moment become hostile, to Yakoob Beg; and in another part was Yakoob Beg himself and his attenuated following. Affairs could not look less hopeful, and if the three parties could have accommodated their own differences for but the short s.p.a.ce of twenty-four hours, Yakoob Beg must infallibly have been destroyed: as it was, they did nothing with an enemy like Yakoob Beg in their proximity, and permitted him to redeem all he had lost by his too great credulity in the good faith of his brother Mussulmans. Let us now see how he saved himself. The first point to do was to restore the courage and self-confidence of his own soldiers, and to do that, it was necessary to strike a sharp blow that was sure of success. The fort could not be taken by a _coup de main_, but the city, large and straggling, presented a more inviting aspect for such an attempt. Abdulla, the Murat of the army of Kashgar, with the most determined intrepidity, carried it by a.s.sault, although here again he attacked without awaiting the arrival of the other contingents. Like Edward Bruce,

"Such was his wonted reckless mood, Yet desperate valour oft made good, Even by its daring, venture rude, Where prudence might have failed."

This achievement put an end to the rejoicings among the Tungani, and compelled them to recognize what a terribly energetic and enterprising foe they had to deal with. But, at this moment, a severe mishap occurred which almost neutralized the advantage thus gained. Buzurg Khan, unable either to crush Yakoob Beg or to enjoy the indulgences to which he had enslaved himself, resolved to secure the latter, happen what might. He accordingly fled from Yarkand with many followers, and retired to his palace at Kashgar. There, not content with pillaging the palace of Yakoob Beg, he proclaimed him a traitor and rebel, and offered a reward to whomsoever should bring him his head. Another general was appointed to the command of the army, and preparations were made for defending Kashgar against any attempt of Yakoob Beg to attack it. But fortunately the Tungani in the citadel of Yarkand were not aware of this dissension among the Kashgari, and as they were struck with admiration for the valour of Yakoob Beg, they surrendered to him soon after the flight of Buzurg. He was then able to turn his undivided attention to his refractory chief. Yakoob Beg had always, as we have said, befriended the church; he was now to experience some benefit for that very commendable respect. Among the first means of crus.h.i.+ng Yakoob Beg that Buzurg Khan had employed was an appeal to the Sheikh-ul-islam of Kashgar to proclaim his Baturbas.h.i.+ outside the pale of the law. This the ecclesiastic refused to do, and a.s.serted, on the contrary, that Yakoob Beg had deserved well both of his country and of the Mahomedan world. Foiled in his effort to stir up a religious feeling against his general, Buzurg Khan was reduced to the more cogent, but in his hands quite useless, argument of the sword. Nor was the field, limited as it must appear to us, free from other pretenders. Sadic Beg, instead of coalescing with Buzurg Khan, set up his own pretensions to rule the country; and the Kucha Khojas and Tungani began to collect troops in view of possible eventualities.

The army of Buzurg Khan, which had marched out to oppose the entry of Yakoob Beg, was outflanked and defeated by Abdulla in the country between Yangy Hissar and the capital; and Yakoob Beg, pressing on with irresistible strides, was received in Kashgar with the acclamations of the people and of his soldiers. He was then publicly proclaimed ruler, and his friend the Sheikh-ul-islam ratified the people's choice. Buzurg Khan, who had taken refuge in the Yangy-Shahr, was seized in his palace there, after a very slight resistance. Some of the more prominent of Yakoob Beg's rivals were executed, and Buzurg Khan himself was placed in a state of honourable confinement. He still persisted in futile intrigues, and so long as he remained in Kashgar was a source of endless trouble to the new government. For more than eighteen months he was permitted to remain however, and then, being detected in instigating the murder of Yakoob Beg, was banished to Tibet. After wandering for some years, he found his way to Khokand, where he is believed to be still residing with a large family. He may be considered to have been the last Khoja prince ruling Kashgar, for it is scarcely probable that, in any future settlement of that country, a restoration of the old reigning family will be supported by any one. He is no exaggerated type of the rule among Central Asian despots, who present to our gaze a long series of petty tyrants and debauchees, until for a few years they are displaced by a successful soldier such as the Athalik Ghazi, or by a skilful minister such as Mussulman Kuli was in Khokand.

The Kirghiz chief, Sadic Beg, did not long hold out against the consolidated power of Yakoob Beg; and the Kucha movements were suspended. In a little more than twelve months Yakoob Beg had occupied Kashgar, Yangy Hissar, and Yarkand. Sirikul and Khoten also acknowledged his rule; but his further operations against them will be narrated by-and-by. He felt now so secure in his seat that he permitted the Badaks.h.i.+ contingent to return home, presenting each soldier with a large present. Ever since that time Yakoob Beg seems to have maintained some influence in Badakshan, and to have been inclined on several occasions to compete with Shere Ali of Afghanistan for the possession of that province. His ambition was never fully revealed in this quarter; but it is certain that Shere Ali regarded him with scarcely concealed suspicion and dislike.

With the a.s.sumption of personal power by Yakoob Beg, on the deposition of the Khoja Buzurg Khan, the first part of the enterprise undertaken in the later days of 1864 was brought to a termination. In the more extended operations of Yakoob Beg against the Tungani and Khoten, may be perceived the effects of events outside his immediate sphere upon, this energetic ruler, who, until his last years, never realized the strength of the Russians, and who had, up to the year 1870 when Kuldja was occupied, convinced himself that he could r.e.t.a.r.d the progress of the great Northern power. It was that idea, besides a thirst for military renown and excitement, that urged him on to the construction of what he fondly believed might prove a formidable and extensive state. As ruler of Kashgar, he could not be anything but a kind of va.s.sal of the Khan of Khokand; as monarch of Eastern Turkestan, he might treat on terms of equality with the Czar of Russia or the Emperor of China. It was no unworthy ambition, and Yakoob Beg, created Athalik Ghazi, Champion Father, in 1866 by the Ameer of Bokhara, accomplished so much of it as was possible.

CHAPTER VIII.

WARS WITH THE TUNGANI.

Yakoob Beg, having deposed Buzurg Khan and suppressed all resistance on the part either of the Tungani or of the Chinese in Western Kashgar, had some leisure to make a careful survey of his exact position. The result of the desultory fighting of the previous twelve months had been eminently satisfactory to himself; but, to say the least, it was dubious how long this state of things might last. Former adventurers had accomplished as much as he had, but the Chinese had always returned with renewed vigour. How was Yakoob Beg to know that the rumours were well founded which a.s.serted that that empire had been sore stricken in other fields than against the Tungani, and that even the victories over the Taepings were not considered a complete set-off to the disasters in every other quarter of the empire? European critics predicted that the last hour of the Chinese Empire was fast approaching; but Yakoob Beg, with far more imperfect means of intelligence at his disposal, feared still, even when the citadel of Kashgar surrendered, that the Khitay would return for revenge. His fears were not groundless, as we now know, but he antic.i.p.ated events by more than ten years. Yakoob Beg was not so sanguine in his own resources or good fortune that he believed that he should not have to encounter the danger that had overwhelmed all his predecessors, and his first object accordingly was to gather all his strength together in a compact ma.s.s to resist the Chinese when they should come. But the dissensions that had, during the conquest of Altyshahr, manifested themselves so palpably in the ill-a.s.sorted conglomeration which had gathered round the standard of Buzurg Khan brought home to the mind of Yakoob Beg the disadvantages of a divided people. He accordingly determined that, whatever else he might fail or succeed in achieving, his most resolute effort should be to weld into one cohesive and effective whole Andijani and Tungani, Kashgari and Khitay. It was no mean ambition; but to cement such discordant elements a policy of "blood and iron" was required. Yakoob Beg did not shrink certainly in its application; but when he had accomplished the task he had set himself to bring about he discovered that the cost had been so great that the state, both in population and in wealth, was at a lower point than it had ever been before. But in the earlier days of 1866 no doubt crossed his mind on this latter point. It must be remembered that, strange to say, the great success of Yakoob Beg in Kashgar had alienated the sympathy of the government of Khokand from his cause; and, although this may be explained by the antipathy of Khudayar Khan, now firmly seated on the throne, who could not entertain any amity for a subject who had on several occasions deserted his cause, it is impossible to attribute to that sentiment alone a fact which must have had some deeper and less personal explanation. At all stages of the history of these petty princes of Asia are we met by the spectacle of mutual jealousy and recrimination, whenever any one of themselves seemed about to exalt himself above his fellows, either by the success of his arms or by the beneficence of his rule. Rarely, indeed, had any of them shown that he possessed more than ordinary ability or courage; but, whenever the phenomenon did appear, he was at once proclaimed by his neighbours to be a dangerous innovation, and as such to be thwarted and opposed. The practice has come down to our own day, and during the long wars that Russia has waged in Asia we have never beheld two states, no matter how insignificant, combine to oppose the common foe. The Khokandians have never aided the Bokhariots or the Khivans, nor have the Afghans or the Kashgari the Khokandians. They have kept the ring, so to speak, as each of them has gone down singly before the prowess of the Muscovite, in a manner that ought to excite the admiration of all those who preserve the memories of the traditional honours of the prize ring; but, as their own existence has been the penalty, it is questionable whether their conduct, inspired by regard for no law of chivalry, but simply by mutual antipathy, has been very prudent. Over such petty jealousies had Yakoob Beg to triumph before he could hope to complete his dream of an united Kashgaria. His path was beset with difficulties. In satisfying himself with too little he might imperil what he had secured, but in attempting too much he might jeopardize everything he had won. Under such circ.u.mstances the boldest man might have stood uncertain, and the most resolute inactive until hurried into action by the progress of events.

For some months Yakoob Beg seems to have remained uncertain what should be his next move.

In 1865, before his last advance on Yarkand, he had seized Maralbas.h.i.+ or Bartchuk, and by so doing not only had he secured communication between Aksu and Yarkand, but also between Aksu and Khoten. This position, lying 200 miles to the east of Yangy Hissar, has always been and is still very important, and Yakoob Beg is supposed to have fortified it very strongly. This success was the permanent result of his great victory over the Tungani from Aksu and Kucha in the neighbourhood of Yangy Hissar, and it effectually secured his flank during further operations.

It was not, however, until he turned his attention to the southern city of Khoten, that the importance of this acquisition was made incontestable. Then it enabled him to devote his attention exclusively to the extension of his sway southward to the mountains of Karakoram and Kuen Lun, beyond which he might expect no enemy. In Khoten the Mufti Habitulla had been invested with supreme control, after the deposition of the Chinese authorities; and during his government of the city and district, order appears to have been maintained without unnecessary exactions. When Yakoob Beg made his first appearance in Yarkand, after his earlier successes round Kashgar, it will be remembered that the Yarkandi acknowledged the supremacy of the new Khoja king. Their example was speedily followed by Habitulla of Khoten, and it is not stated that, even during the progress of hostilities with Yarkand, this ruler repudiated the arrangement into which he had entered. It is true that he was far removed from the immediate sphere of action, but that will not alone account for an indifference to the progress of events in Kashgar, which Khoten had never manifested on any previous occasion. Khoten may, therefore, be considered to have been exceptionally well behaved towards the new Khoja dynasty located at Kashgar; and when Yakoob Beg advanced to the south of Yarkand, Habitulla hastened to send representatives to the camp of the conqueror. They were received with consideration, but deep down in the breast of Yakoob Beg there lurked either an inveterate distrust of, or dislike to, the Mufti Habitulla. Dissembling his true feelings, Yakoob Beg sent a message requesting the presence of the Mufti in his camp. The Mufti, deluded by the friendly treatment bestowed on his emissaries, came with many of his relations and followers into the camp of the Kashgarian general. At first, we are told, they were treated with every mark of respect and kindness; they were feasted and clothed in precious garments, but all these honours were but the preliminaries to the concluding ceremony. During the progress of the evening meal they were disarmed, and led out to execution, while an attack was made from several quarters on the town. Even then the resistance was prolonged, and the slaughter by the infuriated soldiery of the Athalik Ghazi continued long after all serious opposition had ceased. It is impossible to exonerate Yakoob Beg from the chief blame on this occasion, and if he had been a civilized European general, we should have made use of the phrase, that "It must ever remain a blot on his career;" but it would be the height of irony to apply such a phrase to this unscrupulous Asiatic, who, if not worse than the school in which he was brought up, was certainly not much better in a moral sense. As the fact stands, the seizure of Khoten, and the ma.s.sacre of the unarmed leaders of that city, appear to have been acts as unnecessary as they were unjustifiable.

Khoten may have seemed to the Athalik Ghazi of exceptional importance for several reasons, and he may have felt doubtful of the fidelity of Habitulla and his followers; but, so far as we are aware, the reasons for this action are shadowy in the extreme, even regarded from the point of view of political expediency. Down to the present day, too, the memory of this ma.s.sacre, needless even in the eyes of a people accustomed to the shortest cuts to power by wholesale slaughter, has rankled in the minds of the inhabitants of Khoten and Sanju, and the Athalik Ghazi was least popular in that part of his state in which, according to the traditions of his predecessors, his action had been most sweeping, and accordingly most safe. This was early in the year 1867, and the Athalik Ghazi had now an opportunity for settling his relations.h.i.+p with his eastern neighbours, the Tungani.

The Tungan movement proper originated, as explained in the last chapter, in the Chinese provinces of Kansuh and Shensi, and then extended with scarcely a check to Turfan south of the Tian Shan and to Urumtsi north of that range. The flame soon spread from Turfan to Karashar, Kucha, and Aksu, and at all of these towns it was fomented by the appearance of the new element of the Mahomedan Khokandian, and native settlers, acting in combination with the Chinese Tungani. North of the Tian Shan the movement received a temporary repulse; and it is necessary to say something in explanation of the course of the Mahomedan revival in Ili before we proceed to discuss the earlier wars of Yakoob Beg with the Tungani. As early as 1860 serious complications had arisen in that province, although the Chinese had always been more firmly situated there than in Kashgar. In that year a plot was concocted to murder the Chinese viceroy and to upset the existing government. It was discovered, however, and fell through. There appear to have been more causes at work in Ili to produce discontent than in the southern state, and it was not so much a question here between Khitay and Tungani, as it was between a people clamouring for work, for less taxation, and for payment for what they had done, and an administration that was unable to satisfy the demands made upon it from all sides. That last resource of a government at its wits' ends for money, the depreciation of the current coin and the issue of fict.i.tious paper, was adopted by the Viceroy of Ili. The measure, which it had been expected would lessen the difficulty, only added fuel to the flame. The situation of affairs was becoming desperate; the people were encouraged by the disasters of the Chinese in the neighbouring states to increase the number of their demands; and the Chinese officials appear to have lost their heads in the storm that was gathering from all sides around them. They were but the effete representatives of a system which in its vigorous days had claims to general admiration, and they are only saved from incurring our contempt by the possession of courage, the sole virtue left them. When the Chinese first conquered Eastern Turkestan they brought from Kashgar a large number of settlers, and placed them in the country round Ili. They became known as Tarantchis, and, in the course of two or three generations, had increased into a very numerous community. These were always at heart disaffected to the Chinese, but, as they occupied a very subordinate position, would probably never have thought of revolt had not a large division of the conquerors set them the example of insubordination. So soon as the discontent among the working cla.s.ses had a.s.sumed formidable proportions by the pecuniary embarra.s.sment of the Chinese, and the Tungan su