Decision Points Part 13

Five weeks later, I looked Hamid Karzai in the eye for the first time. Forty-four years old with sharp features and a salt-and-pepper beard, Karzai cut a distinctive figure. He wore a s.h.i.+mmering green cape over his gray tunic, along with a pointed cap made of goatskin that was traditional in his southern Afghan tribe.

"Mr. Chairman, welcome to America," I said, "and welcome to the Oval Office." I experienced some fascinating moments in that office over the years. Opening the door for the leader of a free Afghanistan four months after 9/11 ranks among them.

In the Oval Office with Hamid Karzai. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper "On behalf of me and my people, thank you, Mr. President," Karzai said. "The United States liberated Afghanistan from the Soviet Union in the 1980s. And now you have liberated us again from the Taliban and alQaeda.

"We are independent and we will stand on our own two feet," he said, "but we need your help. The most common question I hear from my ministers and others in Afghanistan is whether the United States will continue to work with us."

I a.s.sured Karzai that he could count on America as a partner, and that we would not abandon his country again. We talked about the hunt for the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda operatives, the need to train an Afghan army and police force, and the importance of constructing roads, health clinics, and schools.

The next night, I saw Karzai again, in the House of Representatives for my State of the Union address. Laura sat next to him. One row back was Karzai's vice chairman-and Afghanistan's new minister of women's affairs-Dr. Sima Samar.

Karzai's immediate task was to show that life would improve with the Taliban gone. To support him, I sent Zalmay Khalilzad, a talented Afghan American on the National Security Council staff, to serve as my special envoy and, later, as American amba.s.sador. Zal and Karzai used hundreds of millions of dollars in American aid to build infrastructure, train teachers, print textbooks, and extend electricity and clean water to Afghanistan's rural population. One program funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID, helped more than three million Afghan children return to school. That was three times the number who had attended under the Taliban Taliban. About a million of the new students were girls.

From the beginning, we sought to bring as many nations as possible into the rebuilding effort. A multilateral approach would defray the financial burden and invest nations around the world in the ideological struggle against extremists. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of j.a.pan hosted an international donors' conference in January 2002. The Tokyo meeting yielded $4.5 billion in pledges. America and several key allies decided to divvy up responsibility for helping to build Afghan civil society. We took the lead in training a new Afghan National Army. Germany focused on training the national police. Great Britain adopted a counternarcotics mission. Italy worked to reform the justice system. j.a.pan launched an initiative to disarm and demobilize warlords and their militias.

Basic security was a necessary precondition for political and economic gains. So as part of the Bonn process, we supported the creation of an International Security a.s.sistance Force, known as ISAF, under the auspices of the United Nations. In the fall of 2002, NATO agreed to take command of ISAF, which contained nearly five thousand troops from twenty-two countries. We also had eight thousand American troops under the command of Tommy Franks training the Afghan security forces and conducting operations against the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban.

At the time, thirteen thousand troops seemed like the right amount. We had routed the Taliban with far fewer, and it seemed that the enemy was on the run. I agreed with our military leaders that we did not need a larger presence. We were all wary of repeating the experience of the Soviets and the British, who ended up looking like occupiers.

This strategy worked well at first. But in retrospect, our rapid success with low troop levels created false comfort, and our desire to maintain a light military footprint left us short of the resources we needed. It would take several years for these shortcomings to become clear.

In June 2002, Afghans gathered for a second loya jirga loya jirga to select a transitional government. This time security was good enough to host the conference in Kabul. The delegates chose Karzai to head the new government, and he appointed cabinet ministers from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds. I made it a priority to check in regularly with Karzai. I knew he had a daunting task, and I wanted to lift his spirits and a.s.sure him of our commitment. I offered advice and made requests, but I was careful not to give him orders. The best way to help him grow as a leader was to treat him like one. to select a transitional government. This time security was good enough to host the conference in Kabul. The delegates chose Karzai to head the new government, and he appointed cabinet ministers from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds. I made it a priority to check in regularly with Karzai. I knew he had a daunting task, and I wanted to lift his spirits and a.s.sure him of our commitment. I offered advice and made requests, but I was careful not to give him orders. The best way to help him grow as a leader was to treat him like one.

The young government made progress. In September 2003, President Karzai told me that pay for the average Afghan had increased from one dollar to three dollars a day-a major improvement, but also a reminder of how primitive the country remained. The government's biggest accomplishment was drafting a new const.i.tution, which was ratified by a third loya jirga loya jirga in January 2004. A country that three years earlier had forced women to paint the windows of their homes black now protected basic rights such as freedom of speech and a.s.sembly. The const.i.tution established an independent judiciary and bicameral legislature, and it mandated that women account for 25 percent of the House of the People. in January 2004. A country that three years earlier had forced women to paint the windows of their homes black now protected basic rights such as freedom of speech and a.s.sembly. The const.i.tution established an independent judiciary and bicameral legislature, and it mandated that women account for 25 percent of the House of the People.

The next step was to hold the first free presidential election in Afghanistan's history, which was scheduled for October 9, 2004. The Taliban and al Qaeda al Qaeda pledged to kill voters, candidates, and election officials. U.S., NATO, and UN officials helped train election workers and secure voting stations. I hoped the Afghan people would express their desire for liberty at the polls. In truth, n.o.body knew what to expect. pledged to kill voters, candidates, and election officials. U.S., NATO, and UN officials helped train election workers and secure voting stations. I hoped the Afghan people would express their desire for liberty at the polls. In truth, n.o.body knew what to expect.

When dawn broke, the world witnessed an amazing sight. Across the country, Afghans had lined up overnight, eager to vote. At the front of the line outside the first polling station to open was a nineteen-year-old girl. "I cannot explain my feelings, just how happy I am," she said. "I would never have thought I would be able to vote in this election."

Across the country, turnout exceeded eight million, nearly 80 percent of the voting-age population. Every major ethnic and religious group partic.i.p.ated, as did millions of women. The polls stayed open two extra hours to accommodate the huge crowds.

Condi gave me the news early in the morning in Missouri, where I'd debated John Kerry the night before. I was pleased with the results, but not surprised. I believe the human desire for freedom is universal. History shows that, when given the chance, people of every race and religion take extraordinary risks for liberty. In one village, a toothless man in a black turban said, "It is like independence day, or freedom day. We are bringing security and peace to this country."

When the ballots were tallied, Hamid Karzai became the freely elected president. History has a way of dulling memories. But I will always remember the joy and pride I felt that first election day, when the people of Afghanistan-the land where 9/11 was conceived-cast their ballots for a future of freedom.

In September 2005, the Afghan people went to the polls again, this time to choose a national legislature. More than 2,700 candidates put their names forward for 249 seats. Nearly 7 million voters turned out, despite Taliban Taliban threats and calls for a boycott. The new National a.s.sembly included 68 women and representatives of almost every ethnic group. threats and calls for a boycott. The new National a.s.sembly included 68 women and representatives of almost every ethnic group.

d.i.c.k Cheney represented the United States at the a.s.sembly's inaugural session in December 2005. The ceremony opened with an emotional speech from the nation's former king, ninety-one-year-old Zahir Shah. "I thank G.o.d that today I am partic.i.p.ating in a ceremony that is a step towards rebuilding Afghanistan after decades of fighting," he said. "The people of Afghanistan will succeed!"

I shared his optimism. Four years after the fall of the Taliban, the country had elected a president and a parliament. But I recognized the elections were only a first step. Democracy is a journey that requires a nation to build governing inst.i.tutions such as courts of law, security forces, an education system, a free press, and a vibrant civil society. Afghanistan had made some hopeful progress. Some 5 million children, including 1.5 million girls, were back in school. The economy was growing at an average rate of more than 15 percent per year. A much-antic.i.p.ated new highway from Kabul to Kandahar had been completed. Four million of 7 million refugees had returned home.

On the surface, it seemed we were making progress. But trouble lurked underneath. In June 2005, a four-man Navy SEAL team operating high in the mountains was ambushed by the Taliban. The team leader, Lieutenant Michael Murphy, moved into an exposed position to call in help for his three fellow wounded SEALs. He stayed on the line long enough to relay his teammates' location before suffering fatal wounds. When a Special Forces chopper arrived to extract the SEALs, Taliban fighters shot it down. Nineteen Americans were killed, making it the deadliest day of the war in Afghanistan and the worst for the SEALs since World War II. One SEAL, Petty Officer First Cla.s.s Marcus Luttrell, lived to tell the story in his riveting book, Lone Survivor Lone Survivor.

Two years later, I presented the Medal of Honor to Lieutenant Michael Murphy's parents in the East Room of the White House. We talked about their son, a talented athlete and honors graduate of Penn State whose one brush with trouble came when he intervened in a schoolyard fight to protect a disabled child. In our meeting before the ceremony, they gave me a gold dog tag with Mike's name, photo, and rank engraved on it. I put it on under my s.h.i.+rt and wore it during the ceremony.

Presenting Dan and Maureen Murphy with the Medal of Honor earned by their son, Navy Lieutenant Michael Murphy. White House/Joyce Boghosian White House/Joyce Boghosian As the military aide read the Medal of Honor citation, I looked into the audience. I saw a group of Navy SEALs in their dress blues. These battle-hardened men had tears streaming down their cheeks. As I later told Daniel and Maureen Murphy, I gained strength from having a reminder of Mike next to my heart.

The devastating attack on the SEALs was a harbinger of trouble to come. In 2005 and 2006, Taliban militants killed road-building crews, burned down schools, and murdered teachers in provinces near the Pakistan border. In September 2006, a Taliban suicide bomber a.s.sa.s.sinated the governor of Paktia Province near his office in Gardez. The next day, another suicide bomber struck the governor's funeral, killing six mourners.

My CIA and military briefings included increasingly dire reports about Taliban influence. The problem was crystallized by a series of color-coded maps I saw in November 2006. The darker the shading, the more attacks had occurred in that part of Afghanistan. The 2004 map was lightly shaded. The 2005 map had darker areas in the southern and eastern parts of the country. By 2006, the entire southeastern quadrant was black. In just one year, the number of remotely detonated bombs had doubled. The number of armed attacks had tripled. The number of suicide bombings had more than quadrupled.

It was clear we needed to adjust our strategy. The multilateral approach to rebuilding, hailed by so many in the international community, was failing. There was little coordination between countries, and no one devoted enough resources to the effort. The German initiative to build the national police force had fallen short. The Italian mission to reform the justice system had failed. The British-led counternarcotics campaign showed results in some areas, but drug production had boomed in fertile southern provinces like Helmand. The Afghan National Army that America trained had improved, but in an attempt to keep the Afghan government from taking on an unsustainable expense, we had kept the army too small.

The multilateral military mission proved a disappointment as well. Every member of NATO had sent troops to Afghanistan. So had more than a dozen other countries. But many parliaments imposed heavy restrictions-known as national caveats-on what their troops were permitted to do. Some were not allowed to patrol at night. Others could not engage in combat. The result was a disorganized and ineffective force, with troops fighting by different rules and many not fighting at all.

Failures in the Afghan government contributed to the problem. While I liked and respected President Karzai, there was too much corruption. Warlords pocketed large amounts of customs revenue that should have gone to Kabul. Others took a cut of the profits from the drug trade. The result was that Afghans lost faith in their government. With nowhere else to turn, many Afghans relied on the Taliban and ruthless extremist commanders like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani. A CIA report quoted one Afghan as saying, "I don't care who is in power, as long as they bring security. Security is all that matters."

The stakes were too high to let Afghanistan fall back into the hands of the extremists. I decided that America had to take on more of the responsibility, even though we were about to undertake a major new commitment in Iraq as well.

"d.a.m.n it, we can do more than one thing at a time," I told the national security team. "We cannot lose in Afghanistan."

In the fall of 2006, I ordered a troop increase that would boost our force levels from twenty-one thousand to thirty-one thousand over the next two years. I called the 50 percent increase a "silent surge." "silent surge."** To help the Afghan government extend its reach and effectiveness, we more than doubled funding for reconstruction. We increased the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which brought together military personnel and civilian experts to ensure that security gains were translated into meaningful improvements in everyday life. We also increased the size of the Afghan National Army, expanded our counternarcotics effort, improved intelligence efforts along the Pakistan border, and sent civilian experts from the U.S. government to help Afghan ministries strengthen their capacity and reduce corruption. To help the Afghan government extend its reach and effectiveness, we more than doubled funding for reconstruction. We increased the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which brought together military personnel and civilian experts to ensure that security gains were translated into meaningful improvements in everyday life. We also increased the size of the Afghan National Army, expanded our counternarcotics effort, improved intelligence efforts along the Pakistan border, and sent civilian experts from the U.S. government to help Afghan ministries strengthen their capacity and reduce corruption.

I urged our NATO allies to match our commitment by dropping caveats on their troops and adding more forces. Several leaders responded, including Stephen Harper of Canada, Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark, and Nicolas Sarkozy of France. The British and Canadians fought especially bravely and suffered significant casualties. America was fortunate to have them at our side, and we honor their sacrifice as our own.

Other leaders told me bluntly that their parliaments would never go along. It was maddening. Afghanistan was supposed to be a war the world had agreed was necessary and just. And yet many countries were sending troops so heavily restricted that our generals complained they just took up s.p.a.ce. NATO had turned into a two-tiered alliance, with some countries willing to fight and many not.

The adjustments in our strategy improved our ability to take on the insurgents. Yet the violence continued. The primary cause of the trouble did not originate in Afghanistan or, as some suggested, in Iraq. It came from Pakistan.

For most of my presidency, Pakistan was led by President Pervez Musharraf Pervez Musharraf. I admired his decision to side with America after 9/11. He held parliamentary elections in 2002, which his party won, and spoke about "enlightened moderation" as an alternative to Islamic extremism. He took serious risks to battle al Qaeda. Terrorists tried to a.s.sa.s.sinate him at least four times.

With Pervez Musharraf. White House/Paul Morse White House/Paul Morse In the months after we liberated Afghanistan, I told Musharraf I was troubled by reports of al Qaeda and Taliban Taliban forces fleeing into the loosely governed, tribal provinces of Pakistan-an area often compared to the Wild West. "I'd be more than willing to send our Special Forces across the border to clear out the areas," I said. forces fleeing into the loosely governed, tribal provinces of Pakistan-an area often compared to the Wild West. "I'd be more than willing to send our Special Forces across the border to clear out the areas," I said.

He told me that sending American troops into combat in Pakistan would be viewed as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty. A revolt would likely ensue. His government would probably fall. The extremists could take over the country, including its nuclear a.r.s.enal.

In that case, I told him, his soldiers needed to take the lead. For several years, the arrangement worked. Pakistani forces netted hundreds of terrorists, including al Qaeda leaders like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, and Abu Faraj al Libbi. Musharraf also arrested A.Q. Khan, the revered father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, for selling components from the country's program on the black market. As Musharraf often reminded me, Pakistani forces paid a high price for taking on the extremists. More than fourteen hundred were killed in the war on terror.

In return for Pakistan's cooperation, we lifted the sanctions, designated Pakistan a major non-NATO ally, and helped fund its counterterrorism operations. We also worked with Congress to provide $3 billion in economic aid and opened our markets to more Pakistani goods and services.

Over time, it became clear that Musharraf either would not or could not fulfill all his promises. Part of the problem was Pakistan's obsession with India India. In almost every conversation we had, Musharraf accused India of wrongdoing. Four days after 9/11, he told me the Indians were "trying to equate us with terrorists and trying to influence your mind." As a result, the Pakistani military spent most of its resources preparing for war with India. Its troops were trained to wage a conventional battle with its neighbor, not counterterrorism operations in the tribal areas. The fight against the extremists came second.

A related problem was that Pakistani forces pursued the Taliban much less aggressively than they pursued al Qaeda. Some in the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, retained close ties to Taliban officials. Others wanted an insurance policy in case America abandoned Afghanistan and India tried to gain influence there. Whatever the reason, Taliban fighters who fled Afghanistan took refuge in Pakistan's tribal regions and populated cities like Peshawar and Quetta. In 2005 and 2006, these sanctuaries aided the rise of the insurgency insurgency.

In March 2006, I visited President Musharraf in Islamabad. Our meeting followed a stop in India, where Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and I signed an agreement clearing the way for nuclear cooperation between our two countries. The deal was the culmination of our efforts to improve relations between the world's oldest democracy and the world's largest democracy. I believe India, home to roughly a billion people and an educated middle cla.s.s, has the potential to be one of America's closest partners. The nuclear agreement was a historic step because it signaled the country's new role on the world stage.

With Manmohan Singh. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper The nuclear deal naturally raised concerns in Pakistan. Our amba.s.sador, a remarkable veteran Foreign Service officer named Ryan Crocker, argued strongly that we should spend the night in Islamabad as a sign of respect. No president had done that since Richard Nixon thirty-seven years earlier. The Secret Service was anxious, especially after a bombing near the U.S. consulate in Karachi the day before we arrived. But symbolism matters in diplomacy, and I wanted to signal that I valued our relations.h.i.+p. At the airport, a decoy motorcade drove to the emba.s.sy mostly empty. My chief of protocol, Amba.s.sador Don Ensenat, took my place in the presidential limo, while Laura and I flew secretly via Black Hawk helicopter.

In contrast to the rigid security precautions, President Musharraf organized a relaxed and enjoyable visit. He and his wife, Sehba, received us warmly at their version of the White House, known as the Aiwan-e-Sadr. We met with survivors of the previous October's 7.6-magnitude earthquake in northern Pakistan, which killed more than seventy-three thousand people. America had provided $500 million in relief. Our Chinook helicopters became known as "angels of mercy." The experience reinforced a lesson: One of the most effective forms of diplomacy is to show the good heart of America to the world.

Later in the day, I went to the emba.s.sy courtyard to watch some cricket, Pakistan's national pastime. There I met national team captain Inzamam-ul-Haq, the Pakistani equivalent of Michael Jordan. To the delight of the schoolchildren on hand, I took a few whacks with the cricket bat. I didn't master the game, but I did pick up some of the lingo. At the elegant state dinner that night, I opened my toast by saying, "I was fooled by a googly,*** otherwise I would have been a better batsman." otherwise I would have been a better batsman."

Playing cricket in Pakistan. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper My meetings with President Musharraf focused on two overriding priorities. One was his insistence on serving as both president and top general, a violation of the Pakistani const.i.tution. I pushed him to shed his military affiliation and govern as a civilian. He promised to do it. But he wasn't in much of a hurry.

I also stressed the importance of the fight against extremists. "We've got to keep these guys from slipping into your country and back into Afghanistan," I said.

"I give you our a.s.surances that we will cooperate with you against terrorism," Musharraf said. "We are totally on board."

The violence continued to grow. As the insurgency insurgency worsened, worsened, Hamid Karzai Hamid Karzai became furious with Musharraf. He accused the Pakistani president of destabilizing Afghanistan. Musharraf was insulted by the allegation. By the fall of 2006, the two were barely on speaking terms. I decided to step in with some serious personal diplomacy. I invited Karzai and Musharraf to dinner at the White House in September 2006. When I welcomed them in the Rose Garden, they refused to shake hands or even look at each other. The mood did not improve when we sat down for dinner in the Old Family Dining Room. d.i.c.k Cheney, Condi Rice, Steve Hadley, and I watched as Karzai and Musharraf traded barbs. At one point, Karzai accused Musharraf of harboring the became furious with Musharraf. He accused the Pakistani president of destabilizing Afghanistan. Musharraf was insulted by the allegation. By the fall of 2006, the two were barely on speaking terms. I decided to step in with some serious personal diplomacy. I invited Karzai and Musharraf to dinner at the White House in September 2006. When I welcomed them in the Rose Garden, they refused to shake hands or even look at each other. The mood did not improve when we sat down for dinner in the Old Family Dining Room. d.i.c.k Cheney, Condi Rice, Steve Hadley, and I watched as Karzai and Musharraf traded barbs. At one point, Karzai accused Musharraf of harboring the Taliban Taliban.

A tense Rose Garden welcome for Pervez Musharraf (left) and Hamid Karzai. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper "Tell me where they are," Musharraf responded testily.

"You know where they are!" Karzai fired back.

"If I did, I would get them," said Musharraf.

"Go do it!" Karzai persisted.

I started to wonder whether this dinner had been a mistake.

I told Musharraf and Karzai that the stakes were too high for personal bickering. I kept the dinner going for two and a half hours, trying to help them find common ground. After a while, the venting stopped and the meeting turned out to be productive. The two leaders agreed to share more intelligence, meet with tribes on both sides of the border to urge peace, and stop bad-mouthing each other in public.

As a way to staunch the flow of Taliban Taliban fighters, Musharraf informed us that he had recently struck a series of deals with tribes in the border region. Under the agreements, Pakistani forces would leave the areas alone, while tribal leaders would commit to stopping the Taliban from recruiting operatives or infiltrating into Afghanistan. fighters, Musharraf informed us that he had recently struck a series of deals with tribes in the border region. Under the agreements, Pakistani forces would leave the areas alone, while tribal leaders would commit to stopping the Taliban from recruiting operatives or infiltrating into Afghanistan.

While well intentioned, the strategy failed. The tribes did not have the will or the capacity to control the extremists. Some estimates indicated that the flow of Taliban fighters into Afghanistan increased fourfold.

Musharraf had promised Karzai and me-both skeptics of the strategy-that he would send troops back into the tribal areas if the deals failed. But instead of focusing on that problem, Musharraf and the Pakistani military were increasingly distracted by a political crisis. In March 2007, Musharraf suspended the chief justice of the Supreme Court, who he feared would rule that he was violating the law by continuing to serve as both president and army chief of staff. Lawyers and democracy advocates marched in the streets. Musharraf responded by declaring a state of emergency, suspending the const.i.tution, removing more judges, and arresting thousands of political opponents.

Pressure mounted on me to cut ties with Musharraf. I worried that throwing him overboard would add to the chaos. I had a series of frank conversations with him in the fall of 2007. "It looks ugly from here. The image here is that you have lawyers being beaten and thrown into jail," I said. "I am troubled by the fact that there is no apparent way forward." I strongly suggested one: set a date for free elections, resign from the army, and lift the state of emergency.

Musharraf made each of those commitments, and he kept them. When he scheduled parliamentary elections, former Prime Minister Ben.a.z.ir Bhutto Ben.a.z.ir Bhutto returned from exile to compete. She ran on a pro-democracy platform, which made her a target of the extremists. Tragically, she was a.s.sa.s.sinated on December 27, 2007, at a political rally in Rawalpindi. In February 2008, her followers won the elections soundly. They formed a government, and Musharraf stepped down peacefully. returned from exile to compete. She ran on a pro-democracy platform, which made her a target of the extremists. Tragically, she was a.s.sa.s.sinated on December 27, 2007, at a political rally in Rawalpindi. In February 2008, her followers won the elections soundly. They formed a government, and Musharraf stepped down peacefully. Asif Ali Zardari Asif Ali Zardari, Bhutto's widower, took his place as president. Pakistan's democracy had survived the crisis.

Over time, the Pakistani government learned the lesson of the Bhutto a.s.sa.s.sination. Pakistani forces returned to the fight in the tribal areas-not just against al Qaeda al Qaeda, but against the Taliban and other extremists as well. Yet more than a year had been lost, as Pakistan's attention was focused on its internal political crisis. The Taliban and other extremists exploited that window of opportunity to increase their tempo of operations in Afghanistan, which drove up the violence and led many Afghans to turn against their government and our coalition. It was essential that we find a way to retake the offensive.

By the middle of 2008, I was tired of reading intelligence reports about extremist sanctuaries in Pakistan. I thought back to a meeting I'd had with Special Forces in Afghanistan in 2006.

"Are you guys getting everything you need?" I asked.

One SEAL raised his hand and said, "No, sir."

I wondered what his problem might be.

"Mr. President," he said, "we need permission to go kick some a.s.s inside Pakistan."

I understood the urgency of the threat and wanted to do something about it. But on this issue, Musharraf's judgment had been well-founded. When our forces encountered unexpected resistance, they got into a firefight and made international news. "U.S. Commandos Attack Pakistan Sovereignty," one Pakistani headline said. Islamabad exploded with outrage. Both houses of parliament pa.s.sed unanimous resolutions condemning our action. No democracy can tolerate violations of its sovereignty.

I looked for other ways to reach into the tribal areas. The Predator, an unmanned aerial vehicle, was capable of conducting video surveillance and firing laser-guided bombs. I authorized the intelligence community to turn up the pressure on the extremists. Many of the details of our actions remain cla.s.sified. But soon after I gave the order, the press started reporting more Predator strikes. Al Qaeda's number-four man, Khalid al-Habib, turned up dead. So did al Qaeda leaders responsible for propaganda, recruitment, religious affairs, and planning attacks overseas. One of the last reports I received described al Qaeda as "embattled and eroding" in the border region.

We also stepped up our support for Pakistan's democratic government. We provided money, training, and equipment, and proposed joint counterterrorism operations-all aimed at helping increase Pakistani capabilities. When the financial crisis. .h.i.t in the fall of 2008, we took steps to make sure Pakistan received the a.s.sistance it needed to mitigate the effects of the recession and stay focused on fighting the extremists.

One of my national security team's last projects was a review of our strategy in Afghanistan. It was led by Doug Lute, a brainy three-star general who coordinated day-to-day execution of our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The report called for a more robust counterinsurgency effort, including more troops and civilian resources in Afghanistan and closer cooperation with Pakistan to go after the extremists. We debated whether to announce our findings publicly in the final weeks of my presidency. Steve Hadley checked with his counterpart in the incoming administration, who preferred that we pa.s.s along our report quietly. I decided the new strategy would have a better chance of success if we gave the new team an opportunity to revise it as they saw fit and then adopt it as their own.

In December 2008, I made a farewell trip to Afghanistan farewell trip to Afghanistan. Air Force One landed at Bagram Air Base around 5:00 a.m., just ahead of the dawn. "I have a message to you, and to all who serve our country," I told a hangar full of troops. "Thanks for making the n.o.ble choice to serve and protect your fellow Americans. What you're doing in Afghanistan is important, it is courageous, and it is selfless. It's akin to what American troops did in places like Normandy and Iwo Jima and Korea. Your generation is every bit as great as any that has come before. And the work you do every day is shaping history for generations to come."

I shook hands with the troops and boarded a Black Hawk helicopter for the forty-minute flight to Kabul. Afghanistan is one of those places you have to see to understand. The mountains are gigantic and rugged; the terrain is harsh and bare; the landscape feels desolate and forbidding. Like many Americans, I sometimes wondered how anyone could hide from our military for seven years. When I looked at the topography of Afghanistan, it was easy to understand.

As we got closer to Kabul, I picked up an acrid smell. I realized it was coming from burning tires-sadly, an Afghan way of keeping warm. The air quality was no better on the ground. I was coughing for a week when I got home, a reminder that the country had a long way to go.

When we landed at the presidential palace, President Karzai strode over to meet me in his trademark robe and cap. He introduced me to his cabinet ministers and escorted me to a large sitting room for tea. As usual, he was energetic and exuberant. He beamed with pride as he showed me photos of his young son, Mirwais, his only child. He talked about his plans to increase Afghanistan's agricultural yield and stimulate its business sector in areas like telecommunications. After the meetings, he walked me out into the dusty courtyard. We parted with a handshake and a hug. No doubt he had made mistakes. But despite all the forces working against him, he never lost his determination to lead his country toward a better day. He helped give the Afghan people hope, something they hadn't had in many years. For that, he will always have my grat.i.tude and respect.

With Karzai on the last foreign trip of my presidency. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper As I climbed aboard the chopper, I thought back to the afternoon in October 2001 when I announced the opening of the war from the Treaty Room. A country dominated by one of history's cruelest regimes was now governed by freely elected leaders. Women who had been prisoners in their homes were serving in parliament. While still a danger, al Qaeda al Qaeda had lost the camps it used to train ten thousand terrorists and plan 9/11. The Afghan people had cast their ballots in multiple free elections and had built an increasingly capable army of seventy-nine thousand soldiers. Afghanistan's economy had doubled in size. School enrollment had risen from nine hundred thousand to more than six million, including more than two million girls. Access to health care had gone from 8 percent to 80 percent. In 2010, the Pentagon revealed that geologists had discovered nearly a trillion dollars' worth of mineral deposits in Afghanistan, a potential source of wealth for the Afghan people that the Taliban would never have found. had lost the camps it used to train ten thousand terrorists and plan 9/11. The Afghan people had cast their ballots in multiple free elections and had built an increasingly capable army of seventy-nine thousand soldiers. Afghanistan's economy had doubled in size. School enrollment had risen from nine hundred thousand to more than six million, including more than two million girls. Access to health care had gone from 8 percent to 80 percent. In 2010, the Pentagon revealed that geologists had discovered nearly a trillion dollars' worth of mineral deposits in Afghanistan, a potential source of wealth for the Afghan people that the Taliban would never have found.

I also knew I was leaving behind unfinished business. I wanted badly to bring bin Laden bin Laden to justice. The fact that we did not ranks among my great regrets. It certainly wasn't for lack of effort. For seven years, we kept the pressure on. While we never found the al Qaeda leader, we did force him to change the way he traveled, communicated, and operated. That helped us deny him his greatest wish after 9/11: to see America attacked again. to justice. The fact that we did not ranks among my great regrets. It certainly wasn't for lack of effort. For seven years, we kept the pressure on. While we never found the al Qaeda leader, we did force him to change the way he traveled, communicated, and operated. That helped us deny him his greatest wish after 9/11: to see America attacked again.

As I write in 2010, the war in Afghanistan continues. The Taliban remain active, and the Afghan government is struggling to gain full control of its country. From the beginning, I knew it would take time to help the Afghan people build a functioning democracy consistent with its culture and traditions. The task turned out to be even more daunting than I antic.i.p.ated. Our government was not prepared for nation building. Over time, we adapted our strategy and our capabilities. Still, the poverty in Afghanistan is so deep, and the infrastructure is so lacking, that it will take many years to complete the work.

I strongly believe the mission is worth the cost. Fortunately, I am not the only one. In the fall of 2009, President Obama stood up to critics by deploying more troops, announcing a new commitment to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and increasing the pressure on Pakistan to fight the extremists in the tribal areas.

Ultimately, the only way the Taliban and al Qaeda can retake Afghanistan is if America abandons the country. Allowing the extremists to reclaim power would force Afghan women back into subservience, remove girls from school, and betray all the gains of the past nine years. It would also endanger our security. After the Cold War, the United States gave up on Afghanistan. The result was chaos, civil war, the Taliban takeover, sanctuary for al Qaeda, and the nightmare of 9/11. To forget that lesson would be a dreadful mistake.

Before I took off from Bagram Air Base for the flight home in December 2008, I returned to the hangar for the final meeting of my last foreign trip as president. Standing in the room was a group of Special Forces. Many had served multiple tours, hunting the terrorists and Taliban in the freezing mountains. They had one of the hardest and most dangerous jobs in the world. I shook their hands and told them how grateful I was for their service.

Then a small group of soldiers from the 75th Ranger Regiment entered the room. Their platoon leader, Captain Ramon Ramos, asked if I would be willing to partic.i.p.ate in a brief ceremony. He reached into a pouch, unfurled a large American flag, and raised his right hand. Several of his men stood opposite him and did the same. He delivered an oath, which the men repeated. "I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Const.i.tution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic...."

There in that lonely hangar, in the nation where 9/11 was planned, in the eighth year of a war to protect America, these men on the front lines chose to reenlist.

*Vice President d.i.c.k Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Bob Mueller, Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, CIA Director George Tenet and Deputy Director John McLaughlin, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Hugh Shelton and Vice Chairman d.i.c.k Myers, White House Chief of Staff Andy Card, National Security Adviser Condi Rice and Deputy National Security Adviser Steve Hadley, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, and Chief of Staff to the Vice President I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby.

**The surge in Iraq attracted much more attention.