Decision Points Part 23

Before George deployed to Baghdad, Laura and I invited him and his wife, Sheila, to dinner at the White House. We were joined by Amba.s.sador to Iraq John Negroponte John Negroponte**-an experienced and skilled diplomat who had volunteered for the job-and his wife, Diana. George gave me a biography of legendary football coach Vince Lombardi Vince Lombardi. George had worked as an equipment manager for the Was.h.i.+ngton Redskins during Lombardi's final season. The gift was telling. Like the coach he admired, George was not flashy or glamorous. He was a solid, straightforward commander-a "block of granite," as Lombardi was once known.

General Casey-like General Abizaid and Don Rumsfeld-was convinced our troop presence created a sense of occupation, which inflamed violence and fueled the insurgency. For two and a half years, I had supported the strategy of withdrawing our forces as the Iraqis stepped forward. But in the months after the Samarra bombing, I had started to question whether our approach matched the reality on the ground. The sectarian violence sectarian violence had not erupted because our footprint was too big. It had happened because had not erupted because our footprint was too big. It had happened because al Qaeda al Qaeda had provoked it. And with the Iraqis struggling to stand up, it didn't seem possible for us to stand down. had provoked it. And with the Iraqis struggling to stand up, it didn't seem possible for us to stand down.

Everyone on the national security team shared my concerns about the deteriorating conditions. But it was my national security adviser, Steve Hadley Steve Hadley, who was first to help me find a solution.

Steve came to my attention during the 2000 campaign, when he was part of the foreign policy advisory group a.s.sembled by Condi. Steve was a reluctant public figure. Yet when he was placed before the camera, his scholarly demeanor and logical presentation carried great credibility. Behind the scenes, he was thoughtful and steady. He listened, synthesized, and pondered without brooding. He articulated options clearly. Once I had reached a decision, he knew how to work with the team to implement it.

Steve is a formal person. He would board the airplane for long overseas flights in his tie, sleep in his tie, and emerge with a crisp knot still in place. He once volunteered for cedar chopping at the ranch. His job was to pile up cut branches. He performed the task meticulously, effectively, and in his brogan shoes. Behind the formality, Steve is a kind, selfless, humorous man. I spent many weekends at Camp David with him and his wife, Ann. The two have a great love affair. Both are cerebral. Both are hikers. And both are great parents to their two lovely girls.

With Steve Hadley. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper I met with Steve almost every morning of my second term. After a particularly rough day in the spring of 2006, we reviewed the blue sheet at the Resolute desk. I shook my head and glanced up. Steve was shaking his head, too.

"This is not working," I said. "We need to take another look at the whole strategy. I need to see some new options."

"Mr. President," he responded, "I'm afraid you're right."

Steve went to work organizing a detailed review. Every night, the Iraq team on the NSC staff produced a memo detailing the military and political developments of the past twenty-four hours. The picture they painted was not pretty. One day in the late spring, I asked Meghan O'Sullivan Meghan O'Sullivan, a Ph.D. who had spent a year working for Jerry Bremer in Iraq, to stay behind after a meeting. She maintained contacts with many senior officials in the Iraqi government. I asked what she was hearing from Baghdad. "It's h.e.l.l, Mr. President," she said.

In mid-June, Steve arranged to have a group of outside experts brief me at Camp David. Fred Kagan Fred Kagan, a military scholar at the American Enterprise Inst.i.tute, questioned whether we had enough troops to control the violence. Robert Kaplan Robert Kaplan, a distinguished journalist, recommended adopting a more aggressive counterinsurgency strategy counterinsurgency strategy. Michael Vickers Michael Vickers, a former CIA operative who helped arm the Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s, suggested a greater role for Special Operations. Eliot Cohen Eliot Cohen, the author of Supreme Command Supreme Command, a book about the relations.h.i.+p between presidents and their generals that I had read at Steve's suggestion, told me I needed to hold my commanders accountable for results.

To provide another perspective, Steve brought me articles from colonels and one-star generals who had commanded troops in Iraq. A dichotomy emerged: While Generals Casey and Abizaid supported the train-and-withdraw strategy, many of those closest to the fight thought we needed more troops.

One who intrigued me was Colonel H.R. McMaster. I had read his book on Vietnam, Dereliction of Duty Dereliction of Duty, which charged the military leaders.h.i.+p with not doing enough to correct the strategy adopted by President Johnson and Defense Secretary Bob McNamara. In 2005, Colonel McMaster commanded a regiment in the northern Iraqi city of Tal Afar. He had applied a counterinsurgency strategy, using his troops to clear out insurgents, hold the newly taken territory, and help build the local economy and political inst.i.tutions. This doctrine of clear, hold, and build had turned Tal Afar from an insurgent stronghold to a relatively peaceful, functioning city.

Another pract.i.tioner of counterinsurgency was General David Petraeus. I first met him at Fort Campbell in 2004. He had a reputation as one of the smartest and most dynamic young generals in the Army. He had graduated near the top of his cla.s.s at West Point and earned a Ph.D. from Princeton. In 1991, he was accidentally shot in the chest during a training exercise. He endured a sixty-mile helicopter flight to Vanderbilt University Medical Center, where his life was saved by Dr. Bill Frist Bill Frist, later the Republican leader of the Senate.

Early in the war, General Petraeus had commanded the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul. He sent his troops to live alongside Iraqi residents and patrol the streets on foot. Their presence rea.s.sured residents that we were there to protect them. Petraeus then held local elections to form a provincial council, spent reconstruction funds to revive economic activity, and reopened the border with Syria to facilitate trade. His approach was textbook counterinsurgency. To defeat the enemy, he was trying to win over the people.

It worked. While violence in much of Iraq increased, Mosul remained relatively calm. But when we reduced troops in Mosul, violence returned. The same would happen in Tal Afar.

After overseeing training of the Iraqi security forces, General Petraeus was a.s.signed to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to rewrite the Army's counterinsurgency manual. The premise of counterinsurgency is that basic security is required before political gains can follow. That was the reverse of our existing strategy. I decided to keep a close eye on General Petraeus's work-and on him.

Amid all the bad news of 2006, we did have one bright spot. In early June, Special Forces under the command of the highly effective General Stanley McChrystal tracked down and killed Zarqawi, al Qaeda's leader in Iraq. For the first time since the December elections, we were able to show the public a dramatic sign of progress.

A week later, I quietly slipped out of Camp David after a day of NSC meetings. I hopped on an Army transport helicopter with a small group of aides, flew to Andrews Air Force Base, and boarded Air Force One. Eleven hours later, we landed in Baghdad.

Unlike my Thanksgiving trip in 2003, when my meetings took place at the airport, I decided to meet Maliki in the Green Zone, the fortified complex in central Baghdad. Army helicopters flew us over the city fast and low, shooting off an occasional flare as a protection against a heat-seeking missile. The prime minister was waiting for me when I got to the emba.s.sy. Ever since his selection in April, I had wanted to see Maliki face to face. In our phone calls, he had said the right things. But I wondered if his a.s.surances were real.

"Your decisions and actions will determine success," I told him. "It will not be easy, but no matter how hard it is, we'll help you."

Maliki thanked America for liberating the country and affirmed his desire for a close friends.h.i.+p. "We will achieve victory over terror, which is a victory for democracy," he said. "There are a lot of dark people who fear our success. They are right to be worried, because our success will unseat them from their thrones."

The prime minister had a gentle manner and a quiet voice, but I sensed an inner toughness. Saddam Hussein Saddam Hussein had executed multiple members of Maliki's family, yet he had refused to renounce his role in the opposition party. His personal courage was a seed that I hoped to nurture, so he could grow into the strong leader the Iraqis needed. had executed multiple members of Maliki's family, yet he had refused to renounce his role in the opposition party. His personal courage was a seed that I hoped to nurture, so he could grow into the strong leader the Iraqis needed.

The prime minister took me into a conference room to meet his cabinet, which included s.h.i.+a, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders. I introduced him to my team via videoconference. My advisers, who did not know that I had left Camp David, were stunned to see me in Baghdad. The Iraqis were thrilled to address their counterparts for the first-ever joint national security meeting between the United States and Iraq.

The other pivotal meeting of the trip was with George Casey. The hardworking general had been in Iraq for two years, extending his tour at my request. He told me that 80 percent of the sectarian violence occurred within thirty miles of Baghdad. Controlling the capital was vital to calming the rest of the country.

General Casey was planning a new effort to secure Baghdad. The offensive, Operation Together Forward, would attempt to apply the clear, hold, and build approach that had once succeeded in Tal Afar and Mosul.

I saw a contradiction. The "clear, hold, and build" strategy was troop-intensive. But our generals wanted to reduce our footprint. He picked up on my doubts. "I need to do a better job explaining it to you," General Casey said.

"You do," I replied.

The summer of 2006 was the worst period of my presidency. I thought about the war constantly. While I was heartened by the determination of the Maliki government and the death of Zarqawi, I was deeply concerned that the violence was overtaking all else. An average of 120 Iraqis a day were dying. The war had stretched to more than three years and we had lost more than 2,500 Americans. By a margin of almost two to one, Americans said they disapproved of the way I was handling Iraq.

For the first time, I worried we might not succeed. If Iraq split along sectarian lines, our mission would be doomed. We could be looking at a repeat of Vietnam-a humiliating loss for the country, a shattering blow to the military, and a dramatic setback for our interests. If anything, the consequences of defeat in Iraq would be even worse than in Vietnam. We would leave al Qaeda with a safe haven in a country with vast oil reserves. We would embolden a hostile Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. We would shatter the hopes of people taking risks for freedom across the Middle East. Ultimately, our enemies could use their sanctuary to attack our homeland. We had to stop that from happening.

I made a conscious decision to show resolve, not doubt, in public. I wanted the American people to understand that I believed wholeheartedly in our cause. The Iraqis needed to know we would not abandon them. Our enemies needed to know we were determined to defeat them. Most of all, I thought about our troops. I tried to imagine how it would feel to be a twenty-year-old on the front lines, or a military mom worrying about her son or daughter. The last thing they needed to hear was the commander in chief whining about how conflicted he felt. If I had concerns about the direction of the war, I needed to make changes in the policy, not wallow in public.

I drew strength from family, friends, and faith. When we visited Camp David, Laura and I loved to wors.h.i.+p with military families at the base's chapel. The chaplain in 2006, forty-eight-year-old Navy Lieutenant Commander Stan Fornea Stan Fornea, was one of the best preachers I've ever heard. "Evil is real, biblical, and prevalent," he said in one sermon. "Some say ignore it, some say it doesn't exist. But evil must not be ignored, it must be restrained." He quoted Sir Edmund Burke Sir Edmund Burke, the eighteenth-century British leader: "The only thing needed for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing."

Stan believed that the answer to evil was freedom. He also knew there would be a cost. "There has never been a n.o.ble cause devoid of sacrifice," he said in one sermon. "If freedom is worthy of defense only to the point it costs us nothing then we are in desperate need as a nation."

Above all, Stan was an optimist, and his sense of hope lifted my spirits. "The Scriptures put great premiums on faithfulness, perseverance, and overcoming," he said. "We do not quit or give up. We always believe there is no such thing as a hopeless situation."

I also found solace in history. In August, I read Lincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power, Lincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power, by by Richard Carwardine Richard Carwardine, one of fourteen Lincoln biographies I read during my presidency. They brought to life the devastation Lincoln felt as he read telegrams describing Union defeats at places like Chancellorsville, where the Union suffered seventeen thousand casualties, or Chickamauga, where sixteen thousand were wounded or killed.

The casualties were not his only struggle. Lincoln had to cycle through one commander after another until he found one who would fight. He watched his son Willie die in the White House and his wife, Mary Todd, sink into depression. Yet thanks to his faith in G.o.d and his deep belief that he was waging war for a just cause, Lincoln persisted.

One hallmark of Lincoln's leaders.h.i.+p was that he established an affectionate bond with rank-and-file soldiers. In the darkest days of the war, he spent long hours with the wounded at the Soldiers' Home in Was.h.i.+ngton. His empathy taught a powerful lesson and served as a model for other war presidents to follow.

One of the most moving parts of my presidency was reading letters from the families of fallen service members. I received hundreds, and they spanned the full spectrum of reactions. Many of the letters expressed a common sentiment: Finish the job. The parents of a fallen soldier from Georgia wrote, "Our greatest heartache would be to see the mission in Iraq abandoned." A grieving grandmother in Arizona emailed, "We need to finish what we started before pulling out."

In December 2005, I received a letter from a man in Pensacola, Florida: Dear President Bush,My name is Bud Clay. My son, SSgt Daniel Clay [United States Marine Corps] was killed last week 12/01/05 in Iraq. He was one of the ten Marines killed by the IED in Falluja.Dan was a Christian-he knew Jesus as Lord and Savior-so we know where he is. In his final letter (one left with me for the family-to be read in case of his death) he says, "If you are reading this, it means my race is over." He's home now-his and our real home.I am writing to you to tell you how proud we (his parents and family) are of you and what you are trying to do to protect us all. This was Dan's second tour in Iraq-he knew and said that his being there was to protect us. Many do not see it that way.I want to encourage you. I hear in your speeches about "staying the course." I also know that many are against you in this "war on Terror" and that you must get weary in the fight to do what is right. We and many others are praying for you to see this through-as Lincoln said "that these might not have died in vain."You have a heavy load-we are praying for you.G.o.d bless you,Bud Clay I invited Bud; his wife, Sara Jo; and Daniel's widow, Lisa, to my State of the Union address the next month. Before the speech, I met the Clays in the Oval Office. We hugged, and they reiterated that I was in their prayers. I was inspired by their strength. G.o.d had worked an amazing deed, turning their hearts from grief to compa.s.sion. Their faith was so evident and real that it reconfirmed my own. I was hoping to lift the Clays' spirits, but they lifted mine.

They weren't the only ones. On New Year's Day 2006, Laura and I traveled to Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio. We visited fifty-one wounded service members and their families. In one room, we met Staff Sergeant Christian Bagge of the Oregon National Guard, along with his wife, Melissa. Christian had been on patrol in Iraq when his Humvee hit a roadside bomb. He was pinned in the vehicle for forty-five minutes and lost both legs.

Christian told me he used to be a runner and planned to run again someday. That was hard to imagine. I hoped to buoy his spirits. "When you're ready, just call me," I said. "I will run with you."

On June 27, 2006, I met Christian on the South Lawn. He had two prosthetic legs made of carbon fiber. We took a couple of laps around the jogging track Bill Clinton had installed. I marveled at Christian's strength and spirit. I could barely believe this was the same man who had been confined to a hospital bed less than six months earlier. He did not look at himself as a victim. He was proud of what he had done in Iraq, and he hoped his example might inspire others.

Ready to run with Army Staff Sergeant Christian Bagge. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper I thought about Christian a lot that summer, and in the years that followed. Our country owed him our grat.i.tude and support. I owed him something more: I couldn't let Iraq fail.

On August 17, I convened the national security team in the Roosevelt Room, with General Casey, General Abizaid, and Amba.s.sador Khalilzad on the video screen. The results of Operation Together Forward were not promising. Our troops had driven terrorists and death squads out of Baghdad neighborhoods. But Iraqi forces couldn't maintain control. We could clear but not hold.

"The situation seems to be deteriorating," I said. "I want to be able to say that I have a plan to punch back. Can America succeed? If so, how? How do our commanders answer that?"

General Casey told me we could succeed by transferring responsibility to the Iraqis faster. We needed to "help them help themselves," Don Rumsfeld said. That was another way of saying that we needed to take our hand off the bicycle seat. I wanted to send a message to the team that I was thinking differently. "We must succeed," I said. "If they can't do it, we will. If the bicycle teeters, we're going to put the hand back on. We have to make d.a.m.n sure we do not fail."

Chief of Staff Josh Bolten Josh Bolten, who knew where I was headed, added the exclamation point. "If it gets worse," he said near the end of the meeting, "what radical measures can the team recommend?"

I left the meeting convinced we would have to develop those measures ourselves. I authorized Steve Hadley Steve Hadley to formalize the review the NSC Iraq team to formalize the review the NSC Iraq team*** had been conducting. I wanted them to challenge every a.s.sumption behind our strategy and generate new options. I soon came to view them as my personal band of warriors. had been conducting. I wanted them to challenge every a.s.sumption behind our strategy and generate new options. I soon came to view them as my personal band of warriors.

By the fall, my Iraq briefing charts showed an average of almost a thousand attacks per week. I read accounts of sectarian extremists torturing civilians with power drills, kidnapping patients from hospitals, and blowing up wors.h.i.+ppers during Friday prayers. General Casey had launched a second major operation to restore security in Baghdad, this time with more Iraqi forces to hold territory. Once again, it failed.

I decided a change in strategy was needed. To be credible to the American people, it would have to be accompanied by changes in personnel. Don Rumsfeld had suggested that I might need fresh eyes on Iraq. He was right. I also needed new commanders. Both George Casey and John Abizaid had served extended tours and were scheduled to return home. It was time for fresh eyes in their posts as well.

With the 2006 midterm elections approaching, the rhetoric on Iraq was hot. "The idea that we're going to win this war is an idea that unfortunately is just plain wrong," DNC Chairman Howard Dean Howard Dean proclaimed. "We are causing the problem," said Congressman proclaimed. "We are causing the problem," said Congressman John Murtha John Murtha of Pennsylvania, one of the first prominent Democrats to call for an immediate withdrawal. Senator of Pennsylvania, one of the first prominent Democrats to call for an immediate withdrawal. Senator Joe Biden Joe Biden, the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, recommended part.i.tioning Iraq into three separate ent.i.ties. Republicans were anxious, too, as Mitch McConnell Mitch McConnell made clear with his Oval Office request for a troop reduction. made clear with his Oval Office request for a troop reduction.

I decided to wait until after the elections to announce any policy or personnel changes. I didn't want the American people or our military to think I was making national security decisions for political reasons.

The weekend before the midterms, I met with Bob Gates Bob Gates in Crawford to ask him to become secretary of defense. Bob had served on the Baker-Hamilton Commission, a panel chartered by Congress to study the situation in Iraq. He told me he had supported a troop surge as one of the group's recommendations. I told Bob I was looking for a new commander in Iraq. He would review the candidates and offer his advice. But I suggested that he take a close look at David Petraeus. in Crawford to ask him to become secretary of defense. Bob had served on the Baker-Hamilton Commission, a panel chartered by Congress to study the situation in Iraq. He told me he had supported a troop surge as one of the group's recommendations. I told Bob I was looking for a new commander in Iraq. He would review the candidates and offer his advice. But I suggested that he take a close look at David Petraeus.

After two election cycles in which Republicans increased their numbers in Congress, we took a pounding in 2006. We lost majorities in both the House and Senate. The new speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi Nancy Pelosi, declared, "The American people have spoken....We must begin the responsible redeployment of our troops outside of Iraq."

As our review of the Iraq strategy intensified, we focused on three primary options. The first called for us to accelerate the existing strategy of training Iraqi forces while withdrawing our own. The Iraqis would a.s.sume increasing responsibility for dealing with the violence, while we would focus on more limited missions, including hunting al Qaeda.

The second option was to pull our troops back from Baghdad until the sectarian violence burned out. In October, Condi had traveled to Iraq and come back discouraged with Maliki and the other leaders. If they were determined to fight a sectarian war, she argued, why should we leave our troops in the middle of their blood feud?

The third option was to double down. We would deploy tens of thousands more troops-a surge-to conduct a full-scale counterinsurgency campaign in Baghdad. Rather than pull out of the cities, our troops would move in, live among the people, and secure the civilian population.

The fundamental question was whether the Iraqis had the will to succeed. I believed most Iraqis supported democracy. I was convinced that Iraqi mothers, like all mothers, wanted their children to grow up with hope for the future. I had met Iraqi exchange students, doctors, women's activists, and journalists who were determined to live in freedom and peace. A year after the liberation of Iraq, I met a group of small business owners who had manufactured items like watches and textiles during the Saddam era. To buy materials, they traded Iraqi dinars for foreign currency. When the dinar declined in value, Saddam searched for scapegoats and ordered the men's right hands cut off. Doc.u.mentary producer Don North Don North and Houston TV journalist and Houston TV journalist Marvin Zindler Marvin Zindler heard the story and brought the Iraqis to Texas, where each was fitted for a prosthetic hand by Dr. heard the story and brought the Iraqis to Texas, where each was fitted for a prosthetic hand by Dr. Joe Agris Joe Agris, free of charge.

When the Iraqis arrived in the Oval Office, they were still learning to use their right hands. All were grateful to the American people for freeing them from the brutality of Saddam. And all had hope for their country. One Iraqi picked up a pen in his month-old hand and painstakingly scrawled some Arabic words on a piece of paper: "A prayer for G.o.d to bless America."

Watching this Iraqi man write a prayer for America with his new prosthetic hand. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper I marveled at the contrast between a regime so brutal that it would hack off men's hands and a society so compa.s.sionate that it would help restore their dignity. I believed the Iraqi man who wrote those words spoke for millions of his fellow citizens. They were grateful to America for their liberation. They wanted to live in freedom. And I would not give up on them.

In late October, I sent Steve Hadley Steve Hadley to meet privately with Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad. Steve's a.s.sessment was that Maliki was "either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action." Before I made a decision on the way forward, I needed to determine which of these was true. to meet privately with Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad. Steve's a.s.sessment was that Maliki was "either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action." Before I made a decision on the way forward, I needed to determine which of these was true.

On November 29, 2006, I flew to meet Maliki in Amman, Jordan. The Iraqi prime minister's leaders.h.i.+p had frustrated us at times. He had not always deployed Iraqi troops when he said he would. Some in his government had suspicious ties to Iran. He hadn't done enough to go after s.h.i.+a extremists. General Casey was rightly upset that sectarian officials close to Maliki had blocked our troops from going into s.h.i.+a neighborhoods.

Yet over his six months in power, Maliki had matured as a leader. He had endured death threats, potential coups, and numerous congressional delegations traveling to Iraq to berate him. A few days before our scheduled summit in Jordan, radical s.h.i.+a leader Moqtada al Sadr Moqtada al Sadr threatened to withdraw his supporters from the government if the prime minister met with me. Maliki came anyway. threatened to withdraw his supporters from the government if the prime minister met with me. Maliki came anyway.

"Here is my plan," he said proudly as he handed me a doc.u.ment with the new seal of the Iraqi government on the cover. Inside was an ambitious proposal to retake Baghdad with Iraqi forces. I knew his army and police were not ready for such a major undertaking. What mattered was that Maliki recognized the problem of sectarian violence and was showing a willingness to lead.

"Americans want to know whether your plan allows us to go against both Sunni and s.h.i.+a killers," I asked.

"We don't distinguish by ethnicity," he replied.

I asked to meet with the prime minister alone. Maliki seemed ready to confront the violence. I decided to test his commitment by raising the prospect of a surge.

"The political pressure to abandon Iraq is enormous," I said, "but I am willing to resist that pressure if you are willing to make the hard choices."

I continued: "I'm willing to commit tens of thousands of additional American troops to help you retake Baghdad. But you need to give me certain a.s.surances."

I ran through the list: He had to commit more Iraqi forces, and they had to show up. There could be no political interference in our joint military operations-no more forbidding us from going into s.h.i.+a neighborhoods. He would have to confront the s.h.i.+a militias, including Sadr's army. And as security improved, he had to make progress on political reconciliation among s.h.i.+a, Sunnis, and Kurds.

On every point, Maliki gave me his word that he would follow through.

On the flight home from Jordan, I thought about the options for a new strategy. Accelerating the handover to the Iraqis was not a viable approach. That sounded a lot like our current strategy, which was failing.

I didn't think it was practical to withdraw from the cities and let the violence burn out. I couldn't ask our troops to stand back and watch innocent people being slaughtered by extremists. I worried Iraq could be broken so badly that it would be impossible to put back together.

The surge option brought risks of its own. Increasing our troop levels would be deeply unpopular at home. The fighting would be tough, and casualties could be high. If Maliki let us down, we might not be able to stem the violence.

After seeing Maliki, I believed we could count on his support. The surge was our best chance, maybe our last chance, to accomplish our objectives in Iraq.

Over weeks of intense discussion in November and December, most of the national security team came to support the surge. d.i.c.k Cheney, Bob Gates Bob Gates, Josh Bolten Josh Bolten, and Steve Hadley Steve Hadley and his NSC warriors were behind the new approach. Condi would be, too, so long as the plan didn't send more troops under the same old strategy. and his NSC warriors were behind the new approach. Condi would be, too, so long as the plan didn't send more troops under the same old strategy.

On a decision this controversial and important, it was essential to have unity. Congress and the press would probe for any rift within the administration. If they found one, they would exploit it to justify their opposition and block the plan. To reach that consensus, one more group needed to be on board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Established by the National Security Act of 1947, the Joint Chiefs included the heads of each service branch, plus a chairman and vice-chairman. The chiefs are not part of the chain of command, so they have no direct responsibility for military operations. A key part of their role is to advocate the health and strength of our armed forces. By law, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the president's princ.i.p.al military adviser.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 2006 was General Pete Pace. Pete was the first Marine to serve as chairman and one of the great officers of his generation. As a young lieutenant in Vietnam, Pete led a platoon that endured heavy fighting. For the rest of his career, he carried the photos of the Marines who gave their lives under his command. When he took office as chairman, he made a point of telling me their names. He never forgot them, or the cost of war.

Pete had launched a strategy review within the Joint Chiefs, and I asked Steve Hadley Steve Hadley to make sure the surge concept had a place in their discussions. I decided to go see the chiefs at the Pentagon to listen to their thoughts in person. to make sure the surge concept had a place in their discussions. I decided to go see the chiefs at the Pentagon to listen to their thoughts in person.

Two days before the meeting, Pete came to the Oval Office. He told me I would hear a number of concerns from the chiefs, but they were prepared to support the surge. He also gave Steve an estimate on how many troops might be needed to make a difference: five brigades, about twenty thousand Americans.

On December 13, 2006, I walked into the Tank, the Joint Chiefs' secure wood-paneled conference room at the Pentagon. Coming to their territory was a way to show my respect. I opened by telling them I was there to hear their opinions and ask their advice.

Discussing the surge strategy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Tank. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper I went around the table one by one. The chiefs laid out their concerns. They worried about Maliki's level of commitment. They felt other agencies of the government needed to contribute more in Iraq. They questioned whether the demands of a surge would leave us unprepared for other contingencies, such as a flare-up on the Korean Peninsula.

Their overriding worry was that a troop increase would "break the military" by putting too much strain on service members and their families. Many of our troops in Iraq were serving their second or third tours in the country. To make the surge possible, we would have to extend some tours from twelve to fifteen months. The effect on recruitment, morale, training, preparedness, and military families could be profound.

Army Chief of Staff Pete Schoomaker Pete Schoomaker and Marine Commandant and Marine Commandant James Conway James Conway recommended an increase in the size of their services. They believed an expansion would ease the stress on our forces and help ensure we were ready for potential conflicts elsewhere in the world. I liked the idea and promised to consider it. recommended an increase in the size of their services. They believed an expansion would ease the stress on our forces and help ensure we were ready for potential conflicts elsewhere in the world. I liked the idea and promised to consider it.

At the end of the meeting, I summarized my thinking. "I share your concern about breaking the military," I said. "The surest way to break the military would be to lose in Iraq."

My initial plan was to announce the new Iraq strategy a week or two before Christmas. But as the date approached, I concluded we needed more time. I wanted Bob Gates Bob Gates, who was sworn in as secretary of defense on December 18, to visit Iraq.

Two days before Christmas, Bob came to see me at Camp David. He told me he had visited with Maliki, who had refined his plan for an Iraqi surge to match ours. Maliki would declare martial law, deploy three additional Iraqi brigades to Baghdad, appoint a military governor, and name two deputy commanders with free rein to go after extremists of any sectarian background. Bob had also decided on his recommendation for a new commander. It would be General David Petraeus. We agreed to nominate General Casey for a promotion to Army chief of staff. George had a long and distinguished record of service, and his experience would benefit the Army. I also wanted to make clear that I did not blame him for the problems in Iraq.

The final question to resolve was the size of the surge. Some in the military proposed that we commit two additional brigades initially-a mini-surge of about ten thousand troops-with the possibility of sending up to three more brigades later. Pete Pace reported that General Petraeus and General Ray Odierno, the number-two commander in Iraq, wanted all five brigades committed up front.