International Law. A Treatise Volume Ii Part 6

18-28--Manning, pp. 131-133--Phillimore, III. -- 49--Twiss, II. ---- 22-29--Taylor, ---- 449-451--Wheaton, -- 295--Bluntschli, ---- 510-514--Heffter, ---- 113-114--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.

175-198--Kluber, ---- 235-237--G. F. Martens, II. -- 263--Ullmann, -- 165--Bonfils, Nos. 1000-1001--Despagnet, Nos.

499-505--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos. 2650-2660--Rivier, II. -- 61--Nys, III. pp. 95-117--Calvo, IV. ---- 1860-1864--Fiore, III.

Nos. 1232-1268--Martens, II. -- 106--Westlake, _Chapters_, pp.

258-264--Heilborn, _System_, pp. 321-332--Rettich, _Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Rechts zum Kriege_ (1888), pp. 3-140--Wiesse, _Le Droit international applique aux guerres civiles_ (1898)--Rougier, _Les guerres civiles et le droit des gens_ (1903)--Higgins, _War and the Private Citizen_ (1912), pp. 3-72.

[Sidenote: War no illegality.]

-- 53. As within the boundaries of the modern State an armed contention between two or more citizens is illegal, public opinion has become convinced that armed contests between citizens are inconsistent with Munic.i.p.al Law. Influenced by this fact, impatient pacifists, as well as those innumerable individuals who cannot grasp the idea of a law between Sovereign States, frequently consider war and law inconsistent. They quote the fact that wars are frequently waged by States as a proof against the very existence of an International Law. It is not difficult to show the absurdity of this opinion. As States are Sovereign, and as consequently no central authority can exist above them able to enforce compliance with its demands, war cannot, under the existing conditions and circ.u.mstances of the Family of Nations, always be avoided.

International Law recognises this fact, but at the same time provides regulations with which belligerents have to comply. Although with the outbreak of war peaceable relations between the belligerents cease, there remain certain mutual legal obligations and duties. Thus war is not inconsistent with, but a condition regulated by, International Law.

The latter at present cannot and does not object to States which are in conflict waging war upon each other instead of peaceably settling their difference. But if they choose to go to war they have to comply with the rules laid down by International Law regarding the conduct of war and the relations between belligerents and neutral States. That International Law, if it could forbid war altogether, would be a more perfect law than it is at present there is no doubt. Yet eternal peace is an impossibility in the conditions and circ.u.mstances under which mankind at present live and will have to live for a long time to come, although eternal peace is certainly an ideal of civilisation which will slowly and gradually be realised.

[Sidenote: Conception of War.]

-- 54. War is the contention between two or more States through their armed forces for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases. War is a fact recognised, and with regard to many points regulated, but not established, by International Law. Those writers[58] who define war as the legal remedy of self-help to obtain satisfaction for a wrong sustained from another State, forget that wars have often been waged by both parties engaged for political reasons only; they confound a possible but not at all necessary cause of war with the conception of war. A State may be driven into war because it cannot otherwise get reparation for an international delinquency, and such State may then maintain that it exercises by war nothing else than legally recognised self-help. But when States are driven into or deliberately wage war for political reasons, no legally recognised act of self-help is in such case performed by the war. And the same laws of war are valid, whether wars are waged on account of legal or of political differences.

[Footnote 58: See, for instance, Vattel, III. -- 1; Phillimore, III. -- 49; Twiss, II. -- 26; Bluntschli, -- 510; Bulmerincq, -- 92.]

[Sidenote: War a contention.]

-- 55. In any case, it is universally recognised that war is a _contention_, which means, _a violent struggle through the application of armed force_. For a war to be in existence, two or more States must actually have their armed forces fighting against each other, although the commencement of a war may date back to its declaration or some other unilateral initiative act. Unilateral acts of force performed by one State against another without a previous declaration of war may be a cause of the outbreak of war, but are not war in themselves, as long as they are not answered by similar hostile acts by the other side, or at least by a declaration of the other side that it considers the particular acts as acts of war. Thus it comes about that acts of force performed by one State against another by way of reprisal or during a pacific blockade in the case of an intervention are not necessarily initiative acts of war. And even acts of force illegally performed by one State against another, such, for instance, as occupation of a part of its territory, are not acts of war so long as they are not met with acts of force from the other side, or at least with a declaration from the latter that it considers the particular acts as acts of war. Thus, when Louis XIV. of France, after the Peace of Nimeguen, inst.i.tuted the so-called Chambers of Reunion and in 1680 and 1681 seized the territory of the then Free Town of Stra.s.sburg and other parts of the German Empire without the latter's offering armed resistance, these acts of force, although doubtless illegal, were not acts of war.

[Sidenote: War a contention between States.]

-- 56. To be considered war, the contention must be going on _between States_. In the Middle Ages wars were known between private individuals, so-called private wars, and wars between corporations, as the Hansa for instance, and between States. But such wars have totally disappeared in modern times. It may, of course, happen that a contention arises between the armed forces of a State and a body of armed individuals, but such contention[59] is not war. Thus the contention between the Raiders under Dr. Jameson and the former South African Republic in January 1896 was not war. Nor is a contention with insurgents or with pirates a war. And a so-called civil war[60] need not be from the beginning nor become at all a war in the technical sense of the term according to International Law. On the other hand, to an armed contention between a suzerain and its va.s.sal[61] State the character of war ought not to be denied, for both parties are States, although the fact that the va.s.sal makes war against the suzerain may, from the standpoint of Const.i.tutional Law, be considered rebellion. And likewise an armed contention between a full Sovereign State and a State under the suzerainty of another State, as, for instance, the contention between Servia and Bulgaria[62] in 1885, is war. Again, an armed contention between one or more member-States of a Federal State and the latter ought to be considered as war in the technical sense of the term, according to International Law, although, according to the const.i.tution of Federal States, war between the member-States as well as between any member-State and the Federal State itself is illegal, and recourse to arms by a member-State may therefore correctly, from the standpoint of the const.i.tution, be called rebellion.

Thus the War of Secession within the United States between the Northern and the Southern member-States in 1861-1865 was real war.

[Footnote 59: Some publicists maintain, however, that a contention between a State and the armed forces of a party fighting for public rights must be considered as war. See, for instance, Bluntschli, -- 113, and Fiore, III. -- 1265.]

[Footnote 60: See below, -- 59.]

[Footnote 61: See below, -- 75.]

[Footnote 62: Bulgaria was at that time still a va.s.sal State under Turkish suzerainty.]

[Sidenote: War a contention between States through armed forces.]

-- 57. It must be emphasised that war nowadays is a contention of States _through their armed forces_. Those private subjects of the belligerents who do not directly or indirectly belong to the armed forces do not take part in the armed contention: they do not attack and defend, and no attack is therefore made upon them. This fact is the result of an evolution of practices totally different from those in vogue in former times. During antiquity and the greater part of the Middle Ages war was a contention between the whole of the populations of the belligerent States. In time of war every subject of one belligerent, whether an armed and fighting individual or not, whether man or woman, adult or infant, could be killed or enslaved by the other belligerent at will.

But gradually a milder and more discriminative practice grew up, and nowadays the life and liberty of such private subjects of belligerents as do not directly or indirectly belong to their armed forces are safe, as is also, with certain exceptions, their private property.

This is a generally admitted fact. But opinions disagree as to the general position of such private subjects in time of war. The majority of the European continental writers for the last three generations have propagated the doctrine that no relation of enmity exists between belligerents and such private subjects, or between the private subjects of the respective belligerents. This doctrine goes back to Rousseau, _Contrat Social_, I. c. 4. In 1801, on the occasion of the opening of the French Prize Court, the famous lawyer and statesman Portalis adopted Rousseau's[63] doctrine by declaring that war is a relation between States and not between individuals, and that consequently the subjects of the belligerents are only enemies as soldiers, not as citizens. And although this new doctrine did not, as Hall (-- 18) shows, spread at once, it has since the second half of the nineteenth century been proclaimed on the European continent by the majority of writers. British and American-English writers, however, have never adopted this doctrine, but have always maintained that the relation of enmity between the belligerents extends also to their private citizens.

[Footnote 63: See La.s.sudrie-d.u.c.h.ene, _Jean Jacques Rousseau et le droit des gens_ (1906).]

I think, if the facts of war are taken into consideration without prejudice, there ought to be no doubt that the British and American view is correct.[64] It is impossible to sever the citizens from their State, and the outbreak of war between two States cannot but make their citizens enemies. But the point is unworthy of dispute, because it is only one of terms without any material consequences.[65] For, apart from the terminology, the parties agree in substance upon the rules of the Law of Nations regarding such private subjects as do not directly or indirectly belong to the armed forces.[66] n.o.body doubts that such private individuals are safe as regards their life and liberty, provided they behave peacefully and loyally; and that, with certain exceptions, their private property must not be touched. On the other hand, n.o.body doubts that, according to a generally recognised custom of modern warfare, the belligerent who has occupied a part or the whole of his opponent's territory, and who treats such private individuals leniently according to the rules of International Law, may punish them for any hostile act, since they do not enjoy the privileges of members of armed forces. Although, on the one hand, International Law by no means forbids, and, as a law between States, is not competent to forbid, private individuals to take up arms against an enemy, it gives, on the other hand, the right to the enemy to treat hostilities committed by private[67] individuals as acts of illegitimate warfare. A belligerent is under a duty to respect the life and liberty of private enemy individuals, but he can carry out this duty under the condition only that these private individuals abstain from hostilities against himself.

Through military occupation in war such private individuals fall under the authority[68] of the occupant, and he may therefore demand that they comply with his orders regarding the safety of his forces. The position of private enemy individuals is made known to them through the proclamations which the commander-in-chief of an army occupying the territory usually publishes. Thus General Sir Redvers Buller, when entering the territory of the South African Republic in 1900, published the following proclamation:

"The troops of Queen Victoria are now pa.s.sing through the Transvaal. Her Majesty does not make war on individuals, but is, on the contrary, anxious to spare them as far as may be possible the horrors of war. The quarrel England has is with the Government, not with the people, of the Transvaal. Provided they remain neutral, no attempt will be made to interfere with persons living near the line of march; every possible protection will be given them, and any of their property that it may be necessary to take will be paid for. But, on the other hand, those who are thus allowed to remain near the line of march must respect and maintain their neutrality, and the residents of any locality will be held responsible, both in their persons and property, if any damage is done to railway or telegraph, or any violence done to any member of the British forces in the vicinity of their home."

[Footnote 64: See Boidin, pp. 32-44.]

[Footnote 65: But many continental writers constantly make use of Rousseau's _dictum_ in order to defend untenable positions. See Oppenheim, _Die Zukunft des Volkerrechts_ (1911), pp. 59-61.]

[Footnote 66: See Breton, _Les non-belligerants: Leurs devoirs, leurs droits, et la question des otages_ (1904).]

[Footnote 67: See below, -- 254.]

[Footnote 68: The first edition of this work was wrong in stating that through military occupation private enemy individuals fall under the _territorial supremacy_ of the occupant. Since military occupation by no means vests sovereignty in the occupant, but only actual authority, this authority may not be called _territorial supremacy_.]

It must be emphasised that this position of private individuals of the hostile States renders it inevitable that commanders of armies which have occupied hostile territory should consider and mark as criminals all such private individuals of the enemy as commit hostile acts, although such individuals may act from patriotic motives and may be highly praised for their acts by their compatriots. The high-sounding and well-meant words of Baron Lambermont, one of the Belgian delegates at the Conference of Brussels of 1874--"Il y a des choses qui se font a la guerre, qui se feront toujours, et que l'on doit bien accepter. Mais il s'agit ici de les convertir en lois, en prescriptions positives et internationales. Si les citoyens doivent etre conduits au supplice pour avoir tente de defendre leur pays au peril de leur vie, il ne faut pas qu'ils trouvent inscrits sur le poteau au pied duquel ils seront fusiles l'article d'un traite signe par leur propre gouvernement qui d'avance les cond.a.m.nait a mort"--have no _raison d'etre_ in face of the fact that according to a generally recognised customary rule of International Law hostile acts on the part of private individuals are not acts of legitimate warfare, and the offenders may be treated and punished as war-criminals. Even those writers[69] who object to the term "criminals"

do not deny that such hostile acts by private individuals, in contradistinction to hostile acts by members of the armed forces, may be severely punished. The controversy whether or not such acts may be styled "crimes" is again only one of terminology; materially the rule is not at all controverted.[70]

[Footnote 69: See, for instance, Hall, -- 18, p. 74, and Westlake, _Chapters_, p. 262.]

[Footnote 70: It is of value to quote articles 20-26 of the _Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field_, which the War Department of the United States published in 1863 during the War of Secession with the Southern member-States:

(20) "Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign nations or governments. It is a law and requisite of civil existence that men live in political, continuous societies, forming organised units, called States or nations, whose const.i.tuents bear, enjoy, and suffer, advance and retrograde together, in peace and in war."

(21) "The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy as one of the const.i.tuents of the hostile State or nation, and as such is subjected to the hards.h.i.+ps of war."

(22) "Nevertheless, as civilisation has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honour as much as the exigencies of war will admit."

(23) "Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts, and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can afford to grant in the overruling demands of a vigorous war."

(24) "The almost universal rule in remote times was ... that the private individual of the hostile country is destined to suffer every privation of liberty and protection and every disruption of family ties.

Protection was ... the exception."

(25) "In modern regular wars ... protection of the inoffensive citizens of the hostile country is the rule; privation and disturbance of private relations are the exceptions."

(26) "Commanding generals may cause the magistrates and civil officers of the hostile country to take the oath of temporary allegiance or an oath of fidelity to their own victorious Government or rulers, and they may expel every one who declines to do so. But, whether they do so or not, the people and their civil officers owe strict obedience to them as long as they hold sway over the district or country, at the peril of their lives."]

[Sidenote: War a contention between States for the purpose of overpowering each other.]

-- 58. The last, and not the least important, characteristic of war is its purpose. It is a contention between States for the purpose of overpowering each other. This purpose of war is not to be confounded with the ends[71] of war, for, whatever the ends of war may be, they can only be realised by one belligerent overpowering the other. Such a defeat as compels the vanquished to comply with any demand the victor may choose to make is the purpose of war. Therefore war calls into existence the display of the greatest possible power and force on the part of the belligerents, rouses the pa.s.sion of the nations in conflict to the highest possible degree, and endangers the welfare, the honour, and eventually the very existence of both belligerents. n.o.body can predict with certainty the result of a war however insignificant one side may seem to be. Every war is a risk and a venture. Every State which goes to war knows beforehand what is at stake, and it would never go to war were it not for its firm, though very often illusory, conviction of its superiority in strength over its opponent. Victory is necessary in order to overpower the enemy; and it is this necessity which justifies all the indescribable horrors of war, the enormous sacrifice of human life and health, and the unavoidable destruction of property and devastation of territory. Apart from special restrictions imposed by the Law of Nations upon belligerents, all kinds and all degrees of force may be, and eventually must be, made use of in war in the interest and under the compulsion of its purpose, and in spite of their cruelty and the utter misery they entail. As war is a struggle for existence between States, no amount of individual suffering and misery can be regarded; the national existence and independence of the struggling State is a higher consideration than any individual well-being.

[Footnote 71: See below, -- 66.]

[Sidenote: Civil War.]

-- 59. The characteristics of war as developed above must help to decide the question whether so-called civil wars are war in the technical meaning of the term. It has already been stated above (in -- 56) that an armed contention between member-States of a Federal State and the latter and between a suzerain and its va.s.sal ought to be considered as war because both parties are real States, although the Federal State as well as the suzerain may correctly designate it as a rebellion. Such armed contentions may be called civil wars in a wider sense of the term. In the proper sense of the term a civil war exists when two opposing parties within a State have recourse to arms for the purpose of obtaining power in the State, or when a large portion of the population of a State rises in arms against the legitimate Government. As war is an armed contention between _States_, such a civil war need not be from the beginning, nor become at all, war in the technical sense of the term.

But it may become war through the recognition of each of the contending parties or of the insurgents as the case may be, as a belligerent Power.[72] Through this recognition a body of individuals receives an international position in so far as it is for some parts and in some points treated as though it were a subject[73] of International Law.

Such recognition may be granted by the very State within the boundaries of which the civil war broke out, and then other States will in most cases, although they need not, likewise recognise a state of war as existing and bear the duties of neutrality. But it may happen that other States recognise insurgents as a belligerent Power before the State on whose territory the insurrection broke out so recognises them. In such case the insurrection is war in the eyes of these other States, but not in the eyes of the legitimate Government.[74] Be that as it may, it must be specially observed that, although a civil war becomes war in the technical sense of the term by recognition, this recognition has a lasting effect only when the insurgents succeed in getting their independence established through the defeat of the legitimate Government and a consequent treaty of peace which recognises their independence.

Nothing, however, prevents the State concerned, after the defeat of the insurgents and reconquest of the territory which they had occupied, from treating them as rebels according to the Criminal Law of the land, for the character of a belligerent Power received through recognition is lost _ipso facto_ by their defeat and the re-occupation by the legitimate Government of the territory occupied by them.

[Footnote 72: See below, ---- 76 and 298.]

[Footnote 73: See above, vol. I. -- 63.]

[Footnote 74: See below, -- 298.]