Democracy Incorporated Part 10

With students on couches and chairs around him, Kissinger

took questions on all topics, telling the students, "Feel free to

ask any question you want. There are no impolite questions."

Later he had dinner with a second group of students,

where he gave a lecture.6

How do contemporary elites become elites? What are they taught? Who authorizes them? Or are they recognized rather than authorized-and by what process? are they quietly recruited and initiated like members of Skull and Bones, the secret society of Yale undergraduates, several of whom attained high political positions?

In earlier eras those questions had relatively straightforward answers. One became a member of an elite by heredity. In ancient Greek the word for aristocracy was aristokratia, or rule by the best (aristos). The a.s.sumption was that n.o.ble birth went along with "natural" apt.i.tudes for military or political leaders.h.i.+p or high religious office. Actual skills were acquired through training and tutoring. Later Jefferson cited the term aristoi in extolling the value of a "natural aristocracy" whose members achieved preeminence by ability alone-which a.s.sumed a society that welcomed talent regardless of wealth or birth. In the twenty-first-century United States, however, elite status rarely follows a Horatio Alger scenario where an individual of humble origins gains success by dint of hard work and ability, achieving status and fortune while becoming beholden to none.

Elitism might be defined as the political principle which a.s.sumes that the existence of unequal abilities is an irrefutable fact. That principle was fundamental to n.a.z.i and Fascist regimes; it is equally fundamental to inverted totalitarianism. The "fact" of unequal abilities is not, however, accidental. Today in the United States there is a circular system whereby elites are produced and the inst.i.tutions producing them are confirmed as "elite inst.i.tutions," thereby attracting a fresh supply of promising material that further confirms the inst.i.tutions' special status. A small number of U.S. inst.i.tutions select, groom, train, and certify a small number of individuals as exceptionally talented and warranting privilege.7 "Elite" private preparatory academies, colleges, and universities, including Bible colleges and theological seminaries, perform the function of identifying and producing, not just elites, but authorities.8 At elite inst.i.tutions, unlike community colleges and many public and private educational inst.i.tutions, the humanities and social sciences are featured prominently, whereby those subjects are designated as a badge of superiority distinguis.h.i.+ng their students from those at lesser schools emphasizing "work skills." The vocational education of elites is deferred to the highly compet.i.tive graduate and professional schools in law, medicine, business, the sciences, social sciences, and humanities, where not only qualified pract.i.tioners but "leaders in their field" are produced. Although a few public universities, even an occasional public high school, make the cut, the high costs of elite inst.i.tutions convert attendance into an investment. The expectation is that there will be a "return" in the form of a prestigious career.

Elitism functions as a self-sustaining enterprise. The key is to produce not only successful alumni but rich ones to feed the virtually insatiable appet.i.te of elite inst.i.tutions, where fund-raisers are as prolific as scholars and university financial officers are millionaires. While still in school those chosen as future elites are encouraged to "network" with each other for later reference and a.s.sistance. Academia is also a privileged setting where the successful return as honored guests and lecturers. There they hobn.o.b with the eager wannabes and provide future "contacts," letters of recommendation, and resume entries.

Yet while academic inst.i.tutions are the main manufacturers of elites, there remains the post-postgraduate stage of maintaining and refining them, and utilizing their skills. Bright prospects are pa.s.sed along to think tanks, inst.i.tutes, and centers. There they learn the arts of developing "policy proposals" and demolis.h.i.+ng the arguments of their enemies. Think tanks are not modeled after Plato's austere Academy; they are not environments where individuals are free to explore a problem, letting the chips fall where they may. Rather the tanks and centers function as ideological auxiliaries mobilized to promote the agendas favored by their sponsors. As an executive at one prominent think tank explained, "We're not here as some kind of Ph.D. committee giving equal time. Our role is to provide conservative public policy makers with arguments to bolster our side."9 There are also nonpartisan, mercenary "centers" where ex-officials will sell a.n.a.lyses or proposals on a contractual basis. Flanking these are the foundations that support think tanks, supply grants to select recipients, and promote projects to their liking. Foundations subsidize a variety of causes ranging from liberal to reactionary. Liberal foundations give awards to designated geniuses, while the more extreme conservative foundations are aroused by the prospect of investigating the s.e.xual practices of liberal presidents.10 The reproduction of elites is an instance of the phenomenon of "rationalization." The existence of elites doesn't just happen; it is systematized, premeditated, refined to a practice a.s.suring that those who are selected as "promising leaders.h.i.+p material" will prove to have the right stuff, thus validating the methods of selection and, in the process, perpetuating the system that has made them possible. It is said that at night, when elitists look at themselves in a mirror, they mutter, "The system cannot be all bad . . ."

IV.

Elitism is perhaps most p.r.o.nounced in the areas of politics relating to international relations and foreign policy. This is not surprising because these are precisely the areas where, historically, partisans.h.i.+p has supposedly been taboo-except for bipartisans.h.i.+p. ("Politics stops at the water's edge.") Historically, matters of diplomacy, foreign policy, war, and peace have been singled out as a special province to which both the opposition and the public are admitted only when it becomes politically awkward to bar them or expedient to admit them. Revealingly, foreign policy was once called the domain of "statecraft" and was closely a.s.sociated with so-called arcanae imperii, state secrets, suggestive of a range of especially sensitive matters involving high risk, great dangers, and swift responses, and demanding superior intelligence, specialized knowledge, lengthy experience, and a relatively free hand. Thus, virtually by definition, foreign affairs were not only "outside" politics but a domain of expertise where notions of democracy seemingly made no sense. Foreign affairs, like military affairs, were about power politics, unpredictable dangers-including threats to the very existence of the nation-complex strategies, and "the" national interest, subjects about which average citizens lacked the experience and competence to judge. The models for the kind of experienced expertise qualified to deal with high matters of state were the "wise men" a.s.sembled by President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis and later by President Johnson for Vietnam strategies.11 Although the one was a near nuclear disaster (averted because in the end JFK followed his own judgment) and the other a clear disaster (plunged into because LBJ did follow his more hawkish advisers), neither resulted in discrediting the status of elitism or its claims. Two prominent neocons predicted that installing "a decent and democratic government in Baghdad" would be "a manageable task for the U.S."12 As the second Iraq war proved, failure merely stiffens the resolve of elites and their defenders.

During the first Gulf War George I exulted that "by G.o.d, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all."13 The syndrome included not only popular resistance to an adventurous foreign policy and mounting criticism of "the foreign policy elites," but, equally important, widespread experiments in spontaneous "teach-ins" where the pros and cons of foreign policy and military strategies were avidly discussed by ordinary citizens, students, and teachers. One of the reasons why "the sixties" continues to be a favorite punching bag of neocons and neoliberals is that it represented a decade of prolonged popular political education unique in recent American history. The most frequent topics were racism, foreign policy, corporate power, higher education, and threats to ecology-each in one form or another a domain of elitism. Public universities, such as those at Berkeley, Ann Arbor, and Madison, played a leading role in the organization of antiwar activities. That none of those inst.i.tutions was ruffled by antiwar agitation at the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 testifies to the effective integration of universities into the corporate state.

V.

Elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy,

the inescapable sine qua non. Governments produced by

elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible,

dominated by special interests, and incapable of

adopting policies demanded by the public good. These

qualities make such governments undesirable but they

do not make them undemocratic.

-Samuel P. Huntington14

It is striking that at the very moment in our nation's history when the most vital public questions revolve around foreign policy, the issue of elitism versus democracy should emerge and, equally significant, a.s.sume the form of a neoconservative-neoliberal attack upon democratic elections.

Of late, democratic elections in the United States have appeared clouded. They have not been marked, as elections in Weimar Germany were, by the violence of an extreme Communist Left and an extreme racist-nationalist n.a.z.i movement on the right. Nor have they been threatened, as was Italy's weak parliamentary system of the 1920s, by the repet.i.tion of a Fascist March on Rome-marches in the United States have been overwhelmingly aimed at defending democratic inst.i.tutions. Instead, electoral democracy was subverted in the 2000 election by Republican elites a.s.sisted by toadying conservative appointees on the Supreme Court; by a code of near silence on the part of the ma.s.s media; and by a supine opposition party. The opposition failed to alert the citizenry to the threat posed by the display of managed democracy in Florida and its less publicized equivalents elsewhere in the nation; instead Democrats blamed Ralph Nader. The events heartened the apologists for Superpower who have set about to discredit democratic elections, reducing their status from a first principle to a strategy and, in effect, justifying machinations (sic) that engineered a coronation rather than an election.

VI.

Liberal education is the necessary endeavor to found an

aristocracy within democratic ma.s.s society.

-Leo Strauss15

Today's elitism reflects one particular development without precedent in American history and, indeed, one that runs counter to much of it. This is the role of academic theories in shaping the management and direction of foreign policy. The academic genealogy of today's elitism consists primarily of two branches, one deriving from the emigre political philosopher Leo Strauss, the other from a native son, Samuel Huntington. Both have furnished recruits to the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, and the ranks of punditry. The Straussians, as befits a highly intellectualized elite, have tended to avoid service in the more prosaic departments of Commerce, Transportation, and Labor.

While Straussians project elitist ideals of heroism and a disdain for the ordinary, Huntington confronts the complexity of a world of large collectivities, of conflicting "civilizations." While Straussians are in principle antidemocratic, Huntington wavers. His early writings are critical and incline toward elitism: democracy "is one public virtue, not the only one."16 His more recent writings, however, are of uncertain direction, reflective of a candid disillusionment with current elites. Although neither celebrates capitalism, neither ventures a critique nor explores capitalism as a distinct system of power. Both serve an ideological function, contributing to the legitimation of some powers and the delegitimation of others.

Throughout his career Huntington has been a familiar figure in the halls of power of government, corporate-sponsored think tanks, and academia and has never hesitated in exposing his views to a wider public. Strauss was at the opposite extreme, reclusive, sheltered by his disciples, rarely, if ever, engaged in public debates, never a proponent of specific policies; nonetheless, a pa.s.sionate teacher of an extremely rarefied "political" philosophy whose disciples have occupied high positions of power and influence in foreign and military affairs.

In his own highly distinctive way Strauss was as much a fundamentalist and archaist as the born-again religionists whose disciples also occupy high positions in government. He believed it his mission not only to recover ancient teachings, especially those of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and to reveal their truths concerning "knowledge of the good life and of the good society,"17 but also to attract a coterie who were capable of grasping a teaching that was often deliberately esoteric, and who would eventually repeat the process, identifying new disciples and, if possible, putting the teaching into practice. The claims of political philosophy were not confined to knowledge of the morally uplifting; they extended as well to "the nature of political things," especially concerning who should rule, what aims are to be pursued, and what kind of politics is to be shunned.18 The singularity of Straussism is not the invention of a doctrine or the creation of a coterie privy to esoteric truths from which the uninitiated are excluded. The Pythagorean brotherhood (sixth century BCE) followed a rule of secrecy about the master's teachings and severely punished those who divulged it to outsiders.19 One might argue plausibly that secret doctrines are, by definition, incongruous with both the academic world and the public world of democratic politics. Rather what is astonis.h.i.+ng is that the Straussian initiates once occupied high political positions even though the secret teaching and the disciples themselves appear incongruous in a governmental setting that is strongly redolent of the corporate world and its values of materialism and self-interest. How is it possible for the adepts of absolute truths hidden in the ancient past to make common cause with powers-such as science, technology, and corporate capitalism-that, if they are anything, are bent toward overcoming past achievements? Is the alliance based on nothing more than expediency in which one side provides access to power and its possibilities while the other supplies ideological cover for what amounts to a drive for economic and political hegemony?

Nowhere is that incongruity more striking than in the leaders.h.i.+p of the Defense Department during the first administration of George II. Its secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, was the incarnation of the blending of the corporate and governmental worlds and was renowned for his nononsense approach, the last person one would a.s.sociate with esoterica or love of (abstract) truth, and the first person one might nominate as the embodiment of the crude drive for power per se. He has been an elected representative, a member of the White House staff, and the chief executive of one of the largest pharmaceutical corporations-and he is a former member of the Princeton wrestling team. Notwithstanding, his onetime second-in-command, a.s.sistant Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, was a Straussian who, presumably, would not have been appointed without Rumsfeld's approval. By all accounts, Wolfowitz, along with other initiates, was among the princ.i.p.al architects of the invasion of Iraq. Perhaps it is relevant to note that before leaving n.a.z.i Germany, Strauss enjoyed close intellectual relations with Carl Schmitt, a political and legal philosopher who collaborated with the n.a.z.is and enjoyed official favor; moreover, both before and after he left Germany, he offered no harsh public criticism of either Hitler or Mussolini.20 To understand what, at first glance, appeared to be the extremely odd couple of Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, we must briefly look at the master's teaching, inquiring how its particular form of archaism could contribute to the dynamic of Superpower, to the practice of elitism, and to the subversion of democracy. Like Superpower itself, Straussism is based upon a fantasy about power-in this case, the power to be found in a most unlikely form, philosophy. Unlike most of the fantasts of scientific and technological power, who are rapturous about the material benefits for humankind that such powers can bring, Strauss was a fantast who warned of the harm to the "ma.s.ses" that the true philosophy would wreak should the Many ever gain even a glimpse of its meaning and implications.

What form does the awesome power of the true philosophy take? The true philosophy knows a great and dangerous truth, that society is founded on and held together by myths, that is, untruths. By nature the ma.s.ses are credulous; their credulity is necessary to the existence and preservation of society and, not least, of philosophers. So the "Few," "wis.h.i.+ng neither to be destroyed nor to bring destruction upon the mult.i.tude," must not expose to the Many, or publicly ridicule, the insubstantial basis of ma.s.s beliefs.21 So, while the true philosophy holds that religious teachings are false, its adepts must not openly attack those beliefs or even express contempt. By extension, although Strauss did not commit himself on the subject, the same self-restraint would hold regarding capitalism-but perhaps not for those exceptional "captains of industry" who sought power rather than mere wealth, say, by endowing university chairs or supporting think tanks of the proper persuasion.

For Strauss there is "a" true political teaching found primarily in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, with more than a nod now and then to Nietzsche, the apostle of "superman" (ubermensch) and a strong believer in the gullibility of the ma.s.ses. The teaching is about "values," not policies. It is not to be understood or conveyed by ordinary methods of reading, nor is it accessible to the ordinary, even to the skilled reader. The great texts must be deciphered for an esoteric or hidden meaning that can be revealed only by a learned master who has the responsibility of ensuring that true meanings are taught only to those Few of unusual intellect and virtue. The convolutions of the method are such that the master's teachings are also cast in esoteric terms, so that their "real" meaning is comprehensible only to those who have undergone a demanding apprentices.h.i.+p and instruction in the arts of decipherment. Hence students, implicitly young men, must be carefully selected and nurtured, and are expected to remain loyal to the teacher and each other. The disciples resemble a brotherhood; women rarely figure in the ranks of Straussians. The teaching and teacher must be insulated from the "crowd," from what one prominent Straussian called "native populism and vulgarity."22 What is "the" teaching and why the phobia about secrecy? It is not directly about "policies," practical means, or programs, but about principles. The first principle is that power should be in the hands of the virtuous, meaning those dedicated to what is "highest": to absolute truth and "the good," to the supreme value of the intellect, especially as embodied in the philosopher. This worthy is not the pragmatic, or a.n.a.lytic philosopher of the Anglo-American tradition, much less the postmodern philosopher of twentieth-century France; the exemplars are the two preeminent philosophers of ancient Greece and the premature n.a.z.i, Nietzsche.23 Secrecy is enjoined as a matter of prudence. The philosopher has to be cautious, to conceal his true beliefs from the "many" who have an "unqualified commitment . . . to the opinions on which society rests."24 (Translated, that means not attacking democracy but using it.) In order to protect themselves and the "mult.i.tude" the philosophical "few" resort to coded language when communicating publicly.25 Truth and the true philosopher are both dangerous to society, not least because they are subversive of the common beliefs, myths, and prejudices that the vast majority hold: the glue of society.26 While the teaching is self-described as "lofty," it is far from being fastidious about the uses of power or allergic to a certain ruthless deployment of it as long as it is being wielded by the virtuous, who "know" and value the Good and respect the true hierarchy of values.

There is, as the above account suggests, a marked strain of antimodernism in the ideology: it is hostile toward social science, cool toward the natural sciences, contemptuous of popular culture, and tactful toward capitalism, especially in the form of financial support from rightwing foundations, such as the Olin Foundation.27

VII.

Straussian ideology outfits its adherents not with specific policies but rather with grandiose ambitions, like "democratizing" the Middle East. The achievement of bringing Straussism to bear upon political actualities belongs unquestionably to Harvey Mansfield, Jr. Mansfield has sought to demonstrate, not so much how, but why power and virtue should be combined so that politics can again be a great stage for heroic action and n.o.ble deeds. In a dazzling and subtle account Mansfield depicts an ideal political world where the "executive" dominates the political system, not a political system understood in terms of checks and balances or responsibility to the citizenry, but one inspired in almost equal parts by an ideal of monarchy, a patriot king, and a dismissive contempt for democracy.28 Mansfield's "prince" is not conceived either as an official whose princ.i.p.al responsibility is to execute the laws pa.s.sed by the legislative power or as "the people's tribune." Far from being "tamed," as the ironical t.i.tle of Mansfield's book seems to imply, Mansfield's "prince" is instructed to exploit the possibilities of an office that is claimed to be "at least in part outside the law and not explained by the system."29 Clearly, George II-with his expansive conception of presidential power, as represented by his practice of appending "signing statements" to legislation, proclamations that place his understanding of statutes above that of Congress and his understanding of the proper treatment of prisoners above that of the rule of law-would have no difficulty qualifying as a "prince."

Mansfield's prince governs in the broad sense; he "rules" with a kind of Gaullist grandeur, testing the const.i.tutional limits of office, while pursuing a politics of "daring, sacrifice," and "n.o.bility."30 Above all, ideally the executive stands not for programs but for "virtue." That means, among other things, he is prepared to act in defiance of the popular will. Virtue, or the love of the highest things, is something only the Few can aspire to and the Many never appreciate. A true leader would be justified-not to put too fine a point on it-in concealing his motives and objectives from the public. In Mansfield's polity the citizenry has no substantive share in political power; their lot is to respect the virtue embodied in their governors and, by definition, denied them.

There is a remarkable, although not uncharacteristic, pa.s.sage where Mansfield refers to a famous incident in the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta and offers it as a telling example of the politics of risk and glory. It reads especially poignantly in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. "Not even Alcibiades," Mansfield lamented, "could convince a modern democracy to launch the Sicilian expedition that he persuaded the Athenians to undertake."31 Mansfield fails to round out the picture: Alcibiades happened to have first betrayed his native Athens and then sided with its deadly enemy, Sparta, only to betray it in turn; upon his return to Athens, his demagogic talents enabled him to regain power and persuade the Athenians to risk a new expedition against Sicily. It resulted in a disastrous defeat, hastening the eventual surrender of Athens and the beginning of its demise.32 But it was undeniably daring . . .

Mansfield is scathingly contemptuous of the politics dominated by interest groups. "Interests" are viewed primarily as a useful political tool for buying off the demos, distracting them from interfering in what Nietzsche called "grosse Politik," politics on a grand scale. The whole subject of economic policy or of policies of any kind has no place in Mansfield's conception. And, predictably, he is silent about corporate power. Perhaps rightly so: his prince is not that kind of crusader. We need no longer speculate as to what might happen if the "virtuous" wing of the Bush administration, the Alcibiades faction, were to persuade the "corporate wing" to embark on a bold, unprovoked invasion of Iraq that, at this writing, promises neither glory nor profits, only a debacle of unprecedented magnitude and a deceit-filled chapter in the history of the republic. But it was daring . . .

VIII.

Elitism stands for rightful ent.i.tlement to power, and by implication a claim to greater authority than that conferred by the citizenry. The fundamental importance of elections for democracy and, in a more complex sense, of First Amendment rights, is that they are the irreducible means by which consent can be expressed and the conditional basis of authority affirmed. The point of the elaborate grooming of elites discussed earlier is to establish a process of selection that wants to be recognized as an inst.i.tutionalized alternative to election, as a rite of pa.s.sage to legitimation. As defined in a previous chapter, legitimation involves the method(s) by which power acquires authority, or the rightful exercise of power. The obvious big step for elitists is to delegitimize its main rivals, the inst.i.tution of electing leaders and the democratic ideals of which elections are the political expression. The objective is nothing less than to diminish and replace consent as the first principle of legitimation-and to foreshadow the contempt for democratic elections and the subsequent coup of 2000.

Fareed Zakaria, a protege of Huntington, has obliged with The Future of Freedom (2003), a frontal attack on democracy and an attempted apologia for elitism.33 Zakaria's argument is exactly the opposite of the a.n.a.lysis I have been advancing. Instead of a beleaguered democracy growing ever more powerless, he portrays democracy as all-powerful, total in its influence. At the same time, he contends that while elites actually rule in the United States, they are hesitant to admit it. What is troubling about Zakaria's a.n.a.lysis is not the particular political problems he identifies. Rather it is his account of their causes and his proposed solutions.

According to Zakaria, "For much of the twentieth century, professionals formed a kind of modern aristocracy, secure in its status and concerned with the country's welfare and broader interests. . . . For all of the elitism and privilege that accompanies such a world, American democracy was well served by public-spirited elites."34 In contrast to my claims about the grooming system and its emphasis upon producing professionals, Zakaria contends that we have become enveloped by a totally democratic society, a reflection of the fact that power has s.h.i.+fted "downward." "[T]he democratic wave is breaking down hierarchies, empowering individuals, and transforming societies well beyond their politics." The term "democratization," as Zakaria employs it, is given an elasticity that allows it to cover virtually any phenomenon he deplores. Thus the "ma.s.ses" are declared to be "the primary engine of social change." The proof is in the "democratic" character of capitalism whereby "hundreds of millions" have been "enriched."35 Thanks to money-market funds "suddenly a steelworker . . . could own shares in blue-chip companies."36 In news that should cheer the homeless, Chase Manhattan Bank is declared guilty of "catering to the great unwashed."37 Similarly consumerism is the expression of democracy, consumerism conceived not as simple consumption but as the exercise of ma.s.s power. Not long ago "patrons of art . . . rarely gave a thought . . . to curry[ing] favor with the public," but now (ostensibly as another expression of democratization) "corporate sponsors support art as part of a business strategy."38 Democracy is also the beneficiary of the "information revolution." The latter has "made control impossible and dissent easy"-a stunning claim in the light of revelations about government spying on the Internet. Worse, "most anyone can get his hands on anything. Like weapons of ma.s.s destruction." The result: we are threatened by "the democratization of violence."39 (As contrasted with what, aristocratic violence?) At the same time the state has been weakened, its authority "sapped" by "capital markets, private businesses, local governments, [and] nongovernmental organizations." Even more bad news: democracy has been displaced by "a simple-minded populism that makes popularity and openness the key measures of legitimacy."40 Zakaria seems not to allow the possibility of a development that appears to have antielitist implications and yet has no causal relation to democratization. Thus he deplores that doctors and lawyers, instead of acting as dignified professionals, have become "hustlers," and presents this is an instance of democratization instead of, say, normal market behavior.41 One might suggest, however, that recent scandals about the role of doctors in promoting pharmaceutical products are evidence not of an insidious egalitarianism at work but rather of the "opportunities" thrown up by an intensely compet.i.tive and dynamic economy that often is at odds with ethical standards in several professions.42 Zakaria, however, insists the problem is one of "democratization"-his comprehensive term for a porous society where access to every social domain is open to any and all. "Democracy" is its political version. Zakaria defines democracy as "rule of the people" and identifies elections as the essential element of democracy. He never explains or ill.u.s.trates how the people actually "rule" or even in what sense they form a single coherent ent.i.ty. For him democracy is concentrated in the single inst.i.tution of elections. To defend that narrow conception he simply decrees that "the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, a.s.sembly, religion, and property" have "nothing intrinsically to do with democracy." In the past "free elections" produced Hitler, and now they might bring "Islamic theocracy or something like it."43 Throughout the world he sees "illiberal democracies" that violate rights and override const.i.tutional limitations.44 Dictators.h.i.+ps, such as those of t.i.to or Suharto, are preferred because they were more "secular" and "tolerant" than some elected regimes. All of this justified because the "people" need "guidance" by authority.45 He has kind words for Musharraf's coup in Pakistan and for Pinochet, who, we are instructed, "did eventually lead his country to liberal democracy"46-and, no doubt, the disappeared reappeared. Zakaria favors "liberalizing autocracies" and "dictators.h.i.+ps [that] opened the economy" and "made the government more and more liberal." His model is the East Asian autocracy, which, he notes, is superior to the American South of the 1950s.47 In the United States slavery and segregation were "entrenched" by virtue of "the democratic system." Jim Crow was destroyed, Zakaria opines, not by democracy "but despite it." He attributes no significance to the civil rights movement except as part of the sixties' "a.s.sault" on "the basic legitimacy of the American system."48 Curiously, despite his preoccupation with elites Zakaria maintains an absolute silence about the most ambitious attempts in recent times to proclaim the principle of elitism, to cultivate it systematically, and to put it into practice. n.a.z.i Germany, Fascist Italy, and Stalin's Soviet Union, despite their differences, all shared a basic conviction that their respective societies could achieve their objectives only if led by the exceptional Few, typically represented by the leaders.h.i.+p of "the" party.49 Instead, Zakaria identifies the British colonial system as the ideal regime for preparing a society to become a liberal democracy-American elitists of a non-Straussian stripe tend to be Anglophiles. According to his Kiplingesque view, the British elites imposed "limited const.i.tutional liberalism and capitalism."50 As regards the United States Zakaria prefers the early republic when political candidates were chosen by "tightly controlled hierarchies" and legislatures were hierarchical and "closed"-in contrast to today when politicians "do scarcely anything else but listen to the American people."51 "Special interests now run Was.h.i.+ngton," and the major responsibility, predictably, is attributed to the attacks on authority launched during the sixties and to the political reforms that followed. Once the floodgates were opened, "minorities," lobbyists, celebrities, and the rich began to dominate.52 The new elites that now control the political parties are inferior to "the old party elites": the arrivistes consist of Was.h.i.+ngton professionals, activists, ideologues, pollsters, and fund-raisers. Zakaria's list does not include corporate donors and sponsors.53 The main problem, as he sees it, is that those who operate the present system fail to "enact policies for the long run." Instead of "real reform," such as tr.i.m.m.i.n.g welfare benefits, there is "pandering." His solution is antidemocratic as well as antipolitical: "the economic realm" should be sealed off from politics and "the impartial judge" adopted as our political model.54 The best examples of that model are inst.i.tutions protected from political pressures such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Federal Reserve Bank.55 We need to "insulate some decision-makers from the intense pressures of interest groups, lobbies, and political campaigns-that is to say, from the intense pressures of democracy. . . . What we need in politics today is not more democracy but less."56 As examples of regimes able to enact farsighted policies, Zakaria points to Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Chile, Indonesia, "or even China."57 Despite his tirade against "democratization" Zakaria acknowledges grudgingly that elites do exist and rule; however, because of the influence of democratization elites don't recognize themselves as such or they hesitate to acknowledge publicly their uniqueness. When Zakaria enters the most d.a.m.ning indictment of the current elites, that they lack true public spirit or the fundamental virtue of disinterestedness, his elites surrender any ethical claim to legitimacy they might have had.

By declaring war on elitism, we [sic] have produced politics by a hidden elite, unaccountable, unresponsive, and often unconcerned with any larger public interest. The decline of America's traditional elites and inst.i.tutions-not just political but cultural, economic and religious-is at the heart of the transformation of American society.58 In the end Zakaria has no solution; he wearily concedes that democracy remains "the last, best hope." That he offers no clues as to how democracy can be expected to cure itself of itself leaves one with the suspicion that either he has misdiagnosed the problem-if it is one-of why there are no "true" elites, or else he is reluctant to pursue his own suspicions. Following his ritualistic indictments of porous democractization he concedes that the corruption of the political process and the abysmal quality of popular culture are, at bottom, due to the influence of money and to those (elites?) who have lots of it. Zakaria's ideal of "const.i.tutional liberalism" is inspired by nineteenth-century liberalism, with its priorities of "individual economic, political, and religious liberty" and its rejection of all forms of "coercion." Far from recognizing the power of capital, Zakaria defends nineteenth-century laissez-faire and argues for freeing economic activity from government regulations-as though by reducing governmental power one reduced the political power of capital. At the same time he fails to recognize that what he chooses to label as "democratization" has in reality been a feature of capitalism since long before modern political democracy and its electoral systems even existed. A French historian of an earlier generation pointed out that what was unique about the early bourgeois capitalist was that in his transactions he was indifferent to a buyer's political affiliation, religious beliefs, or skin color.59 Historically, however, it did not follow that the bourgeois was similarly indifferent about removing property or racial qualifications for office or for voting, or that he believed that workers had the right to form trade unions, or that black Americans had the same rights as other citizens. Rather he understood that wealth was power and that a society which recognized that equation would allow the wealthy to use their power to further whatever political, social, or cultural goals they favored. They could be public benefactors (Carnegie) or private mischief-makers (robber barons). But to attribute that situation to "democratization" is to invite Anatole France's gibe about the majesty of the law in that it equally allows the rich and the poor to sleep under the bridges at night.

In the end Zakaria can offer no solution to the problem he has identified as democratization operating in collusion with nontraditional elites, presumably including the kind represented by Zakaria himself-immigrant background, graduate of Yale and Harvard, editor at the ma.s.s-circulation magazine Newsweek .60 Democratization anyone?61

IX.

As a leading American inst.i.tution, Harvard College has

a responsibility to educate its students-who will live and

work in all corners of the globe-as citizens not only of

their home country, but also of the world, with the capacity