The Great War and How It Arose Part 8

They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality, in the event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and defensive forces, and especially upon the sea. They asked us--to put it quite plainly--for a free hand, so far as we were concerned, if and when they selected the opportunity to overpower and dominate the European world. To such a demand one answer was possible, and that was the answer we gave."[83]

FOOTNOTES:

[81] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 101.

[82] House of Commons, August 6, 1914.

[83] _South Wales Daily News_, October 3, 1914.

IF BRITAIN HAD REFUSED TO FIGHT.

If, in view of all this evidence, Britain had refused to fight, what would have been her position? The Prime Minister, speaking at the Guildhall on September 4, 1914, said:--

"But let me ask you, and through you the world outside, what would have been our condition as a nation to-day if, through timidity, or through a perverted calculation of self-interest or through a paralysis of the sense of honour and duty, we had been base enough to be false to our word and faithless to our friends?

"Our eyes would have been turned at this moment with those of the whole civilised world to Belgium--a small State which has lived for more than 70 years under a several and collective guarantee, to which we, in common with Prussia and Austria, were parties--and we should have seen, at the instance, and by the action of two of these guaranteeing Powers, her neutrality violated, her independence strangled, her territory made use of as affording the easiest and most convenient road to a war of unprovoked aggression against France.

"We, the British people, should have at this moment been standing by with folded arms and with such countenance as we could command, while this small and unprotected State (Belgium), in defence of her vital liberties, made a heroic stand against overweening and overwhelming force.

"We should have been watching as detached spectators the siege of Liege, the steady and manful resistance of a small Army, the occupation of Brussels with its splendid traditions and memories, the gradual forcing back of the patriotic defenders of their native land to the ramparts of Antwerp, countless outrages suffered by them, and buccaneering levies exacted from the unoffending civil population, and finally the greatest crime committed against civilisation and culture since the Thirty Years' War--the sack of Louvain, with its buildings, its pictures, its unique library, its unrivalled a.s.sociations, a shameless holocaust of irreparable treasures lit up by blind barbarian vengeance....

"For my part I say that sooner than be a silent witness--which means in effect a willing accomplice--of this tragic triumph of force over law and of brutality over freedom, I would see this country of ours blotted out of the pages of history."

Further, we need not imagine that the peace we should have gained would have been a lasting one. If we had dishonoured our name in the manner Mr. Asquith has described, we should have been left without a friend in the world. Who can doubt that we should have been Germany's next victim if she had succeeded in crus.h.i.+ng Belgium and France and warding off the blows of Russia? As Mr. Bonar Law said, on the same occasion:--

"We are fighting for our national existence, for everything which nations have always held most dear."

The fate which has fallen upon Belgium would have been our fate in a few years' time, but with this difference, that we should have had no powerful friends to give back as far as humanly possible what we had lost, as Russia, France and Britain are determined to do for Belgium.

APPENDIX A.

GERMANY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE ULTIMATUM DELIVERED BY AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERBIA ON JULY 23, 1914.

Germany did her utmost to make the Great Powers believe that she had no knowledge of the contents of the Ultimatum delivered by Austria-Hungary to Serbia at 6 p.m. on Thursday, July 23, 1914.

Two days before the delivery of the Ultimatum, the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, at the Diplomatic Audience, said to Herr von Jagow (German Secretary of State), that he supposed the German Government then had full knowledge of the Note prepared by Austria. Herr von Jagow protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that Note, and expressed himself in the same way on that date (July 21) to the French Amba.s.sador also. The very next day (July 22), however, M.

Paul Cambon, the French Amba.s.sador in London, in a despatch to the Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, stated:--

"Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Amba.s.sador, who stated to him that at Berlin a _demarche_ of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Serbian Government was expected.

Prince Lichnowsky a.s.sured him that the German Government were endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but that up to the present time they had not been successful in this, and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a _demarche_ of this kind.... The communications of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the Italian Amba.s.sador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Serbian relations."[84]

Here it will be noticed that Prince Lichnowsky, the German Amba.s.sador in London, stated that the German Government were endeavouring to "hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna." How could they have done this if they were not aware of the general terms of the Ultimatum which Austria-Hungary proposed sending to Serbia. Moreover, the impression given by the Italian Amba.s.sador was probably derived from his knowledge of what had happened over a year before, when Austria appears to have been resolved on provoking war with Serbia on August 9, 1913.

But unfortunately for Germany the statement was refuted by one of its own States, Bavaria. The Ultimatum to Serbia was not delivered until 6 p.m. on the evening of July 23; yet earlier on that day M. Allize, the French Minister at Munich, in his Report to Paris, stated:--

=" ... Official circles have for some time been a.s.suming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.=

="In particular, the President of the Council said to me to-day that the Austrian Note, the contents of which were known to him (dont il avait connaissance) was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Serbia, but that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to be very serious."=[85]

It is difficult to think that the President of the Bavarian Council knew the contents of the Austrian Note while the German Secretary of State at Berlin was kept in ignorance of its terms. Yet, the next day, Herr von Jagow again makes the denial which is forwarded to Paris in the French Amba.s.sador's despatch, dated Berlin, July 24:--

"I asked the Secretary of State to-day in the interview which I had with him if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that Austria had presented a Note to the Powers on her dispute with Serbia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.

"Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the Note was forcible and that he approved it, the Serbian Government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria....

_Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.... It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to everyone that they were ignorant of the scope of the Note sent by Austria to Serbia._"[86]

Confirmation of Germany's complicity is received in a despatch to his Government from the French Amba.s.sador (M. Paul Cambon) in London, dated July 24, 1914:--

"I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have despatched her Ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.

"Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter Capital by the rumours of a naval _entente_ between Russia and England, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian Army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany.

"The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so, she could have stopped the despatch of the Ultimatum."[87]

Again on the same day (July 24, 1914) we have an interesting despatch from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris to the French Amba.s.sadors abroad, detailing what transpired at a visit received from Herr von Schoen (the German Amba.s.sador in Paris), at which the latter twice read (but refused to leave copy of) a note which said:--

"Under these circ.u.mstances the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified.

In spite of that, the att.i.tude which public opinion as well as the Government in Serbia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Serbian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative att.i.tude towards Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Serbian Government by strong pressure, and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.... The German Government consider that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately concerned.

"The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable consequences...."[88]

A note of similar effect was left with Sir Edward Grey by the German Amba.s.sador in London.[89]

Now the details of the Ultimatum to Serbia were only communicated to the French and Russian Governments on July 24, 1914, after 10 o'clock in the morning (nearly 17 hours after they had been delivered to Serbia), and presumably they were communicated to all the other Governments at about the same time. Germany would have us believe that she received the contents at the same time and on the same day as the other Governments.

Yet, a few hours later, the German Amba.s.sador in Paris is able, on instructions from his Government, to present a detailed note and to argue the matter in all its bearings. That is to say, Germany would have us believe that the Kaiser and his Ministers received the contents of the Ultimatum in the morning, and, almost within a few minutes, gathered together and discussed a question which they knew, if not carefully handled, must mean a European war; pretend that it was a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; and promptly instruct their Amba.s.sador in Paris to the minutest details.

As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked to the British Amba.s.sador in Petrograd on this fateful morning, "Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted."[90]

It has since been proved that Germany and Austria were parties not only to this, but to an exactly similar conspiracy which took place twelve months before.

On December 5, 1914, in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Signor Giolitti (ex-Premier of Italy) made the following momentous statement:--

"During the Balkan War, on the 9th August, 1913, about a year before the present war broke out, during my absence from Rome, I received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San Giuliano (late Foreign Minister), the following telegram:--

"'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the _casus foederis_ of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. (_Sensation._)

"'I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, therefore, we do not consider that the _casus foederis_ arises.

"'Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve.'

"I replied:--