Their Finest Hour Part 18

It is some time since I ventured to cable personally to you, and many things, both good and bad, have happened in between. It has now become most urgent for you to let us have the destroyers, motor-boats, and flying-boats for which we have asked. The Germans have the whole French coastline from which to launch U-boats and dive-bomber attacks upon our trade and food, and in addition we must be constantly prepared to repel by sea-action threatened invasion in the Narrow Waters, and also to deal with break-outs from Norway towards Ireland, Iceland, Shetlands, and Faroes. Besides this, we have to keep control of the exits from the Mediterranean, and if possible the command of that inland sea itself, and thus to prevent the war spreading seriously into Africa.We have a large construction of destroyers and anti-U-boat craft coming forward, but the next three or four months open the gap of which I have previously told you. Latterly the air attack on our s.h.i.+pping has become injurious. In the last ten days we have had the following destroyers sunk: Brazen, Codrington, Delight, Wren, Brazen, Codrington, Delight, Wren, and the following damaged: and the following damaged: Beagle, Boreas, Brilliant, Griffin, Montrose, Walpole, Whitshed; Beagle, Boreas, Brilliant, Griffin, Montrose, Walpole, Whitshed; total eleven. All this in the advent of any attempt which may be made at invasion! Destroyers are frightfully vulnerable to air-bombing, and yet they must be held in the air-bombing area to prevent sea-borne invasion. We could not sustain the present rate of casualties for long, and if we cannot get a substantial reinforcement the whole fate of the war may be decided by this minor and easily remediable factor. total eleven. All this in the advent of any attempt which may be made at invasion! Destroyers are frightfully vulnerable to air-bombing, and yet they must be held in the air-bombing area to prevent sea-borne invasion. We could not sustain the present rate of casualties for long, and if we cannot get a substantial reinforcement the whole fate of the war may be decided by this minor and easily remediable factor.This is a frank account of our present situation, and I am confident, now that you know exactly how we stand, that you will leave nothing undone to ensure that fifty or sixty of your oldest destroyers are sent to me at once. I can fit them very quickly with Asdics and use them against U-boats on the western approaches, and so keep the more modern and better-gunned craft for the Narrow Seas against invasion. Mr. President, with great respect. I must tell you that in the long history of the world this is a thing to do now. now. Large construction is coming to me in 1941, but the crisis will be reached long before 1941. I know you will do all in your power, but I feel ent.i.tled and bound to put the gravity and urgency of the position before you. Large construction is coming to me in 1941, but the crisis will be reached long before 1941. I know you will do all in your power, but I feel ent.i.tled and bound to put the gravity and urgency of the position before you.If the destroyers were given, the motor-boats and flying-boats, which would be invaluable, could surely come in behind them.I am beginning to feel very hopeful about this war if we can get round the next three or four months. The air is holding well. We are hitting that man hard, both in repelling attacks and in bombing Germany. But the loss of destroyers by air attack may well be so serious as to break down our defence of the food and trade routes across the Atlantic.Tonight the latest convoys of rifles, cannon, and ammunition are coming in. Special trains are waiting to take them to the troops and Home Guard, who will take a lot of killing before they give them up. I am sure that, with your comprehension of the sea affair, you will not let this crux of the battle go wrong for want of these destroyers.

Three days later I telegraphed to our Amba.s.sador: 3.VIII.40.[The] second alternative, i.e., [granting of] bases [in British possessions], is agreeable, but we prefer that it should be on lease indefinitely and not sale. It is understood that this will enable us to secure destroyers and flying-boats at once. You should let Colonel Knox and others know that a request on these lines will be agreeable to us.... It is, as you say, vital to settle quickly. Now is the time when we want the destroyers. We can fit them with Asdics in about ten days from the time they are in our hands, all preparations having been made. We should also be prepared to give a number of Asdics sets to the United States Navy and a.s.sist in their installation and explain their working. Go ahead on these lines full steam.

Profound and anxious consultations had taken place at Was.h.i.+ngton, and in the first week of August the suggestion was made to us through Lord Lothian that the fifty old but reconditioned American destroyers which lay in the east coast Navy yards might be traded off. to us in exchange for a series of bases in the West Indian islands, and also Bermuda. There was, of course, no comparison between the intrinsic value of these antiquated and inefficient craft and the immense permanent strategic security afforded to the United States by the enjoyment of the island bases. But the threatened invasion, the importance of numbers in the Narrow Seas, made our need clamant. Moreover, the strategic value of these islands counted only against the United States. They were, in the old days, the stepping-stone by which America could be attacked from Europe or from England. Now, with air power, it was all the more important for American safety that they should be in friendly hands, or in their own. But the friendly hands might fail in the convulsive battle now beginning for the life of Britain. Believing, as I have always done, that the survival of Britain is bound up with the survival of the United States, it seemed to me and to my colleagues that it was an actual advantage to have these bases in American hands. 1 therefore did not look upon the question from any narrow British point of view.

There was another reason, wider and more powerful than either our need for the destroyers or the American need for the bases. The transfer to Great Britain of fifty American wars.h.i.+ps was a decidedly unneutral act by the United States. It would, according to all the standards of history, have justified the German Government in declaring war upon them. The President judged that there was no danger, and I felt there was no hope, of this simple solution of many difficulties. It was. .h.i.tler's interest and method to strike his opponents down one by one. The last thing he wished was to be drawn into war with the United States before he had finished with Britain. Nevertheless the transfer of destroyers to Britain in August, 1940, was an event which brought the United States definitely nearer to us and to the war, and it was the first of a long succession of increasingly unneutral acts in the Atlantic which were of the utmost service to us. It marked the pa.s.sage of the United States from being neutral to being non-belligerent. Although Hitler could not afford to resent it, all the world, as will be seen, understood the significance of the gesture.

For all these reasons the War Cabinet and Parliament approved the policy of leasing the bases to obtain the destroyers, provided we could persuade the West Indian island Governments concerned to make what was to them a serious sacrifice and disturbance of their life for the sake of the Empire. On August 6, Lothian cabled that the President was anxious for an immediate reply about the future of the Fleet. He wished to be a.s.sured that if Britain were overrun, the Fleet would continue to fight for the Empire overseas and would not either be surrendered or sunk. This was, it was said, the argument which would have the most effect on Congress in the question of destroyers. The prospects of legislative action, he thought, were steadily improving.

I expressed my own feelings to the Foreign Secretary: 7.VIII.40.The position is, I think, quite clear. We have no intention of surrendering the British Fleet, or of sinking it voluntarily. Indeed, such a fate is more likely to overtake the German Fleet or what is left of it. The nation would not tolerate any discussion of what we should do if our island were overrun. Such a discussion, perhaps on the eve of an invasion, would be injurious to public morale, now so high. Moreover, we must never get into a position where the United States Government might say: "We think the time has come for you to send your Fleet across the Atlantic in accordance with our understanding or agreement when we gave you the destroyers."We must refuse any declaration such as is suggested, and confine the deal solely to the colonial leases.

I now cabled to Lothian: 7.VIII.40.We need the fifty or sixty destroyers very much, and hope we shall obtain them. In no other way could the United States a.s.sist us so effectively in the next three or four months. We were, as you know, very ready to offer the United States indefinite lease facilities for naval and air bases in West Indian islands, and to do this freely on grounds of inevitable common a.s.sociation of naval and military interests of Great Britain and the United States. It was, therefore, most agreeable to us that Colonel Knox should be inclined to suggest action on these or similar lines as an accompaniment to the immediate sending of the said destroyers. But all this has nothing to do with any bargaining or declaration about the future disposition of the British Fleet. It would obviously be impossible for us to make or agree to any declaration being made on such a subject. I have repeatedly warned you in my secret telegrams and those to the President of the dangers United States would run if Great Britain were successfully invaded and a British Quisling Government came into office to make the best terms possible for the surviving inhabitants. I am very glad to find that these dangers are regarded as serious, and you should in no wise minimise them. We have no intention of relieving United States from any well-grounded anxieties on this point. Moreover, our position is not such as to bring the collapse of Britain into the arena of practical discussion. I have already several weeks ago told you that there is no warrant for discussing any question of the transference of the Fleet to American or Canadian sh.o.r.es. I should refuse to allow the subject even to be mentioned in any Staff conversations, still less that any technical preparations should be made or even planned. Above all, it is essential you should realise that no such declaration could ever be a.s.sented to by us for the purpose of obtaining destroyers or anything like that. Pray make it clear at once that we could never agree to the slightest compromising of our full liberty of action, nor tolerate any such defeatist announcement, the effect of which would be disastrous.Although in my speech of June 4 I thought it well to open up to German eyes the prospects of indefinite oceanic war, this was a suggestion in the making of which we could admit no neutral partner. Of course, if the United States entered the war and became an ally, we should conduct the war with them in common, and make of our own initiative and in agreement with them whatever were the best dispositions at any period in the struggle for the final effectual defeat of the enemy. You foresaw this yourself in your first conversation with the President, when you said you were quite sure that we should never send any part of our Fleet across the Atlantic except in the case of an actual war alliance.To the President I telegraphed:15.VIII.40.I need not tell you how cheered I am by your message or how grateful I feel for your untiring efforts to give us all possible help. You will, I am sure, send us everything you can, for you know well that the worth of every destroyer that you can spare to us is measured in rubies. But we also need the motor torpedo-boats which you mentioned, and as many flying-boats and rifles as you can let us have. We have a million men waiting for rifles.The moral value of this fresh aid from your Government and people at this critical time will be very great and widely felt.We can meet both the points you consider necessary to help you with Congress and with others concerned, but I am sure that you will not misunderstand me if I say that our willingness to do so must be conditional on our being a.s.sured that there will be no delay in letting us have the s.h.i.+ps and flying-boats. As regards an a.s.surance about the British Fleet, I am, of course, ready to reiterate to you what I told Parliament on June 4. We intend to fight this out here to the end, and none of us would ever buy peace by surrendering or scuttling the Fleet. But in any use you may make of this repeated a.s.surance you will please bear in mind the disastrous effect from our point of view, and perhaps also from yours, of allowing any impression to grow that we regard the conquest of the British Islands and its naval bases as any other than an impossible contingency. The spirit of our people is splendid. Never have they been so determined. Their confidence in the issue has been enormously and legitimately strengthened by the severe air fighting in the past week. As regards naval and air bases, I readily agree to your proposals for ninety-nine-year leases, which are far easier for us than the method of purchase. I have no doubt that once the principle is agreed between us the details can be adjusted and we can discuss them at leisure. It will be necessary for us to consult the Governments of Newfoundland and Canada about the Newfoundland base, in which Canada has an interest. We are at once proceeding to seek their consent.Once again, Mr. President, let me thank you for your help and encouragement, which mean so much to us.

Lothian thought this reply admirable, and said there was a real chance now that the President would be able to get the fifty destroyers without legislation. This was still uncertain, but he thought we should send some British destroyer crews to Halifax and Bermuda without any delay. It would create the worst impression in America if destroyers were made available and no British crews were ready to transport them across the Atlantic. Moreover, the fact that our crews were already waiting on the spot would help to impress the urgency of the case on Congress.

At his press conference on August 16, the President made the following statement: 'The United States Government is holding conversations with the Government of the British Empire with regard to acquisition of naval and air bases for the defence of the Western Hemisphere and especially the Panama Ca.n.a.l. The United States Government is carrying on conversations with the Canadian Government on the defence of the Western hemisphere.

According to the newspapers, the President stated that the United States would give Great Britain something in return, but that he did not know what this would be. He emphasised more than once that the negotiations for the air bases were in no way connected with the question of destroyers. Destroyers were, he said, not involved in the prospective arrangements.

The President, having always to consider Congress and also the Navy authorities in the United States, was of course increasingly drawn to present the transaction to his fellow-countrymen as a highly advantageous bargain whereby immense securities were gained in these dangerous times by the United States in return for a few flotillas of obsolete destroyers. This was indeed true; but not exactly a convenient statement for me. Deep feelings were aroused in Parliament and the Government at the idea of leasing any part of these historic territories, and if the issue were presented to the British as a naked trading-away of British possessions for the sake of the fifty destroyers it would certainly encounter vehement opposition. I sought, therefore, to place the transaction on the highest level, where indeed it had a right to stand, because it expressed and conserved the enduring common interests of the English-speaking world.

With the consent of the President I presented the question to Parliament on August 20, in words which have not perhaps lost their meaning with time: Presently we learned that anxiety was also felt in the United States about the air and naval defence of their Atlantic seaboard, and President Roosevelt has recently made it clear that he would like to discuss with us, and with the Dominion of Canada and with Newfoundland, the development of American naval and air facilities in Newfoundland and in the West Indies. There is, of course, no question of any transference of sovereignty that has never been suggested or of any action being taken without the consent or against the wishes of the various Colonies concerned, but for our part His Majesty's Government are entirely willing to accord defence facilities to the United States on a ninety-nine years' leasehold basis, and we feel sure that our interests no less than theirs, and the interests of the Colonies themselves and of Canada and Newfoundland, will be served thereby. These are important steps. Undoubtedly this process means that these two great organisations of the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage. For my own part, looking out upon the future, I do not view the process with any misgivings. I could not stop it if I wished; no one can stop it. Like the Mississippi, it just keeps rolling along. Let it roll. Let it roll on full Hood, inexorable, irresistible, benignant, to broader lands and better days.

Former Naval Person to President.

22.VIII.40.

I am most grateful for all you are doing on our behalf. I had not contemplated anything in the nature of a contract, bargain, or sale between us. It is the fact that we had decided in Cabinet to offer you naval and air facilities off the Atlantic Coast quite independently of destroyers or any other aid. Our view is that we are two friends in danger helping each other as far as we can. We should, therefore, like to give you the facilities mentioned without stipulating for any return, and even if tomorrow you found it too difficult to transfer the destroyers, etc., our offer still remains open because we think it is in the general good.2. I see difficulties, and even risks, in the exchange of letters now suggested or in admitting in any way that the munitions which you send us are a payment for the facilities. Once this idea is accepted, people will contrast on each side what is given and received. The money value of the armaments would be computed and set against the facilities, and some would think one thing about it and some another.3. Moreover, Mr. President, as you well know, each island or location is a case by itself. If, for instance, there were only one harbour or site, how is it to be divided and its advantages shared? In such a case we should like to make you an offer of what we think is best for both, rather than to embark upon a close-cut argument as to what ought to be delivered in return for value received.4. What we want is that you shall feel safe on your Atlantic seaboard so far as any facilities in possessions of ours can make you safe, and naturally, if you put in money and make large developments, you must have the effective security of a long lease. Therefore, I would rather rest at this moment upon the general declaration made by me in the House of Commons yesterday, both on this point and as regards the future of the Fleet. Then, if you will set out in greater detail what you want, we will at once tell you what we can do, and thereafter the necessary arrangements, technical and legal, can be worked out by our experts. Meanwhile, we are quite content to trust entirely to your judgment and the sentiments of the people of the United States about any aid in munitions, etc., you feel able to give us. But this would be entirely a separate spontaneous act on the part of the United States, arising out of their view of the world struggle and how their own interests stand in relation to it and the causes it involves.5. Although the air attack has slackened in the last few days and our strength is growing in many ways, I do not think that bad man has yet struck his full blow. We are having considerable losses in merchant s.h.i.+ps on the northwestern approaches, now our only channel of regular communication with the oceans, and your fifty destroyers, if they came along at once, would be a precious help.

Lothian now cabled that Mr. Sumner Welles had told him that the const.i.tutional position made it "utterly impossible" for the President to send the destroyers as a spontaneous gift; they could come only as a quid pro quo. quid pro quo. Under the existing legislation neither the Chief of the Staff nor the General Board of the Navy were able to give the certificate that the s.h.i.+ps were not essential to national defence, without which the transfer could not be legally made, except in return for a definite consideration which they would certify added to the security of the United States. The President had tried to find another way out, but there was none. Under the existing legislation neither the Chief of the Staff nor the General Board of the Navy were able to give the certificate that the s.h.i.+ps were not essential to national defence, without which the transfer could not be legally made, except in return for a definite consideration which they would certify added to the security of the United States. The President had tried to find another way out, but there was none.

Former Naval Person to President.

25.VIII.40.

I fully understand the legal and const.i.tutional difficulties which make you wish for a formal contract embodied in letters, but I venture to put before you the difficulties, and even dangers, which I foresee in this procedure. For the sake of the precise list of instrumentalities mentioned, which in our sore need we greatly desire, we are asked to pay undefined concessions in all the islands and places mentioned, from Newfoundland to British Guiana, "as may be required in the judgment of the United States." Suppose we could not agree to all your experts asked for, should we not be exposed to a charge of breaking our contract, for which we had already received value? Your commitment is definite, ours unlimited. Much though we need the destroyers, we should not wish to have them at the risk of a misunderstanding with the United States, or, indeed, any serious argument. If the matter is to be represented as a contract, both sides must be defined, with far more precision on our side than has. .h.i.therto been possible. But this might easily take some time.As I have several times pointed out, we need the destroyers chiefly to bridge the gap between now and the arrival of our new construction, which I set on foot on the outbreak of war. This construction is very considerable. For instance, we shall receive by the end of February new destroyers and new medium destroyers, 20; corvettes, which are a handy type of submarine-hunter adapted to ocean work, 60; motor torpedo-boats, 37; motor anti-submarine boats, 25; Fairmiles, a wooden anti-submarine patrol boat, 104; seventy-two-foot launches, 29. An even greater inflow will arrive in the following six months. It is just in the gap from September to February inclusive, while this new crop is coming in and working up, that your fifty destroyers would be invaluable. With them we could minimise s.h.i.+pping losses in the northwestern approaches and also take a stronger line against Mussolini in the Mediterranean. Therefore, time is all-important. We should not, however, be justified, in the circ.u.mstances, if we gave a blank cheque on the whole of our transatlantic possessions merely to bridge this gap, through which, anyhow, we hope to make our way, though with added risk and suffering. This, I am sure you will see, sets forth our difficulties plainly.2. Would not the following procedure be acceptable? I would offer at once certain fairly well-defined facilities which will show you the kind of gift we have in mind, and your experts could then discuss these, or any variants of them, with ours we remaining the final judge of what we can give. All this we will do freely, trusting entirely to the generosity and good will of the American people as to whether they on their part would like to do something for us. But anyhow, it is the settled policy of His Majesty's Government to offer you, and make available to you when desired, solid and effective means of protecting your Atlantic seaboard. I have already asked the Admiralty and the Air Ministry to draw up in outline what we are prepared to offer, leaving your experts to suggest alternatives. I propose to send you this outline in two or three days and to publish it in due course. In this way there can be no possible dispute, and the American people will feel more warmly towards us, because they will see we are playing the game by the world's cause and that their safety and interests are dear to us.3. If your law or your Admiral requires that any help you may choose to give us must be presented as a quid pro quo, quid pro quo, I do not see why the British Government have to come into that at all. Could you not say that you did not feel able to accept this fine offer which we make, unless the United States matched it in some way, and that therefore the Admiral would be able to link the one with the other? I do not see why the British Government have to come into that at all. Could you not say that you did not feel able to accept this fine offer which we make, unless the United States matched it in some way, and that therefore the Admiral would be able to link the one with the other?4. I am so grateful to you for all the trouble you have been taking, and I am sorry to add to your burdens, knowing what a good friend you have been to us.

Former Naval Person to President.

27.VIII.40.

Lord Lothian has cabled me the outline of the facilities you have in mind. Our naval and air experts, studying the question from your point of view, had reached practically the same conclusions, except that in addition they thought Antigua might be useful as a base for flying-boats. To this also you would be very welcome. Our settled policy is to make the United States safe on their Atlantic seaboard "beyond a peradventure," to quote a phrase you may remember.12. We are quite ready to make you a positive offer on these lines forthwith. There would, of course, have to be an immediate conference on details, but, for the reasons which I set out in my last telegram, we do not like the idea of an arbiter should any difference arise, because we feel that as donors we must remain the final judges of what the gift is to consist of within the general framework of the facilities which will have been promised, and always on the understanding that we shall do our best to meet United States wishes.3. The two letters dratted by Lord Lothian to the Secretary of State are quite agreeable to us. The only reason why I do not wish the second letter to be published is that I think it is much more likely that the German Government will be the one to surrender or scuttle its fleet or what is left of it. In this, as you are aware, they have already had some practice. You will remember that I said some months ago in one of my private cables to you that any such action on our part would be a dastard act, and that is the opinion of every one of us.4. If you felt able after our offer had been made to let us have the "instrumentalities" 2 2 which have been mentioned or anything else you think proper, this could be expressed as an act not in payment or consideration for, but in recognition of, what we had done for the security of the United States. which have been mentioned or anything else you think proper, this could be expressed as an act not in payment or consideration for, but in recognition of, what we had done for the security of the United States.5. Mr. President, this business has become especially urgent in view of the recent menace which Mussolini is showing to Greece. If our business is put through on big lines and in the highest spirit of good will, it might even now save that small historic country from invasion and conquest. Even the next forty-eight hours are important.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

27.VIII.40.

Lord Lothian's account of President Roosevelt's request should now be put into the first person in case a public declaration is required in our name. For instance, "His Majesty's Government make the following offer to the President of the United States: 'We are prepared in friends.h.i.+p and good will to meet your representatives immediately in order to consider the provision of effective naval and air bases in the following islands,' " etc.Let me have a draft on these lines, so that I can dictate a cable. The draft should be in my hands this morning.

Accordingly: 27.VIII.40.His Majesty's Government make the following offer to the President of the United States:We are prepared in friends.h.i.+p and good will to meet your representatives forthwith, in order to consider the lease for ninety-nine years of areas for the establishment of naval and air bases in the following places:

NEWFOUNDLAND.

ANTIGUA.

BERMUDA.

ST. L LUCIA.

BAHAMAS.

TRINIDAD.

JAMAICA.

BRITISH G GUIANA.

Subject to later settlements on points of detail....

At the same time I suggested the following text of the telegram for publication which the President might send me to elicit the a.s.surance he desired.

The Prime Minister of Great Britain is reported to have stated on June 4, 1940, to Parliament, in effect, that if during the course of the present war in which Great Britain and British Colonies are engaged, the waters surrounding the British Isles should become untenable for British s.h.i.+ps-of-war, a British Fleet would in no event be surrendered or sunk, but would be sent overseas for the defence of other parts of the Empire.The Government of the United States would respectfully inquire whether the foregoing statement represents the settled policy of the British Government.

The President adopted this version, and I sent him the following agreed reply: You ask, Mr. President, whether my statement in Parliament on June 4, 1940, about Great Britain never surrendering or scuttling her Fleet "represents the settled policy of His Majesty's Government." It certainly does. I must, however, observe that these hypothetical contingencies seem more likely to concern the German Fleet or what is left of it than our own.

Thus all was happily settled, and on September 5, using the language of understatement, I duly informed the House of Commons and obtained their acquiescence and indeed general consent: The memorable transactions between Great Britain and the United States, which were foreshadowed when I last addressed the House, have now been completed. As far as I can make out, they have been completed to the general satisfaction of the British and American peoples and to the encouragement of our friends all over the world. It would be a mistake to try to read into the official notes which have pa.s.sed more than the doc.u.ments bear on their face. The exchanges which have taken place are simply measures of mutual a.s.sistance rendered to one another by two friendly nations, in a spirit of confidence, sympathy, and good will. These measures are linked together in a formal agreement. They must be accepted exactly as they stand. Only very ignorant persons would suggest that the transfer of American destroyers to the British flag const.i.tutes the slightest violation of international law, or affects in the smallest degree the non-belligerency of the United States.

I have no doubt that Herr Hitler will not like this transference of destroyers, and I have no doubt that he will pay the United States out, if he ever gets the chance. That is why I am very glad that the army, air, and naval frontiers of the United States have been advanced along a wide arc into the Atlantic Ocean, and that this will enable them to take danger by the throat while it is still hundreds of miles away from their homeland. The Admiralty tell us also that they are very glad to have these fifty destroyers, and that they will come in most conveniently to bridge the gap which, as I have previously explained to the House, inevitably intervenes before our considerable wartime programme of new construction comes into service.

I suppose the House realises that we shall be a good deal stronger next year on the sea than we are now, although that is quite strong enough for the immediate work in hand. There will be no delay in bringing the American destroyers into active service; in fact, British crews are already meeting them at the various ports where they are being delivered. You might call it the long arm of coincidence. I really do not think that there is any more to be said about the whole business at the present time. This is not the appropriate occasion for rhetoric. Perhaps I may, however, very respectfully, offer this counsel to the House: When you have got a thing where you want it, it is a good thing to leave it where it is.

Thus we obtained the fifty American destroyers. We granted ninety-nine-year leases of the air and naval bases specified in the West Indies and Newfoundland to the United States. And thirdly, I repeated my declaration about not scuttling or surrendering the British Fleet, in the form of an a.s.surance to the President. I regarded all these as parallel transactions, and as acts of good will performed on their merits and not as bargains. The President found, it more acceptable to present them to Congress as a connected whole. We neither of us contradicted each other, and both countries were satisfied. The effects in Europe were profound.

6.

Egypt and the Middle East 1940.

June - - July July - - August August

Mussolini Prepares to Invade Egypt - Our Competing Anxieties - The Italian Strength in North Africa - Concentration Towards the Egyptian Frontier - Beads on the String - Initiative of Our Covering Troops - Amphibious Possibilities - Need to Reinforce with Tanks and Other Weapons - My Complaints of Dispersion - The Kenya Front - Palestine - Need to Send Forth an Armoured Brigade and Later the Second Armoured Division - The Mediterranean Short Cut - The Tanks Have to Go Round the Cape - Plans for Cutting the Italian Coastal Road from the Sea - Ministerial Committee on the Middle East - General Wavell Comes Home for Conference - Hard and Tense Discussions with Him - Directive of August 16 - a.s.sembly of the Army of the Nile - Its Tactical Employment - The Somaliland Episode - A Vexatious Rebuff - My Minutes Thereupon - Increase in Italian Forces in Albania - My Report on the General Situation to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand.

WITH THE DISAPPEARANCE of France as a combatant and with Britain set on her struggle for life at home, Mussolini might well feel that his dream of dominating the Mediterranean and rebuilding the former Roman Empire would come true. Relieved from any need to guard against the French in Tunis, he could still further reinforce the numerous army he had gathered for the invasion of Egypt. The eyes of the world were fixed upon the fate of the British Island, upon the gathering of the invading German armies, and upon the drama of the struggle for air mastery. These were, of course, our main preoccupations. In many countries we were presumed to be at the last gasp. Our confident and resolute bearing was admired by our friends, but its foundations were deemed unsure. Nevertheless, the War Cabinet were determined to defend Egypt against all comers with whatever resources could be spared from the decisive struggle at home. All the more was this difficult when the Admiralty declared themselves unable to pa.s.s even military convoys through the Mediterranean on account of the air dangers. All must go round the Cape. Thus we might easily rob the Battle of Britain without helping the Battle of Egypt. It is odd that, while at the time everyone concerned was quite calm and cheerful, writing about it afterwards makes one s.h.i.+ver. of France as a combatant and with Britain set on her struggle for life at home, Mussolini might well feel that his dream of dominating the Mediterranean and rebuilding the former Roman Empire would come true. Relieved from any need to guard against the French in Tunis, he could still further reinforce the numerous army he had gathered for the invasion of Egypt. The eyes of the world were fixed upon the fate of the British Island, upon the gathering of the invading German armies, and upon the drama of the struggle for air mastery. These were, of course, our main preoccupations. In many countries we were presumed to be at the last gasp. Our confident and resolute bearing was admired by our friends, but its foundations were deemed unsure. Nevertheless, the War Cabinet were determined to defend Egypt against all comers with whatever resources could be spared from the decisive struggle at home. All the more was this difficult when the Admiralty declared themselves unable to pa.s.s even military convoys through the Mediterranean on account of the air dangers. All must go round the Cape. Thus we might easily rob the Battle of Britain without helping the Battle of Egypt. It is odd that, while at the time everyone concerned was quite calm and cheerful, writing about it afterwards makes one s.h.i.+ver.

When Italy declared war on June 10, 1940, the British Intelligence estimated we now know correctly that, apart from her garrisons in Abyssinia, Eritrea, and Somaliland, there were about 215,000 Italian troops in the North African coastal provinces. These were disposed as follows: in Tripolitania, six metropolitan and two militia divisions; in Cyrenaica, two metropolitan and two militia divisions, besides frontier forces equal to three divisions; a total of fifteen divisions. The British forces in Egypt consisted of the 7th Armoured Division, two-thirds of the 4th Indian Division, one-third of the New Zealand Division, and fourteen British battalions and two regiments of the Royal Artillery, ungrouped in higher formations; the whole amounting to perhaps fifty thousand men. From these both the defence of the western frontier and the internal security of Egypt had to be provided. We, therefore, had heavy odds against us in the field, and the Italians had also many more aircraft.

During July and August the Italians became active at many points. There was a threat from Ka.s.sala, on the White Nile, westward towards Khartoum. Alarm was spread in Kenya by the fear of an Italian expedition marching four hundred miles south from Abyssinia towards the Tana River and Nairobi. Considerable Italian forces advanced into British Somaliland. But all these anxieties were petty compared with the Italian invasion of Egypt, which was obviously being prepared on the greatest scale. For some time past Mussolini had been steadily moving his forces eastward towards Egypt. Even before the war a magnificent road had been made along the coast from the main base at Tripoli, through Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Libya, to the Egyptian frontier. Along this road there had been for many months a swelling stream of military traffic. Large magazines were slowly established and filled at Benghazi. Derna, Tobruk, Bardia, and Sollum. The length of this road was over a thousand miles, and all these swarming Italian garrisons and supply depots were strung along it like beads on a string.

At the head of the road and near the Egyptian frontier an Italian army of seventy or eighty thousand men, with a good deal of modern equipment, had been patiently gathered and organised. Before this army glittered the prize of Egypt. Behind it stretched the long road back to Tripoli; and after that the sea! If this force, built up in driblets week by week for years, could advance continually eastward, conquering all who sought to bar the path, its fortunes would be bright. If it could gain the fertile regions of the Delta, all worry about the long road back would vanish. On the other hand, if ill-fortune befell it only a few would ever get home. In the field army and in the series of great supply depots all along the coast there were by the autumn at least three hundred thousand Italians, who could, even if unmolested, retreat westward along the road only gradually or piecemeal. For this they required many months. And if the battle were lost on the Egyptian border, if the army's front were broken, and if time were not given to them, all were doomed to capture or death. However, in July, 1940, it was not known who was going to win the battle.

Our foremost defended position at that time was the railhead at Mersa Matruh. There was a good road westward to Sidi Barani, but thence to the frontier at Sollum there was no road capable of maintaining any considerable strength for long near the frontier. A small covering mechanised force had been formed of some of our finest Regular troops, consisting of the 7th Hussars (light tanks), the 11th Hussars (armoured cars), and two motor battalions of the 60th Rifles and Rifle Brigade, with two regiments of motorised Royal Horse Artillery. Orders had been given to attack the Italian frontier posts immediately on the outbreak of war. Accordingly, within twenty-four hours, the 11th Hussars crossed the frontier, took the Italians, who had not heard that war had been declared, by surprise, and captured prisoners. The next night, June 12, they had a similar success, and on June 14, with the 7th Hussars and one company of the 60th Rifles, captured the frontier forts at Capuzzo and Maddalena, taking two hundred and twenty prisoners. On the 16th they raided deeper, destroyed twelve tanks, intercepted a convoy on the Tobruk-Bardia road, and captured a general.

In this small but lively warfare our troops felt they had the advantage, and soon conceived themselves to be masters of the desert. Until they came up against large formed bodies or fortified posts, they could go where they liked, collecting trophies from sharp encounters. When armies approach each other, it makes all the difference which owns only the ground on which it stands or sleeps and which one owns all the rest. I saw this in the Boer War, where we owned nothing beyond the fires of our camps and bivouacs, whereas the Boers rode where they pleased all over the country.

Ever-growing enemy forces were now arriving from the west, and by the middle of July the enemy had re-established his frontier line with two divisions and elements of two more. Early in August our covering force was relieved by the support group of the 7th Armoured Division, comprising the 3d Cold-stream Guards, the first 60th Rifles, the 2d Rifle Brigade, the 11th Hussars, one squadron of the 6th Royal Tank Battalion, and two mechanised batteries, R.H.A., one of which was ant.i.tank. This small force, distributed over a front of sixty miles, continued to hara.s.s the enemy with increasing effect. The published Italian casualties for the first three months of war were nearly thirty-five hundred men, of whom seven hundred were prisoners. Our own losses barely exceeded a hundred and fifty. Thus the first phase in the war which Italy had declared upon the British Empire opened favourably for us.

It was proposed by the Middle East Command, under General Wavell, to await the shock of the Italian onslaught near the fortified position of Mersa Matruh. Until we could gather an army, this seemed the only course open. I therefore proposed the following tasks: First, to a.s.semble the largest fighting force possible to face the Italian invaders. For this it was necessary to run risks in many other quarters. I was pained to see the dispersions which were tolerated by the military authorities. Khartoum and the Blue Nile certainly required strengthening against the Italian-Abyssinian border, but what was the sense of keeping twenty-five thousand men, including the Union Brigade of South Africa and two brigades of excellent West African troops, idle in Kenya? I had ridden over some of this country, north of the Tana River, in 1906. It is a very fine-looking country, but without much to eat. The idea of an Italian expedition of fifteen or twenty thousand men, with artillery and modern gear, traversing the four or five hundred miles before they could reach Nairobi seemed ridiculous. Behind the Kenya front would lie the broad-gauge Uganda Railway. We had the command of the sea, and could move troops to and fro by sea and rail with a facility incomparable to anything that could be achieved by enemy land movements. On account of our superior communications, it was our interest to fight an Italian expedition as near to Nairobi and the broad-gauge railway as possible. For this large numbers of troops were not required. They were more needed in the Egyptian Delta. I got something, but only after a prolonged hard fight against the woolly theme of being safe everywhere.

I did my utmost to draw upon Singapore and bring the Australian division which had arrived there, first to India for training and thence to the Western Desert. Palestine presented a different aspect. We had a ma.s.s of fine troops sprawled over Palestine: an Australian division, a New Zealand brigade, our own choice Yeomanry division, all in armoured cars or about to be; the Household Cavalry, still with horses, but longing for modern weapons; with lavish administrative services. I wished to arm the Jews at Tel-Aviv, who with proper weapons would have made a good fight against all comers. Here I encountered every kind of resistance. My second preoccupation was to ensure that freedom of movement through the Mediterranean was fought for against the weak Italians and the grave air danger, in order that Malta might be made impregnable. It seemed to me most important to pa.s.s military convoys, especially of tanks and guns, through the Mediterranean instead of all round the Cape. This seemed a prize worth many hazards. To send a division from Britain round the Cape to Egypt was to make sure it could not fight anywhere for three months; but these were precious months, and we had very few divisions. Finally, there was our island, now under pretty direct menace of invasion. How far could we denude our home and citadel for the sake of the Middle East?

In July, 1940, I began, as the telegrams and Minutes show, to concern myself increasingly about the Middle East. Always this long coastal road bulked in my mind. Again and again I recurred to the idea of cutting it by the landing of strong but light forces from the sea. We had not, of course, at that time proper tank-landing craft. Yet it should have been possible to improvise the necessary tackle for such an operation. If used in conjunction with a heavy battle it might have effected a valuable diversion of enemy troops from the front.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

10.VII.40.

Bring the following before the C.O.S. Committee:Have any plans been made in the event of large forces approaching the Egyptian border from Libya to cut the coastal motor road upon which they would be largely dependent for supplies of all kinds? It is not sufficient merely to bombard by air or from the sea. But if a couple of brigades of good troops could take some town or other suitable point on the communications, they might, with sea-power behind them, cause a prolonged interruption, require heavy forces to be moved against them, and then withdraw to strike again at some other point. Of course, such an operation would not be effective until considerable forces of the enemy had already pa.s.sed the point of interception. It may be, however, that the desert itself affords free movement to the enemy's supplies. I wonder whether this is so, and if so why the Italians were at pains to construct this lengthy road.

I still do not see why it should not have been possible to make a good plan. It is, however, a fact that none of our commanders, either in the Middle East or in Tunis, were ever persuaded to make the attempt. But General Patton in 1943 made several most successful turning movements of this character during the conquest of Sicily, and gained definite advantages thereby. It was not until Anzio in 1944 that I succeeded in having this experiment tried. This, of course, was on a far larger scale, nor did it, in spite of the success of the landing, achieve the decisive results for which we all hoped. But that is another story.

I was anxious that the case of the Middle East should be strongly presented by a group of Ministers, all experienced in war and deeply concerned in that theatre.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges.

10.VII.40.

I think it would be well to set up a small standing Ministerial Committee, consisting of the Secretaries of State for War [Mr. Eden], India [Mr. Amery], and the Colonies [Lord Lloyd], to consult together upon the conduct of the war in the Middle East (in which they are all three concerned), and to advise me, as Minister of Defence, upon the recommendations I should make to the Cabinet. Will you kindly put this into the proper form? The Secretary of State for War has agreed to take the chair.

Mr. Eden reported to his Committee the shortage of troops, equipment, and resources in the Middle East, and that the C.I.G.S. was equally perturbed. The Committee urged the full equipment of the armoured division already in Egypt but far below strength, and also recommended the provision of a second armoured division at the earliest moment when it could be spared from home. The Chiefs of Staff endorsed these conclusions, the C.I.G.S. observing that the moment must be chosen in relation to declining risks at home and increasing risks abroad. On July 31, Mr. Eden considered that we might be able to spare some tanks in a few weeks' time, and that if they were to reach the Middle East by the end of September we might have to send them and the other equipment through the Mediterranean. In spite of the rising tension about invasion at home, I was in full agreement with all this trend of thought, and brought the extremely hara.s.sing choice before the Cabinet several times.

The other aspects of the Middle East pressed upon me.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.