Their Finest Hour Part 27

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.

4.VIII.40.

The repeated severe losses in the northwestern approaches are most grievous, and I wish to feel a.s.sured that they are being grappled with with the same intense energy that marked the Admiralty treatment of the magnetic mine. There seems to have been a great falling-off in the control of these approaches. No doubt this is largely due to the shortage of destroyers through invasion precautions. Let me know at once the whole outfit of destroyers, corvettes, and Asdic trawlers, together with aircraft available and employed in this area. Who is in charge of their operations? Are they being controlled from Plymouth and Admiral Nasmith's staff? Now that you have s.h.i.+fted the entry from the south to the north, the question arises, Is Plymouth the right place for the Command? Ought not a new Command of the first order to be created in the Clyde, or should Admiral Nasmith [C.-in-C. at Plymouth] move thither? Anyhow, we cannot go on like this. How is the southern minefield barrage getting on? Would it not be possible after a while to ring the changes upon it for a short time and bring some convoys in through the gap which has been left? This is only a pa.s.sing suggestion.There were always increased dangers to be apprehended from using only one set of approaches. These dangers cannot be surmounted unless the protective concentration is carried out with vigour superior to that which must be expected from the enemy. He will soon learn to put everything there. It is rather like the early days in the Moray Firth after the east coast minefield was laid. I am confident the Admiralty will rise to the occasion, but evidently a great new impulse is needed. Pray let me hear from you.

I encountered resistances. The Admiralty accepted my view in September of moving from Plymouth to the North, rightly subst.i.tuting the Mersey for the Clyde. But several months elapsed before the necessary headquarters organisation, with its operation rooms and elaborate network of communications, could be brought into being, and in the meantime much improvisation was necessary. The new Command was entrusted to Admiral Sir Percy n.o.ble, who, with a large and ever-growing staff, was installed at Liverpool in February, 1941. Hence-forward this became almost our most important station. The need and advantage of the change was by then recognised by all.

Towards the end of 1940 I became increasingly concerned about the ominous fall in imports. This was another aspect of the U-boat attack. Not only did we lose s.h.i.+ps, but the precautions we took to avoid losing them impaired the whole flow of merchant traffic. The few harbours on which we could now rely became congested. The turn-round of all vessels as well as their voyages was lengthened. Imports were the final test. In the week ending June 8, during the height of the battle in France, we had brought into the country 1,201,535 tons of cargo, exclusive of oil. From this peak figure imports had declined at the end of July to less than 750,000 tons a week. Although substantial improvement was made in August, the weekly average again fell, and for the last three months of the year was little more than 800,000 tons.

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.

3.XII.40.

The new disaster which has overtaken the Halifax convoy requires precise examination. We heard about a week ago that as many as thirteen U-boats were lying in wait on these approaches. Would it not have been well to divert the convoy to the Minches? Would this not have been even more desirable when owing to bad weather the outward-bound convoys were delayed, and consequently the escort for the inward-bound could not reach the dangerous area in time?

Prime Minister to Chancellor of the Exchequer.

5.XII.40.

Pray convene a meeting to discuss the measures to be taken to reduce the burden on our s.h.i.+pping and finances in consequence of the heavy sinkings off the Irish coast and our inability to use the Irish ports. The following Ministers should be summoned: Trade, s.h.i.+pping, Agriculture, Food, Dominions. a.s.suming there is agreement on principle, a general plan should be made for acting as soon as possible, together with a time-table and programme of procedure. It is not necessary to consider either the Foreign Affairs or the Defence aspect at this stage. These will have to be dealt with later. The first step essential is to have a good workable scheme, with as much in it as possible that does not hit us worse than it does the others.

Prime Minister to Minister of Transport.

13.XII.40.

I am obliged to you for your note of December 3 on steel, and I hope that you are pus.h.i.+ng forward with the necessary measures to give effect to your proposals.In present circ.u.mstances it seems to me intolerable that firms should hold wagons up by delaying to unload them, and action should certainly be taken to prevent this.A sample shows that the average time taken by non-tanker cargo s.h.i.+ps to turn round at Liverpool rose from twelve and a half days in February to fifteen days in July and nineteen and a half in October. At Bristol the increase was from nine and a half to fourteen and a half days, but at Glasgow the time remained steady at twelve days. To improve this seems one of the most important aspects of the whole situation.

Prime Minister to Minister of Transport.

13.XII.40.

I see that oil imports during September and October were only half what they were in May and June, and covered only two-thirds of our consumption. I understand that there is no shortage of tankers, that the fall is the result of the partial closing of the south and east coast to tankers, and that a large number had to be temporarily laid up in the Clyde and others held at Halifax, Nova Scotia. More recently some tankers have been sent to the south and east coasts, and oil imports increased during November.From the reply your predecessor 3 3 made to my Minute of August 26, I gathered that he was satisfied with the preparations in hand for the importation of oil through the west coast ports. His expectations do not appear to have been fulfilled. made to my Minute of August 26, I gathered that he was satisfied with the preparations in hand for the importation of oil through the west coast ports. His expectations do not appear to have been fulfilled.There are two policies which can be followed to meet this situation. We can either expose oil tankers to additional risk by bringing them to south and east coast ports, and thus increase our current imports; or we can continue to draw upon our stocks, relying upon being able to replenish them from the west coast ports when arrangements have been completed for the handling of the cargoes, and accepting the resulting inconvenience. I should be glad if you would consider, in consultation with the First Lord, to what extent each of these two policies should be followed.I am sending a copy of this letter to the First Lord.

Prime Minister to First Lord.

14.XII.40.

Let me have a full account of the condition of the American destroyers, showing their many defects and the little use we have been able to make of them so far. I should like to have the paper by me for consideration in the near future.

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.

27.XII.40.

What have you done about catapulting expendable aircraft from s.h.i.+ps in outgoing convoys? I have heard of a plan to catapult them from tankers, of which there are nearly always some in each convoy. They then attack the Focke-Wulf and land in the sea, where the pilot is picked up, and machines salved or not as convenient.How is this plan viewed?

As we shall see in the next volume, this project was fruitful. s.h.i.+ps equipped for catapulting fighter aircraft to attack the Focke-Wulf were developed early in 1941.

Prime Minister to Minister of Transport.

27.XII.40.

It is said that two-fifths of the decline in the fertility of our s.h.i.+pping is due to the loss of time in turning round s.h.i.+ps in British ports. Now that we are confined so largely to the Mersey and the Clyde, and must expect increasingly severe attacks upon them, it would seem that this problem const.i.tutes the most dangerous part of the whole of our front.Would you kindly give me a note on:a. The facts. The facts.b. What you are doing, and what you propose to do. What you are doing, and what you propose to do.c. How you can be helped. How you can be helped.

Prime Minister to First Lord.

29.XII.40.

These [U-boat decoy s.h.i.+ps] 4 4 have been a great disappointment so far this war. The question of their alternative uses ought to be considered by the Admiralty. I expect they have a large number of skilled ratings on board. Could I have a list of these s.h.i.+ps, their tonnage, speeds, etc. Could they not carry troops or stores while plying on their routes? have been a great disappointment so far this war. The question of their alternative uses ought to be considered by the Admiralty. I expect they have a large number of skilled ratings on board. Could I have a list of these s.h.i.+ps, their tonnage, speeds, etc. Could they not carry troops or stores while plying on their routes?

My indignation at the denial of the Southern Irish ports mounted under these pressures.

Prime Minister to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

1.XII.40.

The straits to which we are being reduced by Irish action compel a reconsideration of these subsidies [to Ireland]. It can hardly be argued that we can go on paying them till our last gasp. Surely we ought to use this money to build more s.h.i.+ps or buy more from the United States in view of the heavy sinkings off the b.l.o.o.d.y Foreland.Pray let me know how these subsidies could be terminated, and what retaliatory measures could be taken in the financial sphere by the Irish, observing that we are not afraid of their cutting off our food, as it would save us the enormous ma.s.s of fertilisers and feeding-stuffs we have to carry into Ireland through the De Valera-aided German blockade. Do not a.s.semble all the pros and cons for the moment, but show what we could do financially and what would happen. I should be glad to know about this tomorrow.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

3.XII.40.

I gave you and each of the C.O.S. a copy of the Irish paper. The Chancellor of the Exchequer's comments are also favourable, and there is no doubt subsidies can be withdrawn at very short notice.We must now consider the military reaction. Suppose they invited the Germans into their ports, they would divide their people, and we should endeavour to stop the Germans. They would seek to be neutral and would bring the war upon themselves. If they withdrew the various cable and watching facilities they have, what would this amount to, observing that we could suspend all connections between England and Southern Ireland? Suppose they let German U-boats come in to refresh in west coast ports of Ireland, would this be serious, observing that U-boats have a radius of nearly thirty days, and that the limiting factor is desire of crews to get home and need of refit, rather than need of refuelling and provisioning? Pray let me have your observations on these and other points which may occur to you.

I thought it well to try to bring the President along in this policy.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

13. XII.40.

North Atlantic transport remains the prime anxiety. Undoubtedly, Hitler will augment his U-boat and air attack on s.h.i.+pping and operate ever farther into the ocean. Now that we are denied the use of Irish ports and airfields, our difficulties strain our flotillas to the utmost limit. We have so far only been able to bring a very few of your fifty destroyers into action on account of the many defects which they naturally develop when exposed to Atlantic weather after having been laid up so long. I am arranging to have a very full technical account prepared of renovations and improvements that have to be made in the older cla.s.ses of destroyers to fit them for the present task, and this may be of use to you in regard to your own older flotillas.In the meanwhile we are so hard pressed at sea that we cannot undertake to carry any longer the 400,000 tons of feeding-stuffs and fertilisers which we have hitherto convoyed to Eire through all the attacks of the enemy. We need this tonnage for our own supply, and we do not need the food which Eire has been sending us. We must now concentrate on essentials, and the Cabinet proposes to let De Valera know that we cannot go on supplying him under present conditions. He will, of course, have plenty of food for his people, but they will not have the prosperous trading they are making now. I am sorry about this, but we must think of our own self-preservation, and use for vital purposes our own tonnage brought in through so many perils. Perhaps this may loosen things up and make him more ready to consider common interests. I should like to know quite privately what your reactions would be if and when we are forced to concentrate our own tonnage upon the supply of Great Britain. We also do not feel able in present circ.u.mstances to continue the heavy subsidies we have hitherto been paying to the Irish agricultural producers. You will realise also that our merchant seamen, as well as public opinion generally, take it much amiss that we should have to carry Irish supplies through air and U-boat attacks and subsidise them handsomely when De Valera is quite content to sit happy and see us strangle.

One evening in December I held a meeting in the downstairs War Room with only the Admiralty and the sailors present. All the perils and difficulties, about which the company was well informed, had taken a sharper turn. My mind reverted to February and March, 1917, when the curve of U-boat sinkings had mounted so steadily against us that one wondered how many months' more fighting the Allies had in them, in spite of all the Royal Navy could do. One cannot give a more convincing proof of the danger than the project which the Admirals put forward. We must at all costs and with overriding priorities break out to the ocean. For this purpose it was proposed to lay an underwater carpet of dynamite from the seaward end of the North Channel, which gives access to the Mersey and the Clyde, to the hundred-fathom line northwest of Ireland. A submerged mine-field must be laid three miles broad and sixty miles long from these coastal waters to the open ocean. Even if all the available explosives were monopolised for this task, without much regard to field operations or the proper rearmament of our troops, it seemed vital to make this carpet a.s.suming there was no other way.

Let me explain the process. Many thousands of contact mines would have to be anch.o.r.ed to the bottom of the sea, reaching up to within thirty-five feet of its surface. Over this pathway all the s.h.i.+ps which fed Britain, or carried on our warfare abroad, could pa.s.s and repa.s.s without their keels striking the mines. A U-boat, however, venturing into this minefield, would soon be blown up; and after a while they would find it not good enough not good enough to come. Here was the defensive to come. Here was the defensive in excelsis. in excelsis. Anyhow, it was better than nothing. It was the last resort. Provisional approval and directions for detailed proposals to be presented were given on this night. Such a policy meant that the diver would in future be thinking about nothing but his air-pipe. But he had other work to do. Anyhow, it was better than nothing. It was the last resort. Provisional approval and directions for detailed proposals to be presented were given on this night. Such a policy meant that the diver would in future be thinking about nothing but his air-pipe. But he had other work to do.

At the same time, however, we gave orders to the R.A.F. Coastal Command to dominate the outlets from the Mersey and Clyde and around Northern Ireland. Nothing must be spared from this task. It had supreme priority. The bombing of Germany took second place. All suitable machines, pilots, and material must be concentrated upon our counter-offensive, by fighters against the enemy bombers, and surface craft a.s.sisted by bombers against the U-boats in these narrow vital waters. Many other important projects were brushed aside, delayed, or mauled. At all costs one must breathe.

We shall see the extent to which this counter-offensive by the Navy and by Coastal Command succeeded during the next few months; how we became the masters of the outlets; how the Heinkel 111's were shot down by our fighters, and the U-boats choked in the very seas in which they sought to choke us. Suffice it here to say that the success of Coastal Command overtook the preparations for the dynamite carpet. Before this ever made any appreciable inroad upon our war economy the morbid defensive thoughts and projects faded away, and once again with s.h.i.+ning weapons we swept the approaches to the isle.

16.

Desert Victory

Suspense and Preparation - The Forward Leap, December 7/8 - Complete Success - Pleasure in Parliament - My Messages to Mr. Menzies and General Wavell - "Frappez la Ma.s.se" - The Gospel of St. Matthew - Bardia, January 3 - Tobruk, January 21 - One Hundred and Thirteen Thousand Prisoners and Over Seven Hundred Guns Taken - Ciano's Diaries - Mussolini's Reactions - My Warnings to the House About the Future - The U-Boat Menace - My Broadcast to the Italian People - "One Man, and One Man Only, Guilty" - The Revolt in Abyssinia - Return of the Emperor - Attempts to Redeem Vichy - My Message to Marshal Petain and to General Weygand - Plans for Liberating Jibouti; "Operation Marie" - Airfields in Greece and Turkey - A Wealth of Alternatives - The End of the Year - I Receive a Letter from the King - My Reply, January 5 - Glory of the British Nation and Empire - The Flag of Freedom Flies - Mortal Peril Impends.

BEFORE a great enterprise is launched the days pa.s.s slowly. The remedy is other urgent business, of which there was at this time certainly no lack. I was myself so pleased that our generals would take the offensive that I did not worry unduly about the result. I grudged the troops wasted in Kenya and Palestine and on internal security in Egypt; but I trusted in the quality and ascendancy of the famous regiments and long-trained professional officers and soldiers to whom this important matter was confided. Eden also was confident, especially in General Wilson, who was to command the battle; but then they were both "Greenjackets," a great enterprise is launched the days pa.s.s slowly. The remedy is other urgent business, of which there was at this time certainly no lack. I was myself so pleased that our generals would take the offensive that I did not worry unduly about the result. I grudged the troops wasted in Kenya and Palestine and on internal security in Egypt; but I trusted in the quality and ascendancy of the famous regiments and long-trained professional officers and soldiers to whom this important matter was confided. Eden also was confident, especially in General Wilson, who was to command the battle; but then they were both "Greenjackets," 1 1 and had fought as such in the previous war. Meanwhile, outside the small group who knew what was going to be attempted, there was plenty to talk about and do. and had fought as such in the previous war. Meanwhile, outside the small group who knew what was going to be attempted, there was plenty to talk about and do.

For a month or more all the troops to be used in the offensive practised the special parts they had to play in the extremely complicated attack. The details of the plan were worked out by Lieutenant-General Wilson and Major-General O'Connor, and General Wavell paid frequent visits of inspection. Only a small circle of officers knew the full scope of the plan, and practically nothing was put on paper. To secure surprise, attempts were made to give the enemy the impression that our forces had been seriously weakened by the sending of reinforcements to Greece and that further withdrawals were contemplated. On December 6 our lean, bronzed, desert-hardened, and completely mechanised army of about twenty-five thousand men leaped forward more than forty miles, and all next day lay motionless on the desert sand unseen by the Italian Air Force. They swept forward again on December 8, and that evening, for the first time, the troops were told that this was no desert exercise, but the "real thing." At dawn on the 9th the battle of Sidi Barrani began.

It is not my purpose to describe the complicated and dispersed fighting which occupied the next four days over a region as large as Yorks.h.i.+re. Everything went smoothly; Nibeiwa was attacked by one brigade at 7 A.M A.M., and in little more than an hour was completely in our hands. At 1.30 P.M P.M. the attack on the Tummar camps opened, and by nightfall practically the whole area and most of its defenders were captured. Meanwhile, the 7th Armoured Division had isolated Sidi Barrani by cutting the coast road to the west. Simultaneously the garrison of Mersa Matruh, which included the Coldstream Guards, had also prepared their blow. At first light on the 10th, they a.s.saulted the Italian positions on their front, supported by heavy fire from the sea. Fighting continued all day, and by ten o'clock the Coldstream Battalion Headquarters signalled that it was impossible to count the prisoners on account of their numbers, but that "there were about five acres of officers and two hundred acres of other ranks."

At home in Downing Street they brought me hour-to-hour signals from the battlefield. It was difficult to understand exactly what was happening, but the general impression was favourable, and I remember being struck by a message from a young officer in a tank of the 7th Armoured Division, "Have arrived at the second B in Buq Buq." I was able to inform the House of Commons on the 10th that active fighting was in progress in the desert; that five hundred prisoners had been taken and an Italian general killed; and also that our troops had reached the coast. "It is too soon to attempt to forecast either the scope or the result of the considerable operations which are in progress. But we can at any rate say that the preliminary phase has been successful." That afternoon Sidi Barrani was captured.

From December 11 onward the action consisted of a pursuit of the Italian fugitives by the 7th Armoured Division, followed by the 16th British Infantry Brigade (motorized) and the 6th Australian Division, which had relieved the 4th Indian Division. On December 12, I could tell the House of Commons that the whole coastal region around Buq Buq and Sidi Barrani was in the hands of British and Imperial troops and that seven thousand prisoners had already reached Mersa Matruh.

We do not yet know how many Italians were caught in the encirclement, but it would not be surprising if at least the best part of three Italian divisions, including numerous Blacks.h.i.+rt formations, have been either destroyed or captured. The pursuit to the westward continues with the greatest vigour. The Air Force are now bombing, the Navy are sh.e.l.ling the princ.i.p.al road open to the retreating enemy, and considerable additional captures have already been reported.While it is still too soon to measure the scale of these operations, it is clear that they const.i.tute a victory which, in this African theatre of war, is of the first order, and reflects the highest credit upon Sir Archibald Wavell, Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson, the Staff officers who planned this exceedingly complicated operation, and the troops who performed the remarkable feats of endurance and daring which accomplished it. The whole episode must be judged upon the background of the fact that it is only three or four months ago that our anxieties for the defence of Egypt were acute. Those anxieties are now removed, and the British guarantee and pledge that Egypt would be effectually defended against all comers has been in every way made good.

The moment the victory of Sidi Barrani was a.s.sured indeed, on December 12 General Wavell took on his own direct initiative a wise and daring decision. Instead of holding back in general reserve on the battlefield the 4th British Indian Division, which had just been relieved, he moved it at once to Eritrea to join the 5th British Indian Division for the Abyssinian campaign under General Platt. The division went partly by sea to Port Sudan, and partly by rail and boat up the Nile. Some of them moved practically straight from the front at Sidi Barrani to their s.h.i.+ps, and were in action again in a theatre seven hundred miles away very soon after their arrival. The earliest units arrived at Port Sudan at the end of December, and the movement was completed by January 21. The division joined in the pursuit of the Italians from Ka.s.sala, which they had evacuated on January 19, to Keren, where the main Italian resistance was encountered. General Platt had, as we shall see, a hard task at Keren, even with his two British Indian Divisions, the 4th and 5th. Without this fa.r.s.eeing decision of General Wavell's the victory at Keren could not have been achieved and the liberation of Abyssinia would have been subject to indefinite delays. The immediate course of events both on the North African sh.o.r.e and in Abyssinia proved how very justly the Commander-in-Chief had measured the values and circ.u.mstances of the situations.

I hastened to offer my congratulations to all concerned, and to urge pursuit to the utmost limit of strength.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

13.XII.40.

I am sure you will be pleased about our victory in Libya. This, coupled with the Albanian reverses, may go hard with Mussolini if we make good use of our success. The full results of the battle are not yet to hand, but if Italy can be broken, our affairs will be more hopeful than they were four or five months ago.