Their Finest Hour Part 41

26.XII.40.

The discrepancy between weapons and ammunition is terrible in the case of the anti-tank rifles, two-inch and three-inch mortars, the climax being reached with the three-inch mortars. We have enough A.T. rifles to equip twenty-three and a half divisions, but only enough ammunitionat 32,000 rounds per month to equip five and a half. We have enough two-inch mortars at 108 per division to equip thirty-three divisions, but ammunition at 32,400 rounds per month suffices only for four and a half divisions. The worst of all is the three-inch mortar, where, oddly enough, we have at eighteen per division enough to equip nearly 40 divisions, but at 14,000 rounds per month only enough ammunition for one and a half divisions.

Prime Minister to First Lord.

26.XII.40.

Provided that it can be arranged that four of the fifteen-inch can be c.o.c.ked up within six months from now, and all other repairs be completed, I agree to abandon my long-cherished hope, in which I have been so continuously frustrated, of making Resolution Resolution into an effective fighting s.h.i.+p for insh.o.r.e action. into an effective fighting s.h.i.+p for insh.o.r.e action.The story of these four s.h.i.+ps since the war began ranks with the story of the two-gun turret of the K.G.V. cla.s.s in the most melancholy pages of the Admiralty annals.I hope I may have your positive a.s.surance that the six months condition will be fulfilled, barring enemy action, of course.25

Prime Minister to First Sea Lord.

26.XII.40.

I consider a greater effort should be made to interrupt the ore traffic through the Leads during January and onwards. This should certainly come before the Iceland-Faroes channel, which is a vast operation under taken chiefly to use mines made for quite a different purpose, in conditions which have pa.s.sed away. Now that we have not to give notice, and can lay secretly anywhere, conditions are much more favourable for mining the Norwegian coast than they were last year, but the need to act seems to be almost as great.Pray let me have a further report.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee. and others concerned.

26.XII.40.

Tactical requirements must be paramount during invasion. I am deeply anxious that gas warfare should not be adopted at the present time. For this very reason I fear the enemy may have it in mind, and perhaps it may be imminent. Every precaution must be kept in order, and every effort made to increase retaliatory power.Sometimes I have wondered whether it would be any deterrent on the enemy if I were to say that we should never use gas ourselves unless it had first been used against us, but that we had actually in store many thousands of tons of various types of deadly gas with their necessary containers, and that we should immediately retaliate upon Germany. On the whole, I think it is perhaps better to say nothing unless or until we have evidence that the attack is imminent. After all, they can make the calculations to which Professor Lindemann refers for themselves. They would certainly say we had threatened them with gas warfare, and would soon invent a pretext. Thirdly, there would be too much bluff in any such statement. If anyone is of a different opinion I shall be glad to know. The subject causes me much anxiety.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

26.XII.40.

I read in the papers of many people being sentenced for various offences against war regulations and for doing things which would not arise in peace-time. I am curious to know how the prison population compares with pre-war, both for imprisonment and penal servitude cases.I should be much obliged if you could give me a few very simple figures. Are there a great many more now in gaol? 26 26

Prime Minister to Minister of s.h.i.+pping.

27.XII.40.

Let me have on one sheet of paper the main heads of your programme as at present settled of imports (a (a) in the next four months, (b) (b) for the year 1941. f should be glad to have this during tomorrow (Sat.u.r.day). for the year 1941. f should be glad to have this during tomorrow (Sat.u.r.day).

(Action this day.) Prime Minuter to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

27.XII.40.

1. I do not recognise at all the account of my views given about "Marie." 27 27 I was under the impression that I had given a written Minute. Pray let this be sought for. It is very unusual for me to give any directions other than in writing. To avoid further misunderstanding, the following is set forth: I was under the impression that I had given a written Minute. Pray let this be sought for. It is very unusual for me to give any directions other than in writing. To avoid further misunderstanding, the following is set forth:2. The "Operation Marie" has been regarded by the Chiefs of the Staff, and is considered by me, to be valuable and important. For this purpose not only the Foreign Legion Battalion but two other French battalions should be sailed in the January 4 convoy, and deposited at Port Soudan, where they can either intervene in Marie or in Egypt. There is no use sending only the Foreign Legion without any other troops of the French forces. Therefore, I have asked for proposals to sail transports capable of taking the other two battalions empty from here to Freetown, so that the whole French force can go round together.Pray let me have today the proposals for giving effect to this.There will be plenty of time to consider the political aspects when these troops have arrived at Port Soudan.

Prime Minister to Lord Privy Seal.

27.XII.40.

You very kindly sent me a report about cold storage of meat, dated November 14, and I wonder whether you would care to bring it up to date in the light of later happenings. I am very much concerned about the meat position.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S.

27.XII.40.

1. Hitherto the production of anti-tank rifles has been a bright spot, and we have nearly 30,000 already made. On the other hand, the ammunition for this weapon is deplorably in arrear, being in fact less than one-fifth of the proper proportion. The failure to "marry" the ammunition and the A.T. rifle is one of the worst blots on our present munition programme. It is little less than a fraud on the troops to issue these large quant.i.ties of A.T. rifles, which would quickly become useless and worth no more than old iron through ammunition shortage. In many cases it has not been possible to allow any rounds for practice at all, these having to be saved for actual use against the enemy.2. In these circ.u.mstances one would expect that the War Office would have concentrated their desires on ammunition, instead of increasing the already gigantic disproportion of A.T. rifles to ammunition. On the contrary, however, for reasons which I have never heard mentioned, the Army requirement of A.T. rifles is suddenly raised from 31,000 to 71,000 for the same number of divisions. When was this decision taken? by whom? and what were the arguments? Was any attempt made at the time to make sure that the ammunition, already lagging so far behind, could catch up this enormous increase in rifles? Let me have a full report on this transaction.3. However, the Germans have now twice bombed the Small Heath factory and checked the output of A.T. rifles in a most decisive manner. There can be no possibility of fulfilling the increased War Office demand of 71,000 at the date desired. On the other hand, it is to be hoped that the ammunition supply will now have a chance of overtaking the weapons. It would therefore appear that a valuable and necessary readjustment of our programme has resulted from enemy action.4. Arising out of the above, I wish to be informed when any large changes are made in the existing programmes for the Army, particularly when these necessitate setting up new plants which can only be set up at the expense of other urgent work. All important modifications of the equipment tables set out in my diagrams are to be reported to me before action is taken.

Prime Minister to C.A.S. and Air Ministry.

29.XII.40.

It seems odd that only one machine should have been despatched from Takoradi during the week ending December 27, when no fewer than forty-four are piled up there waiting. Is there a breakdown in the handling work at Takoradi? Could we have a special report on conditions there? Quite soon they will have the second instalment from the Furious Furious upon them. upon them.

{Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air, C.A.S., and Minister of Aircraft Production. (Secret.) 30.XII.40.

1. I am deeply concerned at the stagnant condition of our bomber force. The fighters are going ahead well, but the bomber force, particularly crews, is not making the progress hoped for. I consider the rapid expansion of the bomber force one of the greatest military objectives now before us. We are of course drawing upon the bomber force for the coastal command and for the Middle East. If the bottle-neck is, as I am told, crews, we must either have the pilots and personnel we are sending out to the Middle East returned to us after they have delivered their machines, or, what would be less injurious to formed squadrons, have other pilots and personnel sent back from the Middle East in their place. The policy is to remount the Middle East, and this must be achieved before reinforcements of a permanent character can be indulged in. Even before the recent reinforcements there were one thousand pilots in the Middle East. Air Marshal Longmore must be told to send back an equal number of good men of the various cla.s.ses, and not add to his already grossly distended personnel.2. In order to increase the number of crews available, the training must be speeded up and a certain measure of dilution accepted.3. The figures placed before me each day are deplorable. Moreover, I have been told on high authority that a substantial increase in numbers available for operations against Germany must not be expected for many months. I cannot agree to this without far greater a.s.surance than I have now that everything in human wit and power has been done to avert such a complete failure in our air expansion programme.4. So far as aircraft are concerned, the question arises, from constant study of the returns, whether sufficient emphasis is put upon bomber production. The fighters are streaking ahead, and it is a great comfort that we have so good a position in them. We must however increase our bomb deliveries on Germany, and it appears some of the types and patterns most adapted to this are not coming forward as we had hoped.I am well aware of the damage done by enemy action, but I ask whether it cannot be remedied, and what further steps are possible.5. I wish to receive a programme of expansion week by week, and also a plan set forth showing what measures can be taken to improve the position, which at present is most distressing and black.

Appendix B

AUTHOR'S NOTE The first table contains the figures which were given to the President in my letter of December 8, 1940.1 The second table gives the final a.s.sessment in the light of post-war knowledge.

TABLE I.

WEEKLY L LOSSES AT AT S SEA.

[image]

TABLE I - W I - WEEKLY L LOSSES AT AT S SEA (Continued) (Continued) [image]

TABLE II.

MONTHLY T TOTALS OF OF S s.h.i.+PPING L LOSSES.

BRITISH, ALLIED, AND AND N NEUTRAL.

May, 1940 to December, 1940 [image]

Appendix C

AIRCRAFT STRENGTH DURING THE BATTLE OF BRITAN, 1940 1 1.

1. AIRCRAFT P PRODUCTION IN IN 1940 1940.

[image]

2 OPERATIONAL S STRENGTHS D DURING THE B BATTLE OF B BRITAIN.

SUMMARISED ORDER OF BATTLE ( (BOMBER COMMAND) AND BOMBER AIRCRAFT IN AIRCRAFT STORAGE UNITS AND BOMBER AIRCRAFT IN AIRCRAFT STORAGE UNITS.

BOMBER C COMMAND.

[image]

AIR SUPPLY UNITS.

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED TO CURRENT OPERATIONAL STANDARDS, READY FOR DISPATCH.

[image]

3. OPERATIONAL S STRENGTHS OF F FIGHTER C COMMAND.

WEEK BY BY W WEEK.

[image]

4. COMPARISON OF B BRITISH AND AND G GERMAN F FIGHTER S STRENGTH.

DURING THE THE B BATTLE OF B BRITAIN.

The preceding table gives the overall strength of Fighter Command, including Blenheims and Defiants. But these cannot be reckoned, for the purposes of comparisons, as part of the day fighting force which consisted of Hurricanes and Spitfires.

After taking representative dates in the period July 10October 31, the approximate daily average of Squadrons available for operations, available for operations, of these two latter types combined, is: of these two latter types combined, is: [image]

On the German side figures of serviceability are not at present available; comparison can therefore be made only in terms of Initial Equipment. The German IE was: [image]

The comparable Initial Equipment figures for British Hurricanes and Spitfires averaged over the 12 weeks, was 827.

Appendix D

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO DAKAR.

BETWEEN MR. CHURCHILL AND MR. MENZIES 1 1.

Mr. Menzies to the Prime Minister.

29.IX.40.

We are very disturbed in regard to Dakar incident which has had unfortunate effect in Australia. First, as to matter of substance:It is difficult understand why attempt was made unless overwhelming chances of success. To make what appears at this distance to be a halfhearted attack is to incur a damaging loss of prestige.Second, as to matter of procedure:It is absolutely wrong that Australian Government should know practically nothing of details of engagement and nothing at all of decision to abandon it until after newspaper publication. I have refrained from any public criticism, but privately can tell you that absence of real official information from Great Britain has frequently proved humiliating. Finally, I must say frankly that Australian Government profoundly hopes difficulties have not been underestimated in the Middle East where clear-cut victory is essential.