Black Hearts Part 10

aHow about this?a Diem asked, thinking of Howard. aIf you will give me twenty-four hours, I think I can get one of the soldiers Watt talked to to come and talk to you.a aYes,a Fenlason said, without hesitation. aDo it.a The closer they could get to firsthand sources, he thought, the better off everybody would be. The rest of the afternoon, Fenlason and Norton worked quietly, trying to make sense of what they had just heard. At dinner that night, they separated themselves from the rest of the platoon as they ate, and Fenlason broke the silence. He had been thinking about it, and he wasnat sure they should be doing any waiting, firsthand source or not. He looked at Norton and said, aHey, boss, we canat do this. We gotta get this booger off of our plate. We need to make this motherf.u.c.ker someone elseas problem and quick.a aI was just thinking the same thing,a Norton replied. Fenlason called Goodwin over the radio.

aSir, I think you need to put together a patrol and get back down here as soon as possible.a aWhy?a aSir, Iad rather not say over the open radio network,a Fenlason responded, abut trust me, you need to get down here.a aYouare going to have to give me something a bit better than that, Sergeant,a an annoyed Goodwin replied.

aSir, letas just say that it is worse than what just happened down here this week.a aThere are soldiers missing?a Goodwin asked, alarmed.

aNo! Negative! N. O. No. No, sir. It is different entirely, but it is serious.a aI am not going to play Twenty Questions with you, Sergeant.a aLet me just say one word, sir,a Fenlason said. aHaditha.a Haditha is a town in western Iraq, but the name had become shorthand for an international media scandal involving a group of Marines who had killed twenty-four men, women, and children there in November 2005. A Time magazine article in March 2006 cast doubt on the militaryas version of events, which initially claimed no one but insurgents had been killed, and an investigation of that incident had been ongoing ever since.

aHaditha?a aHaditha, sir. It makes Haditha look like childas play.a This was driving Fenlason crazy. Anyone who was listening would know something serious was going down.

aHaditha?a aSir, Iad rather not go into this over the radio. Just, really, sir, you need to get down here.a aAll right,a Goodwin responded, still baffled, aIam on my way.a Several soldiers, of various levels, who heard the exchange asked each other, aWhat the f.u.c.k was that all about?a Goodwin arrived a few hours later with 3rd Platoon, and Blaisdell was p.i.s.sed. It sounded a lot like more of Fenlasonas me-first dramatics, as if 3rd Platoon had nothing better to do than cater to Fenlasonas histrionics. As soon as they pulled in, Blaisdell whipped out of the truck.

aDude, who in the f.u.c.k do you think you are?a Blaisdell yelled. aThis had better be f.u.c.king good, acause you got a lot of b.a.l.l.s.a aYou need to calm down and back down,a Fenlason said. aSit down and shut up. This is bigger than anything you can f.u.c.king possibly fathom. So you donat say a G.o.dd.a.m.n thing right now. Just sit down and be quiet and listen.a And Blaisdell did, because he could see in Fenlasonas eyes that this was as serious as he said. Fenlason and Norton briefed Goodwin and Blaisdell. They actually went through it two or three times. The first time, Goodwin just listened, eyes wide and mouth open. After that, he was taking notes and asking questions.

Just after midnight on the 24th, Goodwin called Kunk and told him what he thought had happened. The connection was bad and Goodwin was emotional, but Kunk got the gist, that some of the soldiers may have committed a very serious crime. He said he would be down there in the morning. After briefing Majors Wintrich and Salome and calling the deputy brigade commander up at Camp Striker, he departed Mahmudiyah with Edwards just before 9:30 a.m. They hit an IED near TCP3, which delayed their arrival until after 11:00. After meeting with Norton, Fenlason, Goodwin, Blaisdell, Davis, and Edwards, to get as full a story as anyone had at the time, Kunk decided to question each of the soldiers whose names had come out so far individually.

Yribe was at TCP4, helping with the now drastically understaffed 1st Platoon, so Blaisdell went to fetch him. Kunk told Yribe, as he did each soldier he spoke to that day, that he was there conducting a Commanderas Inquiry to investigate a rape and murder that may have been committed by U.S. soldiers. The purpose of the Commanderas Inquiry was to see if he thought that there was any basis for further investigation by the Armyas law enforcement officers. He read them their rights, and all agreed to talk to him freely and none asked for a lawyer. Before questioning each of them, he also gave them a little speech. In a statement he later filed, Kunk wrote, aI explained to them that the most important thing a man can go to his grave with is his own honor and integrity. How serious and the possible effects of these alleged allegations could have on the mission in Iraq and our own soldiers in First Strike. That bad news does not get better with time and that being honest and going the harder right were the most important things now.a With varying degrees of vehemence and evasiveness, each soldier whom Watt implicated claimed to have no knowledge of what Kunk was talking about. Yribe said he had heard some rumors about Green being involved, but he didnat have any knowledge of that, and he denied finding a shotgun sh.e.l.l at the crime scene.

When Yribe returned to TCP4 after being questioned, as he got out of the Humvee he gave Watt a look like aWhat the f.u.c.k?a aWhat?a Watt said.

aWhat the f.u.c.k did you say?a Yribe asked.

aNothing. What are you talking about?a aKunk is asking about that night, that family. Did you f.u.c.king tell them?a aNo!a aThen who did?a aI donat know,a said Watt, scrambling to push the heat off of him. aMaybe Howard?a aWell, I think I am okay. I was able to catch Barker and talk to him, to make sure of what we were saying. I hope Cortez doesnat talk.a Watt was terrified for his safety. This had all gotten rolling very quickly. Were they going to leave him out here? he wondered. If these dudes would kill a kid, he thought, why wouldnat they kill the soldier who snitched? Everyone had grenades. It would be the simplest thing to just pull the pin on his vest as he was sleeping, and then say, stupid private doesnat even know how to keep his frags taped.

Howard was the second person to be questioned, and he told Kunk that Green laughingly said he had done it. But Howard didnat believe him and dismissed it. Howard did, however, admit to drinking alcohol down at the TCPs, along with Barker, Cortez, and Green. Barker, when questioned, was insolent and uncooperative to the point of being insubordinate. He denied any involvement, although, he repeatedly said, he had heard some anamesa of people who were involved. Whenever he was asked aWhat names?a he just replied, aYou know, guys talk, just names.a Kunk and Edwards traveled to the AVLB, where Cortez was stationed. Cortez told Kunk that the crime scene was gruesome, but he didnat know anything about Americans having a hand in it.

Kunk and Edwards then went to TCP4 to talk to Watt. At that moment, Kunk didnat think there was anything to the allegations. It boggled the imagination, what Watt was alleging. As he spoke to Watt, Kunk was increasingly frustrated because Watt didnat have command of even the most basic facts. aHis story made no sense,a Kunk said. aNone whatsoever. There was no logic, any rhyme or reason to it.a Watt was fl.u.s.tered and scared. He wanted to know if Kunk was going to keep the soldiers segregated, because he was concerned they would talk and get their stories straight. Kunk thought Watt was getting way ahead of himself. He was making some serious allegations and Watt didnat even have his own story straight.

aDo you understand what you are doing here?a Kunk thundered.

Kunk was far from convinced that there was anything to Wattas tale, but there was enough doubt and confusion that he decided to recommend a fuller investigation. He would take Watt with him to Mahmudiyah for the time being. Kunk was close to doing nothing at all about the allegations, but, he said, aI either had to prove that this happened, or prove that it didnat happen. Because I could not allow there to be a lingering rumor that something like that happened.a Kunk notified the brigade, and the brigade notified the division. At 4:20 p.m. on June 24, General Thurman informed the Armyas Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and at 7:40 p.m. they got their first briefing from Kunk about the rape and quadruple murders that American soldiers may have committed.

On June 25, 1st Platoon rotated from the JSB to Yusufiyah and then went to Mahmudiyah the next day for the memorial for Tucker, Menchaca, and Babineau. Second Platoon took over at the JSB. A lieutenant colonel down there from brigade headquarters asked the platoon leader, Lieutenant Paul Fisher, why none of his men had shaved. Fisher, after the Alamo bridge incident, after all of the work and all of the loss, couldnat hide his exasperation.

aWe drink all the water we have, sir, so that we donat dehydrate,a he said. aWe have been running nonstop since our guys got abducted. We are not really concerned about our looks right now.a aI am just trying to keep the heat off of you, Lieutenant,a the lieutenant colonel said. aYou guys are not looked upon too favorably these days.a By June 26, all of 1st Platoon had moved to Mahmudiyah, ostensibly for the Tucker, Menchaca, and Babineau memorial. But the commanders were also taking a wait-and-see approach on whether any of the investigations led to something concrete. During this time, the rumor mill among the men of 1st Platoon was working overtime, and many had pieced together the broad outlines. Watt had pretty much disappeared, and one by one Cortez, Barker, Yribe, and Howard were all being yanked from their duties. Agents from CID interviewed Watt twice on the morning of the 25th. At 5:30 p.m., separate agents began interrogating Yribe and Howard simultaneously. After nearly five hours, Howard had confessed the major elements of what happened on March 12, implicating all of the other parties, including, for the first time, Spielman. He too was yanked from duties. Over the next five days, and over multiple interrogation sessions (none of which were filmed or recorded by CID agents, despite the agencyas manual urging them to astrongly considera doing so in cases of violent crime), Barker, Cortez, and Spielman all corroborated Howardas overall narrative, but each, in various ways, resisted fully implicating himself.* They would disagree, and lawyers would argue, about some of those details at their trials, and after, for years to come.

Simultaneously, CID and battalion staff were working to find family members related to the murdered family, to inquire about exhuming the bodies to retrieve evidence and to make financial reparations and offer condolences for the crime. The Janabi family was only mildly cooperative. On the advice of their imam, they forbade digging up the corpses, and only a few family members (including Abu Muhammad) could be convinced to testify in various court proceedings. The U.S. Army paid the Janabi family $30,000 for the murders of Qa.s.sim, Fakhriah, Abeer, and Hadeel.

The memorial service for Tucker, Menchaca, and Babineau was held on June 26. It is standard for one soldier, usually a close friend, to eulogize each of the deceased. The men came to Fenlason to say they wanted Yribe to speak for Babineau. Fenlason hesitated. Yribe, after all, was under investigation for some sort of role in the crimes that wasnat yet clear. Fenlason ultimately decided not to make an issue of it. aI remember thinking, Tony being Tony, and the personality and the reverence that some of the soldiers still look at Tony with, that it might actually be helpful,a he recalled. aIf Tony can bring it closure, then weare going to do it that way. I didnat like it, but I believe it was the right decision for the soldiers.a In his remarks, Tony said, aWe have endured much pain and many losses throughout this deployment. Babs and I talked several times while we were on guard about what we would like to have said if something were to happen to one of us. He told me that he would want 1st Platoon to know, and I quote, aIf I were to go, it would be on my own terms. They will never take me alive.aa Many men said it was one of the most wrenching memorials they had ever experienced.

Fenlason had gotten word earlier in the day that 1st Platoon was not going to go back to Yusufiyah. They were staying in Mahmudiyah. Almost exactly nine months into year-long deployment, 1st Platoonas war was effectively over.

Captain Goodwin and First Sergeant Skidis were discussing how and when to tell the platoon about their fate when Fenlason lost it.

af.u.c.k you,a he told Skidis. an.o.body is telling anybody about whatas going to happen with my platoon except me.a After the memorial, Fenlason gathered all of his men in a tent and delivered the news. aWe are not going back home to Yusufiyah,a he told them. aI donat know why. My guess is, with all the people being investigated, and all the interviews that are going to have to be done, it has been deemed impractical. I donat know what we are going to do here. That is all I know at the moment.a He left on his midtour leave the next morning.

The men were bewildered. Some of them were upset that they were not able to go back and afinish the job,a as Army vernacular puts it, but most were so emotionally and physically exhausted that they had ceased to care what happened to them. But a few realized right away: They were almost certainly going home alive.

A few days after the memorial, the men of 1st Platoon were summoned to the chapel tent for a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Kunk and some other senior leaders. It was apparently designed as a kind of town hall meeting, to bring everybody up to speed on what was happening to the platoon and why.

He began by telling them, with complete unconcern for the men who spoke up, aYou are right to think that there is a lot of suspicion and finger-pointing going on, because Diem and Watt came forward to tell the chain of command that five of your s.h.i.+tbag friends probably raped a girl and killed her whole family. And these guys are cracking, it looks like they are guilty.a But the meeting quickly degenerated into the Kunk Gun unloading on the whole platoon.

aWe thought we were going to get the aKeep your heads upa speech,a said one soldier. aWe thought we were going to be told, aWeare going to keep you here in Mahmudiyah now because we donat want anything else to happen to you,a or something like that. Well, it wasnat that at all. It was an a.s.s chewing. He just crushed us.a It was, said the men of 1st Platoon, the culmination of all of the vilifications and disparagements they had ever received from Kunk. It was a tirade of abuse, scorn, and personal attack. And the message was clear: 1st Platoon was to blame for 1st Platoonas problems.

aYou, 1st Platoon, are f.u.c.ked up! f.u.c.ked up! Every single one of you!a he yelled as he scowled across the room. aWhen did I say it was okay to have one vehicle at the Alamo?a he demanded to know. When someone pointed out the number of times he had driven past when there was only one truck there, he exploded. In a torrent of profanities and at top decibel, Kunk told them that their friends were dead because of their failings; he told them they were quitters, crybabies, and complainers; and he told them they were a disgrace and were being kept at Mahmudiyah because they could not be trusted outside the wire.

Some men tried to protest how little support and how few men they had, others asked not to be judged by a criminal few in their midst. But the session soon devolved completely into a cacophony of shouts and accusations. Several men broke down in tears.

Kunk later maintained that he did not remember specifics of what was said that day, but he agreed that it was contentious. aBeing honest and being forthright, itas tough sometimes but thatas what we have to do in this business.a After it was all over and Kunk and the senior leaders left, the chaplain came in and said, aI donat agree with what just happened in here, but if you guys need any help, you can come and see me.a aThat was one of the defining emotional moments of the tour for me,a observed Sergeant John Diem. aIf you talk to others about it, they will most likely say, aWe just got done with the memorial, and they were telling us how f.u.c.ked up we were,a and they will leave it at that. But n.o.body will step back and look at it like, aWait a second. Did they maybe have a point? Were they trying to say something that was important? That maybe we had become something monstrous?a Now, the one thing that was absent was if Colonel Kunk had gotten up there and said, aI f.u.c.ked up too. I have allowed you guys to turn into monsters. And I had completely forsaken you when you needed the support that only I had the power to provide. But I lacked the character to do it. All of you have failed. Me, and we, as a family, as 1st Battalion, Bravo Company, 1st Platoon, all the way down the line, have failed. At some point we failed to have the character to make the right decisions to make it so that this never happened. Mine was the crowning failure, but not the only one.a If, at any point, that had come out of his mouth, a lot of people would have snapped out of it, like that. But n.o.bodyas got the grit to say that. Everybody wants to say, aBut it wasnat my fault.a Including him.a In the aftermath of 1st Platoonas back-to-back debacles, in addition to the criminal investigations against Cortez, Barker, Spielman, Yribe, and Howard, there were two AR 15-6 investigations conducted. The first, begun on June 18, centered on athe decisions made and guidance givena about staffing at the AVLB. That investigation was finished in eleven days.

During his interview with the investigating officer, Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Daugherty, First Lieutenant Norton explained his predicament: aI had twenty-three individuals at the JSB, including the medic. With all the IEDs going off on Sportster, I am not sending less than three vehicles back to the FOB. That takes nine guys out of the fight. That leaves guards on guard for six to eight hours. As much as I push up requests, the response is, aJust go out and get after it.a In order to do all those missions, still make trips to the FOB, and switch out the guards, it wasnat enough bodies. It was pushed up and they acknowledged it, but it was just one of those things you had to do. I am 100 percent sure that I would have done nothing different that day. As a leader, youave got to look at what youave got and where you can put it. That was the best I could do at the time, sir. I have no regrets of my decisions or anything I did that day.a Daughertyas report put the blame squarely on the platoonas and the companyas shoulders, declaring, aThis was an event caused by numerous acts of complacency and a lack of standards at the platoon level.a It recommended that Kunk receive a letter of concern, the lowest and least serious form of admonishment, one that carries no real punitive weight or long-term negative implication for an officeras career (Kunk said he never received such a letter). It recommended that Goodwin and Norton receive letters of reprimand (although it specifically recommended that Norton not be relieved from his position).

For many, this smacked of another instance of pus.h.i.+ng the blame for bad news as far down the chain of command as possible. aEverybody from the battalion commander on down had been past that OP [observation post] and knew that it was bad, knew that it was a target of opportunity to get plucked,a said Alpha Companyas Jared Bordwell. aBut during that whole investigation process, it was all focused on how messed up Bravo Company was. And there was some fault on their end, but there was some fault on the upper end too that I donat think was ever acknowledged.a Years later, Colonel Ebel remained irritated about this investigation. He was not interviewed, and he considered the attack at the Alamo not a lapse of discipline but a well-selected target of opportunity by a savvy enemy. aIt was a very hasty investigation,a he said. aAnd it was aimed at holding someone accountable for what essentially I determined was tactical risk. The enemy voted in what was a very volatile and dynamic battlefield.a The second investigation, begun in early July, focused on the rape-murders, specifically looking into ahow four soldiers abandoned their post at TCP2 a without being detecteda and athe frequency and measures that the chain of command (officers and non-commissioned officers) actually checked on and supervised B/1-502 INas tactical sites.a This report was completed by investigating officer Lieutenant Colonel John McCarthy in just five days. Because Sergeant First Cla.s.s Fenlason was on leave at the time of the investigation, McCarthy never interviewed him and he interviewed only eight members of 1st Platoon total. The report makes no mention of how long the duty rotation at the TCPs actually was in March, never mentions that Lieutenant Norton was on leave at the time of the crime, never mentions that Norton had no part in lengthening the TCP rotation beyond a week, and claims that aFenlason was generally commented by soldiers in the platoon as coming by the TCPs one to two times a week.a The soldiersa sworn statements do not support this a.s.sertion, it is implausible that they would say such a thing about Fenlason considering he was widely ridiculed for never leaving TCP1, and he himself later admitted that he never visited either TCP2 or TCP6 during that entire March rotation.

The second AR 15-6 also put the blame on the company-level leaders and below. Of the numerous procedural failures, it said, most notable awas the failure to supervise the operations and enforce standards at the TCPs by the company commander and platoon leader and platoon sergeant.a This investigation recommended that Goodwin be removed from command and that the platoon be busted up. a1LT Norton and SFC Fenlason should be moved to other duties,a it said. a.s.sG Allen and SSG Payne should be moved to a new unit. 1SG Skidis believes SSG Lauzier has performed well and considers him the strongest squad leader in the platoon.a Norton and Goodwin knew they were marked men. as.h.i.+t rolls downwarda is an old Army phrase. They were certain they were going to get hit, they just didnat know how badly. When Norton sat down with one of the investigators, he said that he knew he was a walking bullas-eye. He said he knew that the investigator was there to build a case against him. The investigating officer adopted a tone of bonhomie and straightforwardness with Norton, a.s.suring him, no, no, no, almost conspiratorially, that that was not so.

aI can throw rocks at some of you or pebbles at all of you,a he said, and he told Norton that he intended to throw pebbles. The results of the investigation confirmed Nortonas suspicions. This was going to be a stoning all along. There was nothing Goodwin and Norton could do but wait until the brigade and the division decided on how to respond to the recommendations of the investigators. aI knew I was going to get fired,a said Goodwin. aIt was just a matter of when.a * Private Seth Sch.e.l.ler, the other soldier abandoned at TCP2 with Howard on March 12 (but stationed away from him in the Humvee), told investigators he knew nothing about the crimes, either on the day they happened or any time after. The co-accused all corroborated this, and he was excluded from all further inquiries.

JULYa"SEPTEMBER 2006.

26.

The Fight Goes On.

FIRST PLATOON REMAINED at Mahmudiyah, where they would stay for the remaining two and a half months of the tour, doing not much more than pulling guard on the FOB. Charlie Company, who had handed over significant portions of their territory to the Iraqi Army, picked up the JSB from Bravo Company so that Bravoas 2nd and 3rd Platoons could focus on the traffic control points and Yusufiyah.

Sequestered from the rest of 1st Platoon, Watt spoke frequently with Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth Bowler, the psychiatrist who headed up the battalionas Combat Stress team. After starting strongly, Bowleras relations.h.i.+p with Kunk had deteriorated drastically over the past few months. They clashed often. Kunk was frequently abusive, disparaging, and disrespectful of her. She was, through one of the oddities of the Army Reserve world, and by virtue of her education, the same rank as Kunk, and she frequently acted like it. Others on the FOB found this grating, notwithstanding any issues she may have had with Kunk. She had a brusque and superior manner with some of the company commanders, whom she technically outranked, and they found that ridiculous.

Upon Bowleras first meeting with Watt, she became concerned about his mental health, and his safety. The stress of turning in his friends was weighing heavily on him. She thought that the risks he faced from soldiers seeking revenge were real enough, and debilitating enough to his psyche, that he should be moved to Baghdad, if not evacuated from the theater entirely.

Kunk, however, called her a drama queen and told her that she was going far beyond her authority to be suggesting something like that.

aHeas lucky I donat take him up on charges for making false official statements!a Kunk bellowed, a comment that Bowler did not understand but that disquieted her very much. In the civilian world, as a prison psychiatrist, she worked with skillful liars every day, and she was quite sure Watt was not lying about anything. Kunk later denied that he threatened such a thing. aThatas ludicrous,a he said.

On June 30, a.s.sociated Press reporter Ryan Lenz, who was embedded with a different unit north of Baghdad, wrote a brief story about the investigation now unfolding on Mahmudiyah, relying on anonymous sources who had intimate knowledge of the details of the case. He wrote a much fuller account the next day. What would come to be known as (oddly, for its geographic inaccuracy) the Mahmudiyah Ma.s.sacre, ballooned into an international scandal in a matter of days. Lenzas stories included accurate, minute details about the crime: one of the bodies being burned by a flammable liquid, one of the victims being a young child, and one of the accused having already been discharged from the Army. The story infuriated Kunk, who thought the investigation was too premature to appear in the news. Since Lenz had recently been embedded with the 1-502nd, there was rampant speculation that his source was someone on FOB Mahmudiyah. Kunk became convinced that Bowler was the source, something that both she and Lenz have denied.

Back in the States, Green saw the news stories streaming out of Iraq on all the cable news channels about the investigation. While he suspected it was just a matter of time before he was arrested, a part of him actually thought no one would bother with him. aMy mind was so f.u.c.ked up about Iraqis, I wasnat even really sure I was going to get in trouble. To my mind, it was like, aNo oneas going to be mad about Iraqis. Theyare Iraqis.aa In fact, the Armyas Criminal Investigation Division had notified the FBI about Green on June 27, and they had been working on an affidavit and arrest warrant ever since.

Since his discharge on May 16, Green had wandered around aimlessly. aI was still kind of tripping from the war. All I was doing was drinking and smoking weed and driving around with a pistol and an AK in my car. That was it, all day long.a He visited a cousin, who was appalled that he didnat have any change of clothes, so she took him shopping and bought him several outfits. He met up with old friends, who thought he looked haggard and unwell. Occasionally, when he was drinking, he would tell one or the other of them that he had seen horrific things, including a rape by American soldiers. In the morning, he would tell them to forget he had said anything.

In early July, Green flew to Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C., to attend David Babineauas funeral at Arlington National Cemetery. While in the area, he stayed with Noah Galloway, the 2nd Platoon soldier who had lost an arm and a leg during the December 19, 2005, IED explosion. After the funeral, Green drove to Nebo, North Carolina, to visit his maternal grandmother. Thatas where FBI agents stormed the property and arrested him. aI wish you had called,a he told the agents. aI would have turned myself in.a In the first few days of July, Cortez, Spielman, and Barker were all moved to Camp Striker, where they would spend the rest of their deployment. Theyad had their weapons confiscated and been placed under arrest since they first started confessing, but since their chances of fleeing from Camp Victory were deemed to be infinitesimal, they were not placed in pretrial confinement. Although they had to have an armed escort with them at all times, they were allowed, more or less, to go wherever they wanted on the base, and since they had no real duties except to meet with the Army defense lawyers a.s.signed to their case and continue to be questioned by CID, they could do pretty much as they pleased. They were simply agog at how comfortable life was up at Striker, where the chow halls had steak and lobster night every Friday, some of the soldiers were actually pretty girls whom they could at least look at if not talk to, and many of the palaces converted into barracks or offices still had functioning swimming pools. What would become of Howard and Yribe was still very much unclear, but Barker, Cortez, and Spielman knew, one way or another, that this was almost certainly their final few weeks of anything that resembled freedom.

First Platoon may have been relegated to pulling guard duty on FOB Mahmudiyah, but for the rest of Bravo and the rest of the battalion, the fight was as hard as ever. Bravoas 2nd and 3rd Platoons continued to engage and patrol around Yusufiyah, while Alpha, Charlie, and Delta also tried to keep their sectors running.

In fact, the battle was getting tougher. All throughout Iraq, sectarian violence was increasing. The summer of 2006 would usher in some of the fiercest and bloodiest partisan slaughters of the entire conflict. Baghdad became an open battlefield, with the Mahdi Army and Sunni groups engaging in gun battles and trading t.i.t-for-tat car bombings that would kill dozens and wound scores more at a time. This kind of violence hit the Mahmudiyah area hard. On July 17, a large group of Sunni insurgents drove into the market in Mahmudiyah and killed over seventy people, mainly s.h.i.+aites, with grenades and rifles.

And the headlines about the rape and murders committed by 101st Airborne soldiers in the Triangle of Death werenat making anyoneas job any easier. The Iraqi government and the locals were outraged. Kunk claimed that the Mahmudiyah government and the Iraqi Army were understanding. They were upset, he said, but they understood that criminals exist and perpetrate crimes in every society and subculture, including armies, and they did not view the crime as representative of the unit as a whole.

The locals were harder to convince. Al Qaeda exploited the outrage for maximum propaganda value. On July 10, the Mujahideen Shura Council issued a five-minute video depicting the mutilated corpses of Tucker and Menchaca. The tapeas audio includes clips of Osama bin Ladenas and Zarqawias speeches, as well as the message that the video was being presented as arevenge for our sister who was dishonored by a soldier of the same brigade.a The narration stated that the MSC had known that Americans were behind the rape when it happened, but athey kept their anger to themselves and didnat spread the news, but were determined to avenge their sisteras honor.a This seems unlikely, however, considering that the first message claiming responsibility for the attack in June did not mention revenge or provide any other indication that insurgents were aware that Americans had perpetrated the March 12 ma.s.sacre. On September 22, the MSC released a longer clip that included an animation of Greenas mugshot (which was widely available on the Internet by this time) being engulfed in flames, footage of Tucker and Menchaca being dragged behind a truck, and a television interview by Al Jazeera with Muhammad Taha al-Janabi, one of the murdered familyas relatives.

The crime had a palpable negative effect on the men on the ground in the Yusufiyah area. aWe were having some form of violence pretty much every day of the week during the month of August,a said one platoon leader in the area. aBefore that, it wasnat great, but it hadnat been that bad. Until the horrible events of June, things were getting better.a Charlie, which absorbed parts of Bravoas AO, felt renewed bitterness from the locals. aLet me tell you, those were some p.i.s.sed-off folks,a said Charlieas executive officer, First Lieutenant Matt Shoaf.

Violence targeted against coalition forces would continue to the very end. Alpha lost a soldier, Private First Cla.s.s Brian Kubik, during another dramatic firefight in Rushdi Mullah. On August 30, Al Qaeda attacked fourteen Iraqi Army checkpoints simultaneously, though the attacks have to be considered a failure because Al Qaeda didnat manage to injure a single soldier.

Even though 1st Platoon was not engaged in direct combat operations anymore, they were living a new nightmare all their own. For months many people in the battalion and brigade had considered 1st Platoon to be First Strikeas problem children. Now, however, the men of 1st Platoon were outright pariahs. aThat was the worst part, being in Mahmudiyah getting treated like s.h.i.+t by guys that didnat see a quarter of the s.h.i.+t we saw,a said one 1st Platoon soldier. aWe were looked at as the enemy after that.a Even 2nd and 3rd Platoons got caught in the perception that all of Bravo was a disgrace. aWhen the sector got divided up to other companies, we started hearing, aOh, weare down here to save Bravo Companyas a.s.s,aa remarked 2nd Platoonas leader Paul Fisher. aIt was awful. It was an awful time.a Kunk moved Norton to a job running parts of FOB Mahmudiyahas headquarters over the night s.h.i.+ft. Norton was stunned at how bad the perception was of the two forward-deployed companies. aI started working up in the TOC,a recalled Norton. aAnd the perspective up there of Bravo and Charlie Company was so negative. I tried to tell people there, aThese are companies in your battalion, this is your unit, they are not the devil, you know?aa Nortonas move to the TOC left Fenlason, upon his return from leave, to run the platoon pretty much alone. aWe were just existing at that point,a he said. aI talked to the squad leaders every night about the stuff we needed to get done. We had some equipment issues. We didnat have all of our stuff. I didnat know at that time that the reason we couldnat go back to Yusufiyah was CID was going through everybodyas stuff. It had basically been locked down as a crime scene. I didnat know that there was an FBI team that was going to come in. I didnat know any of that stuff. We didnat have a lot of allies. I just didnat have a lot of friends at that point. n.o.body wanted to be me, thatas for G.o.dd.a.m.n sure,a added Fenlason. aI wasnat getting a whole bunch of people coming up telling me, aItas going to be all right, brother.a The only person that did that when we were in country was Phil Blaisdell. Blaisdell never, ever left FOB Mahmudiyah if he was up there without stopping in and visiting us. Rick Skidis canat say that. John Goodwin canat say that. And Iam grateful for that. The fact that he didnat abandon us says a lot about Phil Blaisdell.a Sergeant Major Edwards hatched a plan to break up the platoon. He was going to send the squad leaders throughout the brigade, and the soldiers would be divided up among the battalion. But the plan floundered because the other first sergeants from the battalion vociferously resisted. They didnat see the point, this late in the deployment. Plus, n.o.body wanted to take in any 1st Platoon soldiers. Just leave them where they are, the first sergeants argued to Edwards. It is too complicated to try to integrate new blood, especially given the circ.u.mstances and especially this late. Just leave them alone. Ultimately, Edwards relented.

On FOB Mahmudiyah, HHC commander Shawn Umbrell was in charge of overseeing the wayward 1st Platoon. His priority, he explained, was to treat them as normally as possible. aWe got some pretty weird guidance from Battalion. We were told to come up with a training plan, indicating how we were going to reinstill discipline,a he said. aAnd my first sergeant told them, aThe soldiers donat need a training program. What the soldiers need are leaders who can show them what right looks like. Until now, they havenat had that.aa That is something Umbrell thought about ever since. aClearly a lot of what happened can be attributed to a leaders.h.i.+p failure,a he remarked. aAnd Iam not talking about just at the platoon level. Iam talking about platoon, company, battalion. Even I feel in some way indirectly responsible for what happened out there. I mean, we were all part of the team. We just let it go. And we let it go, and go, and go. And these things happened. And you can say, aIt was Greenas fault. He was a criminal.a But it goes beyond that. We failed those guys by letting them be out there like that without a plan.a

27.

aThis Was Life and Death Stuffa

FRUSTRATED, BORED, ANGRY, and demonized, much of 1st Platoon were at each otheras throats during this period. While most of the soldiers agreed that Watt did the right thing, there was talk that a few were plotting to take violent revenge on him. Watt had been moved to a different area of the FOB, but anybody who wanted to find him on Mahmudiyah could. Private First Cla.s.s Shane Hoeck, one of Wattas best friends, tipped him off, telling him to watch his back; some soldiers were saying some stuff about making him pay.

But that wasnat the only way platoon unity was fracturing. A rumor got around that CID thought 1st Platoon was a kind of Murder, Inc., kill squad, complete with blood rituals and civilian-murder initiation requirements for new soldiers. Word was, CID was trolling now for any suspicious killings that they could turn into murder probes. Early on, investigators had heard rumors that there was more to the story about the woman Sergeant Tony Yribe had shot and killed at TCP3 on November 18, 2005. Some soldiers alleged that the account of the vehicle refusing to stop that day was not merely a lie to make an accident sound more plausible, but a cover for a cold-blooded murder. By July 17, CID had begun investigating the incident as a potential murder, questioning everyone who was there multiple times during an inquiry that would drag on for more than two years before being dropped for lack of evidence.

Paranoia skyrocketed. Lauzier, for one, was not coping well. He felt a blinding anger and crus.h.i.+ng disappointment at what Cortez and Barker were accused of. TCP2 was 3rd Squadas mission that March day; Cortez was his designated proxy while he was on leave. It was a personal betrayal. But he also felt tremendous guilt. If one of the truest tests of leaders.h.i.+p is how your people perform when you are not around, how could his example be considered anything other than a failure? It was debilitating, disorienting, dispiriting. How could they do this? he wondered. How could they think they would get away with it? How could they not consider how it would impact the rest of the unit? Was this what he led them for? Is this what he taught them? And, as he ground himself up inside, no one was putting his arm around Lauzieras shoulder, telling him not to take it so hard. In fact, he was treated like an outcast and encouraged to think of himself that way by this chain of command and the ironclad Army traditions that hold that you are directly responsible for everything your immediate subordinates do or fail to do. aIn a way, the individual soldier is a perfect being,a remarked Justin Watt. aThe soldier is never late, the soldier never makes a mistakea"any failure on the soldieras part is a failure of his direct supervisor. Thatas what Lauzier was dealing with.a A few weeks earlier, Lauzier had been one of the best-regarded squad leaders in the company. On June 13, for example, Kunk approved a recommendation from Bravoas leaders.h.i.+p that Lauzier receive a Bronze Star for meritorious service throughout the deployment, and he pa.s.sed that recommendation up to brigade headquarters. On the routing sheet, Kunk wrote, a.s.sG Lauzier led from the front in the most lethal area of AO Strike. He is a warrior. Outstanding duty performance under the most dangerous environments.a Now he was being treated like a cancer, under suspicion for being the ringleader of some kind of death squad. His interviews with CID were more like interrogations, as if they were trying to pin something major on him too. aThis isnat over, you know,a investigators would say to him at the end of every session. That phrase alone almost gave him a nervous breakdown. He couldnat bear to hear it.

His men found his obsessive tendencies steering into borderline psychosis. If any of his possessions looked different from the way he had left them, he would freak out, yelling, aWho is the mole, who is working for CID!?a Once, he left a piece of official paperwork with his home address and his parentsa address on his cot for a few minutes. When he returned and the paper was gone, he pulled his 9mm pistol on the handful of 1st Squad and 3rd Squad men standing there.

aI donat know who is f.u.c.king with me,a he said, abut if anything happens to my wife or my family, I will waste everything the motherf.u.c.ker who did it holds dear and kill him last.a Stunned, the men put their hands up and sputtered that they did not know what he was talking about. Cross approached, trying to calm Lauzier down, but Lauzier c.o.c.ked his pistol. aTake one more f.u.c.king step, Cross, and I will shoot you right here. Iave got nothing to lose.a Cross backed off and Lauzier lowered his gun. Shortly after that episode, Lauzier decided he was probably long overdue for his first visit to Combat Stress.

Watt was having trouble coping with the strain of being a whistle-blower as well. Despite his ultimate conviction that he had done the right thing, the feeling that he had been a rat was inescapable. And the thought that some of his former friends wanted to kill him was utterly terrifying. Over several consultations with him, Lieutenant Colonel Bowler became worried about Wattas mental state. She felt Kunk was not taking the psychological burden of what head done seriously enough. She likewise thought the whole battalion was taking the threat that Watt felt far too cavalierly. She increasingly implored Watt to protect himself legally. Demand a lawyer, she told him. They are not going to protect you, they may even come after you. Do not talk to Kunk or CID again without a lawyer, she advised.

When Kunk got wind that Watt was acting on that advice, demanding a lawyer before he said another word, he became unhinged.

aHey, Sergeant Davis,a Kunk asked Bowleras deputy, ais your doctor a lawyer?a aNo, sir,a Davis responded.

aWell then, what the f.u.c.k is she doing handing out legal advice?a aI donat know, sir.a aGet your commander down here as soon as possible.a When Davis did so, Kunk told the mental health commander, aIf you donat get her off my FOB in the next forty-eight hours, I will have her up on charges like that.a The commander went back to the Combat Stress tent and told Bowler to pack her stuff, she was going back to Baghdad.

Though banished, Bowler over the next several weeks kept in touch with Watt via e-mail, in which she continued to beseech him to get legal help. She also tried to arrange for him to get sent out of theater, something she said should have happened as a matter of course. On Camp Victory, she spoke to another Combat Stress psychiatrist about Wattas case, who spoke to an attorney, and, again via e-mail, she relayed the attorneyas advice to Watt. She told him to write a sworn statement about the threats he was receiving, and then the battalion would be forced to take action.

On July 25, Watt did just that, writing a sworn statement about a specific incident that had happened the night before. At about 8:00 p.m. the previous evening, Hoeck approached him in the chow hall to say that while several 1st Platoon soldiers were grumbling about Wattas being a snitch, Private First Cla.s.s Chris Barnes in particular was talking about making him sorry, whether here in Iraq or once they returned home. Another soldier told Watt that Barnes had been trying to find Wattas new tent.

When Watt told Sergeant Major Edwards later that night what head heard, Edwards replied, aThat should be the least of your worries. Itas the people who talk that you donat need to worry about.a Edwards told Watt, aIall take care of it,a but offered no specifics.

Barnes later acknowledged, aI might have said something to someone else. Supposedly I said aIam going to cut his f.u.c.king throat.a I might have said it, being p.i.s.sed off. But I never actually threatened Watt.a Barnes said he never intended to do Watt any harm, but to this day he doesnat support Wattas decision to come forward. aWhat they did was wrong,a he explained. aBut war is f.u.c.king h.e.l.l, and the s.h.i.+t they went through, if they went crazy, whether itas three minutes or three f.u.c.king hours, I can see how it happened to them. I would never have turned them in. Theyare your brothers, you know? There has to be some kind of loyalty there that you donat break no matter what. Let G.o.d judge them. If theyare not sorry, theyall go to h.e.l.l. And if they are, if they really are, theyare going to have to live with that for the rest of their life.a Bowler had arranged for two members of a Combat Stress team who were heading down to Mahmudiyah on other business to meet with Watt. After speaking with them about Watt, she was confident they would recommend he be moved up to the Victory Base Complex, away from the battalion. To Watt, it looked like a done deal.

But it was far from a done deal. When the two mental health specialists returned to Camp Victory, Bowler was expecting to see Watt in tow. He was not there. When she asked about him, one of them, a psychiatrist, replied, aHeas doing great, heas doing fantastic. He is a strong young man with a lot of inner strength.a Bowler was floored. Whatever may have happened, she was certain that Watt could not have given the impression that he was doing fine. aI was stunned,a she said. aWhat kind of mental gymnastics did they have to go through as clinicians to come back and tell me that he was doing great, fine, fantastic?a When she started to protest that that was impossible, she was, she said, told to back off; she was overly involved in this matter. Shortly thereafter, she was ordered to have no further communication with Watt. aIt was crazy,a she felt. aA whistle-blower in a case like this should have been moved out of theater immediately. All of these friends of these people who are now arrested and charged with rape and murder are running around with guns and heas the whistle-blower? The way Watt was treated was just unthinkable.a The same day that Watt met with the psychiatrist, Sergeant Major Edwards informed him that he was being sent down to Lutufiyah, where he would complete his tour as a member of Charlie Company.

After expecting to get the ax immediately, Goodwin was at first confused and then hopeful as July turned into August and no moves were made against him. The end of the deployment in September was looming ever closer. The advance parties of the 10th Mountain Division, which was relieving First Strike, would be showing up in their AO soon for their right-seat, left-seat rides. After expecting every day to be his last, Goodwin had begun to allow himself the fantasy that he might be allowed to finish the deployment in command of Bravo Company. aI was like, wow, maybe Iam going to make it through this,a he said.

That was not to be. On August 15, Kunk came to Yusufiyah for a routine circulation through the AO. But the next day, he came back for an unscheduled visit. The soldiers working the radios at Bravoas TOC let Goodwin know that Kunk was en route.

aHe is coming down to Yusufiyah?a Goodwin asked.

aRoger that, sir.a aWhat for?a aWe donat know, sir. They didnat say.a Goodwin knew that was it. He walked back to his hooch and started packing up his stuff. When Kunk arrived, they talked privately for half an hour, during which the battalion commander told Goodwin that he was out of a job. aKunk was probably the most cordial he has ever been to me in his life that day,a Goodwin remembered. aWe had a very decent conversation. Almost person to person.a Sent back up to Striker, Goodwin had time to draft reb.u.t.tals to the AR 15-6s and the letter of reprimand he had received. His reb.u.t.tals were, Goodwin said, filled with emotion, finding errors and bad leaders.h.i.+p at every level in the chain of command.

Ebel called Goodwin into his office. aSo this is how you feel?a Ebel asked.

aSir, thatas exactly how I feel,a Goodwin responded.

aTo include Battalion, Brigade, and Division?a aSir, Iam not backing down,a Goodwin replied. aI f.u.c.ked up. Tim f.u.c.ked up. Squad f.u.c.ked up. Battalion f.u.c.ked up. You f.u.c.ked up. Division f.u.c.ked up. There were mistakes at every level.a aIt didnat really help my cause,a Goodwin mused later. Perhaps not, but it probably didnat hurt, either, since Ebel never thought Goodwinas conduct warranted harsh judgment. Colonel Ebel, who had always resisted removing Goodwin from command, clarified that even now Goodwin awas not relieved in its purest sense. He had just met his timelinea for one year in charge of a company and was simply being rea.s.signed. aI told him I wonat relieve him because the fact is this guyas a hero too,a he said. aHe had incidents of breaches of discipline I had witnessed in other commands. His just happened to all fall at the wrong time and the wrong place.a Bravo Companyas executive officer, Justin Habash, who had been promoted to captain in July, was given command of the company.

On August 14, First Lieutenant Tim Norton had received a letter of reprimand from General Thurman citing both the AVLB attack and the rape-murders. On August 16, he got a letter from Ebel suspending him from his position. Like Goodwin, he also was never technically arelieved for causea from his position. He was simply suspended and never reinstated. No punitive or disciplinary action was ever taken against Sergeant First Cla.s.s Jeff Fenlason. He finished the deployment as 1st Platoonas platoon sergeant, and he continued in that role after the unitas return to the States.

On August 21, Captain Bill Dougherty, the commander of Charlie Company, took it upon himself to write a personal e-mail to Rick Watt, Justin Wattas father. The ongoing rape-murder investigation was making international headlines and Justinas name had surfaced in the press as the whistle-blower. Dougherty wanted to a.s.sure the elder Watt that his son had found a supportive home.

aI have told your son that I am proud of him for coming forward,a Dougherty wrote. aIt took moral courage. I am sure that you are proud of him and I am glad to have him in my company. I know that he has been through a lot and I am looking out for him to make sure he is oka. I can a.s.sure you that the Soldiers in Charlie Company all agree that he did the right thing and support him fully.a Dougherty encouraged Rick Watt to stay in touch regarding his son, and he pa.s.sed along word that Goodwin and Norton had been relieved of their positions (he did this, he later said, in case Rick Watt was wondering why he had not heard from either man himself). Dougherty a.s.sured him that Justin ais not wrapped up in anything concerning them being fired. Right now he is driving on with normal activities of an Infantryman serving in South Baghdad.a It was the only direct communication that Rick Watt had received (and would ever receive) from anyone in a leaders.h.i.+p position in 1st Battalion. Rick Watt was desperately worried about his sonas well-being and had been writing e-mails to commanders and senators, trying to get his son removed from Iraq entirely. Delighted finally to have any validation or expression of support for his sonas actions from someone in a position of authority, Rick Watt pa.s.sed the letter on to Gregg Zoroya, a reporter from USA Today.

When USA Today ran a story about Justin Wattas anguish, the paper included a short snippet of Doughertyas e-mail. Kunk and Ebel were furious. Rather than commend Dougherty for thinking of Wattas and his familyas well-being (though perhaps recommending he do a better job of ensuring that his correspondents kept his e-mails confidential), Ebel issued Dougherty a letter of reprimand for athe gross error in judgment you displayed recently by sending an e-mail communication to PFC Justin Wattas father.a Even though Rick Watt prevailed upon Zoroya not to mention anything in print about Goodwinas situation, Ebel accused Dougherty of betraying his peer, writing, aYou acted recklessly and worst of all you did so without any consideration for the professional courtesy and loyalty due your fellow commander and this brigadea. The most profound impact of your poor choice is the attention that your negative comments will draw away from the hard-won accomplishments of the Soldiers of Strike Brigade: secure streets, open shops, flouris.h.i.+ng businesses, and hopeful people.a The reprimand was, to Dougherty, as demoralizing as it was nonsensical: There was nothing attributed to Dougherty in the article that could be even remotely construed as negative. It was baffling.

As the deployment wound down, men from all of the FOBs began handing over responsibility to the 10th Mountain Division throughout early September, packing up and preparing for the trip home.

After two weeks of transition, the last remnants of First Strike left Mahmudiyah in mid-September and arrived at Fort Campbell shortly after. For a frontline deployment such as this one, it was common for NCOs or officers in positions of squad leader or above to receive a Bronze Star. First Platoonas squad leadersa"Chaz Allen, Eric Lauzier, and Chris Paynea"were not awarded Bronze Stars. First Lieutenant Tim Norton also did not receive a Bronze Star for his 2005-2006 tour of duty, but Sergeant First Cla.s.s Fenlason did.

Following several weeks of battalion-wide leave, the usual changes in leaders.h.i.+p and the routine discharges and transfers of men into and out of the unit commenced, but with this added difference: Bravo Companyas 1st Platoon was being disbanded and would be reconst.i.tuted with almost entirely new personnel. Despite all they had been through, it was, for many of the men, one of the saddest, toughest days of the entire experience. Bravoas new company commander, Justin Habash, choked up as he delivered the news. aNothing I could say to them would erase their feelings of betrayal or feeling like the black sheep for all that they had been through,a Habash said, abut they were not to blame for the murder or other things that they felt they were carrying black marks for.a He declared the breakup an unnecessary step, opining that 1st Platoon could and should be allowed to continue the rebuilding it had already begun.

That would not come to pa.s.s. Most of the men of 1st Platoon soon got scattered throughout Fort Campbell and across the rest of the Army, and the 1-502nd Infantry Regiment began the business of training up for their inevitable return to Iraq. First Strike would deploy again, this time to Baghdad, in the fall of 2007.

aThis was life and death stuff,a concluded Sergeant John Diem with respect to the 2005-2006 deployment, of which he and all the men of Bravo are still trying to make sense. aYou line up three people in a row, and one of them dies. Thatas the kinds of numbers we are talking about. In ways that are important to young men, like what you do, what you stand for, and what you are willing to put on the line, this was the defining moment in a lot of peopleas lives. And I donat think their actions will withstand their own scrutiny. I know mine donat. But I know what kills soldiers now. I know what kills them. Not in the physical sense, but in the psychological sense; what causes soldiers to fail themselves, and what command can do to set them up for failure or not. It was the feeling of isolation at all levels of command that caused what happened. Thereas only one reality. Thereas only one thing that is happening, and thereas only so many variables that surround it. It can be figured out and responsibility can be meted out and then problems can be fixed. If people continue to treat this like a mysterious event that came out of nowhere, and we donat change how we lead soldiers, and we donat honestly look at what caused this to happen, itas going to happen again. I mean, this isnat the only time. Itas just the most notorious time.a

EPILOGUE.

The Triangle of Death Today and Trials at Home.