The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume II Part 19

It was not Reason that discovered the singular & admirable mechanism of the English Const.i.tution. It was not Reason that discovered or ever could have discovered the odd & in the eye of those who are governed by reason, the absurd mode of trial by Jury. Accidents probably produced these discoveries, and experience has given a sanction to them. This is then our guide. And has not experience verified the utility of restraining money bills to the immediate representatives of the people.

Whence the effect may have proceeded he could not say: whether from the respect with which this privilege inspired the other branches of Gov^t to the H. of Co[~m]ons, or from the turn of thinking it gave to the people at large with regard to their rights, but the effect was visible & could not be doubted--Shall we oppose to this long experience, the short experience of 11 years which we had ourselves, on this subject. As to disputes, they could not be avoided any way. If both Houses should originate, each would have a different bill to which it would be attached, and for which it would contend.--He observed that all the prejudices of the people would be offended by refusing this exclusive privilege to the H. of Repres^s and these prejudices sh^d never be disregarded by us when no essential purpose was to be served. When this plan goes forth it will be attacked by the popular leaders. Aristocracy will be the watchword; the s.h.i.+boleth among its adversaries. Eight States have inserted in their Const.i.tutions the exclusive right of originating money bills in favor of the popular branch of the Legislature. Most of them however allowed the other branch to amend. This he thought would be proper for us to do.

M^r Randolph regarded this point as of such consequence, that as he valued the peace of this Country, he would press the adoption of it. We had numerous & monstrous difficulties to combat. Surely we ought not to increase them. When the people behold in the Senate, the countenance of an aristocracy; and in the president, the form at least of a little monarch, will not their alarms be sufficiently raised without taking from their immediate representatives, a right which has been so long appropriated to them.--The Executive will have more influence over the Senate, than over the H. of Rep^s Allow the Senate to originate in this Case, & that influence will be sure to mix itself in their deliberations & plans. The Declaration of War he conceived ought not to be in the Senate composed of 26 men only, but rather in the other House. In the other House ought to be placed the origination of the means of war. As to Commercial regulations which may involve revenue, the difficulty may be avoided by restraining the definition to bills, for the _mere_ or _sole_, purpose of raising revenue. The Senate will be more likely to be corrupt than the H. of Rep^s and should therefore have less to do with money matters. His princ.i.p.al object however was to prevent popular objections against the plan, and to secure its adoption.

M^r Rutlidge. The friends of this motion are not consistent in their reasoning. They tell us that we ought to be guided by the long experience of G. B. & not our own experience of 11 years; and yet they themselves propose to depart from it. The _H. of Co[~m]ons_ not only have the exclusive right of originating, but the _Lords_ are not allowed to alter or amend a money bill. Will not the people say that this restriction is but a mere tub to the whale. They cannot but see that it is of no real consequence; and will be more likely to be displeased with it as an attempt to bubble them, than to impute it to a watchfulness over their rights. For his part, he would prefer giving the exclusive right to the Senate, if it was to be given exclusively at all. The Senate being more conversant in business, and having more leisure, will digest the bills much better, and as they are to have no effect, till examined & approved by the H. of Rep^s there can be no possible danger.

These clauses in the Const.i.tutions of the States had been put in through a blind adherence to the British model. If the work was to be done over now, they would be omitted. The experiment in S. Carolina, where the Senate can originate or amend money bills, has shewn that it answers no good purpose; and produces the very bad one of continually dividing & heating the two houses. Sometimes indeed if the matter of the amendment of the Senate is pleasing to the other House they wink at the encroachment; if it be displeasing, then the Const.i.tution is appealed to. Every Session is distracted by altercations on this subject. The practice now becoming frequent is for the Senate not to make formal amendments; but to send down a schedule of the alterations which will procure the bill their a.s.sent.

M^r Carrol. The most ingenious men in Mary^d are puzzled to define the case of money bills, or explain the Const.i.tution on that point, tho it seemed to be worded with all possible plainness & precision. It is a source of continual difficulty & squabble between the two houses.

M^r McHenry[24] mentioned an instance of extraordinary subterfuge, to get rid of the apparent force of the Const.i.tution.

[24] "Mr. McHenry was bred a physician, but he afterwards turned Soldier and acted as Aid to Gen^l Was.h.i.+ngton and the Marquis de la Fayette. He is a Man of Specious talents, with nothing of genious to improve them. As a politician there is nothing remarkable in him, nor has he any of the graces of the Orator. He is however, a very respectable young Gentleman, and deserves the honor which his country has bestowed on him. Mr. McHenry is about 32 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 330.

On Question on the first part of the motion as to the exclusive originating of Money bills in the H. of Rep^s

N. H. ay. Ma.s.s. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.

Virg^a ay. M^r Blair & M^r M. no. M^r R, Col. Mason and Gen^l Was.h.i.+ngton[25] ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

[25] He disapproved & till now voted ag^{st} the exclusive privilege, he gave up his judgment he said because it was not of very material weight with him & was made an essential point with others who if disappointed, might be less cordial in other points of real weight.--Madison's Note.

Question on Originating by H. of Rep^s & _amending_ by Senate, as reported Art IV. Sect. 5.

N. H. ay. Ma.s.s. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.

V^a[26] ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

[26] In the printed Journ Virg^a--no.--Madison's Note.

Question on the last clause of Sect. 5, Art: IV--viz "No money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of _appropriations_ that shall originate in the House of Rep^s. It pa.s.sed in the negative--

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Con. no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.

V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Adj^d.

TUESDAY AUG. 14[27]. IN CONVENTION

[27] General Henry Knox wrote to Was.h.i.+ngton from New York under date of August 14th:

"Influenced by motives of delicacy I have hitherto forborne the pleasure my dear Sir of writing to you since my return from Philadelphia.

"I have been apprehensive that the stages of the business of the convention, might leak out, and be made an ill use of, by some people. I have therefore been anxious that you should escape the possibility of imputation. But as the subjects seem now to be brought to a point, I take the liberty to indulge myself in communicating with you.

"Although I frankly confess that the existence of the State governments is an insuperable evil in a national point of view, yet I do not well see how in this stage of the business they could be annihilated--and perhaps while they continue the frame of government could not with propriety be much higher toned than the one proposed. It is so infinitely preferable to the present const.i.tution, and gives such a bias to a proper line of conduct in future that I think all men anxious for a national government should zealously embrace it.

"The education, genius, and habits of men on this continent are so various even at this moment, and of consequence their views of the same subject so different, that I am satisfied with the result of the convention, although it is short of my wishes and of my judgment.

"But when I find men of the purest intentions concur in embracing a system which on the highest deliberation, seems to be the best which can be obtained, under present circ.u.mstances, I am convinced of the propriety of its being strenuously supported by all those who have wished for a national republic of higher and more durable powers.

"I am persuaded that the address of the convention to accompany their proposition will be couched in the most persuasive terms.

"I feel anxious that there should be the fullest representation in Congress, in order that the propositions should receive their warmest concurrence and strongest impulse...."--Wash. MSS.

Article VI. Sect. 9. taken up.

M^r Pinkney argued that the making the members ineligible to offices was _degrading_ to them, and the more improper as their election into the Legislature implied that they had the confidence of the people; that it was _inconvenient_, because the Senate might be supposed to contain the fittest men. He hoped to see that body become a School of public Ministers, a nursery of Statesmen: that it was _impolitic_, because the Legislature would cease to be a magnet to the first talents and abilities. He moved to postpone the section in order to take up the following proposition viz--"the members of each House shall be incapable of holding any office under the U. S. for which they or any of others for their benefit receive any salary, fees, or emoluments of any kind--and the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats respectively."

Gen^s Mifflin[28] 2^{ded} the motion.

[28] "General Mifflin is well known for the activity of his mind, and the brilliancy of his parts. He is well-informed and a graceful Speaker. The General is about 40 years of age and a very handsome man."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 328.

Col. Mason ironically proposed to strike out the whole section, as a more effectual expedient for encouraging that exotic corruption which might not otherwise thrive so well in the American Soil--for compleating that Aristocracy which was probably in the contemplation of some among us, and for inviting into the Legislative Service, those generous & benevolent characters who will do justice to each other's merit, by carving out offices & rewards for it. In the present state of American morals & manners, few friends it may be thought will be lost to the plan, by the opportunity of giving premiums to a mercenary & depraved ambition.

M^r Mercer. It is a first principle in political science, that whenever the rights of property are secured, an aristocracy will grow out of it.

Elective Governments also necessarily become aristocratic, because the rulers being few can & will draw emoluments for themselves from the many. The Governments of America will become aristocracies. They are so already. The public measures are calculated for the benefit of the Governors, not of the people. The people are dissatisfied & complain.

They change their rulers, and the public measures are changed, but it is only a change of one scheme of emolument to the rulers, for another. The people gain nothing by it, but an addition of instability & uncertainty to their other evils.--Governm^{ts} can only be maintained by _force_ or _influence_. The Executive has not _force_, deprive him of influence by rendering the members of the Legislature ineligible to Executive offices, and he becomes a mere phantom of authority. The Aristocratic part will not even let him in for a share of the plunder. The Legislature must & will be composed of wealth & abilities, and the people will be governed by a Junto. The Executive ought to have a Council, being members of both Houses. Without such an influence, the war will be between the aristocracy & the people. He wished it to be between the Aristocracy & the Executive. Nothing else can protect the people ag^{st} those speculating Legislatures which are now plundering them throughout the U. States.

M^r Gerry read a Resolution of the Legislature of Ma.s.s^{ts} pa.s.sed before the Act of Cong^s recommending the Convention, in which her deputies were instructed not to depart from the rotation established in the 5^{th} art: of Confederation, nor to agree in any case to give to the members of Cong^s a capacity to hold offices under the Government.

This he said was repealed in consequence of the Act of Cong^s with which the State thought it proper to comply in an unqualified manner. The Sense of the State however was Still the same. He could not think with M^r Pinkney that the disqualification was degrading. Confidence is the road to tyranny. As to Ministers & Amba.s.sadors few of them were necessary. It is the opinion of a great many that they ought to be discontinued, on our part; that none may be sent among us, & that source of influence be shut up. If the Senate were to appoint Amba.s.sadors as seemed to be intended, they will multiply emba.s.sies for their own sakes.

He was not so fond of those productions as to wish to establish nurseries for them. If they are once appointed, the House of Rep^s will be obliged to provide salaries for them, whether they approve of the measures or not. If men will not serve in the Legislature without a prospect of such offices, our situation is deplorable indeed. If our best Citizens are actuated by such mercenary views we had better chuse a single despot at once. It will be more easy to satisfy the rapacity of one than of many. According to the idea of one Gentleman (M^r Mercer) our Government it seems is to be a Gov^t of plunder. In that case it certainly would be prudent to have but one rather than many to be employed in it. We cannot be too circ.u.mspect in the formation of this System. It will be examined on all sides and with a very suspicious eye.

The people who have been so lately in arms ag^{st} G. B. for their liberties, will not easily give them up. He lamented the evils existing at present under our Governments, but imputed them to the faults of those in office, not to the people. The misdeeds of the former will produce a critical attention to the opportunities afforded by the new system to like or greater abuses. As it now stands it is as compleat an aristocracy as ever was framed. If great powers should be given to the Senate we shall be governed in reality by a Junto as has been apprehended. He remarked that it would be very differently const.i.tuted from Cong^s. 1. there will be but 2 deputies from each State, in Cong^s there may be 7. and are generally 5.--2. they are chosen for six years, those of Congress annually. 3. they are not subject to recall; those of Cong^s are. 4. In Congress 9 _States_ are necessary for all great purposes, here 8 _persons_ will suffice. Is it to be presumed that the people will ever agree to such a system? He moved to render the members of the H. of Rep^s as well as of the Senate ineligible not only during, but for one year after the expiration of their terms.--If it should be thought that this will injure the Legislature by keeping out of it men of abilities who are willing to serve in other offices it may be required as a qualification for other offices, that the Candidate shall have served a certain time in the Legislature.

M^r Gov^r Morris. Exclude the officers of the army & navy, and you form a band having a different interest from & opposed to the civil power: you stimulate them to despise & reproach those "talking Lords who dare not face the foe." Let this spirit be roused at the end of a war, before your troops shall have laid down their arms, and though the Civil authority "be intrenched in parchment to the teeth" they will cut their way to it. He was ag^{st} rendering the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices. He was for rendering them eligible ag^n after having vacated their Seats by accepting office. Why should we not avail ourselves of their services if the people chuse to give them their confidence. There can be little danger of corruption either among the people or the Legislatures who are to be the Electors. If they say, we see their merits, we honor the men, we chuse to renew our confidence in them, have they not a right to give them a preference; and can they be properly abridged of it.

M^r Williamson; introduced his opposition to the motion by referring to the question concerning "money bills." That clause he said was dead. Its Ghost he was afraid would notwithstanding haunt us. It had been a matter of conscience with him, to insist upon it as long as there was hope of retaining it. He had swallowed the vote of rejection, with reluctance.

He could not digest it. All that was said on the other side was that the restriction was not _convenient_. We have now got a House of Lords which is to originate money-bills.--To avoid another _inconveniency_, we are to have a whole Legislature at liberty to cut out offices for one another. He thought a self-denying ordinance for ourselves would be more proper. Bad as the Const.i.tution has been made by expunging the restriction on the Senate concerning money bills he did not wish to make it worse by expunging the present Section. He had scarcely seen a single corrupt measure in the Legislature of N. Carolina, which could not be traced up to office hunting.

M^r Sherman. The Const.i.tution sh^d lay as few temptations as possible in the way of those in power. Men of abilities will increase as the Country grows more populous and as the means of education are more diffused.

M^r Pinkney. No State has rendered the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices. In S. Carolina the Judges are eligible into the Legislature. It cannot be supposed then that the motion will be offensive to the people. If the State Const.i.tutions should be revised he believed restrictions of this sort w^d be rather diminished than multiplied.

M^r Wilson could not approve of the section as it stood, and could not give up his judgment to any supposed objections that might arise among the people. He considered himself as acting & responsible for the welfare of millions not immediately represented in this House. He had also asked himself the serious question what he should say to his const.i.tuents in case they should call upon him to tell them why he sacrificed his own Judgment in a case where they authorized him to exercise it? Were he to own to them that he sacrificed it in order to flatter their prejudices, he should dread the retort: did you suppose the people of Penn^a had not good sense enough to receive a good Government? Under this impression he should certainly follow his own Judgment which disapproved of the section. He would remark in addition to the objections urged ag^{st} it, that as one branch of the Legislature was to be appointed by the Legislatures of the States, the other by the people of the States, as both are to be paid by the States, and to be appointable to State offices, nothing seemed to be wanting to prostrate the Nat^l Legislature, but to render its members ineligible to Nat^l offices, & by that means take away its power of attracting those talents which were necessary to give weight to the Govern^t and to render it useful to the people. He was far from thinking the ambition which aspired to Offices of dignity and trust, an ign.o.ble or culpable one. He was sure it was not politic to regard it in that light, or to withhold from it the prospect of those rewards, which might engage it in the career of public service. He observed that the State of Penn^a which had gone as far as any State into the policy of fettering power, had not rendered the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices of Gov^t.

M^r Elsworth did not think the mere postponement of the reward would be any material discouragement of merit. Ambitious minds will serve 2 years or 7 years in the Legislature for the sake of qualifying themselves for other offices. This he thought a sufficient security for obtaining the services of the ablest men in the Legislature, although whilst members they should be ineligible to Public offices. Besides, merit will be most encouraged, when most impartially rewarded. If rewards are to circulate only within the Legislature, merit out of it will be discouraged.

M^r Mercer was extremely anxious on this point. What led to the appointment of this Convention? The corruption & mutability of the Legislative Councils of the States. If the plan does not remedy these, it will not recommend itself; and we shall not be able in our private capacities to support & enforce it: nor will the best part of our Citizens exert themselves for the purpose.--It is a great mistake to suppose that the paper we are to propose will govern the U. States. It is The men whom it will bring into the Govern^t and interest in maintaining it that is to govern them. The paper will only mark out the mode & the form. Men are the substance and must do the business. All Gov^t must be by force or influence. It is not the King of France--but 200,000 janisaries of power that govern that Kingdom. There will be no such force here; influence then must be subst.i.tuted; and he would ask whether this could be done, if the members of the Legislature should be ineligible to offices of State; whether such a disqualification would not determine all the most influential men to stay at home, & prefer appointments within their respective States.

M^r Wilson was by no means satisfied with the answer given by M^r Elseworth to the argument as to the discouragement of merit. The members must either go a second time into the Legislature, and disqualify themselves--or say to their Const.i.tuents, we served you before only from the mercenary view of qualifying ourselves for offices, and have^g answered this purpose we do not chuse to be again elected.

M^r Gov^r Morris put the case of a war, and the Citizen the most capable of conducting it, happening to be a member of the Legislature. What might have been the consequence of such a regulation at the commencement, or even in the Course of the late contest for our liberties?

On question for postponing in order to take up M^r Pinkney's motion, it was lost,

N. H. ay. Mas. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.

M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. div^d.