The Works of George Berkeley Part 23

Qu. How can a line consisting of an unequal number of points be divisible [_ad infinitum_] in two equals?

Mem. To discuss copiously how & why we do not see the pictures.

(M393) Allowing extensions to exist in matter, we cannot know even their proportions-contrary to Malbranch.

(M394) I wonder how men cannot see a truth so obvious, as that extension cannot exist without a thinking substance.

(M395) Species of all sensible things made by the mind. This prov'd either by turning men's eyes into magnifyers or diminishers.

Yr m. v. is, suppose, less than mine. Let a 3rd person have perfect ideas of both our m. vs. His idea of my m. v. contains his idea of yours, & somewhat more. Therefore 'tis made up of parts: therefore his idea of my m. v. is not perfect or just, which diverts the hypothesis.

Qu. Whether a m. v. or t. be extended?

Mem. The strange errours men run into about the pictures. We think them small because should a man be suppos'd to see them their pictures would take up but little room in the fund of his eye.

It seems all lines can't be bisected in 2 equall parts. Mem. To examine how the geometers prove the contrary.

'Tis impossible there should be a m. v. less than mine. If there be, mine may become equal to it (because they are h.o.m.ogeneous) by detraction of some part or parts. But it consists not of parts, ergo &c.

Suppose inverting perspectives bound to ye eyes of a child, & continu'd to the years of manhood-when he looks up, or turns up his head, he shall behold wt we call _under_. Qu. What would he think of _up_ and _down_(238)?

(M396) I wonder not at my sagacity in discovering the obvious tho' amazing truth. I rather wonder at my stupid inadvertency in not finding it out before-'tis no witchcraft to see.

(M397) Our simple ideas are so many simple thoughts or perceptions; a perception cannot exist without a thing to perceive it, or any longer than it is perceiv'd; a thought cannot be in an unthinking thing; one uniform simple thought can be like to nothing but another uniform simple thought.

Complex thoughts or ideas are onely an a.s.semblage of simple ideas, and can be the image of nothing, or like unto nothing, but another a.s.semblage of simple ideas, &c.

(M398) The Cartesian opinion of light & colours &c. is orthodox enough even in their eyes who think the Scripture expression may favour the common opinion. Why may not mine also? But there is nothing in Scripture that can possibly be wrested to make against me, but, perhaps, many things for me.

(M399) Bodies &c. do exist whether we think of 'em or no, they being taken in a twofold sense-

1. Collections of thoughts.

2. Collections of powers to cause those thoughts.

These later exist; tho' perhaps _a parte rei_ it may be one simple perfect power.

Qu. whether the extension of a plain, look'd at straight and slantingly, survey'd minutely & distinctly, or in the bulk and confusedly at once, be the same? N. B. The plain is suppos'd to keep the same distance.

The ideas we have by a successive, curious inspection of ye minute parts of a plain do not seem to make up the extension of that plain view'd & consider'd all together.

Ignorance in some sort requisite in ye person that should disown the Principle.

Thoughts do most properly signify, or are mostly taken for the interior operations of the mind, wherein the mind is active. Those yt obey not the acts of volition, and in wch the mind is pa.s.sive, are more properly call'd sensations or perceptions. But yt is all a case of words.

Extension being the collection or distinct co-existence of minimums, i.e.

of perceptions intromitted by sight or touch, it cannot be conceiv'd without a perceiving substance.

(M400) Malbranch does not prove that the figures & extensions exist not when they are not perceiv'd. Consequently he does not prove, nor can it be prov'd on his principles, that the sorts are the work of the mind, and onely in the mind.

(M401) The great argument to prove that extension cannot be in an unthinking substance is, that it cannot be conceiv'd distinct from or without all tangible or visible quality.

(M402) Tho' matter be extended wth an indefinite extension, yet the mind makes the sorts. They were not before the mind perceiving them, & even now they are not without the mind. Houses, trees, &c., tho' indefinitely extended matter do exist, are not without the mind.

(M403) The great danger of making extension exist without the mind is, that if it does it must be acknowledg'd infinite, immutable, eternal, &c.;-wch will be to make either G.o.d extended (wch I think dangerous), or an eternal, immutable, infinite, increate Being beside G.o.d.

(M404) Finiteness of our minds no excuse for the geometers.

(M405) The Principle easily proved by plenty of arguments _ad absurdum_.

The twofold signification of Bodies, viz.

1. Combinations of thoughts(239);

2. Combinations of powers to raise thoughts.

These, I say, in conjunction with h.o.m.ogeneous particles, may solve much better the objections from the creation than the supposition that Matter does exist. Upon wch supposition I think they cannot be solv'd.

Bodies taken for powers do exist wn not perceiv'd; but this existence is not actual(240). Wn I say a power exists, no more is meant than that if in the light I open my eyes, and look that way, I shall see it, i.e. the body, &c.

Qu. whether blind before sight may not have an idea of light and colours & visible extension, after the same manner as we perceive them wth eyes shut, or in the dark-not imagining, but seeing after a sort?

Visible extension cannot be conceiv'd added to tangible extension. Visible and tangible points can't make one sum. Therefore these extensions are heterogeneous.