Some Account of the Public Life of the Late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart Part 1

Some Account of the Public Life of the Late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart.

by E. B. Brenton.

The character and conduct of individuals in high and responsible situations, will naturally and necessarily be the subject of free and open discussion. The conduct of a soldier is more particularly exposed to this scrutiny. His success or his failure is a matter of such powerful interest to his country, that he generally receives even more than his full measure of approbation or of blame. Notwithstanding all the difficulties of forming a correct judgment on the merits of military operations, there is perhaps no subject upon which public opinion expresses itself so quickly and so decidedly. Disappointed in the sanguine hopes which they had entertained, and mortified by the consciousness of defeat, the public too frequently imagine cause for censure, and without a competent knowledge of the facts necessary to enable them to form a sound and satisfactory judgment, unhesitatingly condemn those who have perhaps pa.s.sed in their service a long life of anxiety and labour. But while, in the moment of irritation, they are thus disposed to impugn the conduct of their military servants, they are no less ready, on more deliberate inquiry, and a fuller understanding of the facts, to grant them a candid and generous acquittal.

These observations are peculiarly applicable to the case of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, who, after having devoted to his country thirty-five of the best years of his life; after having distinguished himself in many gallant actions; and after having preserved to the crown of Great Britain some of its most valuable foreign possessions, was called upon, at the close of his honourable career, to answer charges which vitally affected his reputation, and which he was prevented by death from fully and clearly refuting.

Painful as it was to the friends of Sir George Prevost to allow a single stain to rest upon the memory of so brave and distinguished a soldier, more especially when they possessed the means of removing every doubt as to his conduct, they yet considered an appeal to the candour and justice of his country as unnecessary. The violent prejudices which at one period existed against the late Commander of the Forces in the Canadas were gradually wearing away; his memory had been honored by a just tribute of his Sovereign's regret and approbation; and the scenes in which he had been so conspicuous an actor, had ceased to be a matter of general interest. Under these circ.u.mstances, the relatives of Sir George Prevost would confidently have entrusted his reputation to the unprejudiced judgment of posterity, had they not seen, with equal regret and indignation, a late attempt to revive the almost exploded calumnies and misrepresentations of which he had been the victim. That the Quarterly Review[1] should have lent its pages to an attack like this, will, upon the perusal of the present volume, excite the surprise of every candid person; and it is chiefly for the purpose of correcting the mis-statements into which the Reviewer has been led, that the following pages are presented to the public.

Before entering more particularly upon the subject of Sir George Prevost's conduct, so wantonly attacked in the article above alluded to, it may not be thought improper briefly to advert to his father's services and to his own early history. From his military career, previous to his appointment to the chief command in British North America, it will clearly appear that he was not without reason selected by his Majesty's Government for the discharge of that important trust.

Major-General Augustin Prevost, the father of the late Sir George Prevost, was by birth a citizen of Geneva: he entered the British service as a Cornet in the Earl of Albemarle's regiment of Horse Guards, and was present at the battle of Fontenoy, where he was wounded.

Having attained the rank of Major in the 60th regiment in 1759, he had the honor of serving under General Wolfe, and received a severe wound in the head, whilst gallantly forcing a landing, twenty miles above Quebec, under the immediate command of General Carleton, afterwards Lord Dorchester. Upon the reduction of Canada, Major Prevost was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and served with reputation at the capture of Martinique and the Havannah. In 1775, he was appointed to the command in East Florida, and, in 1778, he eminently distinguished himself by his defence of Savannah, against the attack of a very superior force of French and Americans, under the Comte d'Estaing and General Lincoln. The garrison consisted of only 2,300 men, while the force of the besiegers amounted to 8,000, supported by a fleet of twenty-two sail of the line. Such, however, was the determined energy of Major-General Prevost, and of the British soldiers and sailors under his command, that the enemy were compelled to abandon the enterprize, after thirty-three days' close siege.[2]

In 1780, Major-General Prevost, after having served twenty-two years in North America and the West Indies, returned to England, to enjoy the pleasing consciousness of having always discharged his duty with zeal and effect. His health was much impaired by a long residence in climates unfavorable to an European const.i.tution, and, on the 6th May, 1786, he died, at Greenhill Grove, near Barnet, in the sixty-third year of his age.

In 1765, Major-General Prevost married, at Lausanne, a daughter of M.

Grand, of that place;[3] and, on her husband's departure to America, Mrs.

Prevost accompanied him thither. George, their eldest son, was born while General Prevost was stationed in the province of New Jersey, on the 19th May, 1767. Being designed by his father for the military profession, he was placed with that view at Lochee's academy, at Chelsea, and his education was finished at Colmar, on the continent. He obtained his first commission in the 60th regiment, and being removed upon promotion to the 28th foot, he joined that corps at Gibraltar in 1784. He obtained his majority in 1790, and early in 1791, he took the command of the 3d battalion of the 60th regiment at Antigua. In March, 1794, he was promoted to a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the 60th, and, in 1795, he proceeded to Demerara, and from thence to St. Vincent's, at that time attacked by the French. He was there actively employed in suppressing the Carib insurrection, and in resisting the French invasion, and at the storming of the Vigie he commanded a column. In October, 1795, he was ordered to Dominica, to relieve Lieutenant-Colonel Madden in the command of the troops in that island; but in January, 1796, he resumed the command of the 3d battalion of the 60th regiment at St. Vincent's, where he was twice severely wounded in successfully resisting the enemy's progress towards the capital of the colony, after the defeat of Major-General Stewart at Colonary. In consequence of his wounds, Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost obtained leave to return to England. The sense which the inhabitants of St.

Vincent's entertained of his services was warmly expressed in an address from the Council and House of Representatives in that island.[4]

On his arrival in England, Lieutenant-Colonel Provost was appointed Inspecting Field Officer. In January, 1798, he obtained the rank of Colonel, and proceeded in the same year to the West Indies as Brigadier-General. In 1798, he was removed from the command of the troops at Barbadoes to St. Lucie, as Commandant, where he was afterwards appointed Lieutenant-Governor, in compliance with a request from the inhabitants.[5]

Brigadier-General Prevost continued to perform the duties of Governor of St. Lucie until the peace of 1802, when that colony was restored to the French. The address which he received from the inhabitants of the island on his departure, fully evinces the popularity which he had acquired;[6] while the letters addressed to him, and to Colonel Brownrigg, Secretary to H.R.H.

the Commander in Chief, by Sir Thomas Trigge, at that time Commander of the Forces in the West Indies, satisfactorily prove that he merited the confidence reposed in him by Government.[7]

In July, Brigadier-General Prevost arrived in England, when the government of Dominica was immediately offered to him by Lord Hobart. Having accepted the appointment, he embarked for that island in the following November, and landed there on the 25th of December, 1802.

In the following year, he volunteered his services on the expedition against St. Lucie and Tobago, and served as second in command under Lieutenant-General Grenfield, who in his general order, after the capture of Morne Fortunee, thus mentions his conduct upon that occasion:--

"To the cool and determined conduct of Brigadier-general Prevost and Brigadier-General Brereton, who led the two columns of attack, may be attributed the success of the action; but to Brigadier-General Prevost it must be acknowledged, that to his counsel and arrangements the Commander of the forces attributes the glory of the day."[8]

The important services of Brigadier-General Prevost upon this expedition, received numerous tributes of approbation from distinguished military characters;[9] and even the French Commander could not refrain from expressing the esteem and admiration with which he regarded his generous enemy.[10] Upon the successful termination of this affair, Brigadier-General Prevost returned to his Government at Dominica, where nothing worthy of notice occurred until the 22d February, 1805, when an unexpected attack was made by a French squadron from Rochefort. The result of that attack was highly creditable to the valour and military talents of the Governor, who after having, with the few troops under his command, disputed inch by inch the landing of the French force, amounting to 4,000 men, and covered by an overwhelming fire from the s.h.i.+ps, succeeded in effecting a retreat to the fort of Prince Rupert. The French Commander in Chief, after vainly summoning him to surrender, reimbarked the whole of his troops, and sailed to Guadaloupe.[11]

The terms in which H. R. H. the Commander in Chief was pleased to express his sense of General Prevost's conduct upon this occasion, were highly gratifying to his feelings.[12] In consequence of his gallant and successful defence of the Colony, General Prevost received a communication from the Speaker of the House of a.s.sembly,[13] conveying to him the thanks of that body, and informing him that a Thousand Guineas had been voted by them for the purchase of a sword and a service of plate, to be presented to him in testimony of their grat.i.tude and approbation.[14] A similar testimonial to the conduct of General Prevost upon this occasion was given by the Patriotic Fund, who voted him a sword of the value of one hundred pounds, and a piece of plate, of the value of two hundred pounds, "for the distinguished gallantry and military talents which he had displayed."[15]

From the West India Planters and Merchants General Prevost likewise received a piece of plate to the value of three hundred guineas.[16]

In July, 1805, General Prevost returned to England.[17] Soon after his arrival he was created a Baronet, and was subsequently appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Portsmouth.

In February, 1808, he was selected to command a brigade destined to reinforce Nova Scotia, where he succeeded Sir John Wentworth as Governor, and in December, 1808, he left Halifax, in order to a.s.sist in the reduction of Martinique. The expedition sailed from Barbadoes on the 28th of January, 1809, and on the 30th, the troops were landed on the island of Martinique.

Sir George Prevost was second in command under General Sir George Beckwith, and to him the management of all the active operations was confided. The result of this expedition was, that the French troops were driven into Fort Bourbon, where they held out until the 24th of February, when the surrender of that fort completed the conquest of the island.[18]

Upon the conclusion of this short but brilliant campaign, Sir George Prevost pa.s.sed a few days at Dominica, where he was received with many demonstrations of joy. Addresses were upon this occasion presented to him by the House of a.s.sembly of Dominica, and by the merchants and inhabitants of St. Christophers.[19]

In the month of April the army returned to Halifax, and from this period until his appointment to the chief civil and military command in British North America, in 1811, upon the resignation of Sir James Craig, Sir George Prevost remained in Nova Scotia, esteemed and beloved by all ranks of the inhabitants. On his departure for his new government, he received the most gratifying addresses from the inhabitants of Halifax,[20] and from the clergy of Nova Scotia, &c. &c.[21]

Upon the arrival of Sir George Prevost at Quebec in 1811, he found much dissatisfaction and discontent existing in the Lower Province. The inhabitants were divided into two parties, termed the English and the Canadian, and the feelings of hostility with which they viewed each other, had unfortunately not been allayed by the policy which the late Governor in Chief, Sir James Craig, had thought it necessary to adopt during his administration. To such a degree had this party spirit been carried, and so doubtful had he been of the disposition of the Canadians, that it had been thought inexpedient to call out the militia, lest they should make an improper use of the arms to be intrusted to them. Under these circ.u.mstances, it was evidently the duty of Sir George Prevost to conciliate, by every means in his power, the confidence and affection of the Canadians, more particularly as in case of hostilities with America, it would have been impossible to preserve Lower Canada without the cordial support of its inhabitants. Sir George Prevost therefore did not hesitate to adopt a system which the true interest of the Province seemed so imperiously to require. He anxiously endeavoured to unite the two adverse parties, and to soothe the irritation which not only threatened the tranquillity of his government, but even the safety of the colony itself.

In the distribution of the patronage which he enjoyed, he resolved to be guided solely by a consideration of the public good, and when offices became vacant, he bestowed them, with a due regard to the merits of the individuals, indifferently upon the English and the Canadians.

The beneficial effects of these measures became every day more apparent.

The Governor in Chief speedily acquired the confidence of all ranks of people, who submitted with cheerfulness to the privations and sacrifices which they were soon afterwards called upon to endure. In numerous instances he received from the inhabitants, both collectively and individually, the strongest proofs of their zeal; and he had the satisfaction of seeing them united in their attachment to his government, at a time when the preservation of the colony depended upon such feelings.

Having thus given a brief sketch of the situation in which the Governor in Chief found the Province of Lower Canada upon his arrival, and of the views and objects which he entertained respecting it, we shall proceed to point out the conduct which he pursued, when, from the aspect of affairs, it became evident that hostilities with America could not be long delayed. No sooner had Sir George Prevost a.s.sumed the chief command of the Canadas, than he became sensible of the necessity of placing those provinces in the most efficient state of defence; and he therefore applied himself with the utmost vigour and vigilance to call forth all their resources. It is difficult to believe that the unwearied exertions of Sir George Prevost, with a view to this important object, should have been altogether unknown to the writer in the Quarterly Review. But supposing him to have been ignorant of them, yet without access to the private and confidential correspondence which took place between Sir George Prevost and his Majesty's Government, or to the communications which pa.s.sed between him and the officers under his command, it was impossible that the Reviewer could form a correct opinion upon the subject. And yet he has not hesitated boldly to a.s.sert, that, "in the winters of 1811 and 1812, although the designs upon the Canadas were openly avowed in the American Congress, except the embodying of the militia of the Lower Province, Sir George Prevost made _not the slightest preparation for defence_."[22] The following statement will show the degree of credit to which this a.s.sertion of the Reviewer is ent.i.tled.

In the month of September, 1811, Sir George Prevost arrived in Canada, and in the same month, proceeding from Quebec to the district of Montreal, he inspected the different forts and military positions in that neighbourhood, and on the American frontier. Soon after his return to Quebec in the November following, he communicated confidentially with the Adjutant-General of the forces in England, upon the apprehended hostilities with America. In December he proposed to Lord Liverpool, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, the raising a corps of Fencibles, from the Glengarry settlement in Upper Canada; and in his correspondence with Admiral Sawyer, who commanded on the Halifax station, he requested that a s.h.i.+p of war might be sent, on the opening of the navigation, to the St.

Lawrence. In the month of February, 1812, another communication was made to the Secretary of State's Office, in which Sir George Prevost expressed a hope, that the proceedings in Was.h.i.+ngton would justify him, in making preparations to repel the threatened attack. Those preparations had been commenced as early as November, 1811, by forwarding arms and ammunition to the Upper Province. During the winter of 1811 and 1812, and the spring of the latter year, frequent communications pa.s.sed between the Commander of the forces and Major-General Brock, who commanded in Upper Canada, respecting the preparations which would be necessary in the event of a war.

It was proposed to reinforce Amherstburgh, and Fort George; and supplies of provisions, cavalry-arms, accoutrements and money, were directed to be conveyed to Upper Canada. Accoutrements and clothing for the militia in the Canadas, were requested from the British Government. Another schooner was directed to be built, to increase our marine on Lake Erie. Captain Gray, Deputy a.s.sistant-Quarter-Master-General, was despatched to the Upper Province, in order to a.s.sist in forwarding these defensive preparations; and Captain Dixon, of the Royal Engineers, was directed to proceed to Amherstburgh, to inspect the works of that fort, which the Commander of the forces had ordered to be put in a tenable state. The propriety of strengthening and fortifying York was submitted to Government; and the commanding engineer was directed to make the repairs, which his report on the different forts and posts in Upper Canada, had stated to be necessary.

In addition to these measures, a reinforcement from the 41st regiment, and five companies of the Newfoundland Fencibles, left Quebec in the month of May for the Upper Province.

On the 31st March, Sir George Prevost addressed a private and confidential letter to Major-General Brock, in which his sentiments respecting the approaching war, and the policy to be adopted in meeting it, were clearly detailed. One pa.s.sage in this letter merits a more particular notice, since it is highly important, not only as repelling the accusation of the Reviewer respecting the want of preparation for the war, but also as containing an answer to another charge, which will afterwards be noticed.

The paragraph in the letter is as follows: "You are nevertheless to persevere in your preparations for defence, and in such arrangements as may, upon a change in the state of affairs, enable you to employ any disposeable part of your force _offensively_ against the common enemy."

Independently of all these various communications with the officer commanding in Upper Canada, respecting the measures to be pursued in the event of war, and of the supplies of men, arms, money, stores, and provisions, which, with a view to that event, had been afforded to Upper Canada; much correspondence had previously taken place, and many difficulties had been removed with regard to the supply and transport of the Indian presents to the Upper Province, upon the due furnis.h.i.+ng of which very materially depended the support which we might expect to receive from the Indians, in case of a rupture with America.

From this statement, drawn from the original correspondence, and from official doc.u.ments, it is evident, that even in contemplation of hostilities, an event by no means certain, and which the British Government were so far from thinking probable, that they discouraged any measure of extraordinary expense to meet it, the Commander of the forces did, as far as rested with him, during the winter of 1811 and 1812, and for months prior to the declaration of war, make every preparation for defence, consistent with the means which he possessed. All the requisitions of Major-General Brock which the Commander of the forces had the power to grant, were promptly complied with; nor was the slightest intimation ever given by that invaluable officer, that any measure, either suggested by himself or which ought to have occurred to the Commander of the forces, for the preservation of the Upper Province, in the event of its being attacked, had been overlooked or neglected. The same vigilant foresight will be found to mark the conduct of Sir George Prevost in the Lower Province. One of the first measures of his government, in contemplation of war, was an application to the legislature of Lower Canada, in February, 1812, for an act to new model the militia laws, and which might enable him to call forth a proportion of the population into active service. Averse as the Canadians had hitherto been to grant any power of this description to former Governors, and repugnant as many of the clauses which it was intended to introduce into the bill, were to the habits and feelings of the people, such was the deserved popularity acquired by Sir George Prevost, from the conciliatory policy, which, as before stated, he had adopted towards the Canadians, immediately upon his arrival amongst them, that he obtained from the Legislature nearly all that he had required. Before the end of May, 1812, a sum exceeding 60,000_l._ was placed at his disposal for the militia service; and he was authorized to embody 2,000 Bachelors, between the age of eighteen and twenty-five years, for three months in the year; and in case of invasion, or imminent danger of it, to retain them for a year. In case of war, he was empowered to embody if necessary, the whole militia of the Province. Under that law, a force of 2,000 men, from the finest and most efficient cla.s.s of the militia, was embodied on the 13th May, so to remain for three months, unless the then state of affairs should render it expedient to retain them longer. A corps of Canadian voltigeurs, under the command of Major De Salaberry, of the 60th regiment, consisting of between 300 and 400 men, had likewise, been raised and disciplined; and 400 recruits for the Glengarry Fencibles, had, before the 1st June, been a.s.sembled at Three Rivers, in Lower Canada. The advantages arising from thus embodying the militia prior to the war, were incalculable, and it may be confidently a.s.serted, materially contributed to the preservation of the Canadas.

The American Government, deceived by the erroneous information which they had received respecting the disaffection of the Canadian population to Great Britain, had calculated upon meeting with considerable support from the people in their invasion of the Province. They had been told, and they believed, that the militia would not serve, or, if embodied, would be worse than useless. The embodying, arming, and training of 2,000 of the most active portion of the population, for several weeks before the war was declared, was a severe disappointment to the American Government; and was one of the causes of that determined resistance, which they afterwards experienced in every attempt to penetrate into that Province. This militia force also enabled the Commander of the forces to detach a larger portion of the regular troops, than he could otherwise have been justified in parting with, to the Upper Province; while, at the same time, it afforded him the means, on the breaking out of the war, of guarding the different pa.s.ses and roads into Lower Canada, with a description of men perfectly well acquainted with the nature of the country, and with the mode of warfare necessary for its defence. The line of frontier in the Lower Province was thus most effectually guarded by Sir George Prevost's able disposition of this new force, together with the a.s.sistance of the regular troops; and every prudent precaution consistent with his means, and with the instructions he was constantly receiving from England, to avoid all unnecessary expense, was taken. The precautionary measures which were pursued upon this occasion, by the Commander of the forces, met with the full approbation of His Majesty's Government, expressed in a despatch from Lord Bathurst, of the 6th November, 1812, in which his Lords.h.i.+p informed Sir George Prevost, that "the preparations for defence which he had made upon _the first intimation_ of eventual hostility with America, and which he had since so vigorously continued, had met with the Prince Regent's entire approbation."

After charging Sir George Prevost with negligence, in not preparing to meet the threatened hostilities, the Reviewer proceeds to hazard an opinion, that the occupation and fortifying of Coteau du Lac, and Isle aux Noix, which he terms the keys of Lower Canada, was a measure which Sir George Prevost ought to have adopted, in preference to all others; but which he entirely overlooked and neglected.[23] The fact is, that the occupation of Coteau du Lac, as is well known to every military man acquainted with the Canadas, could only be useful as against the enemy advancing from Lake Ontario, or the sh.o.r.es of the St. Lawrence, above Montreal. No such force could be expected to descend the river from the lake, so long as we had the command of it, as we undoubtedly had, not only at the commencement of the war, but for several months afterwards; and as little was it to be apprehended as collecting on the sh.o.r.es of the river. The information which the Commander of the forces was constantly receiving of the intended movements of the enemy, and of the real and immediate object of their attack, was too correct to leave him in any doubt as to their attempting the Lower Province in that direction, or to induce him to diminish the small means he possessed, for the defence of more important points, by the occupation of posts which at that period could afford him no additional security. Coteau du Lac, was not therefore occupied as a post, either before the war or for several months afterwards, but its real importance was neither overlooked nor disregarded, as the Reviewer has stated. It was examined and reported upon by different officers, sent to inspect the line of frontier extending from Lower Canada to Lake Ontario, immediately after the declaration of war, and particularly by Colonel Lethbridge, who was afterwards in command there. In possession of Kingston, and commanding the waters of the lake, and with the knowledge possessed by Sir George Prevost, of the force and designs of the enemy, no military man in the Canadas, would have thought it necessary, in the then state of affairs, that Coteau du Lac should be occupied. When subsequent events clearly shewed the intentions of the enemy to invade Lower Canada from Lake Ontario, and when the means of Sir George Prevost were better adapted for defending the whole line of that frontier, Coteau du Lac was _occupied and fortified_; and had it not been for the defeat which part of General Dearborn's army met with from Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison's division in descending the St. Lawrence, that post would have presented a formidable obstacle to the advance of the enemy.

The importance of Isle aux Noix, as a post, has been considerably lessened[24] since the defence of the Canadas by the French, in consequence of the facility with which Lower Canada may now be entered by the various routes which the intercourse between that Province and the United States has created. Isle aux Noix had long ceased to be either the only, or princ.i.p.al barrier between the two countries. The occupation of this post was not therefore deemed necessary as a precautionary measure before the war; nor was it until some time afterwards that Sir George Prevost was enabled to put it in a state of defence. As soon, however, as the reinforcements and supplies from England gave him the means of more effectually guarding all the avenues to the Lower Province, Isle aux Noix became the object of his consideration. In consequence of the condition in which it was then placed, and of the force stationed there, two armed schooners of the enemy fell into our possession, and laid the foundation of the marine which was afterwards formed for carrying forward the operations on Lake Champlain. There cannot be a stronger proof of the little importance which the enemy themselves attached to this post in the early part of the contest, than their never making the slightest attempt to obtain possession of it.

Having thus stated what Sir George Prevost did _not_ do, by way of preparation for the defence of the Canadas before the war, the Reviewer proceeds to point out what _was_ done by him after the commencement of hostilities. And here we find the same want of candour which distinguishes the remarks to which we have already adverted.[25]

In order to form a correct opinion of Sir George Prevost's conduct at this period, it will be necessary to advert to the system which he adopted on the commencement of the war, and to the motives which induced him to pursue it.

The declaration of war by the United States of America, it is well known, was finally carried in Congress, after long debate, and a most violent opposition, by a comparatively small majority. The northern and eastern states, whose interests, it was acknowledged, were most affected by the British orders in council, the ostensible and avowed cause of the war, were constantly and strenuously opposed to hostile measures. It was apparent to every person at all conversant with what was pa.s.sing in the United States at this time, that a contest undertaken in opposition to the sentiments and wishes of so considerable a portion of the Union, and for an object which Great Britain might, without any sacrifice of national honor, so easily concede, as she was, in fact, about to do, at that very period, must necessarily be of short duration. This was the opinion entertained by the most sensible and well informed men in the northern and eastern states, as well as in the Canadas, and in that opinion Sir George Prevost concurred.

It will likewise be seen, that the sentiments of His Majesty's Government on this head were in unison with those of the Commander of the forces.

Under these circ.u.mstances, and with these impressions, it became the obvious policy of Sir George Prevost, upon the breaking out of the war, to avoid whatever might tend to widen the breach between the two countries, and to pursue a line of conduct, which, while it should effectually tend to defeat the object of the American Government in their attack upon the Canadas, should also serve still further to increase the dislike and opposition of the northern and eastern states, to those measures of aggression against the British Provinces, which they had constantly predicted would be attended with discomfiture and disgrace. In his adherence to this defensive system, Sir George Prevost was encouraged and supported, as it will speedily be shewn, not only by the approbation of the British Government, but likewise by the concurrence of those who were best qualified by their knowledge and situation to form a correct judgment on the propriety of the measures which he was pursuing. This policy was also the more necessary, in consequence of the inadequacy of the means possessed by the Commander of the forces to repel the threatened attack of the Americans at the commencement of the contest. The whole of the regular force at that time in the Canadas did not amount to 5,000 men; the law for embodying the militia had only been recently pa.s.sed; and the population, which had been previously considered as not well affected, had neither been armed nor accustomed to discipline for many years. The military chest was exhausted, and there was little prospect, that for some months at least, considering the exertions which Great Britain was then called upon to make in Europe, any supplies either of men or money could be afforded for the defence of her Dominions in North America. These difficulties neither depressed nor discouraged the ardent and active spirit of Sir George Prevost. Although he fully coincided in opinion with that able and judicious officer Sir James Craig, that in the event of a war with America, Quebec should be the object of primary consideration; yet the defence of the whole line of frontier between the Canadas and the United States, occupied his early and serious consideration. That frontier comprehended a distance of more than 900 miles, every part of which he determined to dispute inch by inch, and to defend by every means in his power.

It was in pursuance of the defensive line of policy which had been so wisely determined upon, as well with reference to his own resources, and the character of the enemy with whom he had to contend, as to the views and instructions of the British Government, that the Commander of the forces immediately after the commencement of the war, gave general instructions to those in command under him, to abstain from any unnecessary and uncalled for act of hostility upon the American territory. Notwithstanding these general instructions, much was of course left to the discretion of those who received them, in availing themselves of any fair opportunity of retaliating upon the enemy the aggressive warfare they might attempt, by attacking, wherever it might be done with any reasonable prospect of success, the contiguous forts and possessions of the Americans.

The private letter of 31st March, 1812, to Major-General Brock, from which an extract has already been made, evidently shews, that Sir George Prevost never meant to restrain the officers in command under him from acting upon the offensive, whenever circ.u.mstances were such as would justify their departure from the defensive system. Of these circ.u.mstances they were the best judges. That this was the light in which Sir George Prevost's instructions were viewed by Major-General Brock, appears by the following extract from a letter addressed by him to the Commander of the forces, on the 3rd July, 1812, at which time he was fully aware of the defensive line of policy which had been adopted:

"The account received, first through a mercantile channel, and soon after repeated from various quarters, of war having been declared by the United States against Great Britain, would have justified, in my opinion, offensive operations. But the reflexion, that at Detroit and St. Joseph's, the weak state of the garrisons would prevent the Commanders from attempting any essential service connected in any degree with their future security, and that my only means of annoyance on this communication, was limited to the reduction of Fort Niagara, which could be battered at any future period, I relinquished my original intentions, and attended only to defensive measures."

That Captain Roberts, the commanding officer at Fort St. Joseph's, acted from a sense of this discretion thus entrusted to him, there cannot be a doubt, as in his official letter to the Adjutant-General, announcing the capture of Michilimachinac, he does not allude in the slightest degree to his having acted contrary to his orders. The approval of his conduct in general orders is likewise a convincing proof that Sir George Prevost considered that he had acted up to the spirit of his instructions whatever they might have been, and that he had used a sound discretion respecting them.

It however clearly appears by the above letter, that Captain Roberts acted altogether from the orders he received from Major-General Brock, who was fully aware, as it has been already shewn, of the sentiments of Sir George Prevost, and who did not hesitate to give Captain Roberts the discretionary order, which led to the attack and capture of the fort.

It will be seen from the preceding pages, that the approaching hostilities with America had been the subject of frequent communication between Sir George Prevost and Major-General Brock, for several months _prior to the commencement_ of the war; and that, in more than one letter to which reference has been made, the precautions necessary to be taken, and the system and line of defence to be adopted in the event of war, had been clearly and distinctly pointed out. Possessed then, as Sir George Prevost knew General Brock to be, of his sentiments on this subject, and aware that he would receive from the North West company, from whom he had himself derived the information, the earliest intelligence of the actual declaration of war, an immediate further communication of his sentiments was unnecessary. On the day, however, on which the intelligence of that event reached Quebec, the 25th June, 1812, a letter was despatched to Major-General Brock from the Adjutant-General, communicating the information; and as soon as the important arrangements respecting the Lower Province, and particularly those for the defence of Quebec had been completed, Sir George Prevost proceeded to Montreal. Upon his receiving at that place a despatch from Mr. Foster, our late minister at Was.h.i.+ngton, with an official notification of the war, he immediately afterwards, (on 7th July,) and within a fortnight after the first intelligence of it had reached him at Quebec, sent off his first despatch to Major-General Brock.

This was followed by another on the 10th of the same month by Colonel Lethbridge, who was sent to take the command at Kingston; and in both these letters every instruction and information which Sir George Prevost's situation afforded, or enabled him to give, were sent to the Major-General.

That these despatches did not reach General Brock until the 29th of the month was owing to circ.u.mstances over which Sir George Prevost had no control. It must be observed, however, that General Brock received the despatches several days before he set off to join the army opposed to General Hull, although the Reviewer[26] gives his readers to understand that it did not arrive until after General Hull's capture.

The above statement will afford a full and satisfactory answer to the misrepresentations of the Quarterly Reviewer,[27] and to the unwarrantable insinuation by which they are accompanied, if indeed any answer were wanting to a.s.sertions in which the writer has directly contradicted himself. The Reviewer states, "that Sir George Prevost sent no instructions whatever to General Brock for some weeks after he received intimation of the war:"--and further, "that he, General Brock, was only restrained from the measure of attacking Fort Niagara, _by the perplexity of his situation, in being left without orders_." It is singular that the writer should have forgotten, that only five pages before, he had stated[28] that "_on the receipt_ of the intelligence of the American declaration of war, Major-General Brock, who commanded the troops in the Upper Province _immediately_ despatched DISCRETIONARY orders to the British officer in charge of Fort St. Joseph's, to act either _offensively_ or otherwise against the enemy at Michilimachinac, as he should find advisable." If General Brock was justified in giving these discretionary orders to act offensively as circ.u.mstances might require, it follows that he must have considered a similar line of conduct open to himself; and yet, in the face of this statement, the Reviewer gravely endeavours to persuade his readers, that General Brock was in perplexity with regard to the measures which he should pursue.