A History of England Principally in the Seventeenth Century Part 39

[458] Correro: 'Questo termino di via parlamentaria vuol dire libere concessioni secondo la loro dispositione e di haver cognitione in qualche maniera delli impieghi.'

[459] 'Ils disent' (so it is said in Ruszdorf, Negotiations i. 596) 'que tout alloit mal, que les deniers qu'ils ont contribue ont ete mal employes: il falloit toujours et avant toutes choses redresser et regler le gouvernement de l'etat.'

CHAPTER VII.

THE COURSE OF FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1625 TO 1627.

In reviewing so important a conflict as that which had broken out at home, it almost requires an effort of will to bestow deep interest upon foreign affairs in turn. But not only is this necessary from the connexion between the two, but we should not be able to understand the history of England if we left out of consideration its relation to those great events of European importance which absorbed even the largest share of public attention.

Charles I had undertaken to do what his father avoided to the end of his life,--to offer open opposition to the Spanish monarchy and its aims. Like Queen Elizabeth he took this step in alliance with France, Holland, and the Protestants of Germany and the North, but yet not in full agreement with his own people. This was due mainly to the circ.u.mstance that France had become far more Catholic under Mary de'

Medici and Louis XIII than it had been under Henry IV. The offensive alliance between France and England now developed a character which rather irritated than quieted the religious feelings which prevailed in England.

[Sidenote: A.D. 1625.]

On the first shocks sustained by the close alliance which had existed between the Catholic powers, the Huguenots in France rose in order to recover their former rights which had been curtailed. But the French government was not at all inclined to give fresh life to these powerful and dangerous movements: on the contrary it invoked the a.s.sistance of England and Holland to put them down. For the great strength of the Huguenots lay in their naval resources, and without the help of the maritime powers the French government would never have been able to overcome them. And so imperative seemed the necessity of internal peace in France,[460] if she was to be induced to take an active share in the war against Spain, that the English and Dutch were actually persuaded to put their crews and vessels at the disposal of the French government, which then used them with decisive results. The naval power of the Huguenots, which had formed so large an element of the fighting strength of the Protestants, was broken by the a.s.sistance of England and Holland. Queen Elizabeth, in the midst of her war with Philip II, would certainly never have been brought to this step, and even now it roused the bitterest dislike. It was found that the execution of the orders issued met with resistance even on board the s.h.i.+ps themselves. A light is thrown upon the ill-feeling at home, when a member of the Privy Council, Lord Pembroke, tells a captain who resisted this mutinous spirit, that the news of the insubordination of his crew was the best which he had heard for a long time, and that it was welcome even to the King: that he must deal leniently with his men, and only see that he remained master of the s.h.i.+p.[461] But what an impression must doubtless have been produced on the population of England, which still stood in the closest relation to the French Reformed! Sermons were delivered from the pulpits against these proceedings of the government.

But if the active alliance of France against Spain and Austria was secured by this immense sacrifice, what could have appeared more natural than to employ the whole strength of that country for the restoration of the Count Palatine, which the French saw to be advantageous to themselves, and for the support of German Protestantism? In pursuance of the stipulations which had been made the King of Denmark was already in the field: his troops had already fought hand to hand at Nienburg in the circle of Lower Saxony with the forces of the League which were pressing forward into that country. He was strong in cavalry but weak in infantry: the German envoys who were present in England insisted that gallant English troops should be sent to his a.s.sistance, and that the fleet which was ready for service should be ordered to the Weser; for that the support which the fleet would give to the King would encourage him to advance with good heart. And then, as they added with extravagant hopefulness, the King of Sweden, who had already offered his aid, would come forward actively, if only he had some security; the Elector of Brandenburg, who had just married his sister to the King of Sweden, would declare himself; the Prince of Transylvania, who was connected with the same family, would force his way into Bohemia: every one would withstand the League and compel it to restore the lands occupied by it to their former sovereigns, and to the religion hitherto professed in them.

But Buckingham had as little sympathy with the German as with the French Protestants: his pa.s.sionate ambition was to make the Spaniards directly feel the weight of his hatred. For this purpose he had just concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the United Provinces; even the great maritime interests of England were themselves a reason for opposing Spain. At all events, in the autumn of 1625 he despatched the fleet, not to the Weser, which appeared to him almost unworthy of this great expedition, but against the coasts of the Spanish peninsula. Orders were given to it to enter the mouth of the Guadalquivir, and to alarm Seville, or else to take the town of Cadiz, for which object it had on board a considerable number of land troops; or, finally, to lie in wait for the Spanish fleet laden with silver, and to bring home the cargo as a lawful prize. Buckingham proceeded on the supposition that the foundation of the Spanish power and its influence would be undermined by the interruption of the Spanish trade with America, and that in the next year the Spaniards would be able to effect nothing. He did not perceive that this would have no decisive influence on that undertaking on which in the first instance everything depended, that of the King of Denmark, as meanwhile in Rome, Vienna, and Munich, native forces, independent of Spain, had been collected. But while he preferred the more distant to the more immediate end, it was his fate to achieve neither the one nor the other. In December 1625 the fleet returned without having effected anything at sea or on the Spanish coasts. On the contrary it had suffered the heaviest losses itself.

[Sidenote: A.D. 1626.]

The discredit into which Buckingham fell with those whom he had desired to win over, and whose wishes were fixed on the struggle with Spain, is exhibited in a very extraordinary enterprise which sprung up at this time, and which had for its object the formation of what we may almost call a joint-stock war company. A wish was felt to form a company for making war on Spain, upon the basis, it is true, of a royal charter, but under the authority of Parliament, with the intention of sharing the booty and the conquests, as well as the costs among the members.[462]

By the late enterprise moreover the means had been wasted which might have been used for supporting the German allies of England. Left without sufficient subsidies in his quarrel with Parliament, the King was unable to pay the arrears due both to the seamen who were returning from Spain, and to his troops in Holland. He could not repair his fleet; he could hardly defend his coasts: how could he be in a position to make any persevering effort for the conduct of the war in Germany? The King of Sweden asked for only 15,000 in order to set his forces in motion; but at that time this sum could not be raised. The King of Denmark was the more thrown on England, as the French also made their services depend on what the English would do: but Conway, the Secretary of State, declared himself unable to pay the stipulated sum. Could men feel astonished that the Danish war was not carried on with the energy which the cause seemed to demand?

Christian IV had not troops enough, and could not pay even those which he had. The cavalry, which const.i.tuted his main strength, had on one occasion refused to fight, because they had not received their pay. He himself threw the chief blame on the English for the defeat which he now sustained at Lutter; and which was the more decisive, as meanwhile Mansfeld also, who wished to turn his steps to the hereditary dominions of Austria in order to combine with the Prince of Transylvania, had been not only defeated, but almost annihilated. The armies which were to have defended the Protestant cause disappeared from off the field. The forces of the Emperor and of the League now occupied North Germany also on both sides of the Elbe.

To Germany the alliance with England had at that time brought no good.

It may be doubted whether the Elector Palatine would have accepted the crown of Bohemia but for the support which he thought to find in England. This affair had a great part in bringing on the outbreak of the great religious conflict. But James I sought to retrieve the misfortune into which the Elector had fallen, not so much by employing his own power, as by developing his relations with the Spaniards; and thus he had himself given them the opportunity of establis.h.i.+ng themselves in the Palatinate, and had caused the Catholic reaction to triumph in Upper Germany. Without the instigation of England, and the great combination of the powers in East and West hostile to the house of Austria, the King of Denmark would not have determined to begin war, nor would the circle of Lower Saxony have aided him. On this occasion as on others in England the interests of its own power outweighed consideration for the allies. The policy of the English had formerly been ruled by their friendly relations with Spain: it was now ruled by their hostile intentions towards that country. All available forces were employed for their purpose, and the movement in Germany was left to its fate.

Meanwhile another consequence of the breach with Spain came to light, which King James had always feared. In order not to be forced to fight both great powers at once, Spain found it advisable to show a compliance hitherto unprecedented in the affairs of Italy, in which France had interested herself. After this the irritation against the ascendancy of the Spaniards evidently abated in France.

For in alliances of great powers it is self-evident that their political points of view, if for a moment they coincide, must nevertheless in a short time be again opposed to one another. How should one power really seek the permanent advantage of another?

At that time also, as on so many occasions, other relations arising out of the position of the leading statesmen as members of parties, produced an effect on politics. Cardinal Richelieu met with opposition from a zealously Catholic party, which gathered round the queen mother, and considered the influence of Spain to a certain degree necessary. This party seized the first favourable opportunity of setting on foot a preliminary treaty of peace, to which Richelieu, however long he hesitated, and however much he disliked it, could not help acceding.

Quite in keeping with this understanding between the Catholic powers was the partial recoil of Protestantism in England from the advances which it had made to the Catholic party. The French who surrounded the Queen were so numerous, that a strong feeling of opposition on religious and national grounds was awakened in them by their contact with the English character. They saw in the English nothing but heretics and apostates; the Catholics who had formerly been executed at Tyburn as rebels they honoured as martyrs. The Queen herself, upon whom her priests laid all kinds of penance corresponding to her dignity, was once induced to take part in a procession to this place of execution. It is conceivable how deeply wounded and irritated the English must have felt at these odious demonstrations. To the King it seemed insufferable that the household of his consort should take up a position of open hostility to the ecclesiastical laws of the land.

Personally also he felt injured and affronted. We hear complaints from him that he was robbed of his sleep at night by these demonstrations.

He quickly and properly resolved to rid himself once for all of these refractory people, whatever might be the consequence. The Queen's court was then refusing to admit into it the English ladies whom he had appointed to attend on her. The King seized the opportunity: he invited his wife to dine with him, for they still had separate households; and after dinner he made her understand by degrees that he could no longer put up with this exhibition of feeling on the part of her retinue, but must send them all home again, priests and laymen, men and women alike.[463] This resolution was carried out in spite of all the resistance offered by those whom it affected. Only some few ladies and two priests of moderate views were left with the Queen; all the rest were s.h.i.+pped off to France. There they filled the court and the country with their complaints. Those about the Queen-mother a.s.sumed an air as if the most sacred agreements had been infringed, and any measure of retaliation was thought justifiable.

Marshal Ba.s.sompierre indeed set out once more for England in order to bring about a reconciliation. Though ill received at first, he nevertheless won his way by his splendid appearance and by clever talk and moderation. In a preliminary agreement leave was given to the Queen to receive back a number of priests and some French ladies;[464]

and Buckingham prepared to go to France to remove the obstacles still remaining. But meanwhile the feeling of estrangement at the French court had become still stronger. The agreement was not approved: and the court would not hear of a visit from Buckingham, as it was thought that he would be sure to use the opportunity afforded by his presence to stir up the Huguenots. Richelieu thought that the dispute with England had been provoked by his enemies in order to break up the friendly relations which he had established. But nevertheless he too did not wish to see Buckingham in France, for he feared that the English minister might side outright with his opponents.

Personal considerations of many kinds co-operated in producing this result, but it was not due mainly to their influence. The religious sympathies and hatreds at work had incalculable effects. While the opposition between the two religions again awoke in all its strength, and a struggle for life and death was being fought out between them in Germany, an alliance could not well be maintained between two courts which professed opposite religious views. The current of the general tendencies of affairs has a power by which the best considered political combinations are swept into the background.

The paramount importance of religious movements not only prevented a combination between France and England, but also brought both Catholic powers into closer agreement with one another, as soon as their immediate differences had been in some measure adjusted. Father Berulle had promoted the marriage of a French princess with the King of England in the hope of converting him; but now that he became conscious of his mistake, he lent his pen to a project for a common attack to be made by the Catholic powers upon England. The domestic dissensions in that country, which again aroused Catholic sympathies among a part of the population, appeared to favour such a project. An agreement on the subject was in treaty for some time. It was at last concluded and ratified in France in the form in which it was sent back from Spain.[465]

Although it is not clear that people in England had authentic information of these negotiations, yet the advances made by the two courts to one another, which were visible to every one, could not but cause some anxiety in the third. The English were always anxiously considering what Philip IV might have in view for the next year; at times even in Charles' reign they feared another attack from the Belgian coast. What would happen if France lent her aid in such an enterprise? It was known at all events that the priests exhorted her to do so. That France and Spain should make a joint attack on England appeared to be most for the interest of the Catholic world.[466]

Another ground for anxiety in England was from that resolution to revive the French naval power, which Richelieu had already taken in consequence of his late experiences. He bought s.h.i.+ps of war, or had them built, and took foreign sailors into his service. Charles I perceived this with the greatest displeasure. He regarded it as a threat against England, for he thought that the French could have no other intention than that of robbing England of the supremacy that she had exercised from time immemorial over the sea which bears her name.

He declared that he was resolved to prevent matters from going so far.

A great effect was produced by a very definite misunderstanding which now arose between England and France, and affected naval interests as well as the question of religion.

Of all the French Huguenots, who had been compelled by their last defeat to seek peace with the King, the citizens of Roch.e.l.le felt the blow most deeply. They had at that time been hemmed in on all sides, and were especially hara.s.sed by a fort erected in their neighbourhood.

They had been a.s.sured that at the proper time they would be relieved of this annoyance. They had not an express and unequivocal promise; but the English amba.s.sador, who had been invited to mediate, had guaranteed to them, after conference with the French ministry, such an interpretation of the expressions used as would secure the wished-for result.[467] But just the contrary took place: they were constantly being more closely shut in, and more seriously threatened with the loss of that measure of independence which they had hitherto enjoyed.

They turned to Charles I. They would rather have acknowledged him as their sovereign than have submitted to such a loss, and he felt the full weight of his obligation to them. But, if he desired to grant them a.s.sistance, it could only be rendered by open war.

[Sidenote: A.D. 1627.]

When the English resolved to undertake an expedition against the Island of Rhe, the prevention of the fall of Roch.e.l.le was not the only object in view. It was rather considered that nothing could be more desirable and advantageous than the command of this island in the event of a struggle with the two powers. For Biscay could be reached in a voyage of one night from thence, and the communication between the Netherlands and the harbours on the north-east coast of Spain could at any time be interrupted by the possessors of the island, which might be used at the same time for keeping up constant communication with the Huguenots, and for giving the French power employment at home.[468] The Huguenots had already taken up arms again, and Roch.e.l.le displayed the English banner on its walls. Charles I intended to use Rhe as a station for his fleet, but to cede the general sovereignty over it to Roch.e.l.le. A successful result here might serve to infuse new life into the Protestant cause.

In order to achieve so great an end the King thought it admissible to levy a forced loan, and thus to collect those sums which Parliament had promised him by word of mouth, but had not yet formally granted.

We shall have hereafter to consider the resistance which he encountered in this attempt, and the various arbitrary acts to which he resorted for its suppression; for they formed one of the turning points of his history. At first he actually succeeded so far, that a fleet of more than a hundred sail was able to put to sea for the attack of Rhe and the support of Roch.e.l.le. It was considered in raising this loan that a war with France had greater claims upon popular support than any other. In the present doubtful state of affairs a decided advantage gained in such a war might even now have exercised great influence upon the internal state of the kingdom.

At this juncture Buckingham a.s.sumed a position of extraordinary importance. After the repeated failures of the Protestants, his undertaking aroused all their hopes. Directed against both the Catholic powers, it must, if successful, have directly benefited the French Protestants, and indirectly the German Protestants also by the effect which it would inevitably have produced. But it was besides one enterprise more undertaken by the sole power of the monarch: it was carried out independently of any Parliamentary grants properly so called. It represented the principle of a moderate monarchical Protestantism, combined with toleration for the native Catholics, among whom Buckingham endeavoured to find support. His was a position of which the occupant must either be a great man or perish.

Buckingham, who had no equal in restless activity, and was by nature not devoid of adroitness and ability, nevertheless had not that persevering and comprehensive energy which is required for the performance of great actions. He had not gone through the school of those experiences in which minds ripen: and for the want of this training his native gifts were not sufficient to compensate. He was so far fortunate as to gain possession of the Island of Rhe; but Fort Martin, which had been erected there a short time before, and on which the possession of the island depended, defied his attacks, and he was not skilful enough to intercept the support which was thrown into the fort in the hour of its greatest danger. The defence of the French certainly showed greater perseverance than the attack of the English.

Buckingham did not know how to awaken among his men that fiery devotion which shrinks from no obstacle, and which would have been necessary here. And the measures which were arranged at home were not so effective as to bring him at the right moment the reinforcement he needed. In November 1627 he returned to England without having effected his object. He left behind him the French Protestants, and Roch.e.l.le especially, in the greatest distress.

Charles I had no intention of proving false to the promises which he had given them, any more than he wished to allow the King of Denmark to sink under his difficulties. But what means did he possess of bestowing help either on the former or on the latter?

After the battle of Lutter he had told the Danish amba.s.sador, that he would come to the a.s.sistance of his uncle, even if he should have to p.a.w.n his crown. How heavily his position weighed on him at that time!

While he had undertaken the responsibility of contending for the greatest interests of the world, he was obliged to confess, and did so with tears in his eyes, that at present he hardly had at his disposal the means of defraying the necessary expenses of his daily life.

The King of Denmark advised him to call Parliament together again, and make the needful concessions, in order to obtain such subsidies as would enable him to give vigorous support to his allies. Charles I in the first instance took umbrage at this, because it was good advice from an uncle and an elder, as if some blame were thereby cast on him: by degrees he became convinced of the necessity of this measure.

It was quite evident from the events of the last few years that the King would not be able to maintain the position he had a.s.sumed, without active support from Parliament.

NOTES:

[460] Z. Pesaro, April 25, 1625: 'Che la conservatione della pace in Francia sara il fondamento del beneficio comune, che li rumori civili in quella natione sariano il solo remedio che Spagnoli procurano alli loro mali.'

[461] 'That the King and all the rest were exceedingly glad of that relation which he made of the discontent and mutiny of his compagnie.'

[462] M. A. Correro: 'Trattano di formar una compagnia per la quale possino con l'autorita del parlamente e privilegi reggi attaccare con una flotte il re di Spagna per dividere l'interesse della spesa e l'utile delli bottini e delli acquisti nelli compagni che ne averanno parte (27 Mayo 1626).'

[463] Letter to Joseph Mead: Court and Times of Charles I, i. 134.

[464] According to Ruszdorf, who was well acquainted with Ba.s.sompierre, the latter represented 'hoc facto regem obligatum nihil esse intermissurum, quod ad conservationem fortunae illius queat conducere.'

[465] Siri, Memorie recondite vi. 261.

[466] Letter to Joseph Mead, March 16, 1626: 'It still holds that both France and Spain make exceeding great preparations both for sea and land.--The priests of the Dunkirkers are said to preach that G.o.d had delivered us into their hands.' (Court and Times of Charles I, i.

205).