Loss Of The Steamship 'Titanic' Part 9

After sinking as far as the after part of the boat deck she went down more quickly. The s.h.i.+p disappeared at 2.20 a. m.

OBSERVATIONS.

I am advised that the _t.i.tanic_ as constructed could not have remained afloat long with such damage as she received. Her bulkheads were s.p.a.ced to enable her to remain afloat with any two compartments in communication with the sea. She had a sufficient margin of safety with any two of the compartments flooded which were actually damaged.

In fact, any three of the four forward compartments could have been flooded by the damage received without sinking the s.h.i.+p to the top of her bulkheads.

Even if the four forward compartments had been flooded the water would not have got into any of the compartments abaft of them though it would have been above the top of some of the forward bulkheads. But the s.h.i.+p, even with these four compartments flooded, would have remained afloat.

But she could not remain afloat with the four compartments and the forward boiler room (No. 6) also flooded.

The flooding of these five compartments alone would have sunk the s.h.i.+p sufficiently deep to have caused the water to rise above the bulkhead at the after end of the forward boiler room (No. 6) and to flow over into the next boiler room (No. 5), and to fill it up until in turn its after bulkhead would be overwhelmed and the water would thereby flow over and fill No. 4 boiler room, and so on in succession to the other boiler rooms till the s.h.i.+p would ultimately fill and sink.

It has been shown that water came into the five forward compartments to a height of about 14 feet above the keel in the first 10 minutes. This was at a rate of inflow with which the s.h.i.+p's pumps could not possibly have coped, so that the damage done to these five compartments alone inevitably sealed the doom of the s.h.i.+p.

The damage done in the boiler rooms Nos. 4 and 5 was too slight to have hastened appreciably the sinking of the s.h.i.+p, for it was given in evidence that no considerable amount of water was in either of these compartments for an hour after the collision. The rate at which water came into No. 6 boiler room makes it highly probable that the compartment was filled in not more than an hour, after which the flow over the top of the bulkhead between 5 and 6 began and continued till No. 5 was filled.

It was shown that the leak in No. 5 boiler room was only about equal to the flow of a deck hose pipe about 3 inches in diameter.

The leak in No. 4, supposing that there was one, was only enough to admit about 3 feet of water in that compartment in 1 hour 40 minutes.

Hence the leaks in Nos. 4 and 5 boiler rooms did not appreciably hasten the sinking of the vessel.

The evidence is very doubtful as to No. 4 being damaged. The pumps were being worked in No. 5 soon after the collision. The 10-inch leather special suction pipe which was carried from aft is more likely to have been carried for use in No. 5 than No. 4 because the doors were ordered to be opened probably soon after the collision when water was known to be coming into No. 5. There is no evidence that the pumps were being worked in No 4.

The only evidence possibly favorable to the view that the pipe was required for No 4, and not for No. 5, is that Scott, a greaser, says that he saw engineers dragging the suction pipe along one hour after the collision. But even as late as this it may have been wanted for No. 5 only.

The importance of the question of the damage to No. 5 is small because the s.h.i.+p as actually constructed was doomed as soon as the water in No.

6 boiler room and all compartments forward of it entered in the quant.i.ties it actually did.

It is only of importance in dealing with the question of what would have happened to the s.h.i.+p had she been more completely subdivided.

It was stated in evidence that if No. 4 had not been damaged or had only been damaged to an extent within the powers of the pumps to keep under, then, if the bulkheads had been carried to C deck, the s.h.i.+p might have been saved. Further methods of increased subdivision and their effect upon the fate of the s.h.i.+p are discussed later.

Evidence was given showing that after the water-tight doors in the engine and boiler rooms had been all closed, except those forward of No.

4 group of boilers, they were opened again, and there is no evidence to show that they were again closed. Though it is probable that the engineers who remained below would have closed these doors as the water rose in the compartments, yet it was not necessary for them to do this, as each door had an automatic closing arrangement which would have come into operation immediately a small amount of water came through the door.

It is probable, however, that the life of the s.h.i.+p would have been lengthened somewhat if these doors had been left open, for the water would have flowed through them to the after part of the s.h.i.+p, and the rate of flow of the water into the s.h.i.+p would have been for a time reduced as the bow might have been kept up a little by the water which flowed aft.

It is thus seen that the efficiency of the automatic arrangements for the closing of the water-tight doors, which was questioned during the inquiry, had no important bearing on the question of hastening the sinking of the s.h.i.+p, except that, in the case of the doors not having been closed by the engineers, it might have r.e.t.a.r.ded the sinking of the s.h.i.+p if they had not acted. The engineers would not have prevented the doors from closing unless they had been convinced that the s.h.i.+p was doomed. There is no evidence that they did prevent the doors from closing.

The engineers were applying the pumps when Barrett, leading stoker, left No. 5 boiler room, but even if they had succeeded in getting all the pumps in the s.h.i.+p to work they could not have saved the s.h.i.+p or prolonged her life to any appreciable extent.

EFFECT OF SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL SUBDIVISION UPON FLOATATION.

_Water-tight decks._--It is in evidence that advantage might be obtained from the point of view of greater safety in having a water-tight deck.

Without entering into the general question of the advantage of water-tight decks for all s.h.i.+ps, it is desirable to form an opinion in the case of the _t.i.tanic_ as to whether making the bulkhead deck water-tight would have been an advantage in the circ.u.mstances of the accident, or in case of accident to s.h.i.+ps of this cla.s.s.

I am advised that it is found that with all the compartments certainly known to have been flooded, viz., those forward of No. 4 boiler room, the s.h.i.+p would have remained afloat if the bulkhead deck had been a water-tight deck. If, however, No. 4 boiler room had also been flooded the s.h.i.+p would not have remained afloat unless, in addition to making the bulkhead deck water-tight, the transverse bulkhead abaft of No. 4 boiler room had been carried up to D deck.

To make the bulkhead deck effectively water-tight for this purpose it would have been necessary to carry water-tight trunks round all the openings in the bulkhead deck up to C deck.

It has been shown that with the bulkhead abaft No. 5 boiler room carried to C deck the s.h.i.+p would have remained afloat if the compartments certainly known to have been damaged had been flooded.

I do not desire to express an opinion upon the question whether it would have conduced to safety in the case of the _t.i.tanic_ if a water-tight deck had been fitted below the water line, as there may be some objections to such a deck. There are many considerations involved, and I think that the matter should be dealt with by the bulkhead committee for s.h.i.+ps in general.

_Longitudinal subdivision._--The advantages and disadvantages of longitudinal subdivision by means of water-tight bunker bulkheads were pointed out in evidence.

While not attempting to deal with this question generally for s.h.i.+ps, I am advised that if the _t.i.tanic_ had been divided in the longitudinal method, instead of in the transverse method only, she would have been able, if damaged as supposed, to remain afloat, though with a list which could have been corrected by putting water ballast into suitable places.

This subject is one, however, which again involves many considerations, and I think that for s.h.i.+ps generally the matter should be referred to the bulkhead committee for their consideration and report.

_Extending double bottom up the sides._--It was shown in evidence that there would be increased protection in carrying the double bottom higher up the side than was done in the _t.i.tanic_, and that some of the boiler rooms would probably not then have been flooded, as water could not have entered the s.h.i.+p except in the double bottom.

In the case of the _t.i.tanic_ I am advised that this would have been an advantage, but it was pointed out in evidence that there are certain disadvantages which in some s.h.i.+ps may outweigh the advantages.

In view of what has already been said about the possible advantages of longitudinal subdivision, it is unnecessary further to discuss the question of carrying up the double bottom in s.h.i.+ps generally. This matter should also be dealt with by the bulkhead committee.

_Water-tight doors._--With reference to the question of the water-tight doors of the s.h.i.+p, there does not appear to have been any appreciable effect upon the sinking of the s.h.i.+p caused by either shutting or not shutting the doors. There does not appear to have been any difficulty in working the water-tight doors. They appear to have been shut in good time after the collision.

But in other cases of damage in s.h.i.+ps constructed like the _t.i.tanic_, it is probable that the efficiency of the closing arrangement of the water-tight doors may exert a vital influence on the safety of the s.h.i.+p.

It has been represented that in future consideration should be given to the question--

as to how far bulkhead should be solid bulkheads, and how far there should be water-tight doors, and, if there should be water-tight doors, how far they may or may not be automatically operated.

This again is a question on which it is not necessary here to express any general opinion, for there are conflicting considerations which vary in individual cases. The matter, however, should come under the effective supervision of the board of trade much more than it seems to come at present, and should be referred to the bulkhead committee for their consideration with a view to their suggesting in detail where doors should or should not be allowed, and the type of door which should be adopted in the different parts of s.h.i.+ps.

[Ill.u.s.tration: S.S. "t.i.tANIC."

NOTE.--The vertical letters signify the different decks. The horizontal letters signify the water-tight bulkheads. The heavy line shows the top of the water-tight bulkheads. The crosshatched compartments are those opened to the sea at the time of the collision with the iceberg.]

IV.--ACCOUNT OF THE SAVING AND RESCUE OF THOSE WHO SURVIVED.

THE BOATS.

The _t.i.tanic_ was provided with 20 boats. They were all on the boat deck. Fourteen were life boats. These were hung inboard in davits, 7 on the starboard side and 7 on the port side, and were designed to carry 65 persons each. Two were emergency boats. These were also in davits, but were hung outboard, one on the starboard side and one on the port side, and were designed to carry 40 persons each. The remaining 4 boats were Engelhardt or collapsible boats. Two of these were stowed on the boat deck and 2 on the roof of the officers' quarters, and were designed to carry 47 persons each. Thus the total boat accommodation was for 1,178 persons. The boats in davits were numbered, the odd numbers being on the starboard side and the even numbers on the port side. The numbering began with the emergency boats, which were forward, and ran aft. Thus the boats on the starboard side were numbered 1 (an emergency boat), 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15 (lifeboats), and those on the port side 2 (an emergency boat), 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16 (lifeboats). The collapsible boats were lettered, A and B being on the roof of the officers' quarters and C and D being on the boat deck; C was abreast of No. 1 (emergency boat) and D abreast of No. 2 (emergency boat). Further particulars as to the boats will be found on page 18.

In ordinary circ.u.mstances all these boats (with the exception of 1 and 2) were kept covered up, and contained only a portion of their equipment, such as oars, masts, and sails, and water; some of the remaining portion, such as lamps, compa.s.ses, and biscuits being stowed in the s.h.i.+p in some convenient place, ready for use when required. Much examination was directed at the hearing to showing that some boats left the s.h.i.+p without a lamp and others without a compa.s.s, and so on, but in the circ.u.mstances of confusion and excitement which existed at the time of the disaster this seems to me to be excusable.

Each member of the crew had a boat a.s.signed to him in printed lists, which were posted up in convenient places for the men to see; but it appeared that in some cases the men had not looked at these lists and did not know their respective boats.

There had been no proper boat drill nor a boat muster. It was explained that great difficulty frequently exists in getting firemen to take part in a boat drill. They regard it as no part of their work. There seem to be no statutory requirements as to boat drills or musters, although there is a provision (sec. 9 of the merchant s.h.i.+pping act of 1906) that when a boat drill does take place the master of the vessel is, under a penalty, to record the fact in his log. I think it is desirable that the board of trade should make rules requiring boat drills and boat musters to be held of such a kind and at such times as may be suitable to the s.h.i.+p and to the voyage on which she is engaged. Boat drill, regulated according to the opportunities of the service, should always be held.