The Swedish Revolution Under Gustavus Vasa Part 8

[121] Rensel, _Berattelse_, pp. 45-47; Svart, _Gust. I.'s kron._, pp.

89-92; _Handl. ror. Skand. hist._, vol. xiv. pp. 72-73; and _Kon. Gust.

den Forstes registrat._, vol. ii. pp. 143-146, 155-158, 160-165, 168-169, 181-183 and 188.

CHAPTER VII.

DEALINGS WITH FOREIGN POWERS. 1525-1527.

Negotiations between Fredrik and Gustavus.--Treachery of Norby.--Sunnanvader and the Cabinet of Norway.--Overthrow and Death of Norby.--Trial and Execution of Knut and Sunnanvader.--Debt to Lubeck.--Treaty with Russia; with the Netherlands.--Dalarne and the Lubeck Envoys.--Swedish Property in Denmark.--Province of Viken.--Refugees in Norway.

The Swedish Revolution was the work of three nations, all foes at heart, endeavoring to effect a common object on utterly divergent grounds.

Gustavus wished to free his country from a tyrant's rule, while Fredrik's purpose was to gain the throne of Denmark, and Lubeck's was to crush her rival in the Baltic trade. Without the alliance of these three parties, it is not likely that any one of them could have gained his end. So long, therefore, as the common object was in view, each felt an a.s.surance that the others would not fail. It was only when Christiern's power was altogether gone that this triple alliance was dissolved.

The varying hopes of Christiern may be gauged with singular accuracy by Fredrik's show of friends.h.i.+p to Gustavus. One cannot read the despatches sent from Denmark without observing a constant change of att.i.tude; the monarch's feelings cooling somewhat as the chance that Christiern would recover Denmark grew more remote. At the moment when Norby returned to Bleking, the movements of Christiern caused the monarch much alarm, and his letters to Gustavus were filled with every a.s.surance of good-will.

This a.s.surance, however, Gustavus took at little more than it was worth.

So long as Knut and Sunnanvader were protected by Fredrik's officers in Norway, the Danish monarch's a.s.surances of friends.h.i.+p carried little weight. Gustavus seems not to have appealed to Fredrik in this matter till every effort to persuade the Danish officers in Norway had been tried. He wrote even to the Norwegian Cabinet, and begged them to keep the promises made to him in Malmo. While in the midst of these entreaties, a letter came from Fredrik asking for the release of certain prisoners, among them Norby's daughter, whom Gustavus had captured in the war with Norby. This was the very opportunity which Gustavus craved.

He wrote back that in the same war in which these prisoners had been taken, some guns belonging to him had been lost, and he offered to exchange the prisoners for the guns. He requested, further, that Fredrik command his officers in Norway to yield the refugees. While this answer was on the road, Fredrik received a note from Norby, to whom Gustavus had written to say that Fredrik had promised that the guns should be returned. Fredrik, therefore, wrote Gustavus that these guns were not in his possession, but if the Danish prisoners were surrendered, he would try to get them. When this letter came, the monarch was indignant.

Fredrik, it was clear, was playing with him, and hoped to get the prisoners and give nothing in return. The answer which the monarch made was this: "We have just received your letter with excuses for the detention of our guns and ammunition, along with a request for the surrender of Sren Brun, whom you a.s.sert we captured in a time of truce.

Of such a truce we wish to inform you we are ignorant. He was lawfully taken, inasmuch as he was one of Norby's men.... As to our ammunition you say that it was captured from you and carried off to Gotland. If so, it was no fault of ours. We have written frequently about it, but have met with nothing but delays. If Norby, who you say has sworn allegiance to you, holds this ammunition in Visby Castle, it is unquestionably in your power to order that it be returned. So soon as this is done, the prisoners shall be released." Before this determined letter arrived in Denmark, Fredrik had modified his plans, for news had come that Christiern's fleet was on the way to Norway, intending to winter there and make an incursion into Denmark in the spring. Fredrik, therefore, despatched a note to Norby telling him to yield the ammunition, and wrote Gustavus that the guns were ready, and if he would send his officers to Denmark for them they should be delivered. A few days later an officer of Fredrik wrote Gustavus that property of Danish subjects had been seized in Sweden, and begged that the persons wronged be recompensed. To this Gustavus answered that Swedish subjects had been treated in the same way in Denmark, and promised to observe the treaty if the Danes would do so in return. He likewise wrote to Fredrik thanking him for his action relating to the guns, declaring that he would send for them as requested, and as soon as they were yielded would set the prisoners free.[122]

This amicable adjustment of their difficulty was on paper, but much more shuffling was required before it was reduced to fact. Gustavus feared that Fredrik was in league with Norby, and rumor had it that Norby was preparing for another war. Late in 1525, the pirate wrote the Swedish officer in Kalmar that he had come to terms with Fredrik, and that all the injury which he had done to Sweden had been forgiven. To this the officer replied: "I fail to see how Fredrik can have promised that you may keep our ammunition." Norby at all events did keep it, and early in 1526 Gustavus wrote: "We hear that Norby has let fall calumnies against us. We place no confidence whatever in him, especially as he is growing stronger every day.... From his own letters we discover he has no thought of giving up our ammunition." To Fredrik himself the monarch wrote: "From Norby's letters we learn he has no intention of obeying your commands." In the same strain Gustavus addressed the Danish Cabinet, and expressed the hope that Norby was not acting under their behest. If the Cabinet's a.s.sertion can be trusted, he was not; for several of the Cabinet wrote Gustavus to keep an eye on Norby, as he was raising a large force in Bleking despite their orders to him to desist.

There being little hope that Fredrik would force the pirate to obey, Gustavus ventured to arrange the matter for himself. It so happened at this moment that one of Norby's vessels, laden with arms and ammunition, stranded on the coast not far from Kalmar. The monarch's officers hurried to the spot, and seized what ammunition they could find. This stroke, however, was in some degree offset by a reprisal which Norby managed to secure upon the coast of Bleking. Matters now appeared so serious that the king addressed himself to Norby. "We find," he said, "that a part of the ammunition taken from the wreck off Kalmar is our own. All the rest of it you may have, provided we are given the guns and ammunition promised us by Fredrik.... As soon as these are handed over, your daughter and the other prisoners shall be freed." This proposition would have satisfied any man but Norby. To him it seemed unfair. The fleet of Christiern was looked for early in the spring, and Norby thought by waiting to obtain more favorable terms. He wrote back, therefore, that, though Fredrik may have told Gustavus he should have his guns, he could not have them, for in the treaty recently drawn up between himself and Fredrik, it had been stipulated that all injury done by him to Sweden should be forgotten, and a part of this injury consisted in the seizure of these guns. Norby closed his letter with an offer to hold a personal conference with the king. The reply which Norby had to this proposal was sharp and warm. "We shall permit no nonsense,"

wrote the king. If Norby wanted his daughter, let him return the guns.

"As to a personal meeting with you, we cannot spare the time." Norby's pride apparently was not touched by this rebuke. He wrote again, simply repeating what he had said before, and in reply obtained another letter from the king. "We have already told you," wrote Gustavus, "that you may have your daughter when we get our guns. We were promised them by the treaty of Malmo, which we desire in every particular to observe. And we will hand over the property belonging to you in the wreck off Kalmar, if you will forward to that town our ammunition together with a promise in writing never from this day forth to wrong us or our men." This letter, dated on the 4th of March, was the last communication that pa.s.sed between the pirate and the king. Norby had at length discovered that he could not dupe the king, and Gustavus deemed it folly to continue parley with one whose only object was to use up time.[123]

Unable to accomplish anything with Norby, it was more than ever important that Gustavus should be on terms of amity with Fredrik. For the moment it appeared that Fredrik would be fair. At all events, he had made Gustavus a generous promise about the guns, and his Cabinet kept Gustavus constantly informed about the acts of Norby. In February, when the lakes were frozen, the monarch sent, as Fredrik had suggested, for his ammunition, and intrusted to the same emissary a letter for the Danish king. This letter was in reply to one from Fredrik, asking for the surrender of a Danish refugee. Gustavus could not comply with his request, for the refugee was gone; but he seized again the opportunity to mention Sunnanvader. "We earnestly entreat you," were his words, "to write your Cabinet in Norway no longer to protect this man or any of his party." It was certainly time that something should be done by Fredrik, for at the very moment while Gustavus was writing this appeal, the Norwegian Cabinet were issuing a pa.s.sport for the traitors through their realm; and to a request from Gustavus for their surrender, the Cabinet offered the absurd excuse that the fugitives themselves protested they were innocent. "However," it was added, "the fugitives will return if they are given your a.s.surance that they may be tried, as priests, before a spiritual tribunal." In this reply the reason for the detention of the fugitives leaked out. They were high in office in the Church, and the archbishop of Trondhem, with whom they had taken refuge, feared the Lutheran tendencies of the king. Fredrik did not wholly share this fear, and on the 4th of March for the first time addressed the archbishop, commanding him to revoke the pa.s.sport of the renegades. This letter producing no immediate effect, Gustavus waited about six weeks, and then despatched to the Cabinet of Norway a safe-conduct for the renegades to be tried before "a proper tribunal," and, if adjudged not guilty, to return to Norway. The pa.s.sport was directed to the Cabinet of southern Norway, to whom the monarch used these words: "We marvel much at the language of your northern brothers, and particularly that they are deceived by the treachery of these rascals, which is well known hundreds of miles from here, and might be known in Norway if the people were not blind. I might tell you how they lay a long while in Dalarne, and in the name of the people sent deceitful letters through the land, to stir up hostility against us. But as soon as the people began to leave them, and the Dalesmen announced that these letters were not issued with their consent, they betook themselves to Norway.... If, now, the fugitives will come before a proper tribunal, we cannot and we would not refuse to let them do so. We therefore send a safe-conduct to guard them against all wrong, according to their request. If they do not come, it will be manifest whether they are innocent." The safe-conduct, it may be well to say, ran only to the 10th of August following, and no notice apparently was taken of it till near the expiration of that time.[124]

Gustavus now devoted himself to the task of fighting Norby. The pirate had given the king of Denmark a written promise that he would do no injury to Sweden, but it was very soon apparent that this promise was not likely to be kept. By the end of January Norby's acts so far aroused suspicion that Gustavus ordered spies to enter Bleking and discover Norby's plans. No very definite information, however, was obtained, probably for the reason that Norby did not know his plans himself. He was waiting for intelligence from Christiern. Late in March Gustavus fancied the pirate was preparing to depart for Norway. A few days afterwards, Brask wrote the monarch: "A report is spread that Norby has seized some seven or eight small craft and two large s.h.i.+ps. I do not comprehend his purpose. Merchants just arrived from Denmark add that the Germans have handed Gotland over to the Danes, though on the other hand it is declared that Lubeck has sent a strong force of men and ammunition to the isle." The day following the writing of this letter, Gustavus despatched a note to Finland, with a warning to beware of Norby, for the news had reached him secretly that the pirate was about to make an incursion into Finland. This was followed, after a week's interval, by another letter announcing that Norby's fleet was lying at anchor, all ready to set sail. The monarch's apprehensions proved to be unfounded.

Norby had important business nearer home. Christiern had not wintered in Norway, as some persons had supposed he would, but had continued his efforts to raise a force in Holland. His efforts had been attended with some measure of success, and early in May the Swedish Cabinet had word that Christiern had despatched a force of seven or eight thousand men under Gustaf Trolle to make an attack on Denmark. While this fleet was believed to be under sail, the tortuous Norby wrote to Denmark that he was ready to sacrifice his life for Fredrik, and took the opportunity to charge Gustavus with every sort of crime. The expedition of Christiern appears to have miscarried, but it so startled Fredrik that he hastened to rid himself of his doubtful ally, Norby. On pretence of wanting an escort for his daughter, about to sail for Prussia, he asked the pirate to come to Copenhagen. Norby, willing though he was to sacrifice his life for Fredrik, thought he scented bait. He could not go, he said, unless he did so in his own vessel attended by seven hundred of his men, and as an additional guaranty demanded at the outset that his men be paid. This was a little more than Fredrik could digest. His answer was a letter to Gustavus, declaring that the pirate was in constant communication with Christiern, and meantime spared no efforts to stir up discord between Gustavus and himself. He was now preparing with a fleet and body of seven hundred men to make an incursion into Sweden. Should this occur, Gustavus might rely upon the aid of Fredrik. For this generous a.s.surance Gustavus in his answer thanked the king, and promised, in return, that if the pirate should make war on Denmark, Fredrik might count on him. Despite these mutual promises of fidelity, neither party relied much on the other. Gustavus, in a letter to his Cabinet in Finland, openly declared his discontent with Fredrik.

However, a common danger kept the allies together, and early in August Gustavus sent a fleet to Kalmar Sound with orders to make an incursion into Bleking on the north, at the same moment that Fredrik's fleet was attacking Norby from the south. For some reason Fredrik did not hear of the Swedish movement till the day was won. On August 24 the Danish and Lubeck fleets were lying off the coast of Bleking, and, thinking that an attack would soon be made by land, bore down upon the fleet of Norby. It was an unequal contest, and the allied fleets were victorious. Seven of Norby's vessels were captured, with four hundred of his men. The conquerors then entered Bleking, and placed the district once more under Danish rule. Norby himself escaped across the Baltic Sea to Russia.

There he expected to enlist the grand duke in a war against Gustavus. He found, however, that he had mistaken the opinions of his host. The grand duke threw him into prison, where he remained two years. At the end of that time he was set at liberty by request of Charles V., under whose banner he then enlisted. After serving about a year, he was killed outside the walls of Florence, whither he had been sent with the emperor's forces to storm the town. "Such was the end," so runs the chronicle, "of one who in his palmy days had called himself a friend of G.o.d and an enemy to every man."[125]

Meantime matters had progressed to some extent with Norway. On the 22d of July, the pa.s.sport issued for the refugees having nearly expired without intimation that it would be used, Gustavus wrote to Fredrik: "Sunnanvader and the other fugitives are still maintained with honor in Norway, and are continually plotting new revolt. They receive especial favor from the archbishop of Trondhem, who is said to have appointed one of them his deacon. We have written frequently about them to the Cabinet of Norway, but the more we write the more honor they receive." This charge was proved by subsequent events to be a trifle hasty. Scarce had the letter been despatched when Knut, who was probably the least guilty of the two conspirators, arrived. He came by order of the archbishop of Trondhem, and along with him came a letter from the archbishop, declaring that, as the king had promised the fugitives they should be tried by prelates of the Church, one of them was surrendered.

Sunnanvader would likewise have been handed over but that he was ill.

The archbishop closed by urging Gustavus to show mercy. It is to be noted that the king had never promised that the tribunal should consist of prelates. What he had said was that they should be tried before a "proper tribunal." Doubtless it was customary that priests should not be tried by laymen, but the practice was not invariably followed, and the language of the pa.s.sport was enough to throw the conspirators on their guard. In a case of conspiracy against the crown, the Swedish Cabinet would seem to be a proper tribunal, and as a matter of fact it was before the Cabinet that this case was tried. The Cabinet consisted of the archbishop of Upsala, three bishops, and eight laymen. Their decree was, in the first place, that the pa.s.sport did not protect Knut from trial, and secondly, that he was guilty of conspiracy against the crown.

The decree was dated August 9. On that very day the king of Denmark wrote Gustavus that he had ordered the archbishop of Trondhem to give no shelter to the traitors, and added: "We are told that you are ready to promise them a trial before yourself and the Swedish Cabinet, after which they shall be permitted to go free." Gustavus had never promised that they should go free, and it was preposterous for anybody to expect it. The only object of the trial was to give the traitors an opportunity to prove their innocence, and if they failed to do so, it was only fair that they should suffer. As soon as the decree was signed, Gustavus wrote the archbishop of Trondhem that Knut had been found guilty, but that his life should be spared to satisfy the archbishop, at any rate until Gustavus could learn what the archbishop proposed to do with the other refugees. A similar letter was sent also by the Cabinet, declaring that "many serious charges were made against Knut, which he was in no way able to disprove." One of the Cabinet members, who had been asked by the archbishop to intercede for Knut, wrote back: "His crime is so enormous and so clearly proved by his own handwriting, that there is no hope for him unless by the grace of G.o.d or through your intercession."

Even Brask wrote: "He has won the king's ill-favor in many ways, for which he can offer no defence." Against such a pressure of public opinion the archbishop of Trondhem dared no longer stand, and on the 22d of September despatched Sunnanvader to the king, adding, with the mendacity of a child, that he had detained him in Norway only in order that he might not flee. Gustavus, with grim humor, thanked him for his solicitude, and begged him now to return all other refugees. Sunnanvader was kept in jail till the 18th of February, 1527. He was then brought before a tribunal consisting of the entire Chapter of Upsala, two bishops, and a number of laymen. The king produced some sixty letters written by the traitor, establis.h.i.+ng his conspiracy beyond the shadow of a doubt. He was condemned at once, and executed the same day outside the Upsala walls. Three days later, his accomplice, Knut, was similarly put to death in Stockholm. Thus ended a conspiracy which had cost the monarch infinite annoyance, and which during a period of three years had been a constant menace to the realm.[126]

What most annoyed the king at this time was the importunate demands of Lubeck. Ever since Gotland, in the summer of 1525, had fallen into the hands of Lubeck, Gustavus had appreciated the necessity of keeping the Hanseatic town in check. So early as August of that year the monarch wrote Laurentius Andreae: "You have advised us to cling to Lubeck and place no confidence in the Danes, since they have always played us false. We are not sure, however, that even Lubeck can be trusted, for we have no certainty what she has in mind, especially as she is sheltering in Gotland that outspoken traitor, Mehlen." The Swedish envoys, who had arrived in Lubeck too late to meet the Danes, as had been agreed in Malmo, seem to have reached no terms with Lubeck, and, when they returned to Sweden in September, Gotland was in Lubeck's hands, and Lubeck had announced her purpose of defending Mehlen. Her strongest hold on Sweden lay in the fact that Sweden was still her debtor in a very large amount. Early in 1526 this burden had become so great that the Cabinet pa.s.sed an act decreeing that two thirds of all the t.i.thes accrued for the year just ended should be surrendered by the Church to meet the nation's debt. The announcement of this levy made Lubeck for the moment more importunate than before. Believing that the money would soon be pouring in, she kept her envoys constantly d.o.g.g.i.ng the monarch's steps, and in the month of April Gustavus wrote: "Our creditors will scarce permit us to leave the castle-gate." They were, therefore, as greatly disappointed as Gustavus when the money did not come. In June Gustavus wrote that he had got together ten thousand marks,--a mere nothing,--and that Lubeck had written to demand immediate payment of the whole. "Her envoys have now closed our doors so tight that it is hardly possible for us to go out." It was clear that some new scheme must be devised, and on the 23d of June the king applied to certain members of his Cabinet. "We have now," he wrote, "as frequently before, had letters from Lubeck demanding in curt language the payment of her debt. You are aware that we have often, especially in Cabinet meetings, asked you to suggest some mode of meeting this requirement, and have never yet been able to elicit any tangible response. Indeed, you have not had the matter much at heart, but have rather left it to be arranged by us. You have, it is true, suggested that the t.i.thes be used, but we find that, though we much relied upon them, they are but a t.i.ttle. Our entire taxes for last year, including iron, skins, b.u.t.ter, salmon, amounted to somewhat over ten thousand marks. This sum, which would naturally be used to pay the expenses of our court, has been handed over to pay the debt. The t.i.thes received, which we were a.s.sured would be a considerable sum, are shown by our books not to have exceeded two thousand marks in all. The treasury balance has now run so low that we have but a trifle left, and our soldiers, who are now much needed to keep off Christiern and Norby, must be paid. We therefore beg you take this matter seriously to heart, and devise some means by which the debt may soon be paid....

It is utterly impossible from the taxes alone to keep an army and pay this heavy debt, for the taxes are no greater than they were some years ago, though the expenses are very much increased; and, moreover, we have no mines to turn to, as our fathers had." This urgent appeal inspired the Cabinet to act, and at a meeting held in August they provided that a new tax be laid on every subject in the realm. In the table that accompanied this Act, the amounts to be contributed by the different provinces were accurately fixed, as well as the amounts to be collected in the towns. The bishops, too, were called upon to furnish each his quota, based upon an estimate of his means: the archbishop of Upsala paying four thousand marks, the bishop of bo three thousand marks, Linkoping two thousand five hundred marks, Skara and Strengnas each two thousand marks, Vesters one thousand marks, and Vexio five hundred marks. The amount imposed on bo seems unreasonably large, which is probably to be accounted for by the fact that bo was not present at the meeting. Brask, in writing to bo, told the bishop that his quota was three thousand marks, but did not name to him the individual amounts to be contributed by the other bishops. Gustavus, in a letter to the members of his Cabinet in Finland, was even more unfair. He told them that bo was to pay three thousand marks, and added that Linkoping and Skara were to pay the same. Brask's letter is particularly important in that it puts the balance of the debt to Lubeck at forty-five thousand Lubeck marks, equivalent to ninety thousand Swedish marks, of which amount the archbishop and bishops were expected to raise fifteen thousand marks. Brask, with his usual shrewdness, urged the king to pay the debt that autumn, and thus get rid of Lubeck before the winter came.

Gustavus doubtless shared with him this view, but there were several grave difficulties in the way. Early in October the monarch held a conference with the Lubeck envoys, and found the balance, as they figured it, to be larger than he had supposed. Moreover, the peasants in the north of Sweden declared they could not spare the funds, and urged Gustavus to postpone the levy till a more convenient time. So that at the close of 1526 the Lubeck envoys were still clamoring for their pay.[127]

The cramped position in which Gustavus was held by Lubeck made it of great importance that he should be on amicable terms with other powers.

So early as 1523, he had sent amba.s.sadors to Russia to ratify the treaty made by Sture. They had returned, however, with announcement that the grand duke's envoys would come to Stockholm and arrange the terms. This promise had never been fulfilled. As soon, therefore, as opportunity was found, the monarch prepared to send amba.s.sadors again. The person to whom the matter was intrusted was the monarch's brother-in-law, Johan von Hoya. In November, 1525, this officer, who had just returned from an expedition to Lubeck, set sail for Finland, where he already had been granted fiefs, with orders to determine whether or not it was desirable that the emba.s.sy should go. Considerable delay ensued because Gustavus was in want of funds. He thought that since the expedition would be mainly for the benefit of Finland, the cost of sending it should be borne by her. It was, therefore, not till May of 1526, when Russian depredations became unbearable in Finland, that an arrangement could be made. Envoys then were sent to Moscow, and presented to the grand duke a letter from Gustavus under date of 20th of May. In this doc.u.ment the monarch stated that his envoys had once before been sent to Moscow to ratify the treaty made with Sture, but for some reason had never reached the capital. Since then great injury had been done in Finland by Russian subjects. Gustavus desired, therefore, to renew the treaty, and begged the grand duke to recompense his subjects, and also to make known to him in what towns in Russia his subjects would be allowed to trade. This letter appears to have been some months upon the road, for the grand duke's answer was not given till the 2d of September. In this answer he declared that the previous emba.s.sy of Gustavus had held a conference with Russian envoys, and by them the treaty made with Sture had been ratified. Swedish merchants were allowed to trade in all the towns of Russia, and all wrongs done to Swedish subjects should be punished and the persons injured recompensed. On the other hand, he should expect Gustavus to punish his own subjects for wrongs which they had done in Russia, and all buildings by them erected on Russian soil must be torn down. While the Swedish envoys were returning with this letter, Norby reached the grand duke and complained that Swedes had injured Russian subjects in Lapland. The grand duke therefore ordered that Gustavus be notified of the complaint, and asked to punish the offenders if the charge were true. When the emba.s.sy returned to Sweden, and the monarch found they had not yet obtained the grand duke's seal, he resolved to go to Finland in the spring of 1527 and meet the Russian emissaries there.

This plan, however, was given up for lack of funds, and the Russian emissaries were asked to meet the king in Stockholm. The offer was accepted, the emissaries came, and after an elaborate exchange of costly presents, both parties signed a ratification of the treaty made for seventy years with Sture. The ratification was dated on the 26th of May.[128]

The main reason why Gustavus dreaded a rupture between himself and Lubeck was that it would cause great injury to his commerce. Immediately after his election in 1523, the monarch in a moment of enthusiasm had conferred on Lubeck, Dantzic, and their allies a perpetual monopoly of Swedish trade. In an earlier century, when these so-called Vend Cities controlled the Baltic trade, Lubeck would have claimed the monopoly even without a grant. But another branch of the Hanse Towns had ere this grown up in Holland, with a power so formidable that the Vend Cities dared not a.s.sert their claim. So long, however, as the privileges granted Lubeck were unrepealed, the Dutch Towns were reluctant to incur her enmity by sending s.h.i.+ps to Sweden. The result was that practically all imports came from Lubeck, and when relations between that city and Gustavus became a trifle strained, great difficulty was experienced in obtaining food. To remedy this evil, the envoys sent to Lubeck in 1525, finding themselves too late for the congress with the Danes, entered into negotiations with the Dutch envoys that happened to be there. They found at once that Holland wished to trade in Sweden, and was ready to do so if the terms could be arranged. As a provisional measure, the amba.s.sadors on both sides promised, August 17, that the two nations should remain at peace during the next three years, and before the end of that time another congress should be held to make a more systematic treaty. It was agreed further that in the coming autumn a consignment of salt and other wares should be forwarded by the Dutch to Sweden.

Apparently this consignment did not come till the spring of 1526, but both parties were eager to arrange a treaty, and it was agreed that a congress for this purpose should be held in Bremen, May 20, 1526. This congress was afterwards postponed, though the Swedish envoy brought a ratification of the former treaty signed by Gustavus under date of May 12, 1526, and promised further that salt should be admitted into Sweden free. A similar ratification was signed by Charles V., Sept. 19, 1526.

This accomplished, Holland opened negotiations with Sweden to the end that all articles of commerce be placed upon the free-list along with salt; and she requested further that all the Swedish harbors be open to her s.h.i.+ps. So ambitious a proposal terrified Gustavus. He would have been rejoiced to grant it, but he feared by doing so to irritate Lubeck.

It is somewhat amusing to trace the steps by which he convinced himself that such a course was right. Brask, as usual, was the first to question whether Lubeck would consent. On the 9th of December, 1526, he wrote: "I advocate the treaty, but I doubt much whether Lubeck will not raise objections, for she has wished to have the Baltic to herself." A few days later Gustavus put out a feeler to his Cabinet in the south of Sweden. "So far as we know," he wrote with caution, "our relations with Lubeck and the Vend Cities do not forbid this treaty." By the spring of 1527 he had grown more confident of his position, and wrote as follows: "The provisional arrangement made with Holland has proved greatly to our advantage. We now desire to make a perpetual treaty with her before Whitsunday next, and for this purpose recommend that Olaus Magni be sent at once to Amsterdam." Two weeks after this he added: "The privileges which the German cities wrung from us in Strengnas are so grinding that we can no longer adhere to them in all their points." On the 22d of April the monarch had so far removed his doubts as to commission Magni to negotiate the treaty, and he intrusted him with a written promise over the royal signature and seal, conferring on Holland, Brabant, Zealand, and East and West Friesland the right to enter all the Swedish rivers and harbors, on payment of the customary duties. It is noticeable that in this doc.u.ment Gustavus did not remit the duties, as had been desired, nor even promise that salt should be admitted free; and in the letter to his envoy the diplomatic monarch used these words: "Do not be too liberal, especially in the matter of duties. If they really insist upon free-trade, you must discreetly avoid promising it, and suggest that probably the privilege will be granted them as a favor." Brask, who feared lest these negotiations might cause trouble, hastened to throw a favorable light upon his own position. "You will remember," he wrote his fellow-counsellors, "that I opposed the grant of these great privileges to Lubeck, believing them injurious to the welfare of our people."

Magni, in conformity with the king's injunctions, proceeded to the town of Ghent, where he was given an audience of Margaret, regent of the Netherlands. As soon as the letters of May 12, 1526, and April 18, 1527, were translated for her, she raised a number of objections, chief of which were that the latter letter did not provide that salt should be admitted free, and did not seem to open to her vessels all the Swedish ports. To these objections Magni answered that certain harbors were made ports of entry out of convenience to Gustavus, and as to duties, Magni seems to have a.s.sured her that they would probably be taken off. After more palaver, Margaret signed a doc.u.ment accepting the offer a.s.sumed to have been made by Sweden; namely, that vessels of the emperor might enter all the rivers and harbors of Sweden, paying only the same duties that were paid by Swedish subjects, salt, however, to be admitted free.

She expressed a hope, moreover, that other articles might be exempt from duty too. To this doc.u.ment she attached her seal, July 29, 1527.[129]

It is particularly to be noted that Lubeck did not raise her voice against the treaty. A probable solution is that she wished beyond all else to secure her money, and felt that Sweden would be more able to meet the debt in case she were allowed to trade with Holland. All through the winter of 1527 Gustavus struggled to raise funds. Some portions of the country seem to have responded freely, but in Dalarne and other northern provinces it appeared likely that the levy would end in actual revolt. In January Gustavus warned the people that all responsibility in the matter lay with them. If Lubeck made war upon the kingdom, it would be because of their unwillingness to pay the debt. As a matter of fact, the Dalesmen had much reason for delay. The monarch, by his ill-judged privileges to Lubeck, had kept the country in a state of famine, from which it now was just beginning to emerge. Many of the people were utterly devoid of means, and the new levy seemed like wringing water from a stone. This in the course of time Gustavus learned, and in March he prudently suggested to his officers that the tax be modified in special cases. The Dalesmen, however, were not so easily to be appeased. Other causes of complaint were rife among them, and they formed a compact to the end that no tax should be paid until these grievances had been redressed. On the 2d of April Gustavus a.s.serted that the Dalesmen had not contributed a cent. Brask, for reasons that will be manifest later on, was in sympathy with the people, and declared: "I fear danger, for the Dalesmen are reported to be incensed, and rightfully incensed, against the king. If it lay with me, I should remit a portion of the tax rather than give occasion for this revolt." Gustavus, however, was still hara.s.sed by Lubeck, and dared not take this step. As there were several matters to be straightened out in Dalarne, he summoned a general diet of the realm. The Dalesmen showing opposition, Gustavus urged the people in the south of Sweden to persuade the people of Dalarne to come. "We should be glad," he urged, "if you would write to the people of Dalarne, and ask them to lay their complaints before the diet to be held in Vesters. We shall there explain our conduct, and if our people are not satisfied, shall gladly resign the throne. The German envoys will be present, and the Dalesmen can then adopt some means to quiet their incessant demands." All efforts to persuade the Dalesmen failed. They despatched a long list of their grievances to Stockholm, but they did not attend the diet. When the other delegates came together, Gustavus laid these grievances before them. The Dalesmen had complained, he said, that they were burdened with heavy taxes. If they had been more obedient, a smaller army would have been sufficient, and the taxes would not have been so heavy. He told them, further, that the whole debt occasioned by the war amounted to about one hundred thousand marks, of which sum a large portion was still unpaid.[130] The outcome of the matter was that the delegates voted to quell the insurrection in Dalarne, and if enough money could not now be raised to pay the debt, to levy further taxes. These stringent measures were not, however, put into effect at once. Gustavus was busy, in the autumn of 1527, with other things; and furthermore a dispute had arisen between himself and Lubeck as to the exact total of the debt. The year closed, therefore, with the debt still hanging over Sweden's head. The Lubeck envoys accepted all the goods and money they could get, the whole amount thus paid in 1527 being in the neighborhood of 22,800 Swedish marks.[131]

All through this period Gustavus was in constant negotiation with Fredrik. Christiern's efforts to recover the crown had been brought to a halt by the sudden collapse of Norby, and Fredrik had a.s.sumed in consequence a more aggressive att.i.tude toward Sweden. By the treaty signed at Malmo each monarch promised to protect the interests which citizens of the other held within his realm. But the ink was scarcely dry when complaints were heard that Fredrik had failed to substantiate this clause. The most flagrant breach occurred in the case of property owned in Denmark by Margaret, sister of the king of Sweden. So great difficulty was experienced by Margaret in protecting this estate, that early in 1526 the monarch counselled her to sell it. He wrote also to certain Danish officers, and begged them to defend her rights. These exhortations proving futile, Margaret sent her agent to the spot to see what he could do. This only irritated the natives, and they fell upon the agent with their fists. It was reported, too, that the deed was ordered by an officer of Fredrik. At all events, the agent was given no redress, and Gustavus, after urging Margaret's husband to appeal to Fredrik, wrote finally to the Danish king himself. He laid the whole affair before him, and declaring that he had ever upheld the rights of Danes in Sweden, urged Fredrik to investigate the matter and punish those by whom the violence had been committed. With this request the Danish monarch promised to comply; and as we find no further mention of the case, it is probable the quarrel was adjusted and the rights of Margaret maintained.[132]

Another dispute originating in the Malmo treaty concerned the province of Viken, which lay along the Swedish frontier in the southeast part of Norway. This province had joined Gustavus in the war with Christiern, and after the war was over had continued under Swedish rule. In course of time, however, the inhabitants grew eager to return once more to Norway. With a view to satisfy their longing, Gustavus allowed them, early in 1526, to be governed by Norwegian law and custom. Possibly this would have appeased the natives, but Fredrik was desirous for more. He thought that Viken, being originally a province of Norway, should be ruled by him. He therefore wrote Gustavus, and begged a conference to settle their respective claims. Gustavus, defrauded of his rights in Gotland, answered that he would gladly hold a conference to settle all matters of dispute between them. Fredrik waited nearly six months before making his reply. He then informed Gustavus that the Danish envoys had appeared in Lubeck at the day fixed for the conference, but that nothing was accomplished simply because the Swedish envoys did not come. He therefore urged Gustavus to name a time and place at which the question of Viken should be settled. The Swedish monarch had learned by sad experience that a conference with Denmark meant no benefit to him. He answered that his envoys had been sent to Lubeck, as agreed, but had failed through stress of weather to reach the place of meeting on the day arranged. Gustavus appears not to have cared particularly to retain the province, though he was not willing to yield it without obtaining something in return. He saw no reason why Viken should be given up to Fredrik unless Gotland should be given up to him. In answer, therefore, to repeated solicitations, he declared his readiness to meet the Danish king half-way; he would treat with him concerning Viken, but at the same time some definite conclusion must be reached about the isle of Gotland.

When negotiations had reached this point, they were interrupted for the moment by a new dispute.[133]

Ever since the fall of Kalmar, Christina's boy had been in Stockholm, under the surveillance of the king. Gustavus for some reason had never liked the boy, and in April, 1527, he sent him to his mother with a reprimand, at the same time urging that he be placed for a period under the quiet influence of some rural town. This incident was the signal for another conspiracy against the crown. This time the aspirant was a gay young hostler, who conceived the desperate project of posing as the regent's son. Relying on his own audacity and on the perennial state of insurrection in the north of Sweden, he went to Dalarne with the story that he had escaped the clutches of Gustavus, whose orders were that he be put to death. He then proceeded from one village to another, extolling the virtues of the young Sten Sture, and urging the people, since they had sworn allegiance to his father, to do the same to him.

The support which he received was small. One or two villages were at first deceived, but the majority of them told him flatly that he lied.

He therefore followed the course of earlier impostors, and betook himself to Norway. Approaching first the archbishop of Trondhem, he told his story and awoke the archbishop's interest by announcing that Gustavus had fallen from the faith. It being bruited that certain of the church dignitaries were on terms of friends.h.i.+p with this impostor, the archbishop received him kindly, and though he refused to give him shelter, promised he would take no steps to harm him. Gustavus then addressed the archbishop and the Cabinet of Norway, urging that the traitor be returned. He pointed out, moreover, that, Sten Sture having been married only fourteen years before, it was impossible that this traitor was his son. This argument producing no effect, Gustavus prevailed upon Fredrik's emissaries, then in Stockholm, to join him in his appeal. An answer then came back from the archbishop of Trondhem that he had refused to shelter the impostor, though he had promised that he would not harm him. Since then a letter had arrived from Dalarne saying that the Swedish king was dead. The impostor had therefore collected a band of refugees in Norway, and was now once more in Sweden.

With this mendacious explanation Gustavus was forced to be content. The fraud had been discovered, and by the close of 1527 the insurrection in Dalarne was practically at an end.[134]

FOOTNOTES:

[122] _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1510-1511, 1517-1588 and 1568-1575; _Dipl. Dal._, vol. ii. pp. 66-67; _Handl. ror. Skand. hist._, vol. xxiii. pp. 60-65; _Kon. Gust. den Forstes registrat._, vol. ii. pp.

169-170, 187-188, 196-197, 204-206, 208-213, 218-219, 240-242, 252-257 and 278-285; and _Saml. til det Norske Folks Sprog og Hist._, vol. i.

pp. 484-485.

[123] _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1576-1584, 1587-1591, 1593-1596 and 1602-1605; and _Kon. Gust. den Forstes registrat._, vol.

iii. pp. 2-3, 13-15, 30-32, 38-39, 61-62, 78-80, 353-355, 364-365, 369-370 and 375-376.

[124] _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1585-1587 and 1589-1593; _Dipl. Dal._, vol. ii. pp. 82-83 and 89; _Handl. ror. Sver. inre forhll._, vol. i. pp. 23-25; _Kon. Gust. den Forstes registrat._, vol.

iii. pp. 50-51, 55, 57-58, 59-60, 71, 367-369, 372, 373-374 and 381-384; and _Saml. til det Norske Folks Sprog og Hist._, vol. i. pp. 485-486 and 488-495.

[125] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kron._, pp. 84-85; _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol.

i. pp. 1-144 and vol. iv. pp. 1584, 1606-1612, 1614-1626, 1633-1635, 1639-1643 and 1646-1651; _Handl. ror. Skand. hist._, vol. xv. pp. 5-7, 19-24, 27-29 and 32-47; _Handl. till upplysn. af Finl. hafd._, vol. ii.

p. 158; _Kon. Gust. den Forstes registrat._, vol. iii. pp. 46, 97-98, 110-111, 117, 167-169, 170-172, 188-190, 195-196, 199-200, 203-207, 218-220, 250-251, 256-260, 380-381, 386-393, 394-404, 406-407, 411-414 and 415-416; and _Sver. trakt._, vol. iv. pp. 104-105.

[126] Svart, _Gust. I.'s kron._, pp. 112-114; _Christ. II.'s arkiv_, vol. iii. pp. 1075-1083, and vol. iv. pp. 1627-1628; _Dipl. Dal._, vol.

ii. p. 92, and vol. iii. pp. 30-32; _Handl. ror. Skand. hist._, vol.

xvi. pp. 18-20; _Kon. Gust. den Forstes registrat._, vol. iii. pp.

207-208, 220-224, 326-327, 405-406, 408-410 and 419, and vol. iv. pp.

61-62; _Saml. til det Norske Folks Sprog og Hist._, vol. i. pp. 496-513; and _Skrift. och handl._, vol. ii. pp. 267-268 and 270-271.

[127] _Alla riksdag. och mot. bes.l.u.th_, vol. i. pp. 42-56; _Christ.

II.'s arkiv_, vol. iv. pp. 1492 and 1613; _Dipl. Dal._, vol. ii. pp.

79-80 and _Handl. ror. Skand. hist._, vol. xiv. pp. 89-90, vol. xv. pp.

29-32, and vol. xvi. pp. 15-16; _Handl. ror. Sver. inre forhll._, vol.

i. pp. 15-18 and 30-31; _Handl. till upplysn. af Finl. hafd._, vol. ii.

pp. 185-187; _Kon. Gust. den Forstes registrat._, vol. ii. pp. 190-191, 222-223 and 229-231, and vol. iii. pp. 15-16, 18-21, 32-34, 109-110, 122, 173-176, 179-181, 236-243, 248-249, 294-295, 308-309, 324-326 and 416-417; and _Svenska riksdagsakt._, vol. i. pp. 39-47.