Theologico-Political Treatise Volume IV Part 4

(20:35) However, I do not deny that there are some doctrines which, while they are apparently only concerned with abstract truths and falsehoods, are yet propounded and published with unworthy motives. (36) This question we have discussed in Chapter XV., and shown that reason should nevertheless remain unshackled. (37) If we hold to the principle that a man's loyalty to the state should be judged, like his loyalty to G.o.d, from his actions only - namely, from his charity towards his neighbours; we cannot doubt that the best government will allow freedom of philosophical speculation no less than of religious belief. (38) I confess that from such freedom inconveniences may sometimes arise, but what question was ever settled so wisely that no abuses could possibly spring therefrom? (39) He who seeks to regulate everything by law, is more likely to arouse vices than to reform them. (40) It is best to grant what cannot be abolished, even though it be in itself harmful. (41) How many evils spring from luxury, envy, avarice, drunkenness, and the like, yet these are tolerated - vices as they are - because they cannot be prevented by legal enactments. (42) How much more then should free thought be granted, seeing that it is in itself a virtue and that it cannot be crushed! (43) Besides, the evil results can easily be checked, as I will show, by the secular authorities, not to mention that such freedom is absolutely necessary for progress in science and the liberal arts: for no man follows such pursuits to advantage unless his judgment be entirely free and unhampered.

(20:44) But let it be granted that freedom may be crushed, and men be so bound down, that they do not dare to utter a whisper, save at the bidding of their rulers; nevertheless this can never be carried to the pitch of making them think according to authority, so that the necessary consequences would be that men would daily be thinking one thing and saying another, to the corruption of good faith, that mainstay of government, and to the fostering of hateful flattery and perfidy, whence spring stratagems, and the corruption of every good art.

(20:45) It is far from possible to impose uniformity of speech, for the more rulers strive to curtail freedom of speech, the more obstinately are they resisted; not indeed by the avaricious, the flatterers, and other numskulls, who think supreme salvation consists in filling their stomachs and gloating over their money-bags, but by those whom good education, sound morality, and virtue have rendered more free. (46) Men, as generally const.i.tuted, are most p.r.o.ne to resent the branding as criminal of opinions which they believe to be true, and the proscription as wicked of that which inspires them with piety towards G.o.d and man; hence they are ready to forswear the laws and conspire against the authorities, thinking it not shameful but honourable to stir up seditions and perpetuate any sort of crime with this end in view. (47) Such being the const.i.tution of human nature, we see that laws directed against opinions affect the generous minded rather than the wicked, and are adapted less for coercing criminals than for irritating the upright; so that they cannot be maintained without great peril to the state.

(20:48) Moreover, such laws are almost always useless, for those who hold that the opinions proscribed are sound, cannot possibly obey the law; whereas those who already reject them as false, accept the law as a kind of privilege, and make such boast of it, that authority is powerless to repeal it, even if such a course be subsequently desired.

(20:49) To these considerations may be added what we said in Chapter XVIII.

in treating of the history of the Hebrews. (50) And, lastly, how many schisms have arisen in the Church from the attempt of the authorities to decide by law the intricacies of theological controversy! (51) If men were not allured by the hope of getting the law and the authorities on their side, of triumphing over their adversaries in the sight of an applauding mult.i.tude, and of acquiring honourable distinctions, they would not strive so maliciously, nor would such fury sway their minds. (52) This is taught not only by reason but by daily examples, for laws of this kind prescribing what every man shall believe and forbidding anyone to speak or write to the contrary, have often been pa.s.sed, as sops or concessions to the anger of those who cannot tolerate men of enlightenment, and who, by such harsh and crooked enactments, can easily turn the devotion of the ma.s.ses into fury and direct it against whom they will. (53) How much better would it be to restrain popular anger and fury, instead of pa.s.sing useless laws, which can only be broken by those who love virtue and the liberal arts, thus paring down the state till it is too small to harbour men of talent. (54) What greater misfortune for a state can be conceived then that honourable men should be sent like criminals into exile, because they hold diverse opinions which they cannot disguise? (55) What, I say, can be more hurtful than that men who have committed no crime or wickedness should, simply because they are enlightened, be treated as enemies and put to death, and that the scaffold, the terror of evil-doers, should become the arena where the highest examples of tolerance and virtue are displayed to the people with all the marks of ignominy that authority can devise?

(20:56) He that knows himself to be upright does not fear the death of a criminal, and shrinks from no punishment; his mind is not wrung with remorse for any disgraceful deed: he holds that death in a good cause is no punishment, but an honour, and that death for freedom is glory.

(20:57) What purpose then is served by the death of such men, what example in proclaimed? the cause for which they die is unknown to the idle and the foolish, hateful to the turbulent, loved by the upright. (58) The only lesson we can draw from such scenes is to flatter the persecutor, or else to imitate the victim.

(20:58) If formal a.s.sent is not to be esteemed above conviction, and if governments are to retain a firm hold of authority and not be compelled to yield to agitators, it is imperative that freedom of judgment should be granted, so that men may live together in harmony, however diverse, or even openly contradictory their opinions may be. (59) We cannot doubt that such is the best system of government and open to the fewest objections, since it is the one most in harmony with human nature. (60) In a democracy (the most natural form of government, as we have shown in Chapter XVI.) everyone submits to the control of authority over his actions, but not over his judgment and reason; that is, seeing that all cannot think alike, the voice of the majority has the force of law, subject to repeal if circ.u.mstances bring about a change of opinion. (61) In proportion as the power of free judgment is withheld we depart from the natural condition of mankind, and consequently the government becomes more tyrannical.

[20:4] (62) In order to prove that from such freedom no inconvenience arises, which cannot easily be checked by the exercise of the sovereign power, and that men's actions can easily be kept in bounds, though their opinions be at open variance, it will be well to cite an example. (63) Such an one is not very, far to seek. (64) The city of Amsterdam reaps the fruit of this freedom in its own great prosperity and in the admiration of all other people. (65) For in this most flouris.h.i.+ng state, and most splendid city, men of every, nation and religion live together in the greatest harmony, and ask no questions before trusting their goods to a fellow- citizen, save whether he be rich or poor, and whether he generally acts honestly, or the reverse. (66) His religion and sect is considered of no importance: for it has no effect before the judges in gaining or losing a cause, and there is no sect so despised that its followers, provided that they harm no one, pay every man his due, and live uprightly, are deprived of the protection of the magisterial authority.

(20:67) On the other hand, when the religious controversy between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants began to be taken up by politicians and the States, it grew into a schism, and abundantly showed that laws dealing with religion and seeking to settle its controversies are much more calculated to irritate than to reform, and that they give rise to extreme licence: further, it was seen that schisms do not originate in a love of truth, which is a source of courtesy and gentleness, but rather in an inordinate desire for supremacy, (68) From all these considerations it is clearer than the sun at noonday, that the true schismatics are those who condemn other men's writings, and seditiously stir up the quarrelsome ma.s.ses against their authors, rather than those authors themselves, who generally write only for the learned, and appeal solely to reason. (69) In fact, the real disturbers of the peace are those who, in a free state, seek to curtail the liberty of judgment which they are unable to tyrannize over.

(20:70) I have thus shown:-

(71) I. That it is impossible to deprive men of the liberty of saying what they think.

(72) II. That such liberty can be conceded to every man without injury to the rights and authority of the sovereign power, and that every man may retain it without injury to such rights, provided that he does not presume upon it to the extent of introducing any new rights into the state, or acting in any way contrary, to the existing laws.

(20:73) III. That every man may enjoy this liberty without detriment to the public peace, and that no inconveniences arise therefrom which cannot easily be checked.

(74) IV. That every man may enjoy it without injury to his allegiance.

(75) V. That laws dealing with speculative problems are entirely useless.

(76) VI. Lastly, that not only may such liberty be granted without prejudice to the public peace, to loyalty, and to the rights of rulers, but that it is even necessary, for their preservation. (77) For when people try to take it away, and bring to trial, not only the acts which alone are capable of offending, but also the opinions of mankind, they only succeed in surrounding their victims with an appearance of martyrdom, and raise feelings of pity and revenge rather than of terror. (78) Uprightness and good faith are thus corrupted, flatterers and traitors are encouraged, and sectarians triumph, inasmuch as concessions have been made to their animosity, and they have gained the state sanction for the doctrines of which they are the interpreters. (79) Hence they arrogate to themselves the state authority and rights, and do not scruple to a.s.sert that they have been directly chosen by G.o.d, and that their laws are Divine, whereas the laws of the state are human, and should therefore yield obedience to the laws of G.o.d - in other words, to their own laws. (80) Everyone must see that this is not a state of affairs conducive to public welfare. (81) Wherefore, as we have shown in Chapter XVIII., the safest way for a state is to lay down the rule that religion is comprised solely in the exercise of charity and justice, and that the rights of rulers in sacred, no less than in secular matters, should merely have to do with actions, but that every man should think what he likes and say what he thinks.

(20:82) I have thus fulfilled the task I set myself in this treatise.

[20:5] (83) It remains only to call attention to the fact that I have written nothing which I do not most willingly submit to the examination and approval of my country's rulers; and that I am willing to retract anything which they shall decide to be repugnant to the laws, or prejudicial to the public good. (84) I know that I am a man, and as a man liable to error, but against error I have taken scrupulous care, and have striven to keep in entire accordance with the laws of my country, with loyalty, and with morality.

End of Part 4 of 4.

AUTHOR'S ENDNOTES TO THE THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE

CHAPTER XVI.

[Endnote 26]. (1) "No one can honestly promise to forego the right which he has over all things." (2) In the state of social life, where general right determines what is good or evil, stratagem is rightly distinguished as of two kinds, good and evil. (3) But in the state of Nature, where every man is his own judge, possessing the absolute right to lay down laws for himself, to interpret them as he pleases, or to abrogate them if he thinks it convenient, it is not conceivable that stratagem should be evil.

[Endnote 27]. (1) "Every member of it may, if he will, be free." (2) Whatever be the social state a man finds; himself in, he may be free. (3) For certainly a man is free, in so far as he is led by reason. (4) Now reason (though Hobbes thinks otherwise) is always on the side of peace, which cannot be attained unless the general laws of the state be respected.

(5) Therefore the more he is free, the more constantly will he respect the laws of his country, and obey the commands of the sovereign power to which he is subject.

[Endnote 28]. (1) "No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to G.o.d." (2) When Paul says that men have in themselves no refuge, he speaks as a man: for in the ninth chapter of the same epistle he expressly teaches that G.o.d has mercy on whom He will, and that men are without excuse, only because they are in G.o.d's power like clay in the hands of a potter, who out of the same lump makes vessels, some for honour and some for dishonour, not because they have been forewarned. (3) As regards the Divine natural law whereof the chief commandment is, as we have said, to love G.o.d, I have called it a law in the same sense, as philosophers style laws those general rules of nature, according to which everything happens. (4) For the love of G.o.d is not a state of obedience: it is a virtue which necessarily exists in a man who knows G.o.d rightly. (5) Obedience has regard to the will of a ruler, not to necessity and truth. (6) Now as we are ignorant of the nature of G.o.d's will, and on the other hand know that everything happens solely by G.o.d's power, we cannot, except through revelation, know whether G.o.d wishes in any way to be honoured as a sovereign.

(7) Again; we have shown that the Divine rights appear to us in the light of rights or commands, only so long as we are ignorant of their cause: as soon as their cause is known, they cease to be rights, and we embrace them no longer as rights but as eternal truths; in other words, obedience pa.s.ses into love of G.o.d, which emanates from true knowledge as necessarily as light emanates from the sun. (8) Reason then leads us to love G.o.d, but cannot lead us to obey Him; for we cannot embrace the commands of G.o.d as Divine, while we are in ignorance of their cause, neither can we rationally conceive G.o.d as a sovereign laying down laws as a sovereign.

CHAPTER XVII.

[Endnote 29]. (1) "If men could lose their natural rights so as to be absolutely unable for the future to oppose the will of the sovereign" (2) Two common soldiers undertook to change the Roman dominion, and did change it. (Tacitus, Hist. i:7.)

[Endnote 30]. (1) See Numbers xi. 28. In this pa.s.sage it is written that two men prophesied in the camp, and that Joshua wished to punish them. (2) This he would not have done, if it had been lawful for anyone to deliver the Divine oracles to the people without the consent of Moses. (3) But Moses thought good to pardon the two men, and rebuked Joshua for exhorting him to use his royal prerogative, at a time when he was so weary of reigning, that he preferred death to holding undivided sway (Numb. xi:14). (4) For he made answer to Joshua, "Enviest thou for my sake? (5) Would G.o.d that all the Lord's people were prophets, and that the Lord would put His spirit upon them." (6) That is to say, would G.o.d that the right of taking counsel of G.o.d were general, and the power were in the hands of the people. (7) Thus Joshua was not mistaken as to the right, but only as to the time for using it, for which he was rebuked by Moses, in the same way as Abishai was rebuked by David for counselling that s.h.i.+mei, who had undoubtedly been guilty of treason, should be put to death. (8) See 2 Sam. xix:22, 23.

[Endnote 31]. (1) See Numbers xxvii:21. (2) The translators of the Bible have rendered incorrectly verses 19 and 23 of this chapter. (3) The pa.s.sage does not mean that Moses gave precepts or advice to Joshua, but that he made or established him chief of the Hebrews. (4) The phrase is very freguent in Scripture (see Exodus, xviii:23; 1 Sam. xiii:15; Joshua i:9; 1 Sam.

xxv:80).

[Endnote 32] (1) "There was no judge over each of the captains save G.o.d." (2) The Rabbis and some Christians equally foolish pretend that the Sanhedrin, called "the great" was inst.i.tuted by Moses. (3) As a matter of fact, Moses chose seventy colleagues to a.s.sist him in governing, because he was not able to bear alone the burden of the whole people; but he never pa.s.sed any law for forming a college of seventy members; on the contrary he ordered every tribe to appoint for itself, in the cities which G.o.d had given it, judges to settle disputes according to the laws which he himself had laid down. (4) In cases where the opinions of the judges differed as to the interpretation of these laws, Moses bade them take counsel of the High Priest (who was the chief interpreter of the law), or of the chief judge, to whom they were then subordinate (who had the right of consulting the High Priest), and to decide the dispute in accordance with the answer obtained. (5) If any subordinate judge should a.s.sert, that he was not bound by the decision of the High Priest, received either directly or through the chief of his state, such an one was to be put to death (Deut.

xvii:9) by the chief judge, whoever he might be, to whom he was a subordinate. (6) This chief judge would either be Joshua, the supreme captain of the whole people, or one of the tribal chiefs who had been entrusted, after the division of the tribes, with the right of consulting the high priest concerning the affairs of his tribe, of deciding on peace or war, of fortifying towns, of appointing inferior judges, &c. (7) Or, again, it might be the king, in whom all or some of the tribes had vested their rights.(8) I could cite many instances in confirmation of what I here advance. (9) I will confine myself to one, which appears to me the most important of all. (10) When the s.h.i.+lomitish prophet anointed Jeroboam king, he, in so doing, gave him the right of consulting the high priest, of appointing judges, &c. (11) In fact he endowed him with all the rights over the ten tribes, which Rehoboam retained over the two tribes. (12) Consequently Jeroboam could set up a supreme council in his court with as much right as Jehoshaphat could at Jerusalem (2 Chron. xix:8). (13) For it is plain that neither Jeroboam, who was king by G.o.d's command, nor Jeroboam's subjects, were bound by the Law of Moses to accept the judgments of Rehoboam, who was not their king. (14) Still less were they under the jurisdiction of the judge, whom Rehoboam had set up in Jerusalem as subordinate to himself. (15) According, therefore, as the Hebrew dominion was divided, so was a supreme council setup in each division. (16) Those who neglect the variations in the const.i.tution of the Hebrew States, and confuse them all together in one, fall into numerous difficulties.

CHAPTER XIX.

[Endnote 33]. (1) I must here bespeak special attention for what was said in Chap. XVI. concerning rights.

End of Part IV Endnotes.