Cyprus, as I Saw It in 1879 Part 22

In my opinion the entire question hangs upon the integrity of Turkey as an ally. England has done but little for her, and we may expect too much. The Turks are thoroughly aware that an Anglo-Turkish defensive alliance, and the "Protectorate of Asia Minor by Great Britain," are political arrangements based upon self-interest, for which they owe us no personal grat.i.tude; in the hour of their distress we declined material a.s.sistance, but seized the opportunity for occupying one of their important positions--Cyprus; their only satisfaction remained in the knowledge that they had "done us" in the bargain. We have quickly discovered the painful fact, and one party to the alliance already feels aggrieved, and seeks for an alteration in the terms of the Convention.

I cannot conceive any more dangerous risk to friends.h.i.+ps than an interference in the private affairs of individuals, or in the public administration of governments. We have a.s.sumed the enormous responsibility of the Protectorate of Asia Minor under conditions which we must know will never be fulfilled; Turkey promises to reform the abuses of her internal administration, &c. &c.! Anybody who knows Turkey must be aware that such a reform is impossible: the honest administrative material does not exist in the Ottoman Empire, and the promises of the Porte have been tolerably exemplified since the Crimean war. Under these circ.u.mstances the Anglo-Turkish alliance is in a questionable position. We have a.s.sumed the Protectorate of Asia Minor conditionally; we occupy Cyprus conditionally; and should Turkey fail to perform her promises in the government of her Asiatic provinces, we have a back-door for an escape from our onerous engagement. Unfortunately English diplomacy is celebrated for back-doors. In the Berlin Treaty we entered Cyprus through a back-door, and we may possibly retire by the same exit; but there is little doubt that the Turk does not believe in our professed determination to defend him by force of arms in the event of a future conflict between Russia and the Sultan in Asia Minor.

Notwithstanding our professed sincerity, the Turk has become an unbeliever in the faith of treaties and political engagements; he believes most thoroughly that should "British interests" require the sacrifice of honour, England will somehow or other manage to slip through the Ottoman fingers, and escape from her alliance when called upon to meet Russia in the field. Of course the ignorant Turk is wrong, and his suspicions are unfounded.

With a mutual want of confidence in the integrity of an alliance, it would hardly be surprising should the Sultan attach more importance to the practical force of Russia than to the moral rect.i.tude and high political principles of England. The power of Russia has been felt, and the position of European Turkey is that of a dislocated and dismembered Empire, which upon the next explosion will reduce the Sultan to the small extremity on the Bosphorus between Constantinople and the lines of Tchataldja. Turkey will cease to be a European Power, and upon the outbreak of the next Russian war she will be discovered as represented by Asia Minor, in which the claws of the Eagle are already fixed in the vital points--Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan. A Russian advance from those positions will, according to the terms of the alliance, compel Great Britain to exhibit herself as the champion of Turkish rights in armed defence of Asia Minor.

When we reflect upon the prodigious responsibility of such an alliance with a crippled Power that has been completely subdued, the victorious army of the Czar retired from the gates of the capital, the nation bankrupt beyond all hopes of liquidation, the various states in chronic discontent both in Europe and in Asia, and the claims of Greece threatening to explode the combustible materials, we may well appreciate the back-door that has so frequently afforded a retreat from an untenable position.

If it is necessary for England to form a defensive alliance with Turkey as a crippled Power, with Russia actually established in Asia Minor, why should we have waited until Turkey was mortally stricken, when by an earlier alliance we could have at least saved Asia Minor in its integrity? We have let the lion into the house with a boast that we will turn him out in the event of further roaring, instead of having prevented his entry in the first instance.

Under all the circ.u.mstances of the risk and responsibility a.s.sumed by England in a defensive alliance with Turkey under the t.i.tle of a Protectorate of Asia Minor, the Cyprus Convention is highly unfavourable in its conditions. The island should have been simply conveyed from Turkey and transferred as a free gift to England, as a position necessary for her occupation under the probable contingencies of the Anglo-Turkish alliance, and it should have at once become a portion of the British Empire. Had this course been pursued a mutual confidence would have been established; on the other hand, all back-doors would have been sealed, as we should have been bound by all the laws of honour to defend Turkey to the last extremity in Asia Minor.

Russia, in Kars, occupies a position which affords an unbounded horizon for political intrigue. The various Turkish Pachas and other district authorities throughout Asia Minor have witnessed the irresistible advance of Russia, while England stood afar off, and only a.s.sisted Turkey with her good counsel. The same authorities now see Russia in possession, while England, who has not a.s.sisted during the b.l.o.o.d.y struggle, appears upon the scene as a political Paul Pry, and intrudes upon the mysteries that surround Pachas, Governors, and various functionaries, who, from the highest to the lowest official, mainly exist upon extortion.

It is hardly necessary to explain that British a.s.sistance in such a form will be most unwelcome, and will increase our reputation for intermeddling while in the hour of extremity we withhold the required aid. Any interference on our part with the administration of Asia Minor will cause an extreme jealousy and suspicion throughout all cla.s.ses of Turkish officials, who will be rendered the more amenable to the guiles of Russian intrigues from Kars and Ardahan. A very slight knowledge of Turkish character would induce the natural conclusion. The English would be suspected of coveting Asia Minor, as they had already obtained Cyprus, and Russia would have gained her end in destroying all confidence that might possibly have existed, and thus endanger the defensive alliance.

There are serious risks that might enforce the advance of Russian troops beyond the defined frontier. Already there are reports of general discontent and threatened disturbances. In the event of a mutiny of Turkish troops on the Russian border, the Russians might be invited to a.s.sist by the Pacha in command. Sometimes such revolts are fact.i.tious, for political purposes. In all cases the position of Russia in Asia Minor is one of extreme danger to Turkey, and it is far from improbable that activity on her side, and pa.s.siveness upon ours, may terminate in a friends.h.i.+p between the Russians and the Turks to the detriment of British interests, and to the confusion of the a.s.sumed Protectorate.

This doc.u.ment distinctly states:--If "Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any further attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia as fixed by the definitive treaty of peace, England engages to join his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms."

In a despatch from Lord Salisbury to Sir A. H. Layard, dated 30th May, 1878, these ominous words are contained:--

"Even if it be certain that Batoum and Ardahan and Kars will not become the base from which emissaries of intrigue will issue forth, to be in due time followed by invading armies, the mere retention of them by Russia will exercise a powerful influence in disintegrating the Asiatic dominion of the Porte."

In the same lengthy despatch the conditions are described which Turkey must fulfil in reforming the abuses of the present administration, &c.

&c., and there can be no doubt that the British government contemplated the necessity of supplanting a considerable number of the peculant Turkish officials by experienced English officers, whose supervision would ensure the necessary reforms. If such a course should have been accepted by the Porte there could be no question of the salutary effect, as the presence of British officials in actual authority throughout the provinces of Asia Minor would have proved to the various races our positive determination to uphold their rights, and to defend them from the oppression and extortion to which they had been subjected. Such a position would have given England the control that is absolutely necessary to effect the reforms in the administration of Asia Minor, without which the result will be anarchy and revolution within a few years, fostered by Russia precisely in accordance with the policy that has terminated in the disruption of Turkey in Europe.

In the same despatch of 30th May, 1878, Lord Salisbury continues:--

"Her Majesty's Government intimated to the Porte on the occasion of the Conference at Constantinople that they were not prepared to sanction misgovernment and oppression, and it will be requisite before they can enter into any agreement for the defence of the Asiatic territories of the Porte in certain eventualities, that they should be formally a.s.sured of the intention of the Porte to introduce the necessary reforms into the government of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in those regions. IT IS NOT DESIRABLE TO REQUIRE MORE THAN AN ENGAGEMENT IN GENERAL TERMS, FOR THE SPECIFIC MEASURES TO BE TAKEN COULD ONLY BE DEFINED AFTER A MORE CAREFUL INQUIRY AND DELIBERATION THAN COULD BE SECURED AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE."

The italics are my own, for the weak point of the Convention is exhibited by this sentence.

No "general terms" should ever be mentioned in a communication with Orientals, and no convention should have been concluded with the Porte, unless every detail had been previously considered and specially agreed upon between the contracting parties. When this Convention was made public, I concluded that the British government contemplated the official employment of a certain number of their own officers to carry out the spirit of the agreement, without which the Convention would be a farce; at the same time I was convinced that the suspicions of the Turkish government and the stubborn pride of the race would resist any such direct interference upon the part of England. Under these conditions Asia Minor would remain exactly where it was. A grand scheme which would have had immense political results, had the Turks accepted our interference in the honourable spirit of our intentions, has been frustrated by their want of confidence, and the Convention remains, containing an agreement of stupendous importance, by which England is committed to a military undertaking of the first magnitude, while Turkey risks nothing except her "PROMISES OF REFORM in the administration of her Asiatic provinces."

"British interests" in this transaction are represented by Cyprus, which we occupy as tenants--paying 96,000 pounds a year for the ruined house, and leaving ourselves no balance from the revenue for the necessary repairs.

There is no more difficult political a.s.sociate than the Turk; his defensive weapon is delay, and in moments of the greatest emergency his peculiar apathy or patience never forsakes him. Proud and haughty to a superlative degree, in his heart he detests all extraneous counsel and interference, and would rather glide onward to destruction than grasp the hand stretched out to save him. Turkey has expected much from England, and has made a poor return for our sacrifice of blood and treasure during the Crimean war. She obtained an ephemeral financial reputation through the aid of France and England in becoming guarantees for a public loan; upon this false position she traded until the inevitable bankruptcy plunged her into ruin, and opened the gate for the entrance of her enemies, at the same time that dishonesty entailed the severance of friends. England has from mutual interests endeavoured to preserve her from absolute dissolution, and the Protectorate of Asia Minor was a step of political audacity in her favour that surprised the world. This extraordinary offer of material aid has been met by the same want of confidence that has marked the decline of the Turkish Empire; the only extra interference in Asia Minor has been the appointment of a few additional British consuls. These gentlemen will report long lists of abuses, and the general mal-administration of the Turkish officials; they will be hated accordingly, and being absolutely powerless for good, they will simply keep the Foreign Office informed of what was thoroughly well known before. Remonstrances upon our part will be made to the Porte, who will deny the accuracy of the consular reports, and ultimately a special commission will be sent out, which will prove their correctness; the Porte will again promise amendment, but will not sanction the appointment of British officials. In this old-fas.h.i.+oned course, so thoroughly understood by all who have any knowledge of Turkey, the affairs of Asia Minor will be conducted, until revolution shall bring Russia upon the scene at the most favourable opportunity; and England, who has been thwarted by the Power she has endeavoured to save, will, by the terms of the Convention, be compelled to appear in arms as the defender of the remnant of the Turkish Empire.

Common sense would suggest the absolute necessity of special and clearly defined conditions in concluding an alliance with Turkey which may at any moment demand our military interference. If we are bound to a.s.sist by force of arms in the defence of Asia Minor, it is equally necessary that Turkey should be bound to qualify herself for resistance to an attack from Russia. It should have been distinctly agreed that Turkey should raise a territorial army of an estimated strength for the protection of Asia Minor, and that a certain number of British officers should hold important commands, to ensure the regular payment of the troops and to maintain the necessary discipline. Had such conditions been defined, and the civil courts been placed under the supervision of British officials, the Protectorate of Asia Minor would have become a practical combination that would have been an effectual check to Russian encroachments; but as the affair now stands, the alliance is fraught with extreme danger to ourselves. I cannot conceive the possibility of a credulity that would induce experienced statesmen to believe in the a.s.surances given either by Turkey or by Russia. The history of the past is sufficient to prove the utter fallacy of a.s.sertions, promises, and treaties; Turkey will persist in mal-administration; Russia, who is now marching upon Merv in spite of former a.s.surances, as she advanced on Khiva under similar pretexts, will at the moment of her own selection a.s.suredly break through her boundaries in Asia Minor. The position of England will be contemptible. We have thrown down the gauntlet to Russia by an ostentatious alliance with Turkey, but we hesitate to insist upon the overwhelming necessity of British official and military officers to organise the civil administration and an army of defence; thus, when the sudden emergency shall arise, Turkey will be totally unprepared; the various races that comprise her Asiatic dominions will already have been poisoned by intrigue, and the only defence that can be offered to a Russian advance will be afforded by Turkish neglect, which has left the country devoid of roads.

Under these inevitable circ.u.mstances, England will probably accuse Turkey of neglecting to fulfil the conditions of the defensive alliance, and the "back-door" will offer a convenient exit from the difficulty; in which case, Turkey will be compelled to make terms with Russia that will probably terminate in a Russo-Turkish alliance AGAINST England, who will be accused of having treacherously deserted her after breaking a solemn engagement--and obtaining Cyprus.

This may be a gloomy prospect, but it is not one shade darker than the reality of the position, unless the Porte will sanction the a.s.sistance of a British administration that would entirely change the political aspect. A reform of administration in Asia Minor to be effective, should be based upon the judicial system pursued by the English in the courts of Cyprus--where the Turkish laws remain undisturbed, but they are administered under the supervision of specially appointed officers. For the most part Turkish laws are based upon pure equity, and leave little to be desired beyond their faithful execution. The oppression and extortion prevalent throughout the Turkish dominions are directly contrary to the laws, and are the result of personal tyranny on the part of the authorities.

In the event of a rupture with our ally that would result in a Russo-Turkish combination, Cyprus would exhibit its importance as a strategical position that would entirely command the coasts of Syria and the approach to Egypt. As I have already stated, the value of the island is conditional upon the permanence of the Turkish alliance; should Turkey and England remain friends and allies, Cyprus is quite unnecessary as a British military station; but our possession will probably ENTAIL THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF TURKISH GOOD FAITH, as the restored a.r.s.enal and harbour of Famagousta would complete a position that would dominate the whole of the Turkish sh.o.r.es upon the Mediterranean, and in conjunction with Greece, which would a.s.sure the refuge of Corfu to our fleets, the naval power of Great Britain would be absolute to the east of Gibraltar.

CHAPTER XX.

CONCLUSION.

TROODITISSA MONASTERY, CYPRUS.

It is the 22nd August, and the ma.n.u.script of "Cyprus as I saw it in 1879" has already been forwarded to England. In another month we shall be en route for the Euphrates via Alexandretta, and through Bagdad to India by the Persian Gulf. I shall therefore be placed at the serious disadvantage of an exclusion from the proofs, which may require alterations and corrections; this will I trust excuse me should any repet.i.tions be apparent that would otherwise have been detected before publication. There is little to add to the description I have given that would be of public interest, therefore the few additional details are consigned to a short Appendix.

The seclusion of the monastery has been an agreeable interval that has formed a moral harbour from the uncertain seas of busy life, and we shall leave the quiet spot and the good old monks with some regret. A great change has been effected since our arrival in early May. The heaps of filth have given place to extreme cleanliness; the monks wash their hands and faces; even the monastery yard is swept. No atom of impurity is allowed to deface the walk from the cold spring to the great walnut-tree. My little garden has flourished and produced largely; the melons were of excellent flavour; the tomatoes and other vegetables were good, including a species of esculent amaranthus which is a subst.i.tute for spinach. I employed a man and his son to open the path for 2.75 miles, from the monastery to the military route to Troodos, which much improved the communication, and somewhat relieved our solitude by increasing the visits of our friends. If any stranger should now arrive from England at Trooditissa he would appreciate the calm and cool asylum contrasting with the heat of the lower country; but should he arrive even one short month after our departure, I fear the picture will have changed. Throngs of mules will have defiled our clean courtyard, and will be stabled within our shady retreat beneath the walnut-tree, which will remain unswept. The filthy habits of the people, now restrained only by strong remonstrance, will be too apparent. The old monks, Neophitos and Woomonos, (who are dear old people when clean) will cease to wash, and the place and people will certainly relapse into the primeval state of dirt and holiness in which we first discovered it.

We leave in friends.h.i.+p with all, and during our sojourn at Trooditissa of more than three months, no quarrels, or even trifling disagreements, have occurred between the servants or the people. The temporary storm occasioned by the abrupt departure of Christina was quickly lulled by the arrival of the middle-aged-maid of all work of seventy-five, who has performed all her arduous duties with admirable patience. Our own servants have been most satisfactory since their first engagement upon our arrival in Cyprus in January last; Georgi the "prodigal son," has been of much service as interpreter, and is an honest and willing young man, but there is a peculiarity in his physical const.i.tution exhibited in the mutual want of attachment between his person and his b.u.t.tons.

These small but necessary friends continually desert him; and his shoes appear to walk a few inches faster than his feet, leaving him in a chronic state of down-at-heel. Collars will not a.s.similate with his neck; whether they are tied with strings, or fastened with b.u.t.tons, the result is the same, and Georgi's exterior when all or three parts of his b.u.t.tons have deserted him, exhibits a looseness which I am glad to say by no means applies to his character. The cook Christo is an excellent fellow, always willing to please, and good in his profession; added to which, he a.s.sumes a demeanour of importance which is irresistible, and makes all paths smooth. My Abyssinian, Amarn, is always the same quiet, steady character, who performs his daily work with the calm regularity of the stream that turns a mill-wheel, and can always be depended on. It is a pleasure to me that our party does not dissolve upon leaving Cyprus, but the servants accompany us on the Asiatic sh.o.r.e.

In conclusion, I must acknowledge with due thanks the valuable a.s.sistance that I have received in statistical information afforded by the kindness of the High Commissioner, His Excellency General Biddulph, R. A, C. B., and the various chief commissioners of districts, including Lieutenant-Colonel White, First Royal Scots, of Lefkosia; Lieutenant-Colonel Warren, R. A., of Limasol (now promoted to Chief of the Staff); Claude Delaval Cobham, Esq., M. A., of Larnaca; Captain Inglis, of Famagousta; and Captain A. Wauchope, 42nd Highlanders, of Baffo.

In taking leave of Cyprus I must express my share in the general regret at the departure of Sir Garnet and Lady Wolseley, from whom we received much kindness. His successor, General Biddulph, R. A., is well known as a most able and painstaking officer, who is admirably suited for the responsible position he now occupies, but all will remember with due appreciation the vigorous administration of Sir Garnet Wolseley, who was selected for the command of Cyprus in the difficult period of the first British occupation.

THE END.

APPENDIX.

METEOROLOGICAL REGISTER THROUGHOUT JOURNEYS IN CYPRUS.

FROM 1ST FEBRUARY TO 21ST AUGUST, 1879.

It will be remarked that August at Trooditissa is considerably lower in temperature than July.

The following data, from 1st to 17th August, kindly supplied me by Lieut.-Colonel White, Chief Commissioner of Lefkosia, will exhibit the difference between that station, 442 feet above the sea level, and Trooditissa Monastery, 4,340 feet.

The following official estimate of revenue and expenditure must be accepted as only approximate. As the taxes are at present collected by dimes, or tenths, the amount must depend upon the agricultural prosperity of the island, which is liable to considerable fluctuations, and during the present year of semi-famine will result in a serious diminution. There will probably be a sensible decrease in the Customs receipts, as the import of European goods has been checked by the collapse of many European traders who had arrived in Cyprus at the first announcement of the British occupation, and discovered that their goods were unsuited to the requirements of the extremely poor and frugal population. The greater portion of the English traders have already retired from the island; the Greek merchants who have been long established are satisfied with small profits, and their expenses are upon a proportionate scale, which renders British compet.i.tion quite impossible. The Cypriotes decline to purchase from the English stores, as they are ignorant of the language, and the goods are ill-adapted to their wants. The first rush of commercial activity due to the political movement in 1878 has subsided, and the trade will be represented chiefly by the agricultural exports from the island until some more favourable conditions of our occupation may induce a new impulse, and capitalists may venture upon investments in Cyprus.

The mines of umber near Larnaca have been let, and it is by no means improbable that an extension may in a few years be apparent in enterprises of this description. Copper mines near Khrysokhus are being opened, but the preliminary operations can afford no clue to the value of the result. The umber is s.h.i.+pped exclusively to Holland for the manufacture of paint, and the produce of Cyprus is considered to be the finest quality. Although asbestos is reported to exist of a remarkably long fibre and soft texture, I have never met with it except in the coa.r.s.e form which is common in many portions of the island, especially on the Troodos range, where the base of this stone is a s.h.i.+ning greenish substance of a h.o.r.n.y texture, which gradually terminates in bristles of asbestos. I have also seen it in thin veins of metamorphic rocks, glittering like silver, and when scratched with a knife, it resolves into a downy condition like sc.r.a.ped cotton. All these mineral resources require a special and minute investigation.

ESTIMATES OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE IN CYPRUS FOR 1878-79.

Memorandum on the Revenue and Charges of the Island of Cyprus for the Five Years from 1873-4 to 1877-8, under Turkish Administration, with an Estimate for the Year 1878-9, including the Charges of British Administration of the Island.

In submitting the enclosed statement of the accounts of Cyprus for the past five years, with the estimate of revenue and expenditure for the current official year, 1878-79, I propose to describe briefly the character and operation of the several taxes of the island in the past, and the considerations that have guided me in framing the estimate for the present year.

Dimes, or t.i.thes on Produce of the Land.

This is the Government share of the produce of the land, and const.i.tutes by far the largest item in the revenue of the island. In the, year 1874 the t.i.the was raised to an eighth part, or 12 1/2 per cent on the produce, but that was abandoned in 1876, and the t.i.the is all that has been since levied with the sanction of the Turkish Government.