The Fight For The Republic in China Part 4

[Ill.u.s.tration: Silk-reeling done in the open under the Walls of Peking.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: Modern Peking: A Run on a Bank.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: The Re-opening of Parliament on August 1st, 1916, after three years of dictatorial rule.]

Moreover Yuan s.h.i.+h-kai had also shown in his selection and use of foreign Advisers, that he was determined to proceed in such a manner as to advertise his suspicion and enmity of j.a.pan. After the Coup d'etat of the 4th November, 1913, and the scattering of Parliament, it was an American Adviser who was set to work on the new "Const.i.tution"; and although a j.a.panese, Dr. Ariga, who was in receipt of a princely salary, aided and abetted this work, his endors.e.m.e.nt of the dictatorial rule was looked upon as traitorous by the bulk of his countrymen. Similarly, it was perfectly well-known that Yuan s.h.i.+h-kai was spending large sums of money in Tokio in bribing certain organs of the j.a.panese Press and in attempting to win adherents among j.a.panese members of Parliament.

Remarkable stories are current which compromise very highly-placed j.a.panese but which the writer hesitates to set down in black and white as doc.u.mentary proof is not available. In any case, be this as it may, it was felt in Tokio that the time had arrived to give a proper definition to the relations between the two states,--the more so as Yuan s.h.i.+h-kai, by publicly proclaiming a small war-zone in Shantung within the limits of which the j.a.panese were alone permitted to wage war against the Germans, had shown himself indifferent to the majesty of j.a.pan. The j.a.panese having captured Kiaochow by a.s.sault before the end of 1914 decided to accept the view that a _de facto_ Dictators.h.i.+p existed in China. Therefore on the 18th of January, 1915, the j.a.panese Minister, Dr. Hioki, personally served on Yuan s.h.i.+h-kai the now famous Twenty-one Demands, a list designed to satisfy every present and future need of j.a.panese policy and to reduce China to a state of va.s.salage.

CHAPTER VI

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

Although the press of the world gave a certain prominence at the time to the astounding _demarche_ with which we now have to deal, there was such persistent mystery about the matter and so many official _dementis_ accompanied every publication of the facts that even to this day the nature of the a.s.sault which j.a.pan delivered on China is not adequately realized, nor is the narrow escape a.s.signed its proper place in estimates of the future. Briefly, had there not been publication of the facts and had not British diplomacy been aroused to action there is little doubt that j.a.pan would have forced matters so far that Chinese independence would now be virtually a thing of the past. Fortunately, however, China in her hour of need found many who were willing to succour her; with the result that although she lost something in these negotiations, j.a.pan nevertheless failed in a very signal fas.h.i.+on to attain her main objective. The Pyrrhic victory which she won with her eleventh hour ultimatum will indeed in the end cost her more than would have a complete failure, for Chinese suspicion and hostility are now so deep-seated that nothing will ever completely eradicate them. It is therefore only proper that an accurate record should be here incorporated of a chapter of history which has much international importance; and if we invite close attention to the ma.s.s of doc.u.ments that follow it is because we hold that an adequate comprehension of them is essential to securing the future peace of the Far East. Let us first give the official text of the original Demands:

j.a.pAN'S ORIGINAL TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

Translations of Doc.u.ments Handed to the President, Yuan s.h.i.+h-kai, by Mr. Hioki, the j.a.panese Minister, on January 18th, 1915.

GROUP I

The j.a.panese Government and the Chinese Government being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighbourhood existing between the two nations agree to the following articles:--

Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full a.s.sent to all matters upon which the j.a.panese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions, which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Article 2. The Chinese Government engages that within the Province of Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third Power under any pretext.

Article 3. The Chinese Government consents to j.a.pan's building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Kiaochou-Tsinanfu railway.

Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as possible certain important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports. What places shall be opened are to be jointly decided upon in a separate agreement.

GROUP II

The j.a.panese Government and the Chinese Government, since the Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by j.a.pan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:--

Article 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of lease of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to the period of 99 years.

Article 2. j.a.panese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming.

Article 3. j.a.panese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant to j.a.panese subjects the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards what mines are to be opened, they shall be decided upon jointly.

Article 5. The Chinese Government agrees that in respect of the (two) cases mentioned herein below the j.a.panese Government's consent shall be first obtained before action is taken:--

(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third Power to build a railway or to make a loan with a third Power for the purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

(b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third Power pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as security.

Article 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if the Chinese Government employs political, financial or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, the j.a.panese Government shall first be consulted.

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees that the control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway shall be handed over to the j.a.panese Government for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this Agreement.

GROUP III

The j.a.panese Government and the Chinese Government, seeing that j.a.panese financiers and the Hanyehping Co. have close relations with each other at present and desiring that the common interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following articles:--

Article 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations and they further agree that without the previous consent of j.a.pan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said Company nor cause the said Company to dispose freely of the same.

Article 2. The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by other persons outside of the said Company; and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said Company, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.

GROUP IV

The j.a.panese Government and the Chinese Government with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China agree to the following special articles:--

The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China.

GROUP V

Article 1. The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential j.a.panese advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

Article 2. j.a.panese hospitals, churches and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

Article 3. Inasmuch as the j.a.panese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between j.a.panese and Chinese police to settle cases which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by j.a.panese and Chinese or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous j.a.panese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

Article 4. China shall purchase from j.a.pan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50% or more) of what is needed by the Chinese Government or that there shall be established in China a Sino-j.a.panese jointly worked a.r.s.enal. j.a.panese technical experts are to be employed and j.a.panese material to be purchased.

Article 5. China agrees to grant to j.a.pan the right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hanchow, and another between Nanchang and Chaochou.

Article 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and construct harbour-works (including dock-yards) in the Provinces of f.u.kien, j.a.pan shall be first consulted.

Article 7. China agrees that j.a.panese subjects shall have the right of missionary propaganda in China.[13]

The five groups into which the j.a.panese divided their demands possess a remarkable interest not because of their sequence, or the style of their phraseology, but because every word reveals a peculiar and very illuminating chemistry of the soul. To study the original Chinese text is to pa.s.s as it were into the secret recesses of the j.a.panese brain, and to find in that darkened chamber a whole world of things which advertise ambitions mixed with limitations, hesitations overwhelmed by audacities, greatnesses succ.u.mbing to littlenesses, and vanities having the appearance of velleities. Given an intimate knowledge of Far Eastern politics and Far Eastern languages, only a few minutes are required to re-write the demands in the sequence in which they were originally conceived as well as to trace the natural history of their genesis.

Unfortunately a great deal is lost in their official translation, and the menace revealed in the Chinese original partly cloaked: for by transferring Eastern thoughts into Western moulds, things that are like nails in the hands of soft sensitive Oriental beings are made to appear to the steel-clad West as cold-blooded, evolutionary necessities which may be repellent but which are never cruel. The more the matter is studied the more convinced must the political student be that in this affair of the 18th January we have an international _coup_ destined to become cla.s.sic in the new text-books of political science. All the way through the twenty-one articles it is easy to see the desire for action, the love of accomplished facts, struggling with the necessity to observe the conventions of a stereotyped diplomacy and often overwhelming those conventions. As the thoughts thicken and the plot develops, the effort to mask the real intention lying behind every word plainly breaks down, and a growing exultation rings louder and louder as if the coveted Chinese prize were already firmly grasped. One sees as it were the j.a.panese nation, released from bondage imposed by the Treaties which have been binding on all nations since 1860, swarming madly through the breached walls of ancient Cathay and disputing hotly the spoils of age-old domains.

Group I, which deals with the fruits of victory in Shantung, has little to detain us since events which have just unrolled there have already told the story of those demands. In Shantung we have a simple and easily-understood repeated performance of the history of 1905 and the settlement of the Russo-j.a.panese War. Placed at the very head of the list of demands, though its legitimate position should be after Manchuria, obviously the purpose of Group I is conspicuously to call attention to the fact that j.a.pan had been at war with Germany, and is still at war with her. This flourish of trumpets, after the battle is over, however, scarcely serves to disguise that the fate of Shantung, following so hard on the heels of the Russian debacle in Manchuria, is the great moral which Western peoples are called upon to note. j.a.pan, determined as she has repeatedly announced to preserve the peace of the Orient by any means she deems necessary, has found the one and only formula that is satisfactory--that of methodically annexing everything worth fighting about.

So far so good. The insertion of a special preamble to Group II, which covers not only South Manchuria but Eastern Inner Mongolia as well, is an ingenious piece of work since it shows that the hot mood of conquest suitable for Shantung must be exchanged for a certain judicial detachment. The preamble undoubtedly betrays the guiding hand of Viscount Kato, the then astute Minister of Foreign Affairs, who saturated in the great series of international undertakings made by j.a.pan since the first Anglo-j.a.panese Treaty of 1902, clearly believes that the stately Elizabethan manner which still characterizes British official phrasing is an admirable method to be here employed. The preamble is quite English; it is so English that one is almost lulled into believing that one's previous reasoning has been at fault and that j.a.pan is only demanding what she is ent.i.tled to. Yet study Group II closely and subtleties gradually emerge. By boldly and categorically placing Eastern Inner Mongolia on precisely the same footing as Southern Manchuria--though they have nothing in common--the a.s.sumption is made that the collapse in 1908 of the great Anglo-American scheme to run a neutral railway up the flank of Southern Manchuria to Northern Manchuria (the once celebrated Chinchow-Aigun scheme), coupled with general agreement with Russia which was then arrived at, now impose upon China the necessity of publicly resigning herself to a j.a.panese overlords.h.i.+p of that region. In other words, the preamble of Group II lays down that Eastern Inner Mongolia has become part and parcel of the Manchurian Question because j.a.pan has found a parallel for what she is doing in the acts of European Powers.