The Struggle for Missouri Part 8

1st. According to orders, it was the duty of this brigade to attack the enemy in the rear and to cut off his retreat, which order I tried to execute, whatever the consequences might be.

2d. The time of service of the 6th Regiment Mo. Volunteers had expired before the battle. I had induced them, company by company, not to leave us in the most critical and dangerous moment, and had engaged them for the time of eight days, this term ending on Friday, the 9th, the day before the battle.

3d. The 3d Regiment, of which 400 three-months men had been dismissed, was composed for the greatest part of recruits, who had not seen the enemy before and were only insufficiently drilled.

4th. The men serving the pieces and the drivers consisted of infantry taken from the 3d Regiment and were mostly recruits, who had had only a few days' instruction.

5th. About two-thirds of our officers had left us. Some companies had no officers at all; a great pity, but a consequence of the system of the three months' service.

Later, when Gen. Sigel was seeking promotion, Maj. Schofield, then a Brigadier-General, sent the following communication to Gen. Halleck: {184} St Louis, Mo.. Feb. 18, 1862. Maj.-Gen. Halleck, Commanding Department of the Missouri.

General: The question of the merits of Brig.-Gen. Franz Slgel as a commander having a.s.sumed such shape as to deeply involve the interests of the service, I deem it my duty to make a statement of facts which came to my knowledge during the campaign of last Summer in the Southwest, ending in the death of Gen. Lyon and the retreat of his army from Springfield.

Soon after the capture of Camp Jackson, in May, Gen. Lyon sent Col. Slgel, with his two regiments of infantry and two batteries of artillery, to the southwestern part of the State, by way of Rolla, to cut off the retreat of Price's force which he (Lyon) was about to drive from Boonville. Col.

Sigel pa.s.sed beyond Springfield, reaching a point not far from the Kansas line, and on the main road used by Price's men in their movement south to join him. Here he left a single company of infantry in a small town, with no apparent object, unless that It might fall in the hands of the enemy, which it did the next day (6th of July). Sigel met Price the next day, and fought the celebrated "battle of Carthage."

Sigel had about two regiments of infantry, well armed and equipped, most of the men old German soldiers, and two good batteries of artillery. Price had about twice Sigel's number of men, but most of them mounted, armed with shotguns and common rifles, and entirely without organization and discipline, and a few pieces of almost worthless artillery.

Sigel retreated all day before this miserable rabble, contenting himself with repelling their irregular attacks, which he did with perfect ease whenever they ventured to make them. The loss on either side was quite insignificant. Price and McCulloch were thus permitted to join each other absolutely without opposition; Sigel, who had been sent there to prevent their Junction, making a "masterly retreat."

Several days before the battle of Wilson's Creek it was ascertained beyond a doubt that the enemy's strength was about 22,000 men, with at least 20 pieces of artillery, while our force was only about 5,000. About the 7th of August the main body of the enemy reached Wilson's Creek, and Gen. Lyon decided to attack him. The plan of attack was freely discussed between Gen. Lyon, the members of his staff, CoL Sigel, and several officers of the Regular Army.

Col. Sigel, apparently anxious for a separate command, advocated the plan of a divided attack. All others, I believe, opposed it.

On the 8th of August the plan of a single attack was adopted, to be carried out on the 9th. This had to be postponed on account of the exhaustion of part of our troops. During the morning of the 9th Col. Sigel had a long interview with Gen. Lyon, and prevailed upon him to adopt his plan, which led to the mixture of glory, disgrace and disaster of the ever-memorable 10th of August Slgel, in attempting to perform the part a.s.signed to himself, lost his artillery, lost his infantry, and fled alone, or nearly so, to Springfield, arriving there long before the battle was ended. Yet he had almost n.o.body killed or wounded. One piece of his artillery and 500 or 600 infantry were picked up and brought in by a company of Regular cavalry. No effort was made by Sigel or any of his officers to rally their men and join Lyon's Division, altho the battle raged furiously for hours after Sigel's rout; and most of his men in their retreat pa.s.sed in rear of Lyon's line of battle.

{185} On our return to Springfield, at about 5 o'clock p. m., Maj.

Sturgis yielded the command to Col. Sigel, and the latter, after consultation with many of the officers of the army, decided to retreat toward Rolla; starting at 2 o'clock a. m.

in order that the column might be in favorable position for defense before daylight. At the hour appointed for the troops to move I found Col. Sigel asleep in bed, and his own brigade, which was to be the advance guard, making preparations to cook their breakfast It was 4 o'clock before I could get them started. Sigel remained in command three days, kept his two regiments in front all the time, made little more than ordinary day's marches, but yet did not get in camp until 10, and on one occasion 12 o'clock at night.

On the second day he kept the main column waiting, exposed to the sun on a dry prairie, while his own men killed beef and cooked their breakfast. They finished their breakfast at about noon, and then began their day's march.

The fatigue and annoyance to the troops soon became so intolerable that discipline was impossible. The officers, therefore, almost unanimously demanded a change. Maj.

Sturgis, in compliance with the demand, a.s.sumed the command.

My position as Gen. Lyon's princ.i.p.al staff officer gave mo very favorable opportunities for judging of Gen. Sigel's merits as an officer, and hence I appreciate his good as well as his bad qualities more accurately than most of those who presume to judge him. Gen. Sigel, in point of theoretical education, is far above the average of commanders in this country. He has studied with great care the science of strategy, and seems thoroly conversant with the campaigns of all the great captains, so far as covers their main strategic features, and also seems familiar with the duties of the staff; but in tactics, great and small logistics, and discipline he is greatly deficient. These defects are so apparent as to make it absolutely impossible for him to gain the confidence of American officers and men, and entirely unfit him for a high command in our army. While I do not condemn Gen. Sigel in the unmeasured terms so common among many, but on the contrary see in him many fine qualities, I would do less than my duty did I not enter my protest against the appointment to a high command in the army of a man who, whatever may be his merits, I know cannot have the confidence of the troops he is to command.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Brigadier-General. U. S. Volunteers.

This was accompanied by a statement embodying the same facts and signed by substantially all the higher officers who had been with Lyon.

{186} At the first halt of the army, about two miles from the battlefield, while the dead and wounded were being gathered up, it was discovered that Gen. Lyon's body had been left behind. The Surgeon and another officer volunteered to take an ambulance and return to the battlefield for it They were received graciously by Gen. McCulloch; the body was delivered to them and they reached Springfield with it shortly after dark. The Surgeon made an attempt to embalm it by injecting a.r.s.enic into the veins, but decomposition, owing to exposure to the hot sun, had progressed too far to render it practicable, and they were compelled to leave it when the army moved off.

Mrs. Phelps, wife of the member of Congress from that District, and a true Union woman, obtained it and had it placed in a wooden coffin, which was hermetically sealed in another one of zinc. Fearing that it might be molested by the Confederate troops when they entered the city, Mrs. Phelps had the coffin placed in an out-door cellar and covered with straw. Later she took an opportunity of having it secretly buried at night.

Thinking that the remains had been brought on, Mr. Danford Knowlton, of New York, a cousin, and Mr. John B. Hasler, of Webster, Ma.s.s., a brother-in-law of Gen. Lyon, came on at the instance of the Connecticut relatives to obtain the remains. Not finding them at St. Louis, they went forward to Rolla, where Col. Wyman furnished them with an ambulance, with which they proceeded to Springfield under a flag of truce. They were kindly received by Gen. Price, and also by Gen. Parsons, whose brigade was encamped on the ground where the body was buried, and exhuming it, brought it to St. Louis. The city went into mourning, and the remains were conducted by a military and civic procession to the depot, where they were delivered to the Adams Express Company to be conveyed East under an escort of officers and enlisted men.

{187} At every station on the road crowds gathered to pay their tribute of respect to the deceased hero and distinguished honors were paid at Cincinnati, Pittsburg, New York, and Hartford. The body was taken to Eastford, Conn., where the General was born, and in the presence of a large a.s.semblage was interred in a grave beside his parents, in accordance with the desire the General expressed while in life.

Upon opening Lyons' will it was found that he had bequeathed all his savings, prudent investments and property, amounting to about $50,000, to the Government to aid it in the prosecution of the war for its existence.

Aug. 25, Gen. Fremont issued congratulatory orders, in which he said: The General Commanding laments, in sympathy with the country, the loss of the indomitable Gen. Nathaniel Lyon.

His fame cannot be better eulogized than in these words in the official report of his gallant successor, Maj. Sturgis, U. S. Cavalry: "Thus gallantly fell as true a soldier as ever drew a sword; a man whose honesty of purpose was proverbial; a n.o.ble patriot, and one who held his life as nothing where his country demanded it of him. Let us emulate his prowess and undying devotion to his duty!"

The order also permitted the regiments and other organizations engaged to put "Springfield" on their colors, and directed that the order should be read at the head of every company in the Department of Missouri.

{188} Dec. 30, 1861, Congress pa.s.sed a joint resolution, in which it said: That Congress deems it just and proper to enter upon its records a recognition of the eminent and patriotic services of the late Brig-Gen. Nathaniel Lyon. The country to whose service he devoted his life will guard and preserve his fame as a part of its own glory.

2. That the thanks of Congress are hereby given to the brave officers and soldiers who, under the command of the late Gen. Lyon, sustained the honor of the flag, and achieved victory against overwhelming numbers at the battle of Springfield, in Missouri, and that, in order to commemorate an event so honorable to the country and to themselves, it is ordered that each regiment engaged shall be authorized to bear upon its colors the word "Springfield," embroidered in letters of gold. And the President of the United States is hereby requested to cause these resolutions to be read at the head of every regiment in the Army of the United States.

{189}

CHAPTER XII. A GALAXY OF NOTABLE MEN

The Union commanders were naturally very apprehensive that as soon as Price and Mc-Culloch realized that the field had been abandoned they would precipitate upon them their immense horde of vengeful hors.e.m.e.n. Such was not the case. Nothing tells so eloquently of the severity of the blow which Lyon had dealt his enemies than that it was two whole days before Price and McCulloch were in a frame of mind to move forward 10 miles and occupy Springfield, the goal of their campaign. This delay was golden to the Union commanders, hampered as they were by hosts of Union refugees fleeing from the rebel wrath, and inc.u.mbering the column with all manner of vehicles and great droves of stock. Considering the activity of the Missourians in guerrilla warfare, and the vicious way they usually harried the Union forces, it is incomprehensible, except on the theory that the Confederate forces had been stunned into torpor by the blow. The Union column was able to make its long retreat of 125 miles from Springfield to Rolla and traverse an exceedingly rough country cut up every few miles by ravines, gorges and creeks, without the slightest molestation from the six or eight thousand hors.e.m.e.n whom McCulloch had complained were so much in the way during the battle on the banks of Wilson's Creek.

{190} Gen. McCulloch made a number of lengthy and labored explanations to the Confederate War Department of his failure to make any pursuit, but in the light of facts that then should have been attainable none of these was at all satisfactory. He admits that he did not enter Springfield until after his scouts had brought him satisfactory a.s.surances that the Union army had abandoned the town. Aug. 12 he advanced to Springfield, and issued proclamations to the people announcing himself as their deliverer, and that his army "by great gallantry and determined courage" had entirely "routed the enemy with great slaughter."

If he expected to be received and feted as a liberator he was sorely disappointed, and in one of his letters he says in connection with his customary uncomplimentary allusions to Gen. Price's army, "and from all I can see we had as well be in Boston as far as the friendly feelings of the inhabitants are concerned."

The truth was that the advance of the Confederates had had a blighting effect upon that large portion of the people which had hoped to remain neutral in the struggle.

Gen. Lyon, with all his intensity of purpose, had kept uppermost in mind that he was an agent of the law, and his mission was to enforce the law. He had kept his troops under excellent discipline, had permitted no outrages upon citizens, and had either paid for or given vouchers for anything his men needed, and had generally conducted himself in strict obedience of the law. His course was a crus.h.i.+ng refutal of the inflammatory proclamations of Gov. Jackson and others about the Union soldiers being robbers, thieves, ravishers and outragers.

{191} Quite different was the course of the twenty or more thousand men whom Price and McCulloch led into Springfield. They were under very little discipline of any kind, and were burning with a desire to punish and drive out of the country not merely those who were outspoken Unionists, but all who were not radical Secessionists. They knew that the sentiment in Springfield and the country of which it was the center was in favor of the Union, and they wanted to stamp this out by terror.

While this brought to their ranks a great many of the more pliant neutrals, it drove away from them a great number, and put into the ranks of the Union many who had been more or less inclined to the pro-slavery element.

The soreness between Price and McCulloch which had been filmed over before the battle by Price subordinating himself and his troops to McCulloch, became more inflamed during the stay at Springfield. In spite of the fact that the Missouri troops had done much better fighting, and suffered severer losses in the battle than McCulloch, he persisted in denouncing them as cowards, stragglers and mobites, without soldierly qualities.

The following extracts from a report to J. P. Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of War, will show the temper which pervaded all his correspondence, and was probably still more manifest in his personal relations with the Missourians: It was at this point that I first saw the total inefficiency of the Missouri mounted men under Brig.-Gen. Rains. A thousand, more or less, of them composed the advance guard, and whilst reconnoiterlng the enemy's position, some eight miles distant from our camp, were put to flight by a single cannon-shot, running in the greatest confusion, without the loss of a single man except one who died of overheat or sunstroke, and bringing no reliable information as to the position or fore of the enemy; nor were they of the slightest service as scouts or spies afterwards.

{192} As evidence of this I will mention here the fact of the enemy being allowed to leave his position, six miles distant from us, 20 hours before we knew it; thus causing us to make a night march to surprise the enemy, who was at that time entirely out of our reach. A day or two previous to this march the Generals of the Missouri forces, by common consent on their part and unasked on mine, tendered me the command of their troops, which I at first declined, saying to them it was done to throw the responsibility of ordering a retreat upon me if one had to be ordered for the want of supplies, their breadstuffs giving out about this time; and, in truth, we would have been in a starving condition had it not been for the young corn, which was just in condition to be used. * * *

The battle over, it was ascertained that the camp followers, whose presence I had so strongly objected to, had robbed our dead and wounded on the battlefield of their arms, and at the same time had taken those left by the enemy. I tried to recover the arms thus lost by my men, and also a portion of those taken from the enemy, but in vain. Gen. Pearce made an effort to get back those muskets loaned to Gen. Price before we entered Missouri the first time. I was informed he recovered only 10 out of 615. I then asked that the battery be given me, which was one taken by the Louisiana regiment at the point of the bayonet. The guns were turned over by the order of Gen. Price, minus the horses and most of the harness. I would not have demanded these guns had Gen. Price done the Louisiana regiment justice in his official report The language used by him was calculated to make the impression that the battery was captured by his men Instead of that regiment * * *

McCulloch was a voluminous writer, both to the Confederate War Department and to personal and official friends, and few of these communications are without some complaint about the Missouri troops. Everything that he had failed to do was due to their inefficiency, their lack of soldierly perceptions, and conduct. They would give him no information, would not scout nor reconnoiter, and he was continually left in the dark as to the movements of the enemy. When they were attacked he claimed that they would run away in a shameful manner. His dislike of Gen. Rains seemed to grow more bitter continually.

{193} Gen. Price saw a great opportunity and was anxious to improve it. The retreat of the Union forces from Springfield opened up the whole western part of the State, and a prompt movement would carry the army forward to the Missouri River again, where it could control the navigation of that great stream, receive thousands of recruits now being a.s.sembled at places north of the river, separate the Unionists of Missouri from the loyal people in Kansas and Nebraska, and hearten up the Secessionists everywhere as much as it disheartened the Union people, and possibly recover St. Louis.

He pressed this with all earnestness upon Gen. McCulloch, only to have it received with cold indifference or strong objections. He proposed that if McCulloch would undertake the movement, that he, Price, would continue in subordination to him and give him all the a.s.sistance that his troops could give.

There is no doubt that Price was entirely right in his views, and that a prompt forward movement with such forces as he and McCulloch commanded would have been a very serious matter for the Union cause and carry discouragement everywhere to add to that which had been caused by the disaster of Bull Run.

The relations between the two Generals constantly became more strained, and for the latter part of the two weeks which McCulloch remained at Springfield there was little communication between them. Gen. Price made good use of the time to bring in recruits from every part of the State which was accessible and to organize and discipline them for further service.

At the end of a fortnight Gen. McCulloch suffered Gen. Pearce to return to Arkansas with his Arkansas Division, while Gen. McCulloch retired with his brigade of Louisianians and Texans, and Price was left free to do as he pleased.

{194} The death of Gen. Lyon at last aroused Gen. Fremont to a fever of energy to do the things that he should have done weeks before. He began a bombardment of Was.h.i.+ngton with telegrams asking for men, money and supplies, and sent dispatches of the most urgent nature to everybody from whom he could expect the least help. He called on the Governors of the loyal Western States to hurry to him all the troops that they could raise, and asked from Was.h.i.+ngton Regular troops, artillery, $3,000,000 for the Quartermaster's Department, and other requirements in proportion. He made a requisition on the St. Louis banks for money, and showed a great deal of fertility of resource.

Aug. 15, five days after the battle, President Lincoln, stirred up by his fusillade of telegrams, dispatched him the following: Was.h.i.+ngton, Aug. 15, 1861. To Gen. Fremont:

Been answering your messages ever since day before yesterday. Do you receive the answers? The War Department has notified all the Governors you designate to forward all available force. So telegraphed you. Have you received these messages? Answer immediately.

A. LINCOLN.

With relation to his conduct toward Gen. Lyon, Gen. Fremont afterward testified to this effect before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: A glance at the map will make it apparent that Cairo was the point which first demanded immediate attention. The force under Gen. Lyon could retreat, but the position at Cairo could not be abandoned; the question of holding Cairo was one which involved the safety of the whole Northwest. Had the taking of St. Louis followed the defeat of Mana.s.sas, the disaster might have been irretrievable; while the loss of Springfield, should our army be compelled to fall back upon Rolla, would only carry with it the loss of a part of Missouri-a loss greatly to be regretted, but not irretrievable. Having reinforced Cape Girardeau and Ironton, by the ut-most exertions, I succeeded in getting together and embarking with a force of 3,800 men, five days after my arrival in St Louis.

{195} From St. Louis to Cairo was an easy day's Journey by water, and transportation abundant To Springfield was a week's march; and before I could have reached it Cairo would have been taken and with it, I believe, St Louis.

On my arrival at Cairo I found the force under Gen. Prentiss reduced to 1,200 men, consisting mainly of a regiment which had agreed to await my arrival. A few miles below, at New Madrid, Gen. Pillow had landed a force estimated at 20,000, which subsequent events showed was not exaggerated. Our force, greatly increased to the enemy by rumor, drove him to a hasty retreat and permanently secured the position.

I returned to St. Louis on the 4th, having in the meantime ordered Col. Stephenson's regiment from Boonville, and Col.

Montgomery's from Kansas, to march to the relief of Gen.

Lyon.

Immediately upon my arrival from Cairo, I set myself at work, amid incessant demands upon my time from every quarter, princ.i.p.ally to provide reinforcements for Gen.

Lyon.

I do not accept Springfield as a disaster belonging to my administration. Causes wholly out of my jurisdiction had already prepared the defeat of Gen. Lyon before my arrival at St Louis.

The ebullition of the Secession sentiment in Missouri following the news of the battle of Wilson's Creek made Gen. Fremont feel that the most extraordinary measures were necessary in order to hold the State. He had reasons for this alarm, for the greatest activity was manifested in every County in enrolling young men in Secession companies and regiments. Heavy columns were threatening invasion from various points. One of these was led by Gen. Hardee, a Regular officer of much ability, who had acquired considerable fame by his translation of the tactics in use in the Army. He had been appointed to the command of North Arkansas, and had collected considerable force at Pocahontas, at the head of navigation on the White River, where he was within easy striking distance of the State and Lyon's line of retreat, and was threatening numberless direful things.

{196} McCulloch and Price had sent special messengers to him to urge him to join his force with theirs to crush Lyon, or at least to move forward and cut off Lyon's communications with Rolla. They found Hardee within 400 yards of the Missouri State line. He had every disposition to do as desired, but had too much of the Regular officer in him to be willing to move until his forces were thoroly organized and equipped. There was little in him of the spirit of Lyon or Price, who improvised means for doing what they wanted to do, no matter whether regulations permitted it or not.

Hardee complained that though he had then 2,300 men and expected to shortly raise this force to 5,000, one of his batteries had no horses and no harness, and none of his regiments had transportation enough for field service, and that all regiments were badly equipped and needed discipline and instruction.

Later, Hardee repaired many of these deficiencies, and was in shape to do a great deal of damage to the Union cause, and of this Fremont and his subordinates were well aware. Gens. Polk and Pillow, with quite strong forces at Columbus, were threatening Cairo and southeast Missouri, and an advance was made into the State by their picturesque subordinate, Gen. M. Jeff Thompson, the poet laureate of the New Madrid marshes and the "Swamp Fox" who was to emulate the exploits of Francis Marion. Thompson moved forward with a considerable force of irregular mounted men, the number of which was greatly exaggerated, and it was reported that behind him was a column commanded by Pillow, ranging all the way from 8,000 to 25,000.

{197} Gen. Fremont set an immense force of laborers to work on an elaborate system of fortification for the city of St. Louis, and also began the construction of fortifications at Cape Girardeau, Ironton, Rolla and Jefferson City. He employed laborers instead of using his troops, in order to give the latter opportunity to be drilled and equipped. He issued the following startling General Order, which produced the greatest commotion in the State and outside of it: Headquarters of the Western Department,