Why We Are At War Part 24

Aus dem osterreich-ungarischen Material.

Wien, 27. Juli. Das in der osterreichisch-ungarischen Zirkularnote an die auswartigen Botschaften in Angelegenheit des serbischen Konflikts erwahnte Dossier wird heute veroffentlicht.

In diesem Memoire wird darauf hingewiesen, da.s.s die von Serbien ausgegangene Bewegung, die sich zum Ziele gesetzt hat, die sudlichen Teile Oesterreich-Ungarns von der Monarchie loszureiszen, um sie mit Serbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu verbinden, weit zuruckgreist.

Diese in ihren Endzielen stets gleichbleibende und nur in ihren Mitteln und an Intensitat wechselnde Propaganda erreichte zur Zeit der Unnerionskrise ihren Hohepunft und trat damals ossen mit ihren Tendenzen hervor. Wahrend einerjeits die gesamte serbische Bresse zum Kampfe gegen die Monarchie ausrief, bildeten sich--von anderen Propagandamitteln abgesehen--Ussoziationen, die diese Kampfe vorbereiteten, unter denen die Harodna Odbrana an Bedeutung hervorragte. Aus einem revolutionaren Komitee hervorgegangen, fonst.i.tuierte sich diese vom Belgrader Auswartigen Amte vollig abhangige Organisation unter Leitung von Staatsmannern und Offizieren, darunter dem General Tantovic und dem ehemaligen Minister Ivanovic. Auch Major Oja Jantovic und Milan Pribicevic geh.o.r.en zu diesen Grundern. Dieser Berein hatte sich die Bildung und Ausrustung von Freischaren fur den bevorstehenden Krieg gegen die ofterreichisch-ungarische Monarchie zum Ziele gesetzt. In einer dem Memoire angefugten Anlage wird ein Auszug aus dem vom Zentralausschusse der Narodna Odbrana herausgegebenen Vereinsorgane gleichen Namens veroffentlicht, worin in mehreren Artikeln die Tatigfelt und Ziele dieses Vereins ausfuhrlich dargelegt werden. Es heit darin, da zu der Hauptaufgabe der Narodna Odbrana die Verbindung mit ihren nahen und ferneren Brudern jenseits der Grenze und unseren ubrigen Freunden in der Welt geh.o.r.en.

_Oesterreich ist als erster und groter Feind bezeichnet_. Wie die Narodna Odbrana die Notwendigkeit des Kampfes mit Oesterreich predigt, predigt sie eine heilige Wahrheit unserer nationalen Lage. Das Schlukapitel enthalt einen Apell an die Regierung und das Volk Serbiens, sich mit allen Mitteln fur den Kampf vorzubereiten, den die Annexion vorangezeigt hat.

Das Memoire schildert nach einer Aussage eines von der Narodna Odbrana angeworbenen Komitatschis die damalige Tatigkeit der Narodna Odbrana, die eine von zwei Hauptleuten, darunter Jankovic, geleitete _Schule zur Ausbildung von Banden_ unterhielt, Schulen, welche von General Jankovic und von Hauptmann Milan Pribicevic regelmaig inspiziert wurden. Weiter wurden die Komitatschis im _Schieen und Bombenwerfen, im Minenlegen, Sprengen von Eisenbahnbrucken_ usw. unterrichtet. Nach der feierlichen Erklarung der Serbischen Regierung vom Jahre 1909 schien auch das Ende dieser Organisation gekommen zu sein. Diese Erwartungen haben sich aber nicht nur nicht erfullt, sondern die Propaganda wurde durch die serbische Presse fortgesetzt. Das Memoire fuhrt als Beispiel die Art und Weise an, wie das Attentat gegen den bosnischen Landeschef Varesanin publizistisch verwertet wurde, indem der Attentater als serbischer Nationalheld gefeiert und seine Tat verherrlicht wurde. Diese Blatter wurden nicht nur in Serbien verbreitet, sondern auch auf wohlorganisierten Schleichwegen in die Monarchie hineingeschmuggelt.

Unter der gleichen Leitung wie bei ihrer Grundung wurde die Narodna Odbrana neuerlich der zentralpunkt einer Agitation welcher der _Schutzenbund mit 762 Vereinen, ein Sokolbund mit 3500 Mitgliedern, und verschiedene andere Vereine angehorten_.

Im Kleide eines Kulturvereins auftretend, dem nur die geistige und die fuorperliche Entwickelung der Bevolkerung Serbiens sowie deren materielle Kraftigung am Herzen liegt, enthullt die Narodna Oobrana ihr wahres reorganisiertes Programm in vorzitiertem Auszug aus ihrem Vereinsorgan, in welchem "die heilige Wahrheit" gepredigt wird, da.s.s es eine unerla.s.sliche Notwendigkeit ist, gegen Oesterreich, seinen ersten grossten Feind, diesen Ausrottungskampf mit Gewehr und Kanone zu fuhren, und das Volk mit allen Mitteln auf den Kampf vorzubereiten, zur Befreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete, in denen viele Millionen unterjochter Bruder schmachten. Die in dem Memoire zitierten Aufrufe und Reden ahnlichen Charakters beleuchten die vielseitige auswartige Tatigkeit der Narodna Oobrana und ihrer affilierten Vereine, die in Vortragsreifen, in der Teilnahme an Festen von bosnischen Vereinen, bei denen offen Mitglieder fur die erwahnte serbische Vereinigung geworben wurden, besteht. Gegenwartig ist noch die Untersuchung daruber im Zuge, da.s.s die Sokolvereine Serbiens a.n.a.loge Vereinigungen der Monarchie bestimmten, sich mit ihnen in einem bisher geheim gehaltenen Verbande zu vereinigen. Durch Vertrauensmanner und Missionare wurde die Aufwiegelung in die Kreise Erwachsener und der urteilslosen Jugend gebracht. So wurden von Milan Pribicewitsch ehmalige honvedoffiziere und ein Gendarmerieleutnant zum Verla.s.sen des Heeresdienstes in der Monarchie unter bedenklichen Umstanden verleitet. In den Schulen der Lehrerbildungsanstalten wurde eine weitgehende Agitation entwickelt. Der gewunschte Krieg gegen die Monarchie wurde militarisch auch insofern vorbereitet, als serbische Emissare im Falle des Ausbruchs der Feindseligkeiten mit der Zerstorung von Transportmitteln usw., der Anfachung von Revolten und Paniken betraut wurden. Alles dies wird in einer besonderen Beilage belegt.

Das Memoire schildert ferner den Zusammenhang zwischen dieser Tatigkeit der Narodna Oobrana und den affilierten Organisationen mit den Attentaten gegen den Koniglichen Kommissar in Agram Cuvaj im Juli 1912, dem Attentat von Dojcic in Agram 1913 gegen Sterlecz und dem missgluckten Attentat Schafers am 20. Mai im Aramer Theater. Es verbreitet sich hierauf uber den Zusammenhang des Attentats auf den Thronfolger und dessen Gemahlin, uber die Art, wie sich die Jungen schon in der Schule an dem Gedanken der Narodna Dobrana vergifteten und wie sich die Attentater mit Hilfe von Pribicewic und Dacic die Werkzeuge zu dem Attentat verschafften, wobei insbesondere die Rolle des Majors Tankofte dargelegt wird, der die Mordwa.s.sen lieferte, wie auch die Rolle eines gewissen Ciganovic, eines gewesenen Komitatschi und jetzigen Beamten der serbischen Eisenbahndirektion Belgrad, der schon 1909 als Zogling der Bandenschule der damaligen Narodna Odbrana austauchte.

Ferner wird die Art dargelegt, wie Bomben und Waffen unbemerkt nach Bosnien eingeschmuggelt wurden, die keinen Zweifel daruber la.s.st, da.s.s dies ein wohl voerberiteter und fur die geheimnisvollen Zwecke der Narodna oft begangener Schleichweg war.

Eine Beilage enthalt einen Auszug aus den Akten des Kreisgerichts in Serajewo uber die Untersuchung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und dessen Gemahlin. Danach sind Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic und Papovic gestandig, in Gemeinschaft mit dem fluchtigen Mehmedbasic ein Komplott zur Erwordung des Erzherzogs gebildet und ihm zu diesen Zweck aufgelauert zu haben. Cabrinovic ist gestandig, die Bombe geworfen und Gabrilo Princip das Attentat mit der Browningpistole ausgefuhrt zu haben. Beide Tater gaben zu, bei der Verubung der Tat die Absicht des Mordes gehabt zu haben. Die weiteren Teile der Anlage enthalten weitere Angaben der Beschuldigten vor dem Untersuchungsrichter uber Entstehung des Komplotts, Herkunft der Bomben, welche fabrikma.s.sig hergestellt wurden, fur millitarische Zwecke bestimmt waren und ihrer Originalpackung nach aus dem serbischen Waffenlager aus Kragujevac stammten. Endlich gibt die Beilage Auskunft uber den Transport der drei Attentater und der Waffen von Serbien nach Bosnien. Aus dem weiteren Zeugenprotokoll ergibt sich, da.s.s ein Angehoriger der Monarchie einige Tage vor dem Attentat dem osterreichisch-ungarischen Konsulat in Belgrad Meldung von der Vermutung erstatten wollte, da.s.s ein Plan zur Verubung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog wahrend dessen Anwesenheit in Bosnien bestehe. Dieser Mann soll nun durch Belgrader Polizeiorgane, welche ihn unmittelbar vor Betreten des Konsulats aus nichtigen Grunden verhafteten, an der Erstattung der Meldung verhindert worden sein.

Weiter gehe aus dem Zeugenprotokoll hervor, da.s.s die betreffenden Polizeiorgane von dem geplanten Attentat Kenntnis gehabt hatten. Da diese Angaben noch nicht nachgepruft sind, kann uber deren Stichhaltigkeit vorlaufig noch kein Urteil gefallt werden. In der Beilage zum Memoire heisst es: Vor dem Empfangssaal des serbischen Kriegsministeriums befinden sich an der Wand vier allegorische Bilder, von denen drei Darstellungen serbischer Kriegserfolge sind, wahrend das vierte die Verwirklichung der monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiens versinnbildlicht. Ueber einer Landschaft, die teils Gebirge (Bosnien), teils Ebene (Sudungarn) darstellt, geht die Zora, die Morgenrote der serbischen Hoffnungen, auf. Im Vordergrunde steht eine bewaffnete Frauengestalt, auf deren Schilde die Namen aller "noch zu befreienden Provinzen": Bosnien, Herzegowina, Wojwodina, Gyrmien, Dalmatien usw.

stehen.

APPENDIX V

Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Amba.s.sador at Vienna respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-Hungarian Government.

(Cd. 7596)

_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey_.

_London, September_ 1, 1914.

Sir,

The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments.

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tchinsky, who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Amba.s.sador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.

So little had the Russian Amba.s.sador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duc Avarna, Amba.s.sador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark.

As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the "Neue Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official "Fremdenblatt", however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the princ.i.p.al streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Emba.s.sy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the princ.i.p.al emba.s.sies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in many other princ.i.p.al cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Amba.s.sador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have pa.s.sed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis[191]. On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that, whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his a.s.surance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandis.e.m.e.nt. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the amba.s.sadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia.

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tchirsky abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Amba.s.sadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Amba.s.sador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szapary had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations.[192] M.

Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit.

Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing att.i.tude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia."

M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th September. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.

M. Dumaine, French Amba.s.sador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his pa.s.sport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's a.s.surance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Amba.s.sador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd a.s.sembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he a.s.sured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been a.s.sa.s.sinated.

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 5th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th April, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium.

Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The "Neue Freie Presse" was violently insulting towards England. The "Fremdenblatt" was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war.

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my pa.s.sport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage.

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my pa.s.sport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.

After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Amba.s.sador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr.

Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Emba.s.sy, to the Ballplatz.

Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circ.u.mstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument...

[Footnote 191: "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."]

[Footnote 192: See No. 137, "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."]

APPENDIX VI

EXTRACTS FROM

THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK

_Recueil de Doc.u.ments Diplomatiques_:

_Negociations ayant precede la guerre_

_10/23 Juillet--24 Juillet/6 Aout 1914_

PREFATORY NOTE TO APPENDIX VI

This important collection of doc.u.ments, which has only reached us since the publication of our first edition, confirms the conclusion, which we had deduced from other evidence in our fifth chapter (_supra_, pp.