The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge Volume Iv Part 25

Ib. pp. 110-113.

But what makes St. Gregory dispute thus nicely, and oppose the common and ordinary forms of speech? Did he in good earnest believe that there is but one man in the world? No, no! he acknowledged as many men as we do; a great mult.i.tude who had the same human nature, and that every one who had a human nature was an individual man, distinguished and divided from all other individuals of the same nature. What makes him so zealous then against saying, that Peter, James and John are three men? Only this; that he says man is the name of nature, and therefore to say there are three men is the same as to say, there are three human natures of a different kind; for if there are three human natures, they must differ from each other, or they cannot be three; and so you deny Peter, James, and John to be [Greek: h.o.m.oousioi], or of the same nature; and for the same reason we must say that though the Father be G.o.d, the Son G.o.d, and the Holy Ghost G.o.d, yet there are not three G.o.ds, but [Greek: mia theotaes], one G.o.dhead and Divinity.

Sherlock struggles in vain, in my opinion at least, to clear these Fathers of egregious logomachy, whatever may have been the soundness of their faith, spite of the quibbles by which they endeavoured to evince its rationality. The very change of the terms is suspicious. "Yes! we might say three G.o.ds" (it would be answered,) "as we say and ought to say three men: for man and humanity, [Greek: anthropos] and [Greek: anthropotaes] are not the same terms;--so if the Father be G.o.d, the Son G.o.d, and the Holy Ghost G.o.d, there would be three G.o.ds, though not [Greek: treis theotaetes],--that is, three G.o.dheads."

Ib. p. 115-16.

Gregory Nyssen tells us that [Greek: thes] is [Greek: theataes] and [Greek: ephoros], the inspector and governor of the world, that is, it is a name of energy, operation and power; and if this virtue, energy, and operation be the very same in all the Persons of the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, then they are but one G.o.d, but one power and energy. * * * The Father does nothing by himself, nor the Son by himself, nor the Holy Ghost by himself; but the whole energy and operation of the Deity relating to creatures begins with the Father, pa.s.ses to the Son, and from Father and Son to the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit does not act anything separately; there are not three distinct operations, as there are three Persons, [Greek: alla ma ts ginetai agathou Boulaematos kinaesis ka diakosmaesis];--but one motion and disposition of the good will, which pa.s.ses through the whole Trinity from Father to Son, and to the Holy Ghost, and this is done [Greek: achronos ka adiaretos], without any distance of time, or propagating the motion from one to the other, but by one thought, as it is in one numerical mind and spirit, and therefore, though they are three Persons, they are but one numerical power and energy.

But this is either Tritheism or Sabellianism; it is hard to say which.

Either the [Greek: Boulaema] subsists in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost, and not merely pa.s.ses through them, and then there would be three numerical [Greek: Boulaemata], as well as three numerical Persons: 'ergo', [Greek: treis theo ae theatai] (according to Gregory Nyssen's shallow and disprovable etymology), which would be Tritheism: or [Greek: hen ti ginetai Boulaema], and then the Son and Holy Ghost are but terms of relation, which is Sabellianism. But in fact this Gregory and the others were Tritheists in the mode of their conception, though they did not wish to be so, and refused even to believe themselves such.

Gregory Nyssen, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus and Damascen were charged with "a kind of Tritheism" by Petavius and Dr. Cudworth, who, according to Sherlock, have "mistaken their meaning." See pp. 106-9, of this "Vindication."

Ib. p. 117.

For I leave any man to judge, whether this [Greek: mia kinaesis Boulaematos], this one single motion of will, which is in the same instant in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, can signify anything else but a mutual consciousness, which makes them numerically one, and as intimate to each other, as every man is to himself, as I have already explained it.

Is not G.o.d conscious to all my thoughts, though I am not conscious of G.o.d's? Would Sherlock endure that I should infer: 'ergo', G.o.d is numerically one with me, though I am not numerically one with G.o.d? I have never seen, but greatly wish to see, Waterland's controversial tracts against Sherlock. Again: according to Sherlock's conception, it would seem to follow that we ought to make a triad of triads, or an ennead.

1. Father--Son--Holy Ghost.

2. Son--Father--Holy Ghost.

3. Holy Ghost--Son--Father.

Else there is an 'x' in the Father which is not in the Son, a 'y' in the Son which is not in the Father, and a 'z' in the Holy Ghost which is in neither: that is, each by himself is not total G.o.d.

Ib. p. 120.

But however he might be mistaken in his philosophy, he was not in his divinity; for he a.s.serts a numerical unity of the divine nature, not a mere specific unity, which is nothing but a logical notion, nor a collective unity, which is nothing but a company who are naturally many: but a true subsisting numerical unity of nature; and if the difficulty of explaining this, and his zeal to defend it, forced him upon some unintelligible niceties, to prove that the same numerical human nature too is but one in all men, it is hard to charge him with teaching, that there are three independent and co-ordinate G.o.ds, because we think he has not proved that Peter, James, and John, are but one man. This will make very foul work with the Fathers, if we charge them with all those erroneous conceits about the Trinity, which we can fancy in their inconvenient ways of explaining that venerable mystery, especially when they compare that mysterious unity with any natural unions.

So that after all this obscuration of the obscure, Sherlock ends by fairly throwing up his briefs, and yet calls out, "Not guilty!

'Victoria'!" And what is this but to say: These Fathers did indeed involve Tritheism in their mode of defending the Tri-personality; but they were not Tritheists:--though it would be far more accurate to say, that they were Tritheists, but not so as to make any practical breach of the Unity;--as if, for instance, Peter, James, and John had three silver tickets, by shewing one of which either or all three would have the same thing as if they had shewn all three tickets, and 'vice versa', all three tickets could produce no more than each one; each corresponding to the whole.

Ib.

I am sure St. Gregory was so far from suspecting that he should be charged with Tritheism upon this account, that he fences against another charge of mixing and confounding the 'Hypostases' or Persons, by denying any difference or diversity of nature, [Greek: hos ek tou mae dechesthai taen kata physin diaphoran, mixin tina ton hypostaseon ka anakuklaesin kataskeuzonta], which argues that he thought he had so fully a.s.serted the unity of the divine essence, that some might suspect he had left but one Person, as well as one nature in G.o.d.

This is just what I have said, p. 116. Whether Sabellianism or Tritheism, I observed is hard to determine. Extremes meet.

Ib. p. 121.

Secondly, to this 'h.o.m.o-ousiotes' the Fathers added a numerical unity of the divine essence. This Petavius has proved at large by numerous testimonies, even from those very Fathers, whom he before accused for making G.o.d only collectively one, as three men are one man; such as Gregory Nyssen, St. Cyril, Maximus, Damascen; which is a demonstration, that however 'he might mistake' their explication of it, from the unity of human nature, they were far enough from Tritheism, or one collective G.o.d.

This is most uncandid. Sherlock, even to be consistent with his own confession, -- 1. p. 120, ought to have said, "However he might mistake their 'intention', in consequence of their inconvenient and unphilosophical explication;" which mistake, in fact, consisted in taking them at their word.

Ib.

Petavius greatly commends Boethius's explication of this mystery, which is the very same he had before condemned in Gregory Nyssen, and those other Fathers.--That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one G.o.d, not three G.o.ds: 'hujus conjunctionis ratio est indifferentia': that is, such a sameness of nature as admits of no difference or variety, or an exact 'h.o.m.o-ousiotes', as he explains it. * * Those make a difference, who augment and diminish, as the Arians do; who distinguish the Trinity into different natures, as well as Persons, of different worth and excellency, and thus divide and multiply the Trinity into a plurality of G.o.ds. 'Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est. Praeter alteritatem enim nec pluralitas quid sit intelligi potest'.

Then if so, what becomes of the Persons? Have the Persons attributes distinct from their nature;--or does not their common nature const.i.tute their common attributes? 'Principium enim, &c.'

Ib. p. 124.

That the Fathers universally acknowledged that the operation of the whole Trinity, 'ad extra', is but one, Petavius has proved beyond all contradiction; and hence they conclude the unity of the divine nature and essence; for every nature has a virtue and energy of its own; for nature is a principle of action, and if the energy and operation be but one, there can be but one nature; and if there be two distinct and divided operations, if either of them can act alone without the other, there must be two divided natures.

Then it was not the Son but the whole Trinity that was crucified: for surely this was an operation 'ad extra'.

Ib. p. 126.

But to do St. Austin right, though he do not name this consciousness, yet he explains this Trinity in Unity by examples of mutual consciousness. I named one of his similitudes before, of the unity of our understanding, memory, and will, 'which' are all conscious to each other; that we remember what we understand and will; we understand what we remember and will; and what we will we remember and understand; and therefore all these three faculties do penetrate and comprehend each other.

'Which'! The 'man' is self-conscious alike when he remembers, wills, and understands; but in what sense is the generic term "memory" conscious to the generic word "will?" This is mere nonsense. Are memory, understanding, and volition persons,--self-subsistents? If not, what are they to the purpose? Who doubts that Jehovah is consciously powerful, consciously wise, consciously good; and that it is the same Jehovah, who in being omnipotent, is good and wise; in being wise, omnipotent and good; in being good, is wise and omnipotent? But what has all this to do with a distinction of Persons? Instead of one Tri-unity we might have a mille-unity. The fact is, that Sherlock, and (for aught I know) Gregory Nyssen, had not the clear idea of the Trinity, positively; but only a negative Arianism.

Ib. p. 127.

He proceeds to shew that this unity is without all manner of confusion and mixture, * * for the mind that loves, is in the love. * * * And the knowledge of the mind which knows and loves itself, is in the mind, and in its love, because it loves itself, knowing, and knows itself loving: and thus also two are in each, for the mind which knows and loves itself, with its knowledge is in love, and with its love is in knowledge.

Then why do we make tri-personality in unity peculiar to G.o.d?

The doctrine of the Trinity (the foundation of all rational theology, no less than the precondition and ground of the rational possibility of the Christian Faith, that is, the Incarnation and Redemption), rests securely on the position,--that in man 'omni actioni praeit sua propria pa.s.sio; Deus autem est actus purissimus sine ulla potentialitate'. As the tune produced between the breeze and Eolian harp is not a self-subsistent, so neither memory, nor understanding, nor even love in man: for he is a pa.s.sive as well as active being: he is a patible agent.

But in G.o.d this is not so. Whatever is necessarily of him, (G.o.d of G.o.d, Light of Light), is necessarily all act; therefore necessarily self-subsistent, though not necessarily self-originated. This then is the true mystery, because the true unique; that the Son of G.o.d has origination without pa.s.sion, that is, without ceasing to be a pure act: while a created ent.i.ty is, as far as it is merely creaturely and distinguishable from the Creator, a mere 'pa.s.sio' or recipient. This unicity we strive, not to 'express', for that is impossible; but to designate, by the nearest, though inadequate, a.n.a.logy,--'Begotten'.

Ib. p. 133.

As for the Holy Ghost, whose nature is represented to be love, I do not indeed find in Scripture that it is any where said, that the Holy Ghost is that mutual love, wherewith Father and Son love each other: but this we know, that there is a mutual love between Father and Son: 'the Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hands'.--John iii. 35. 'And the Father loveth the Son, and sheweth him all things that himself doeth'.-John v. 20; and our Saviour himself tells us, 'I love the Father'.--John xiv. 31. And I shewed before, that love is a distinct act, 'and therefore in G.o.d must be a person: for there are no accidents nor faculties in G.o.d.'

This most important, nay, fundamental truth, so familiar to the elder philosophy, and so strongly and distinctly enunciated by Philo Judaeus, the senior and contemporary of the Evangelists, is to our modern divines darkness and a sound.

Sect. VI. pp. 147-8.

Yes; you'll say, that there should be three Persons, each of which is G.o.d, and yet but one G.o.d, is a contradiction: but what principle of natural reason does it contradict?

Surely never did argument vertiginate more! I had just acceded to Sherlock's exposition of the Trinity, as the Supreme Being, his reflex act of self-consciousness and his love, all forming one supreme mind; and now he tells me, that each is the whole Supreme Mind, and denies that three, each 'per se' the whole G.o.d, are not the same as three G.o.ds!

I grant that division and separation are terms inapplicable, yet surely three distinct though undivided G.o.ds, are three G.o.ds. That the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are the one true G.o.d, I fully believe; but not Sherlock's exposition of the doctrine. Nay, I think it would have been far better to have worded the mystery thus:--The Father together with his Son and Spirit, is the one true G.o.d.

"Each 'per se' G.o.d." This is the [Greek: proton mega pseudos] of Sherlock's scheme. Each of the three is whole G.o.d, because neither is, or can be 'per se'; the Father himself being 'a se', but not 'per se'.