The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge Volume Iv Part 45

Ib. p. 113.

Where a man holds a certain system of doctrines, the State is bound to tolerate, though it may not approve, them; but when he demands a 'license to teach' this system to the rest of the community, he demands that which ought not to be granted incautiously and without grave consideration. This discretionary power is delegated in trust for the common good, &c.

All this, dear Southey, I leave to the lash of your indignation. It would be oppression to do--what the Legislature could not do if it would--prevent a man's thoughts; but if he speaks them aloud, and asks either for instruction and confutation, if he be in error, or a.s.sent and honor, if he be in the right, then it is no oppression to throw him into a dungeon! But the Barrister would only withhold a license! Nonsense.

What if he preaches and publishes without it, will the Legislature dungeon him or not? If not, what use is either the granting or the withholding? And this too from a Socinian, who by this very book has, I believe, made himself obnoxious to imprisonment and the pillory--and against men, whose opinions are authorized by the most solemn acts of Parliament, and recorded in a Book, of which there must be one, by law, in every parish, and of which there is in fact one in almost every house and hovel!

Part IV. p. 1.

The religion of genuine Christianity is a revelation so distinct and specific in its design, and so clear and intelligible in its rules, that a man of philosophic and retired thought is apt to wonder by what means the endless systems of error and hostility which divide the world were ever introduced into it.

What means this hollow cant--this fifty times warmed-up bubble and squeak? That such parts are intelligible as the Barrister understands?

That such parts as it possesses in common with all systems of religion and morality are plain and obvious? In other words that ABC are so legible that they are legible to every one that has learnt to read? If the Barrister mean other or more than this, if he really mean the whole religion and revelation of Christ, even as it is found in the original records, the Gospels and Epistles, he escapes from the silliness of a truism by throwing himself into the arms of a broad brazenfaced untruth.

What! Is the sixth chapter of St. John's Gospel so distinct and specific in its design, that any modest man can wonder that the best and most learned men of every age since Christ have deemed it mysterious? Are the many pa.s.sages concerning the Devil and demoniacs so very easy? Has this writer himself thrown the least light on, or himself received one ray of light from, the meaning of the word Faith;--or the reason of Christ's paramount declarations respecting its omnific power, its absolutely indispensable necessity? If the word mean only what the Barrister supposes, a persuasion that in the present state of our knowledge the evidences for the historical truth of the miracles of the Gospel outweigh the arguments of the Sceptics, will he condescend to give us such a comment on the a.s.sertion, that had we but a grain of mustard seed of it, we might control all material nature, without making Christ himself the most extravagant hyperbolist that ever mis-used language?

But it is impossible to make that man blush, who can seriously call the words of Christ as recorded by St. John, plain, easy, common sense, out of which prejudice, artifice, and selfish interest alone can compose any difficulty. The Barrister has just as much right to call his religion Christianity, as to call flour and water plum pudding:--yet we all admit that in plum pudding both flour and water do exist.

Ib. p. 7.

Socinus can have no claim upon my veneration: I have never concerned myself with what he believed nor with what he taught &c.

The Scripture is my authority, and on no other authority will I ever, knowingly, lay the foundation of my faith.

Utterly untrue. It is not the Scripture, but such pa.s.sages of Scripture as appear to him to accord with his Procrustean bed of so called reason, and a forcing of the blankest contradictions into the same meaning, by explanations to which I defy him to furnish one single a.n.a.logy as allowed by mankind with regard to any other writings but the Old and New Testament. It is a gross and impudent delusion to call a Book his authority, which he receives only so far as it is an echo of his own convictions. I defy him to adduce one single article of his whole faith, (creed rather) which he really derives from the Scripture. Even the arguments for the Resurrection are and must be extraneous: for the very proofs of the facts are (as every 'tyro' in theology must know) the proofs of the authenticity of the Books in which they are contained.

This question I would press upon him:--Suppose we possessed the Fathers only with the Ecclesiastical and Pagan historians, and that not a page remained of the New Testament,--what article of his creed would it alter?

Ib. p. 10.

If the creed of Calvinistic Methodism is really more productive of conversions than the religion of Christianity, let them openly and at once say so.

But Calvinistic Methodism? Why Calvinistic Methodism? Not one in a hundred of the Methodists are Calvinists. Not to mention the impudence of this crow in his abuse of black feathers! Is it worse in a Methodist to oppose Socinianism to Christianity, that is, to the doctrines of Wesley or even Whitfield, which are the same as those of all the Reformed Churches of Christendom, and differ only wherein the most celebrated divines of the same churches have differed with each other,--than for the Barrister to oppose Methodism to Christianity (his Christianity)--that is, to Socinianism, which in every peculiar doctrine of Christianity differs from all divines of all Churches of all ages?

For the one tenet in which the Calvinist differs from the majority of Christians, are there not ten in which the Socinian differs from all? To what purpose then this windy declamation about John Calvin? How many Methodists, does the Barrister think, ever saw, much less read, a work of Calvin's? If he scorns the name of Socinus as his authority, and appeals to Scripture, do not the Methodists the same? When do they refer to Calvin? In what work do they quote him? This page is therefore mere dust in the eyes of the public. And his abuse of Calvin displays only his own vulgar ignorance both of the man, and of his writings. For he seems not to know that the humane Melancthon, and not only he, but almost every Church, Lutheran or Reformed, throughout Europe, sent letters to Geneva, extolling the execution of Servetus, and returning their thanks. Yet it was a murder not the less: Yes! a d.a.m.ned murder: but the guilt of it is not peculiar to Calvin, but common to all the theologians of that age; and, 'Nota bene,' Mr. Barrister, the Socini not excepted, who were prepared to inflict the very same punishment on F.

Davidi for denying the adorability of Christ. If to wish, will, resolve, and attempt to realize, be morally to commit, an action, then must Socinus and Calvin hunt in the same collar. But, O mercy! if every human being were to be held up to detestation, who in that age would have thought it his duty to have pa.s.sed sentence 'de comburendo heretico' on a man, who had publicly styled the Trinity "a Cerberus," and "a three-headed monster of h.e.l.l," what would the history of the Reformation be but a list of criminals? With what face indeed can we congratulate ourselves on being born in a more enlightened age, if we so bitterly abuse not the practice but the agents? Do we not admit by this very phrase "enlightened," that we owe our exemption to our intellectual advantages, not primarily to our moral superiority? It will be time enough to boast, when to our own tolerance we have added their zeal, learning, and indefatigable industry. [7]

Ib. p. 13, 14.

If religion consists in listening to long prayers, and attending long sermons, in keeping up an outside appearance of devotion, and interlarding the most common discourse with phrases of Gospel usage:--if this is religion, then are the disciples of Methodism pious beyond compare. But in real humility of heart, in mildness of temper, in liberality of mind, in purity of thought, in openness and uprightness of conduct in private life, in those practical virtues which are the vital substance of Christianity,--in these are they superior? No. Public observation is against the fact, and the conclusion to which such observation leads is rarely incorrect. * *

The very name of the sect carries with it an impression of meanness and hypocrisy. Scarce an individual that has had any dealings with those belonging to it, but has good cause to remember it from some circ.u.mstance of low deception or of shuffling fraud. Its very members trust each other with caution and reluctance. The more wealthy among them are drained and dried by the leeches that perpetually fasten upon them. The leaders, ignorant and bigoted--I speak of them collectively --present us with no counter-qualities that can conciliate respect.

They have all the craft of monks without their courtesy, and all the subtlety of Jesuits without their learning.

In the whole 'Bibliotlieca theologica' I remember no instance of calumny so gross, so impudent, so unchristian. Even as a single robber, I mean he who robs one man, gets hanged, while the robber of a million is a great man, so it seems to be with calumny. This worthy Barrister will be extolled for this audacious slander of thousands, for which, if applied to any one individual, he would be in danger of the pillory. This paragraph should be quoted: for were the charge true, it is nevertheless impossible that the Barrister should know it to be true. He positively a.s.serts as a truth known to him what it is impossible he should know:--he is therefore doubly a slanderer; for first, the charge is a gross calumny; and were it otherwise, he would still be a slanderer, for he could have no proof, no ground for such a charge.

Ib. p. 15.

Amidst all this spirit of research we find nothing--comparatively nothing--of improvement in that science of all others the most important in its influence * * *. Religion, except from the emanc.i.p.ating energy of a few superior minds, which have dared to snap asunder the cords which bound them to the rock of error * * * has been suffered to remain in its principles and in its doctrines, just what it was when the craft of Catholic superst.i.tion first corrupted its simplicity. So, so. Here it comes out at last! It is not the Methodists; no; it is all and each of all Europe, Infidels and Socinians excepted! O impudence! And then the exquisite self-conceit of the blunderer!

Ib. p. 29.

--If of 'different denominations', how were they thus conciliated to a society of this ominous nature, from which they must themselves of necessity be excluded by that indispensable condition of admittance, "'a union' of religious sentiment in the 'great doctrines':" which very want of union it is that creates these 'different denominations'?

No, Barrister! they mean that men of different denominations may yet all believe in the corruption of the human will, the redemption by Christ, the divinity of Christ as consubstantial with the Father, the necessity of the Holy Spirit, or grace (meaning more than the disposition of circ.u.mstances), and the necessity of faith in Christ superadded to a belief of his actions and doctrines,--and yet differ in many other points. The points enumerated are called the great points, because all Christians agree in them excepting the Arians and Socinians, who for that reason are not deemed Christians by the rest. The Roman Catholic, the Lutheran, the Calvinist, the Arminian, the Greek, with all their sub-divisions, do yet all accord in these articles:--the booksellers might have said, all who repeat the Nicene Creed. N. B. I do not approve, or defend, nay, I dislike, these "United Theological Booksellers": but this utter Barrister is their best friend by attacking them so as to secure to them victory, and all the advantages of being known to have been wickedly slandered;--the best s.h.i.+eld a faulty cause can protend against the javelin of fair opposition.

Ib. p. 56.

Our Saviour never in any single instance reprobated the exercise of reason: on the contrary, he reprehends severely those who did not exercise it. Carnal reason is not a phrase to be found in his Gospel; he appealed to the understanding in all he said, and in all he taught.

He never required 'faith' in his disciples, without first furnis.h.i.+ng sufficient 'evidence' to justify it. He reasoned thus: If I have done what no 'human power' could do, you must admit that my power is 'from above', &c.

Good heavens! did he not uniformly require faith as the condition of obtaining the "evidence," as this Barrister calls it--that is, the miracle? What a shameless perversion of the fact! He never did reason thus. In one instance only, and then upbraiding the base sensuality of the Jews, he said: "If ye are so base as not to believe what I say from the moral evidence in your own consciences, yet pay some attention to it even for my works' sake." And this, an 'argumentum ad hominem,' a bitter reproach (just as if a great chemist should say;--Though you do not care for my science, or the important truths it presents, yet, even as an amus.e.m.e.nt superior to that of your jugglers to whom you willingly crowd, pay some attention to me)--this is to be set up against twenty plain texts and the whole spirit of the whole Gospel! Besides, Christ could not reason so; for he knew that the Jews admitted both natural and demoniacal miracles, and their faith in the latter he never attacked; though by an 'argumentum ad hominem' (for it is no argument in itself) he denied its applicability to his own works. If Christ had reasoned so, why did not the Barrister quote his words, instead of putting imaginary words in his mouth?

Ib. 60, 61.

Religion is a system of 'revealed' truth; and to affirm of any revealed truth, that we 'cannot understand' it, is, in effect, either to deny that it has been revealed, or--which is the same thing--to admit that it has been revealed in vain.

It is too worthless! I cannot go on. Merciful G.o.d! hast thou not revealed to us the being of a conscience, and of reason, and of will;--and does this Barrister tell us, that he "understands" them? Let him know that he does not even understand the very word understanding.

He does not seem to be aware of the school-boy distinction between the [Greek: hoti esti] and the [Greek: dioti]? But to all these silly objections religion must for ever remain exposed as long as the word Revelation is applied to any thing that can be 'bona fide' given to the mind 'ab extra', through the senses of eye, ear, or touch. No! all revelation is and must be 'ab intra'; the external 'phaenomena' can only awake, recall evidence, but never reveal. This is capable of strict demonstration.

Afterwards the Barrister quotes from Thomas Watson respecting things above comprehension in the study of nature: "in these cases, the 'fact'

is evident, the cause lies in obscurity, deeply removed from all the knowledge and penetration of man." Then what can we believe respecting these causes? And if we can believe nothing respecting them, what becomes of them as arguments in support of the proposition that we ought, in religion, to believe what we cannot understand?

Are there not facts in religion, the causes and const.i.tution of which are mysteries?

[Footnote 1: Hints to the Public and the Legislature on the nature and effect of Evangelical Preaching. By a Barrister. Fourth Edition, 1808.]

[Footnote 2: See Aids to Reflection, p. 14, 4th edition.--Ed.]

[Footnote 3: Quart. Review, vol. ii. p. 187.--Ed.]

[Footnote 4: See vol. i., p. 217.--Ed.]

[Footnote 5:

"And from this account of obligation it follows, that we can he obliged to nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by; for nothing else can be a violent motive to us. As we should not be obliged to obey the laws, or the magistrate, unless rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other depended upon our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the commands of G.o.d."

'Paley's Moral and Polit. Philosophy', B. II. c. 2.

"The difference, and the only difference, ('between prudence and duty',) is this; that in the one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world; in the other case, we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come."