An Enquiry into an Origin of Honour; and the Usefulness of Christianity in War Part 1

An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour, and the Usefulness of Christianity in War.

by Bernard Mandeville.

THE PREFACE.

I take it for granted, that a Christian is not bound to believe any Thing to have been of Divine Inst.i.tution, that has not been declared to be such in Holy Writ. Yet great Offence has been taken at an Essay, in the First Part of the Fable of the _Bees_, call'd An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue; notwithstanding the great Caution it is wrote with. Since then, it is thought Criminal to surmise, that even Heathen Virtue was of Human Invention, and the Reader, in the following Dialogues, will find me to persist in the Opinion, that it was; I beg his Patience to peruse what I have to say for my self on this Head, which is all I shall trouble him with here.

The Word Morality is either synonimous with Virtue, or signifies that Part of Philosophy, which treats of it, and teaches the Regulation of Manners; and by the Words Moral Virtue, I mean the same Thing which I believe Every body else does. I am likewise fully persuaded that to govern our selves according to the Dictates of Reason, is far better than to indulge the Pa.s.sions without Stop or Controul, and consequently that Virtue is more beneficial than Vice, not only for the Peace and real Happiness of Society in general, but likewise for the Temporal Felicity of every individual Member of it, abstract from thee Consideration of a future State, I am moreover convinced, that all wise Men ever were and ever will be of this Opinion; and I shall never oppose Any body, who shall be pleased to call this an Eternal Truth.

Having allow'd and own'd thus much, I beg Leave to make a short Grammatical Reflection on the Sounds or Letters we make use of to express this rational Management of ourselves: For tho' the Truth of its Excellency is Eternal, the Words _Moral Virtue_ themselves are not so, any more than Speech or Man himself. Permit me therefore to enquire which Way it is most probably, they must have come into the World.

The Word _Moral_, without Doubt, comes from _Mos_, and signifies every Thing that relates to Manners: The Word _Ethick_ is synonimous with _Moral_, and is derived from [Greek: ithik], which is exactly the same in _Greek_, that _Mos_ is in _Latin_. The _Greek_ for Virtu, is [Greek: arete], which is derived from [Greek: ares], the G.o.d of War and properly signifies Martial Virtue. The same Word in _Latin_, if we believe _Cicero_, comes from _Vir_; and the genuine Signification likewise of the Word _Virtus_ is Fort.i.tude. It is hardly to be conceived, but that in the first Forming of all Societies, there must have been Struggles for Superiority; and therefore it is reasonable to imagine, that in all the Beginnings of Civil Government, and the Infancy of Nations, Strength and Courage must have been the most valuable Qualifications for some Time. This makes me think, that _Virtus_, in its first Acceptation, might, with great Justice and Propriety, be in _English_ render'd _Manliness_; which fully expresses the Original Meaning of it, and shews the Etymology equally with the _Latin_; and whoever is acquainted with that Language must know, that it was some ages before the _Romans_ used it in any other Sense. Nay, to this Day, the Word _Virtus_ by it self, in any of their Historians, has the same Signification, as if the Word _Bellica_ had been added. We have Reason to think, that, as First, Nothing was meant by _Virtus_, but Daring and Intrepidity, right or wrong; or else if could never have been made to signify Savageness, and brutish Courage; as _Tacitus_, in the Fourth Book of his History, makes use of it manifestly in that Sense. Even Wild Beasts, says he, if you keep them shut up, will lose their Fierceness. _Etiam sera animalia, si clausa teneas, virtutis obliviseuntur_.

What the Great Men of _Rome_ valued themselves upon was active and pa.s.sive Bravery, Warlike Virtue, which is so strongly express'd in the Words of Livy: _Et facere & pati fortia Romanum est._ But besides the Consideration of the great Service, All Warriours received from this Virtue, there is a very good Reason in the Nature of the Thing it self, why it should be in far higher Esteem than any other.

The Pa.s.sion it has to struggle with, is the most violent and stubborn, and consequently the hardest to be conquer'd, the Fear of Death: The least Conflict with it is harsh Work, and a difficult Task; and it is in Regard to this, that _Cicero_, in his _Offices_, calls Modesty, Justice and Temperance, the softer and easier Virtues. _Qui virtutibus bis lenioribus erit ornatus, modestia, just.i.tia temperantia,_ &c.

Justice and Temperance require Professors as grave and solemnn, and demand as much Strictness and Observance as any other Virtues. Why _lenioribus_ then; but that they are more mild and gentle in the Restrain they lay upon our Inclinations, and that the Self-denial they require is more practicable and less mortifying than that of Virtue itself, as it is taken in it proper and genuine Sense? To be Just or Temperate, we have Temptations to encounter, and Difficulties to surmount, that are troublesome: But the Efforts we are oblig'd to make upon our selves to be truyly Valiant are infinitely greater; and, in order to it, we are overcome the First, the strongest and most lasting Pa.s.sion, that has been implanted in us; for tho' we may hate and have Aversion to many Things by Instinct, yet this is Nothing so generally terrible, and so generally dreadful to all Creatures, rational or not rational, as the Dissolution of their Being.

Upon due Consideration of what has been said, it will be easy to imagine how and why, soon after Fort.i.tude had been honoured with the Name of Virtue, all the other Branches of Conquest over our selves were dignify'd with the same t.i.tle. We may see in it likewise the Reason of what I have always so strenuously insisted upon, _viz._ That no Practice, no Action or good Quality, how useful or beneficial soever they may be in them selves, can ever deserve the Name of Virtue, strictly speaking, where there is not a palpable Self-denial to be seen. In Tract of Time, the Sense of the Word _Virtus_ received still a grated Lat.i.tude; and it signify'd Worth, Strength, Authority, and Goodness of all Kinds: _Plautus_ makes use of it, for a.s.sistance.

_Virtute Deum_, by the Help of the G.o.ds. By Degrees it was applied not only to Brutes, _Est in juveneis, est in equis patrum Virtus_, but likewise to Things inanimate and was made Use of to express the Power, and peculiar Qualities of Vegetables and Minerals of all Sorts, as it continues to be to this Day. The Virtue of the Loadstone, the Virtue of Opium, &c. It is highly probable, that the Word _Moral_, either in _Greek_ or _Latin_, never was thought of before the Signification of the Word _Virtue_ had been extended so far beyond its Original; and then in speaking of the Virtues of our Species, the Addition of that Epithet became necessary, to denote the Relation they had to our Manners, and distinguish them from the Properties and Efficacy of Plants, Stones, &c. which were likewise call'd _Virtues_.

If I am wrong, I shall be glad to see a better Account, how this Adjective and Substantive came to be join'd together. In the mean Time, I am very sure, that this is Nothing strain'd or forc'd in my Supposition. That the Words, in Tract of Time, are be come of greater Importance, I don't deny. The Words _Clown_ and _Villain_ have opprobrious Meanings annex'd to them, that were never implied in _Colonus_ and _Villa.n.u.s_, from which they were undoubtedly derived. _Moral_, for ought I know, may now signify _Virtue_, in the same Manner and for the same Reason, that _Panic_ signifies _Fear_.

That this Conjecture or Opinion of mine, should be detracting from the Dignity of _Moral Virtue_, or have a Tendency to bring it into Disrepute, I can not see. I have already own'd, that it ever was and ever will be preferable to Vice, in the Opinion of all wise Men. But to call Virtue it self Eternal, can not be done without a strangely Figurative Way of Speaking. There is no Doubt, but all Mathematical Truths are Eternal, yet they are taught; and some of them are very abstruse, and the Knowledge of them never was acquir'd without great Labour and Depth of Thought. _Euclid_ had his Merit; and it does not appear that the Doctrine of the _Fluxions_ was known before Sir _Isaac Newton_ discover'd that concise Way of Computation; and it is not impossible that there should be another Method, as yet unknown, still more compendious, that may not be found out these Thousand Years.

All Propositions, not confin'd to Time or Place, that are once true, must be always so; even in the silliest and most abject Things in the World; as for Example, It is wrong to under-roast Mutton for People who love to have their Meat well done. The Truth of this, which is the most trifling Thing I can readily think on, is as much Eternal, as that of the Sublimest Virtue. If you ask me, where this Truth was, before there was Mutton, or People to dress or eat it, I answer, in the same Place where Chast.i.ty was, before there were any Creatures that had an Appet.i.te to procreate their Species. This puts me in mind of the inconsiderate Zeal of some Men, who even in Metaphysicks, know not how to think abstractly, and cannot forebear mixing their own Meanness and Imbecillities, with the Idea's they form of the Supreme Being.

There is no Virtue that has a Name, but it curbs, regulates, or subdues some Pa.s.sion that is peculiar to Humane Nature; and therefore to say, that G.o.d has all the Virtues in the highest Perfection, wants as much the Apology, that it is an Expression accommodated to vulgar Capacities, as that he has Hands and Feet, and is angry. For as G.o.d has not a Body, nor any Thing that is Corporeal belonging to his Essence, so he is entirely free from Pa.s.sions and Fralities. With what Propriety then can we attribute any Thing to him that was invented, or at least signifies a Strength or Ability to conquer or govern Pa.s.sions and Fralities? The Holiness of G.o.d, and all his Perfections, as well as the Beat.i.tude he exists in, belong to his Nature; and there is no Virtue but what is acquired. It signifies Nothing to add, that G.o.d has those Virtues in the highest Perfection; let them be what they will, as to Perfection, they must still be Virtues; which, for the aforesaid Reasons, it is impertinent to ascribe to the Diety. Our Thoughts of G.o.d should be as worthy of him as we are able to frame them; and as they can not be adequate to his Greatness, so they oughts at least to be abstract from every Thing that does or can belong to silly, reptile Man: And it is sufficient, whenever we venture to speak of a Subject so immensly far beyond our Reach, to say, that there is a perfect and compleat Goodness in the Divine Nature, infinitely surpa.s.sing not only the highest Perfection, which the most virtuous Men can arrive at, but likewise every Thing that Mortals can conceive about it.

I recommend the fore-going Paragraph to the Consideration of the Advocates for the Eternity and Divine Original of Virtue; a.s.suring them, that, if I am mistaken, it is not owing to any Perverseness of my Will, but Want of Understanding.

The Opinion, that there can be no Virtue without Self-denial, is more advantagious to Society than the contrary Doctrine, which is a vast Inlet to Hypocrisy, as I have shewn at large [1]: Yet I am willing to allow, that Men may contract a Habit of Virtue, so as to practise it, without being sensible of Self-denial, and even that they may take Pleasure in Actions that would be impracticable to the Vicious: But then it is manifest, that this Habit is the Work of Art, Education and Custom; and it never was acquired, where the Conquest over the Pa.s.sions had not be already made. There is no Virtuous Man of Forty Years, but he may remember the Conflict he had with some Appet.i.tes before he was Twenty. How natural seem all Civilities to be a Gentleman! Yet Time was, that he would not have made his Bow, if he had not been bid.

[Footnote 1: Fable of the _Bees_. p. ii. P. 106.]

Whoever has read the Second Part of the Fable of the _Bees_, will see, that in these Dialogues I make Use of the same Persons, who are the Interlocutors there, and whose Characters have been already draw in the Preface of that Book.

The First Dialogue Between _Horatio_ and _Cleomenes_.

_Horatio_. I Wonder you never attempted to guess at the Origin of Honour, as you have done at that of Politeness, and your Friend in his Fable of the Bees has done at the Origin of Virtue.

Cleo. I have often thought of it, and am satisfied within my self, that my Conjecture about it is Just; but there are Three substantial Reasons, why I have hitherto kept it to my Self, and never yet mention'd to any One, what my Sentiments are concerning the Origin of that charming Sound.

Hor. Let me hear your Reasons however.

Cleo. The Word Honour, is used in such different Acceptations, is now a Verb, then a Noun, sometimes taken for the Reward of Virtue, sometimes for a Principle that leads to Virtue, and, at others again, signifies Virtue it self; that it would be a very hard Task to take in every Thing that belongs to it, and at the same Time avoid Confusion in Treating of it. This is my First Reason. The Second is: That to set forth and explain my Opinion on this Head to others with Perspicuity, would take up so much Time, that few People would have the Patience to hear it, or think it worth their while to bestow so much Attention, as it would require, on what the greatest Part of Mankind would think very trifling.

Hor. This Second whets my Curiosity: pray, what is your Third Reason?

Cleo. That the very Thing, to which, in my Opinion, Honour owes its Birth, is a Pa.s.sion in our Nature, for which there is no Word coin'd yet, no Name that is commonly known and receiv'd in any Language.

Hor. That is very strange.

Cleo. Yet not less true. Do you remember what I said of Self-liking in our Third Conversation, when I spoke of the Origin of Politeness?

Hor. I do; but you know, I hate Affectation and Singularity of all sorts. Some Men are fond of uncouth Words of their own making, when there are other Words already known, that sound better, and would equally explain their Meaning: What you call'd then Self-liking at last prov'd to be Pride, you know.

Cleo. Self-liking I have call'd that great Value, which all Individuals set upon their own Persons; that high Esteem, which I take all Men to be born with for themselves. I have proved from what is constantly observ'd in Suicide, that there is such a Pa.s.sion in Human Nature, and that it is plainly [2] distinct from Self-love. When this Self-liking is excessive, and so openly shewn as to give Offence to others, I know very well it is counted a Vice and call'd Pride: But when it is kept out of Sight, or is so well disguis'd as not to appear in its own Colours, it has no Name, tho' Men act from that and no other Principle.

[Footnote 2: Fable of the Bees, part II. p. 141]

Hor. When what you call Self-liking, that just Esteem which Men have naturally for themselves, is moderate, and spurs them on to good Actions, it is very laudable, and is call'd the Love of Praise or a Desire of the Applause of others. Why can't you take up with either of these Names?

Cleo. Because I would not confound the Effect with the Cause. That Men are desirous of Praise, and love to be applauded by others, is the Result, a palpable Consequence, of that Self-liking which reigns in Human Nature, and is felt in every one's Breast before we have Time or Capacity to reflect and think of Any body else. What Moralists have taught us concerning the Pa.s.sions, is very superficial and defective.

Their great Aim was the Publick Peace, and the Welfare of the Civil Society; to make Men governable, and unite Mult.i.tudes in one common Interest.

Hor. And is it possible that Men can have a more n.o.ble Aim in Temporals?

Cleo. I don't deny that; but as all their Labours were only tending to those Purposes, they neglected all the rest; and if they could but make Men useful to each other and easy to themselves, they had no Scruple about the Means they did it by, nor any Regard to Truth or the Reality of Things; as is evident from the gross Absurdities they have made Men swallow concerning their own Nature, in spight of what All felt within. In the Culture of Gardens, whatever comes up in the Paths is weeded out as offensive and flung upon the Dunghill; out among the Vegetables that are all thus promiscously thrown away for Weeds, there may be many curious Plants, on the Use and Beauty of which a Botanist would read long Lectures. The Moralists have endeavour'd to rout Vice, and clear the Heart of all hurtful Appet.i.tes and Inclinations: We are beholden to them for this in the same Manner as we are to Those who destroy Vermin, and clear the Countries of all noxious Creatures. But may not a Naturalist dissect Moles, try Experiments upon them, and enquire into the Nature of their Handicraft, without Offence to the Mole-catchers, whose Business it is only to kill them as fast as they can?

Hor. What Fault is it you find with the Moralists? I can't see what you drive at.

Cleo. I would shew you, that the Want of Accuracy in them, when they have treated of Human Nature, makes it extremely difficult to speak intelligibly of the different Faculties of our intellectual Part. Some Things are very essential, and yet have no Name, as I have given an Instance in that Esteem which Men have naturally for themselves, abstract from Self-love, and which I have been forced to coin the Word Self-liking for: Others are miscall'd and said to be what they are not. So most of the Pa.s.sions are counted to be Weaknesses, and commonly call'd Frailties; whereas they are the very Powers that govern the whole Machine; and, whether they are perceived or not, determine or rather create The Will that immediately precedes every deliberate Action.

Hor. I now understand perfectly well what you mean by Self-liking. You are of Opinion, that we are all born with a Pa.s.sion manifestly distinct from Self-love; that, when it is moderate and well regulated, excites in us the Love of Praise, and a Desire to be applauded and thought well of by others, and stirs us up to good Actions: but that the same Pa.s.sion, when it is excessive, or ill turn'd, whatever it excites in our Selves, gives Offence to others, renders us odious, and is call'd Pride. As there is no Word or Expression that comprehends all the different Effects of this same Cause, this Pa.s.sion, you have made one, _viz_. Self-liking, by which you mean the Pa.s.sion in general, the whole Extent of it, whether it produces laudable Actions, and gains us Applause, or such as we are blamed for and draw upon us the ill Will of others.

Cleo. You are extremely right; this was my Design in coining the Word Self-liking.

Hor. But you said, that Honour owes its Birth to this Pa.s.sion; which I don't understand, and wish you would explain to me.

Cleo. To comprehend this well, we ought to consider, that as all Human Creatures are born with this Pa.s.sion, so the Operations of it are manifestly observed in Infants; as soon as they begin to be conscious and to reflect, often before they can speak or go.

Hor. As how?

Cleo. If they are praised, or commended, tho' they don't deserve it, and good Things are said of them, tho' they are not true, we see, that Joy is raised in them, and they are pleased: On the Contrary, when they are reproved and blamed, tho' they know themselves to be in Fault, and bad Things are said of them, tho' Nothing but Truth, we see it excites Sorrow in them and often Anger. This Pa.s.sion of Self-liking, then, manifesting it self so early in all Children that are not Idiots, it is inconceivable that Men should not be sensible, and plainly feel, that they have it long before they are grown up: And all Men feeling themselves to be affected with it, tho' they know no Name for the Thing it self, it is impossible, that they should long converse together in Society without finding out, not only that others are influenced with it as well as themselves, but likewise which Way to please or displease one another on Account of this Pa.s.sion.

Hor. But what is all this to Honour?

Cleo. I'll shew you. When _A_ performs an Action which, in the Eyes of _B_, is laudable, _B_ wishes well to _A_; and, to shew him his Satisfaction, tells him, that such an Action is an Honour to Him, or that He ought to be Honoured for it: By saying this, _B_, who knows that all Men are affected with Self-liking, intends to acquaint _A_, that he thinks him in the Right to gratify and indulge himself in the Pa.s.sion of Self-liking. In this Sense the Word Honour, whether it is used as a Noun or a Verb, is always a Compliment we make to Those who act, have, or are what we approve of; it is a Term of Art to express our Concurrence with others, our Agreement with them in their Sentiments concerning the Esteem and Value they have for themselves. From what I have said, it must follow, that the greater the Mult.i.tudes are that express this Concurrence, and the more expensive, the more operose, and the more humble the Demonstrations of it are, the more openly likewise they are made, the longer they last, and the higher the Quality is of Those who join and a.s.sist in this Concurrence, this Compliment; the greater, without all Dispute, is the Honour which is done to the Person in whose Favour these Marks of Esteem are displayed: So that the highest Honour which Men can give to Mortals, whilst alive, is in Substance no more, than the most likely and most effectual Means that Human Wit can invent to gratify, stir up, and encrease in Him, to whom that Honour is paid, the Pa.s.sion of Self-liking.

Hor. I am afraid it is true.

Cleo. To render what I have advanced more conspicuous, we need only look into the Reverse of Honour, which is Dishonour or Shame, and we shall find, that this could have had no Existence any more than Honour, if there had not been such a Pa.s.sion in our Nature as Self-liking. When we see Others commit such Actions, as are vile and odious in our Opinion, we say, that such Actions are a Shame to them, or that they ought to be ashamed of them. By this we shew, that we differ from them in their Sentiments concerning the Value which we know, that they, as well as all Mankind, have for their own Persons; and are endeavouring to make them have an ill Opinion of themselves, and raise in them that sincere Sorrow, which always attends Man's reflecting on his own Unworthiness. I desire, you would mind, that the Actions which we thus condemn as vile and odious, need not to be so but in our own Opinion; for what I have said happens among the worst of Rogues, as well as among the better Sort of People. If one Villain should neglect picking a Pocket, when he might have done it with Ease, another of the same Gang, who was near him and saw this, would upbraid him with it in good Earnest, and tell him, that he ought to be ashamed of having slipt so fair an Opportunity. Sometimes Shame signifies the visible Disorders that are the Symptoms of this sorrowful Reflection on our own Unworthiness; at others, we give that Name to the Punishments that are inflicted to raise those Disorders; but the more you will examine into the Nature of either, the more you will see the Truth of what I have a.s.serted on this Head; and all the Marks of Ignominy, that can be thought of; have a plain Tendency to mortify Pride; which, in other Words, is to disturb, take away and extirpate every Thought of Self-liking.

Hor. The Author of the Fable of the _Bees_, I think, pretends somewhere to set down the different Symptoms of Pride and Shame.