Trial of the Officers and Crew of the Privateer Savannah on the Charge of Piracy Part 31

It now becomes my duty, gentlemen, to call your attention, very briefly, to the grounds on which the prosecution rests this case. There are two grounds, and I will notice them in their order. The first is, that this was robbery. Well, I have had occasion, already, in what I have said to you, to call your attention to some of the points that distinguish this case from robbery. I say it was not robbery, because, in the first place, one of the requisites of robbery on the sea, which is called piracy, is, that it shall be done with a piratical and felonious intent. The intent is what gives character to the crime; and the point that we shall make on that part of the case is this, that if these men, in the capture of the Joseph (leaving out of view for the present the circ.u.mstance of their having acted under a commission from the Confederate States), acted under the belief that they had a right to take her, there was not the piratical and felonious intent, and the crime of robbery was not committed. I will very briefly call your attention to a few authorities on that subject. One of the most standard English works, and the most universally referred to on this subject of robberies, is _Hale's Pleas of the Crown_. Hale says:

"As it is _cepit_ and _asportavit_ so it must be _felonice_ or _animo furandi_, otherwise it is not felony, for it is the mind that makes the taking of another's goods to be a felony, or a bare trespa.s.s only; but because the intention and mind are secret, they must be judged by the circ.u.mstances of the fact, and though these circ.u.mstances are various and may sometimes deceive, yet regularly and ordinarily these circ.u.mstances following direct in this case.

"If _A_, thinking he hath a t.i.tle to the horse of _B_, seizeth it as his own, or supposing that _B_ holds of him, distrains the horse of _B_ without cause, this regularly makes it no felony, but a trespa.s.s, because there is a pretence of t.i.tle; but yet this may be but a trick to color a felony, and the ordinary discovery of a felonious intent is, if the party does it secretly, or being charged with the goods, denies it. * * * * *

"But in cases of larceny, the variety of circ.u.mstances is so great, and the complications thereof so weighty, that it is impossible to prescribe all the circ.u.mstances evidencing a felonious intent; on the contrary, the same must be left to the due and attentive consideration of the Judge and Jury, wherein the best rule is, _in dubiis_, rather to incline to acquittal than conviction."

The next authority on that subject to which I will refer you is 2_d East's Pleas of the Crown, p._ 649. The pa.s.sage is:

"And here it may be proper to remark, that in any case, if there be _any fair pretence_ of property or _right_ in the prisoner, _or if it be brought into doubt at all, the court will direct an acquittal; for it is not fit that such disputes should be settled in a manner to bring men's lives into jeopardy_.

"The owner of ground takes a horse _damage feasant_, or a lord seizes it as an estray, though perhaps without t.i.tle; yet these circ.u.mstances explain the intent, and show that it was not felonious, unless some act be done which manifests the contrary: as giving the horse new marks to disguise him, or altering the old ones; for these are presumptive circ.u.mstances of a thievish intent."

I call attention also to the case of _Rex_ vs. _Hall_, _3d Carrington & Payne_, 409, which was a case before one of the Barons of the Exchequer in England. It was an indictment for robbing John Green, a gamekeeper of Lord Ducie, of three hare-wires and a pheasant. It appeared that the prisoner had set three hare-wires in a field belonging to Lord Ducie, in one of which this pheasant was caught; and that Green, the gamekeeper, seeing this, took up the wires and pheasant, and put them into his pocket; and it further appeared that the prisoner, soon after this, came up and said, "Have you got my wires?" The gamekeeper replied that he had, and a pheasant that was caught in one of them. The prisoner asked the gamekeeper to give the pheasant and wires up to him, which the gamekeeper refused; whereupon the prisoner lifted up a large stick, and threatened to beat the gamekeeper's brains out if he did not give them up. The gamekeeper, fearing violence, did so.

Maclean, for the prosecution, contended--

"That, by law, the prisoner could have no property in either the wires or the pheasant; and as the gamekeeper had seized them for the use of the Lord of the Manor, under the statute 5 Ann, c. 14, s. 4, it was a robbery to take them from him by violence."

Vaughan, B., said:

"I shall leave it to the Jury to say whether the prisoner acted on an impression that the wires and pheasant were his property, for, however he might be liable to penalties for having them in his possession, yet, if the Jury think that he took them under a _bona fide_ impression that he was only getting back the possession of his own property, there is no _animus furandi_, and I am of opinion that the prosecution must fail.

"Verdict--Not guilty."

Without detaining the Court and Jury to read other cases, I will simply give your honors a reference to them. I refer to the _King_ vs.

_Knight_, cited in 2_d East's Pleas of the Crown_, p. 510, decided by Justices _Gould_ and _Buller_; the case of the _Queen_ vs. _Boden_, 1_st Carrington and Kirwan_, p. 395; and for the purpose of showing that this is the same rule which has been applied by the Courts of the United States, in these very cases of piracy, I need do nothing more than read a few lines from a case cited by the counsel for the prosecution in opening the case of the _United States_ vs. _Tully_, 1_st Gallison's Circuit Court Reports_, 247, where Justices Story and Davis say, that to const.i.tute the offence of piracy, within the Act of 30th April, 1790, by "piratically and feloniously" running away with a vessel, "the act must have been done with the wrongful and fraudulent intent thereby to convert the same to the taker's own use, and to make the same his own property, against the will of the owner. The intent must be _animo furandi_."

Now, gentlemen, I think that when you come to consider this case in your jury-box, whatever other difficulties you may have, you will very speedily come to the conclusion that the taking of the Joseph was with no intent of stealing on the part of these prisoners.

But, gentlemen, there is another requisite to the crime of robbery, which, I contend, and shall respectfully attempt to show to you, is absent from this case. I mean, it must be by violence, or putting him in fear that the property is taken from the owner, and that the crime of robbery is committed. I beg to refer the Court to the definition of robbery in _1st Blackstone's Commentaries_, p. 242, and _1st Hawkins'

Pleas of the Crown_, p. 233, where robbery at common law is defined to be "open and violent _larceny_, the rapina of the civil law, the _felonious_ and _forcible_ taking from the person of another of goods or money to any value by violence, or putting him in fear."

Now, gentlemen, I say there was nothing of that kind in this case. What are the circ.u.mstances as testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution? The circ.u.mstances are, that the Joseph and the Savannah, having approached within hailing distance, the Captain of the Savannah hailed the Captain of the Joseph, standing on the deck of his own vessel, and requested him to come on board and bring his papers. The answer of the Captain of the Joseph was an inquiry by what authority that direction was given; and the Captain of the Savannah replied, "by the authority of the Confederate States." Whereupon the Captain of the Joseph, in his own boat, with two of his crew, went alongside the Savannah, was helped over the side by the Captain of the Savannah, and was informed by him that he was under the disagreeable necessity of taking his vessel and taking them prisoners; and without the slightest force or violence being used by the Captain, or by a single member of the crew of the Savannah--without a gun being fired, or even loaded, so far as anything appears--the Captain of the Joseph voluntarily submitted, yielded up his vessel, and there was not the slightest violence or putting any body in fear.

Therefore, gentlemen, I say, that so far as the crime charged here is the crime of robbery, there is no evidence in the case under which, on either of these grounds, by reason of the secrecy of the act, or the violence or putting in fear, or the showing a felonious intent, by the evidence for the prosecution, these prisoners can be convicted under the indictment before you. To show that the definition of robbery at common law is the one that applies to these statutes of the United States, I beg to refer your honors to cases in the Supreme Court of the United States. I refer to the case of the _United States_ vs. _Palmer, 3 Wheaton, 610_; the _United States_ vs. _Wood, 3d Was.h.i.+ngton, 440_; and the _United States_ vs. _Wilson, 1 Baldwin,_ p. 78.

But, gentlemen, there is another set of counts in this indictment on which, probably, as to those who are citizens, a conviction will be pressed for by counsel on the part of the Government. That is a set of counts to which I am about to call your attention in reference to the acts under which they were framed. You will recollect this, gentlemen, that under the counts charging the offence of robbery, the majority of these prisoners must be convicted, or none of them can be convicted at all, for reasons which I will immediately give you. The only statute under which it is claimed on the part of the prosecution that a conviction can be had, if not for robbery on the high seas, imperatively requires that the prisoners to be convicted must be citizens of the United States. There are twelve prisoners here, and by the statement of the last witness produced on the part of the prosecution, only four of them appear to be citizens of the United States, or ever to have been citizens of the United States. The others were all born in different countries in Europe and Asia, and had never been naturalized; and the Court, whenever this case comes before you, so far as that point is concerned, will give you the evidence on the subject, by which you will see exactly which of these prisoners had ever been citizens of the United States, and which of them had not been. I therefore proceed to examine as to what the statute is, and what the requisites are for a conviction of those who were citizens of the United States at any time. I will read to you the section of the statute to which I have reference. It is the 9th section of the Act of 1790. It reads, "That if any _citizen_ shall commit any piracy or robbery aforesaid, or any act of hostility against the United States, or any citizen thereof, upon the high seas, under color of any commission from any _foreign Prince_ or _State_, or on pretence of authority from any person, such offender shall, notwithstanding the pretence of any such authority, be deemed, adjudged, and taken to be a pirate, felon, and robber, and, on being thereof convicted, shall suffer death."

Now, it will be interesting and necessary to understand the circ.u.mstances under which that statute was pa.s.sed, and the application which it was intended to have. I will briefly read to you the explanation of that subject, which your honors will find in _Hawkins'

Pleas of the Crown, 1st Vol., p. _268. Hawkins says:

"It being also doubted by many eminent civilians whether, during the Revolution, the persons who had captured English vessels by virtue of commissions granted by James 2nd, at his court at St.

Germain, after his abdication of the throne of England, could be deemed pirates, the grantor still having, as it was contended, the right of war in him; it is enacted by 11 and 12 Will. III., chap.

7, sec. 8, 'That if any of his Majesty's natural born subjects or denizens of this Kingdom shall commit any piracy or robbery, or any act of hostility against others of his Majesty's subjects upon the sea, under color of any commission from any foreign Prince or State, or pretence of authority from any person whatsoever, such offender or offenders, and every of them, shall be deemed, adjudged, and taken to be pirates, felons, and robbers; and they and every of them, being duly convicted thereof according to this Act or the aforesaid statute of King Henry the Eighth, shall have and suffer such pains of death, loss of land and chattels, as pirates, felons, and robbers upon the sea ought to have and suffer.'"

Your honors will find that further referred to in the case of the _United States_ vs. _Jones_, _3d Wash. Cir. Court Reps. p._ 219, in these terms:

"The 9th sec. of this law (the Act of 1790) is in fact copied from the statute of the 11th and 12th Wm. 3d, ch. 7, the history of which statute is explained by Hawkins. It was aimed at Commissions granted to Cruisers by James II., after his abdication, which, by many, were considered as conferring a legal authority to cruise, so as to protect those acting under them against a charge of piracy.

Still, we admit that unless some other reason can be a.s.signed for the introduction of a similar provision in our law, the argument which has been founded on it would deserve serious consideration.

We do not think it difficult to a.s.sign a very satisfactory reason for the adoption of this section without viewing it in the light of a legislative construction of the 8th sec, or of the general law.

"If a citizen of the United States should commit acts of depredation against any of the citizens of the United States, it might at least have been a question whether he could be guilty of piracy if he acted under a foreign commission and within the scope of his authority. He might say that he acted under a commission; and not having transgressed the authority derived under it, he could not be charged criminally. But the 9th sec. declares that this shall be no plea, because the authority under which he acted is not allowed to be legitimate. It declares to the person contemplated by this section, that in cases where a commission from his own Government would protect him from the charge of piracy, that is, where he acted within the scope of it or even where he acted fairly but under a mistake in transgressing it, yet that a _foreign_ commission should afford him no protection, even although he had not exceeded the authority which it professed to give him.

But it by no means follows from this that a citizen committing depredations upon foreigners or citizens, not authorized by the commission granted by his own Government, _and with a felonious intention_, should be protected by that commission against a charge of piracy. Another object of this section appears to have been to declare that acts of hostility committed by a citizen against the United States upon the high seas, _under pretence of a commission issued by a foreign Government, though they might amount to treason, were nevertheless piracy and to be tried as such_."

Your honors will find another very interesting history in reference to this statute in _Phillimore's International Law, 1st vol., sec. 398_.

Phillimore says:

"Soon after the abdication of James II., an international question of very great importance arose, namely, what character should be ascribed to privateers commissioned by the monarch, who had abdicated, to make war against the adherents of William III., or rather against the English, while under his rule. The question, in fact, involved a discussion of the general principle, whether a deposed sovereign, claiming to be sovereign _de jure_, might lawfully commission privateers against the subjects and adherents of the sovereign _de facto_ on the throne; or whether such privateers were not to be considered as pirates, inasmuch as they were sailing _animo furandi et depraedundi_, without any _national_ character. The question, it should be observed, did not arise in its full breadth and importance _until James II. had been expelled from Ireland as well as England, until, in fact, he was a sovereign, claiming to be such de jure_, BUT CONFESSEDLY WITHOUT TERRITORY. It appears that James, after he was in this condition, continued to issue letters of marque to his followers. The Privy Council of William III. desired to hear civilians upon the point of the piratical character of such privateers. The arguments on both sides are contained in a curious and rather rare pamphlet, published by one of the counsel (Dr. Tindal) for King William, in the years 1693-4. The princ.i.p.al arguments for the piratical character of the privateers appear to have been--

"That they who acted under such commission may be dealt with as if they had acted under their own authority or the authority of any private person, and therefore might be treated as pirates. That if such a t.i.tular Prince might grant commissions to seize the s.h.i.+ps and goods of all or most trading nations, he might derive a considerable revenue as a chief of such freebooters, and that it would be madness in nations not to use the utmost rigor of the law against such vessels.

"That the reason of the thing which p.r.o.nounced that robbers and pirates, when they formed themselves into a civil society, became just enemies, p.r.o.nounced also that A KING WITHOUT TERRITORY, without power of protecting the innocent or punis.h.i.+ng the guilty, or in any way of administering justice, dwindled into a pirate if he issued commissions to seize the goods and s.h.i.+ps of nations; and that they who took commissions from him must be held by legal inference to have a.s.sociated _sceleris causa_, and could not be considered as members of a civil society."

I will not occupy the time of the Court and Jury by recapitulating the rest of the arguments which were urged with very great ability by the learned and distinguished civilians arrayed against each other in that interesting debate. But the points which arise, and which the Court will have, in due time, to instruct you upon, we respectfully claim and insist are these: That this English statute, after which our own statute was precisely copied, was intended only to apply to the case of pirates cruising under a commission pretended to have been given, in the first place, by a Prince deposed, abdicated, not having a foot of territory yielding him obedience in any corner of the world; and, in the next place, that it was intended to be aimed against those cruising under a commission issued under the pretence of authority from a foreigner, and not from the authorities over them _de jure_ or _de facto_, or from any authorities of the land in which they lived, and where the real object was depredation; because, where it was issued by a monarch without territory--by a foreigner, having no rule, and no country in subjection to him--there could be no prize-court, and none of the ordinary machinery for disposing of prizes captured, according to the rules of international law; and, lastly, it was intended to apply to the case of a citizen, taking a privateer's commission from a foreign Government as a pretence to enable him to cruise against the commerce of his own countrymen. But it was never intended to apply to a case of this kind, where the commission was issued by the authorities of the land in which the parties receiving it live, exercising sway and dominion over them, whether _de jure_ or _de facto_.

Now, gentlemen, so far I have thought it necessary to go in explanation of what the statutes were, of the circ.u.mstances bearing on them, and of the requisites which the prosecution had to make out, in order to ask a conviction at your hands. I come now, for the purpose of this opening, to lay before you what we shall rely upon in our defence. The first defence, as has already appeared to you from the course of the examination of the prosecution's witnesses, has reference to the question of the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine this controversy. The statute has been already read to you, on which that question of jurisdiction rests; but, for fear that you do not recollect it, I will beg once more to call your attention to it. The concluding paragraph of sec. 14 of the Act of 1825, 4th vol. of the Statutes at Large, p. 118, is as follows:

"And the trial of all offences which shall be committed on the high seas or elsewhere out of the limits of any State or District, shall be in the District where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought."

Now, you observe that the language of the statute is imperative--the reasons which led to its adoption were also imperative and controlling.

It is necessary that the law shall make provision for the place where a man shall be put on trial under an indictment against him; and the law wisely provides that in cases of offences committed on the land, the trial shall only take place where the offence was committed. It was thought even necessary to provide for that by an amendment to the Const.i.tution of the United States, in order that there might be no misunderstanding of, and no departure from, the rule.

The Const.i.tution, by one of its amendments, in the same paragraph which provides for the right of every accused to a speedy and impartial trial, provides also that that trial shall take place in the District, which District shall first have been ascertained by law; and as I said to you, in cases of crimes committed on the land, that District must be the District where the offence was committed, and no other.

Now look at the state of things here, gentlemen. These men are all citizens or residents of the State of South Carolina, and have been so for years. This vessel was fitted out in South Carolina. The authority under which she professed to act was given there. The evidence for the defence, if it could be got, must come from there. All the circ.u.mstances bearing on the transaction occurred in that section of the country, and not elsewhere,--occurred in a country which is now under the same Government and domination as Virginia, because Virginia is included at present under the domination and Government of the Confederate States.

Well, with reference to offences committed at sea, the officers capturing a prize have a right to bring it into any port, it is true, and the port where the prisoners are brought is, as we claim under the construction of the statute, the port where the trial is to take place; the port where the prisoners are first brought, whether they are landed or not. On that question of jurisdiction the rule is this: The jurisdiction of the State extends to the distance of a marine league from sh.o.r.e; and if these prisoners were brought on this vessel within the distance of three miles from the sh.o.r.es of Virginia, where the vessel anch.o.r.ed, as in port, having communication with the land, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the Eastern District of Virginia attached, and they could not, after that, be put on trial for that offence elsewhere. It is not necessary for me now to trouble the Jury with re-reading authorities which were read upon this subject yesterday. In a case which occurred some years ago, before Judge Story, the learned Judge had fallen into a misapprehension on a question which did not necessarily arise, because the facts to give rise to it did not occur in the case. An offence had been committed--an attempt to create a revolt on board of a vessel at sea. Those who had made the attempt had either repented of the design, or had not succeeded in it; at all events, they had afterwards gone on to do their duty on the vessel, and had not been incarcerated on board the vessel at all. The vessel first got into a port in Connecticut, and finally got into a port in Ma.s.sachusetts, and there, for the first time, those prisoners were arrested and put into confinement. Undoubtedly the Court in Ma.s.sachusetts had jurisdiction in that case; but Judge Story, speaking on a question which did not arise, appeared to treat the language of the statute as being alternative, giving the Government the right to select one of two places for the trial. That was corrected in a late case which came before the Court in Ma.s.sachusetts, in the same District where Judge Story had decided the previous case. Both Judge Sprague, of the District Court, and Judge Clifford, of the Circuit Court, held that in a case where prisoners had been captured as malefactors on the high seas, and had been confined on board a United States vessel, where the vessel had gone into Key West for a temporary purpose, to get water, without the prisoners ever having been landed, and where they went from thence to Ma.s.sachusetts, where the prisoners were arrested by the civil authorities and imprisoned, that the Court of Ma.s.sachusetts had no jurisdiction whatever. Under the instructions of the Court, the Grand Jury refused to find an indictment, and a warrant of removal was granted to remove the prisoners for trial in the Court at Key West,--the Court of Ma.s.sachusetts holding that that was the only place where they could be tried for the offence, because the vessel having them in custody as prisoners had touched there to get water on her voyage. We have not even the information in that case as to whether the vessel went within three miles of the sh.o.r.e; it was enough that she had communicated with Key West, and that the prisoners might have been landed there; but it was held that the Government had not a right to elect the place of trial of the prisoners; and it is important, particularly in cases of this kind, that no one shall have the right to elect a place of trial. I say that, not with the slightest intention of imputing any unfair motives to the Government, to the officers of the Navy, or any one else. It is a great deal better that where men are to be put on trial for their lives, they should have the benefit of the chapter of accidents.

If it would have been any better for these prisoners to have had a Jury to try them in Virginia, they were ent.i.tled to the benefit of that. In saying so, I mean no reflection on any Jury in New York. I have no doubt you will try this case as honestly, as fairly, and as impartially as any Jury in Virginia could try it. But at the same time we all know that if this right of election can be resorted to on the part of the United States, men might suffer, not from any wrong intention, but from the natural and inevitable and often unconscious tendency of those who are to prosecute, to select the place of prosecution most convenient for themselves.

We shall therefore claim before you, gentlemen, following the rule laid down in Ma.s.sachusetts by Judge Clifford and Judge Sprague, that this vessel, having been within a marine league of the sh.o.r.e of Virginia, was within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Virginia, and that that was the only place where they could be tried. Suppose, as was well suggested to me by one of my a.s.sociates, that on the Minnesota, lying where she did, or on the Harriet Lane, lying where she did in Hampton Roads, a murder had been committed: could it be contended by any one that the United States Court in Virginia would not have had jurisdiction, and the only jurisdiction over the case?

Now, gentlemen, that is all which, on the opening of this case, I am going to say on the subject of jurisdiction.

Our next defence will be, that the commission in this case affords adequate protection to these prisoners; and we will put that before you in several points of view. It will undoubtedly be read to you in evidence. It was one of the doc.u.ments found on board this vessel.

_Mr. Evarts:_ It is not in evidence; and how can counsel open to the Jury upon a commission which is not in evidence?

_Judge Nelson:_ Counsel can refer to it as part of his opening.

_Mr. Larocque:_ Now, gentlemen, you will recollect that the counsel for the prosecution, in framing this indictment, has treated this in the way in which we claim he was bound to treat it; that is to say, that the 9th section of the Act of 1790 was intended to refer exclusively to offences claimed to have been committed under a commission; throwing on the prosecution the necessity of setting forth the commission or the pretence of authority. Having set it forth, the prosecution is bound by the manner in which it is described in the indictment; and if it is described as something which it is not, the prisoners must have the benefit of that mis-description.

Now, in framing this indictment, the counsel for the prosecution has set forth that the prisoners claimed to act under a commission issued by one Jefferson Davis. That is to say, he has attempted to ground his claim to a conviction on that section of the statute. You will recollect that the statute reads, "under pretence of any commission granted by any foreign Prince or State" (which the Courts of the United States have held, to mean a foreign State), "or under pretence of authority from any person." And it was necessary, in order to ground an indictment on that section of the statute, to bring this case within the exact letter or words of one or the other clause of that section of this statute. It would not do for them to claim that this commission was issued by a foreign Prince or foreign State, because, if by a foreign Prince or foreign State, there would be no doubt or question that all of these parties were citizens of that foreign State or residents there, and were not citizens of the United States. Of course, if this were a foreign State, they were foreign citizens, and not citizens of the United States.

What is this commission? As we shall lay it before you, it reads in this way:

"JEFFERSON DAVIS,