Cavalry in Future Wars Part 4

Of course, immediately after detraining, troops will have to march to the districts to which they are a.s.signed for convenience of supply, and this will lead to the formation of temporary groupings, which it will be advisable, if possible, for us to observe. But it must not be overlooked that observations during this period may easily lead to false conclusions, as such movements serve only secondary purposes or introductory measures, and seldom justify any conclusions bearing upon the design of the ultimate operations. These latter only develop after a certain degree of concentration has been attained, and hence the essence of the whole question resolves itself into this--that the Cavalry should not be put in until shortly before the strategical concentration begins.

From the results now obtained the success of the whole campaign may entirely depend. At this climax no secondary consideration must be allowed to distract attention from the princ.i.p.al object. Even the desirability of screening the movements of one's own Army, in so far as this duty is not fulfilled by the reconnaissance itself, must give way to the attainment of the princ.i.p.al object in view, which is _intelligence_, not _security_.

This point requires to be more particularly insisted upon, because fundamentally different arrangements are necessary to fulfil these two purposes. Anyone who attempted to entrust both the provision of intelligence and the protection of the troops to one and the same body of men would in the vast majority of cases fail to secure either purpose as long as the enemy's mounted forces still held the field.

To secure information--_i.e._, intelligence--requires concentration of force. The reconnoitring Cavalry must beat their opponents out of the field in order to obtain opportunities for discovering what is going on behind the enemy's protective screen. To accomplish this, the Cavalry must endeavour to work round the adversary's flanks, and may in consequence have to leave the front of its own Army entirely uncovered. The protection of this Army, on the other hand, requires a wide extension of front and consequent subdivision of force, the exact opposite of the concentration the provision of intelligence imperatively calls for.

Naturally this view encounters opposition. Some contend that the whole triumph of the Art consists in solving both problems simultaneously.

They reason that it is superfluous to seek an encounter with the enemy's Cavalry. Cavalry duels only lead to the mutual destruction of both parties. They maintain that one ought to advance, in the interests both of security and screening, on a certain breadth of front. If, then, circ.u.mstances compel one to fight, one must concentrate quickly, and after the combat gain again the necessary degree of extension to cover the front of the Army. They would leave reconnaissance to be carried out by rapidly advancing patrols, which evade those of the enemy, find cover in the ground, gain advantageous points of observation on the flanks and in rear of the opponent, thus obtaining their objects in spite of the enemy.

I hold it to be a grave error of judgment to believe that any systematic application of this line of action will give sufficient results.

Advantages in war must be fought for; they cannot be filched.

Was it not difficult enough in 1870-1871 to obtain reliable information, although we had no true Cavalry opponent against us, and still more difficult to get that news through to Headquarters in time?

How much more difficult, therefore, will it not be in the future, when we can no longer count on controlling unconditionally the country between the two Armies, and the enemy's Cavalry hold the field as well as we!

Who will then guarantee that our patrols will really penetrate the enemy's screen; above all, that their reports will get back through the district controlled by the enemy's Cavalry in time enough to be of use to Headquarters in forming its decisions? If the patrols are compelled to elude those of the enemy, to seek for intersected country, and to make detours, one cannot count on the requisite rapidity; and the greater the total numbers brought together in modern War, the greater the distances become which have to be reckoned with.

If from the very necessity of finding the shortest way and securing communications with one's own Headquarters it becomes necessary to beat the enemy's Cavalry out of the field to clear up the situation sufficiently, the need of fighting is brought home to one with all the greater force, because any other line of action leaves the enemy chances at least as good as our own, which can never be the objective of any form of military action, and ultimately fighting becomes compulsory if, in addition to reconnaissance, one attempts to carry out screen duties at the same time. It stands to reason that the enemy's Cavalry can only be prevented from seeing by actually driving them off the ground and depriving them of the power of breaking through our own screen. That a numerically and materially inferior Cavalry does well to avoid action goes without saying, but fundamentally the duty of the Cavalry must be to seek to bring about collision with that of the enemy, so that from the very beginning it secures command of the ground between the two armies, and that the actual and moral superiority in the whole zone of operations between the two armies is obtained from the outset for our own Cavalry.

The victory of the 'ma.s.ses' intensifies and invigorates the sense of superiority in the individual combatant, and this sense of individual superiority is essential if the patrols are to carry through their duties in the true Cavalry spirit.

On the one hand, they are only able to solve their tasks both of screening and of reconnaissance by actually defeating the enemy's patrols; on the other hand, the moral factor tells heavily in the scale.

How can one expect courage and determination or audacity from men who have always been taught to avoid their opponent and only fight when they are actually compelled?

The man who leaves these psychic factors out of account will always find himself mistaken in War.

That in certain cases it may be useful to push forward officers as stealthy patrols, with instruction to avoid being drawn into an action, as far as time and opportunity will allow, goes without saying; but nevertheless stress must be laid upon the point that already in the period which is in general taken up with the encounter with the enemy's Cavalry, no opportunity should be lost of keeping the princ.i.p.al ma.s.ses of the enemy's Army under direct observation, and that therefore it is necessary from the very commencement of the advance to send out officers patrols for this special purpose.

These patrols will derive their best support from a tactical victory obtained over the enemy's Cavalry, which is manoeuvring in their rear.

Thus the fact remains that we must fight to reconnoitre and fight to screen, and that only a systematic division of the two spheres of action can give us the freedom necessary to insure the adoption of the proper form at the right time and place.

A victory of the reconnoitring Cavalry by shattering the strength of the enemy's hors.e.m.e.n must always result, both directly and indirectly, in the advantage of our screening force.

The whole consideration, therefore, leads me to the conclusion that the chief task for the Cavalry consists in obtaining a victory over the enemy's Cavalry in that direction which is of decisive importance for the further prosecution of reconnaissance as soon after the beginning of the great operations as possible.

That it cannot be our object to seek the opponent's hors.e.m.e.n in the direction which they themselves have selected--merely to beat them--need scarcely be insisted upon. That would be to take the law from the enemy and allow one's self to be diverted from the princ.i.p.al direction in which reconnaissance is desirable.

Time and direction of the advance must rather be so chosen that they compel the enemy to move to meet us. At the same time our effort must be to appear with numerical superiority, in order to be certain of victory.

In what concerns the Cavalry in the further course of the War, the necessity both of screening and reconnoitring recurs again and again; and in many cases even after the enemy has been beaten out of the field, these objects will still only be obtained by fighting. Such cases will occur in the duties of screening and security when the enemy still possesses enough offensive power to attempt a reconnaissance, with the threat of attack combined, and we ourselves are engaged in a similar manner; also in all such cases in which turning movements entail too much delay, or are rendered impossible by the extension of the enemy's front; or, again, when the enemy on their part renew offensive operations.

The necessity of breaking through the line of Infantry outposts in order to discover the whereabouts of the enemy's princ.i.p.al ma.s.ses and the direction of their movements will also from time to time arise, and it may become necessary to suppress rapidly and thoroughly attempts at armed resistance by the civilian population.

Further, our Cavalry will be called on for attempts against the enemy's communications, the strategical importance of which has been already discussed, and these will be all the more important in cases where the district we are fighting over is too poor to supply the enemy's forces, or where operations have a.s.sumed a stationary character, as before Fredericksburg, Paris, and Plevna, and it becomes desirable to hinder the use of the railways for the transport of troops or evacuation of supplies.

Lastly, the Cavalry may be called on to occupy wide stretches of country and exploit their resources, to nip in their very inception the formation of fresh bodies of armed defenders, or on the defensive, to secure our own communications or districts against undertakings by flying columns of the enemy.

Such undertakings, particularly when they lead in rear of the enemy's Armies, will frequently a.s.sume the character of 'raids' in which the essential purpose is to cover great distances rapidly, often with the sacrifice of all communications with one's own forces, to appear suddenly at previously selected positions, and after completion of one's immediate object to disappear suddenly, before the enemy can bring overwhelming numbers against the a.s.sailant.

The success of such undertakings will depend, on the one hand, on the rapidity with which the opportunities secured by such surprise are utilized, and, on the other, on the available fighting power, which must suffice to break down all opposition with certainty and speed.

Their execution, however, will always encounter many difficulties, particularly when a hostile population has to be dealt with; but to consider them on this account as impracticable seems to me all the more impossible, because to my mind they embody an absolutely indispensable element of future operations.

If it is feasible to enter upon them with fresh horses, and to make adequate provision for supply without delaying the rapidity of movement, either by utilizing the resources of the country, by taking suitably organized columns with one, or by living on stores captured from the enemy himself, then such 'raids' will succeed and exercise most far-reaching consequences.

In my opinion all these conditions can be satisfied. We can preserve our horses by exercising greater moderation in the pursuit of non-essentials; difficulties of supply can be solved by suitable preparations even in an enemy's country, and when working in our own, the sympathetic and persistent support of our own population will level all obstacles; but in all cases we must never leave out of sight the cardinal point that only the concentration of sufficient force at the right time and place can guarantee the final result.

Our conduct, however, will be different when our purpose is solely defensive, or when we have to occupy districts which the enemy does not seek to defend. In such cases, as also when our object is only the concealment of our own designs, a dispersion of force may be necessary, if only in order to occupy important defiles and defensive sections of the ground, or for the occupation of the most important centres of population in the enemy's country. From such tasks, however, it should be the business of the Supreme Command to preserve us, in order that the whole Cavalry strength should be retained intact for offensive purposes more in harmony with its whole character and the spirit of the Arm.

For these, if great results are to be attained, it requires in the generality of cases concentration in time and s.p.a.ce.

With the execution of these strategical missions, which so far alone have attracted our attention, the duties of the Cavalry Arm are by no means exhausted.

Nowadays, as formerly, it will still find work to its hands on the battle-field itself, and this work will be all the more important in proportion as the quality of the forces therein encountered is on a lower level (_e.g._, new formations, Militia, etc.). In any case, however, great results on the battle-field can only be expected from the employment of numerically formidable 'Ma.s.ses.' This is conditioned by the very fact of the numbers which we must in future expect to see engaged.

The portion of the enemy's forces affected by the results of a successful charge must be a sufficient part of the whole which, at a given time and place, is concerned in the task of endeavouring to secure a decision.

Other factors also deserve consideration--above all, the increased range of modern firearms. If the front of the attacking Cavalry is too narrow, it will not only have to face the fire of the troops immediately in its front, but it will be the focus of the fire from all sides.

If the formation for attack does not supply a sufficient sequence of successive efforts, then in many cases it can have no hope of permanent result, for an onslaught by a single line will not have strength enough to pierce the fire zone, and will be shot to pieces before it can reach the enemy.[2]

[Footnote 2: The same point also arises both in pursuit and in the covering of a retreat, two of our most important duties; for though, as already pointed out, the conditions of the present day offer to the Arm the opportunities of the richest harvests, it will only be able to utilize them when employed with concentrated force.]

The ma.s.ses to be encountered are numerically so considerable that single squadrons, regiments, or brigades, hardly count in the scale of a great decision. Partial results they may, indeed, attain, but to bring about the defeat of a whole Army, or even of an important fraction of it, to reap the fruits of such a victory or cover a great retreat, numbers alone can avail.

How many units to employ under any given circ.u.mstances it is, of course, impossible to lay down beforehand; but the essence of the matter is that the limit of force to be thus employed is far in excess of what any existing tactical unit can supply.

If, after this short survey of the many fields of action open to hors.e.m.e.n in the future, we ask the decisive question, Which tasks in the future will need to be most carefully kept in mind in the organization and training of this Arm in peace time? we shall not be able to conceal from ourselves that it is in the strategical handling of the Cavalry that by far the greatest possibilities lie. Charges even of numerically considerable bodies on the battle-field can only lead to success under very special conditions, and even for the protection of a retreat our role can only be a subordinate one. But for reconnaissance and screening, for operations against the enemy's communications, for the pursuit of a beaten enemy, and all similar operations of warfare, the Cavalry is, and remains, the princ.i.p.al Arm.

Here no other can take its place, for none possesses the requisite mobility and independence.

At the same time, it is in these fields that its power is all-important to the Supreme Command. Battles, under pressure of necessity, can be fought without Cavalry at all, and the results even partially utilized; but it is impossible to issue suitable orders without knowledge of the enemy's operations, and equally impossible to act against an enemy's flanks and rear with Infantry alone.

It is in these directions that the future of Cavalry lies, and it is to fit ourselves for the tasks that we should bend all our energy in peace.

CHAPTER III

STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY

We have seen in the previous chapter that the princ.i.p.al duties which can fall to the lot of Cavalry in modern War will require its employment in considerable force; hence it follows that the greatest economy in the use of detachments for secondary purposes must be practised.