Cavalry in Future Wars Part 8

Under modern conditions this lat.i.tude is indispensable, for the amount of force to be applied depends on what is known about the enemy; but the special shape the attack itself a.s.sumes, and more particularly its breadth of front, will be determined by the width of front the enemy opposes and the nature of the ground it has to move over; whilst as to depth, this must be decided by our estimate of the quality of the adversary's force, hence his shock power and the amount of his possible reserves.

The consideration of all these conditions may, in proportion to the numbers in hand, lead us to employ whole Brigades, Divisions, Corps, or portions of these units, arranged in the most varied succession to one another. Whether we should attack by 'Wings' or by 'Lines' must depend on the circ.u.mstances of the movement, the order in which the troops reach the field, and the nature of the country to be traversed; and generally the preference will have to be given to the 'Wing Attack,' for the reasons we have above developed.

This 'Wing Attack' will, therefore, always have to be employed when time is available to form up the troops systematically for action, or when the lines of approach of the units lead naturally to the adoption of the formation. 'Lines' only then, when it is absolutely necessary to deliver an attack from column of route as rapidly as possible, and hence the time is lacking for a more systematic formation. Such cases can, for instance, arise in the deployment at the issue of a defile, or in bringing up troops from a.s.sembly formation through the intervals of a crowded battle-field, or under a.n.a.logous conditions; but even in these cases a foreseeing command will endeavour to facilitate the execution of the 'Wing Attack' by the choice of some such formation as the 'double column,' which admits of deployment to either hand.

Thus we see that our Regulations at least give to the Leader the possibility of choosing the best and most suitable formations for the execution of his purpose, but the latter also must be sufficiently master of his art to know which to select.

Further, it is the duty of the Leader, in the case of mutual encounter between manoeuvring bodies of the Arm, to choose the momentarily most favourable form of attack with reference to his own line of approach.

It is not easy to lay down in general terms in what manner this can be best insured, for the circ.u.mstances of the operations themselves and the nature of the ground are capable of influencing the decision in too many ways. One can only lay down certain general principles which may form a basis in the appreciation of each situation as it happens to arise.

In the first place, one must select one's own base of attack in such a direction that the following blow will force the enemy to retire in what will be for him the most disadvantageous direction, and, conversely, for one's own purposes the best.

But, naturally, in making this choice the tactical advantages or otherwise of the ground must not be overlooked or left to the enemy, for the tactical victory is the necessary preliminary to further results. Further, we should always endeavour to secure the advantage of the 'outer lines' so as to act concentrically upon the enemy. In this position, if beaten, his lines of retreat cross one another, and to avoid this predicament he will be compelled to endeavour to manoeuvre across our front, always a most dangerous undertaking.

On the other hand, if our attack fails, we have still the advantage of eccentric retreat, which compels the adversary to divide his forces, and thus opens to us the opportunity of further tactical success if we can concentrate our own men with sufficient rapidity, whilst at the worst we run no risk of seeing our own troops entangled with one another.

It should be our constant endeavour to gain these positions on the 'outer lines' by previous strategical operations, in order to avoid the danger of being compelled at the last moment to initiate wide flanking movements in face of the enemy. Again, a further advantage accrues if we can rest one flank on inaccessible or difficult ground.

This flank at least will be secure, so we can spare troops from it to strengthen the other, and thus, perhaps, act with decisive effect.

Finally, when it is presumable that we shall have to deal with considerable numerical superiority, we should direct all our efforts to throwing the whole weight of our charge against the enemy's flank, so as to compel him at the last moment to change his front to meet the blow. The opportunity for such action will arise in cases in which, thanks to our previous strategic direction, we can succeed in uniting the ma.s.s of our forces more rapidly than our opponent is able to do, and this may often be the case where the ground favours our advance and conceals the direction of our march.

Generally, it may be laid down that a simultaneous attack directed against the enemy's front and flank is justified when we have the advantage of a considerable numerical superiority, or when our opponent retains for too long a faulty distribution of his forces; but in all other cases a blow with united force against his flank will give the most far-reaching consequences, as it brings immediate pressure against the adversary's line of retreat, and compels him to employ his own forces in succession, not in a concentrated effort.

Hence this form of attack gives the chance of a success even to a force in a numerical minority, as it will often afford it the opportunity of beating the enemy in detail, whereas against a concentrated ma.s.s there would be no hope of success at all.

It will be evident that for the execution of such an attack the forms laid down in the Regulations to be observed in the transition from rendezvous to attack formations are--one is almost tempted to write--about as unfavourable as they well can be. It is true they afford, as already pointed out, the possibility of presenting the same fighting formation in succession to any required point of the compa.s.s, an advantage which has no practical importance in warfare; but against this they increase the difficulties of deployment for attack to the front to the utmost. If it is necessary, for instance, to send the first Line at the enemy's flank, because at the moment that happens to be the shortest way, the front of one of the following Brigades is at once masked, and the latter hampered in its movements. Or if it is desirable to employ one of the rearward Brigades for a flank movement or any similar purposes, then either the leading 'Line' must be checked until the others have gained the required position, or it is certain that these latter will arrive too late to co-operate.

Further, the forms prescribed by the Regulations render it more difficult to make use of such a.s.sistance as the nature of the ground may offer us.

Plainly, it is very much more to our advantage in the conduct of offensive operations to bring up those units which one has at one's disposal--with the sole exception of a Reserve, which is not to be kept too weak, at deploying intervals on the same alignment--in formations which adapt themselves well to the ground, and insure rapid deployment to the front, with the necessary depth in the supports following. For this purpose I recommend primarily the 'double column'

either in Brigades or in Regiments.

This arrangement of the troops satisfies all practical conditions, and insures, above all, the possibility of bringing all forces simultaneously into action, and of carrying out offensive flanking operations; further, it makes it easier for the Commander to take advantage of such support as the ground affords, and to ma.s.s his chief strength on one wing; and, finally, it gives us the shortest line of attack upon the enemy, and makes it easier to avoid the use of inner lines. It unites thus all the advantages of the regulation 'Line'

('Treffen') formation, and avoids its many serious disadvantages; hence it should be employed fundamentally wherever possible.

Turning now to the employment of Cavalry on the battle-field, the first condition which has to be satisfied is to a.s.sign to the 'Ma.s.ses'

their proper place in the line of battle. They must not only be at hand when wanted, but also at the spot which promises the most favourable tactical chances and the greatest prospect of decisive results. Further, they must be able to recognise the right moment to take part in the combat.

With reference to the first point, I should, above all, like to call attention to the writings of General von Schlichting.[10]

[Footnote 10: 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Present Day,' part i., chap, vii., B.]

Theoretically, the Cavalry 'Ma.s.s' is best united on that wing of the battle front which is not supported, but destined for further manoeuvres, hence on which the Arm will enjoy freedom of movement as far as the ground allows. Naturally, it will not always be possible to a.s.sign them such a place, but their position will result generally from the course of the previous manoeuvring.

Either the Cavalry must clear the front of the Army in preparation for the battle, in which case it is not always a matter of free choice in which direction one has to clear off, nor can the Cavalry Commander from his standpoint always determine which wing of the battle front will have to manoeuvre; or it must close in from a flank for the decision, in which case the nearest wing is their natural destination.

But they must always endeavour--and here I differ from General von Schlichting--to range themselves forwards and sidewards of their own Army. It will only be in cases where it is necessary to keep them in rear of the general alignment--as, for instance, it is proposed to use them as a last resort in the interests of the other Arms, as at Mars la Tour--or where the battle front itself is broken up by the nature of the ground or the grouping of the forces in such manner that the whole engagement is divided into a series of individual actions, as may often be the case in future Wars, that this rule must be departed from.

Such dispositions are always less favourable because they imply in a certain degree defensive action, whereas when placed forward in the framework of the battle the offensive element of the Arm finds its fullest opportunity.

That the desire to occupy such positions must not become stereotyped goes without saying; it must always be conditioned by the general and particular circ.u.mstances of the moment.

The course of events may, indeed, require us to take up a position to the flank and rear of the Army, but fundamentally, forwards and to the flank, remains the most desirable disposition. In this position the Cavalry 'Ma.s.ses' are best prepared to act against the enemy's flank, and can best combine the fire of their own Artillery concentrically with that of the guns and Infantry of the main body without losing their tactical connection, and thus divert the forces of the enemy into eccentric operations. Here they occupy the most suitable position to initiate without loss of time a parallel pursuit of the enemy, or to counter his attempts at pursuit; and here also they are best placed to accept the inevitable challenge of the enemy's Cavalry.

General von Schlichting considers these combats as generally superfluous--a kind of family concern which affects the rival Cavalries only--having no connection with the ultimate decision between the two armies.[11]

[Footnote 11: See 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Future,' p. 83. The view that Cavalry which has delivered one charge in the day is useless for the rest of the operations, I cannot accept. It finds no support in the facts of Military history--on the contrary, the most complete refutation.]

I cannot share this opinion, which seems to me to be based mainly on peace-time experiences, in which the opposing Cavalry forces generally neutralize one another. In actual War, however, victory more usually opens the path to other and proportionately more far-reaching results.

I hold, therefore, not only that such Cavalry duels are essential, but that the opportunity for engaging in them should be sought out from the first; for it is only the defeat of the enemy's horse which can open the door for further successful action against his other troops; otherwise the two Cavalries mutually paralyze one another, as at Mars la Tour.

If in practice it has often happened that this Cavalry deadlock has supervened, and the result of their encounter has remained unimportant on the decision of the day, this result, in my opinion, has always been due to a reluctance on one or the other sides to press the combat to its utmost limitations, as in the above-mentioned instance of Mars la Tour, or because the victorious side has retained neither force nor cohesion sufficient to act against the enemy's flanks, as at Chotusitz and at Prague.

Matters, however, will be very different when the Cavalry is really adequate to its duties--when it not only beats the enemy out of the field, but remains, as at Roszbach and Soor, fit for further efforts in pursuit.

To reach this ideal we must strain every fibre of our being, and never rest satisfied, as on the plateau of Ville sur Yron (Mars la Tour), with half results as long as a single trooper remains fit to gallop and handle his lance. The last man and the last breath of his horse must be risked, and he who is not willing to stake his soul is no true 'Cavalry Soldier.'

If we have successfully achieved this first result--_i.e._, victory over the enemy's hors.e.m.e.n--then the next step is to secure rapid rallying and the pursuit of the beaten enemy till they are finally driven from the field; and whilst detachments follow up, the main force of our Cavalry must wheel in upon the flank and rear of the enemy's Army, ready to act with all vigour and determination to bring about the final decision when and where the opportunity offers.

That we failed in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 to obtain this crowning purpose of the Arm is no evidence in itself that the ideal is inaccessible, only proof that neither our training nor comprehension of our duties was on a level with the requirements of the time.

It is certainly possible that our opponent may seek to withdraw his hors.e.m.e.n from the Duel to save their strength for the protection of his threatened flanks; but the consideration remains that by such conduct he voluntarily renounces the best sphere of his own activity--a degree of renunciation on his part hardly to be expected--and precisely because its action to avert defeat may prove of essential consequence, it is our part, in accordance with the offensive spirit of the Arm, to seek him out and destroy his forces before such opportunity arrives.

For this purpose, again, the position to the front and flank is most suitable. The constant threat upon the enemy's communications it implies cannot be disregarded, and will compel him to find means to rid himself of such embarra.s.sment.

Having, therefore, made it clear where the Cavalry should seek its position on the battle-field, the next step is to settle how it should be formed. In this direction General von Schlichting has reached the most practicable solution in laying down that a position in which each Division retains full s.p.a.ce for deployment and room to manoeuvre for the common purpose is theoretically the ideal, and this would still apply to Divisions united to form a Corps.

It is, indeed, evident that it is far easier to unite troops for action towards the front than, under the circ.u.mstances of the battle-field, to deploy them outwards from a common centre. This latter operation will be all the more difficult in proportion as the troops themselves have been brought forward to the front to meet a coming crisis. The danger then is ever present that, by the necessity of gaining room for deployment,[12] the opportunity to strike will be lost, or that the endeavour to seize the opportunity will lead to the troops being put in without order and in confusion.

[Footnote 12: The 6th Cavalry Division at Vionville, August 16, 1870.]

The fundamental principle, therefore, follows that troops, whether Corps, Divisions, or Brigades, should be grouped on the battle-field, preserving always their full deploying intervals.

Of course, local conditions must be taken into account, above all things the necessity of finding cover both from view and fire in the shape of the ground. In practice, therefore, it is only the actual facts as one finds them which can decide as to the best formation to be a.s.sumed, but it must always be of advantage to be perfectly clear in one's own mind as to which disposition to adopt and the consequences which must follow from one's choice.

The chief difficulty always remains--viz., the chance of seizing the opportunity. In the Battle of Mars la Tour our Cavalry failed to solve the problem, and in the subsequent course of the War--particularly against the forces of the Republic--it might often have obtained far better results had it possessed a clearer conception of its mission and better tactical training, as, for instance, in the action at Coulmiers, where we missed a grand opportunity.

The more difficult it becomes, with every increment in the range of firearms, to recognise our opportunities, the more essential is it that we should take the field with a thorough knowledge of our tactical power and its limitations, and it is above all things necessary that we should keep well up to the front, and not s.h.i.+rk even _heavy punishment_ if by so doing we can best secure opportunities for great results.

If this end is to be obtained, then every Cavalry Commander requires to have a complete grasp of the nature of the Infantry combat. He must be able to estimate with as equal certainty as an Infantry General the general course of an engagement, the consumption of reserves, and the gradual moral degradation of the enemy's foot soldiers.

At any moment he must be able to grasp in his mind the whole balance of forces in conflict on any point of the battle-field, so as to be able to decide whether the employment of his own command at any particular point and time is justified by the general situation of affairs.

It is, and always must be, the moments of great crises which give the Cavalry the best opportunities.

Since attempts to ride through the zone controlled and swept by effective Infantry fire may be looked on as synonymous with self-destruction, only such moments must be chosen for a charge during which the enemy is prevented from bringing his full fire power to bear against the a.s.sailants. These, however, only occur--except always where the nature of the ground allows of a thorough surprise action--when the moral disintegration of the enemy's Infantry is such that, under the impression of the threatening Cavalry attack, they are no longer under control, or when they are so completely taken up with their own fire action that it is impossible for them to concern themselves with the coming danger. Where such opportunities arise they must be seized with lightning-like decision and be exploited with the utmost energy. On the other hand, one should never allow one's self to be induced to undertake charges in which the probable losses bear no reasonable proportion to the possible results. Such conduct could only lead to the purposeless sacrifice of men and horses, just as happened to the French Cavalry at Woerth and Sedan.

We can always take as an example the wise restraint exercised by von Seidlitz at Zorndorf, who, in spite of the Royal Command, refused to attack because he did not consider that the right moment had arrived.

The Leader must always keep before his eyes the demands which either pursuit or retreat may make on his horses. One should never sacrifice, to secure results of secondary consideration, means that can be used to better purposes at other times and other places, for the calls which may be made upon Cavalry after the battle are quite exceptional in their nature.