The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, Personal and Political Part 33

IX

CABINET TALK AND WAR PLANS

1917

Cabinet Meetings--National Council of Defense--Bernstorff--War-- Plan for Railroad Consolidation--U-Boat Sinkings Revealed--Alaska

To George W. Lane

Was.h.i.+ngton, February 9,1917

MY DEAR GEORGE,--I am going to write you in confidence some of the talks we have at the Cabinet and you may keep these letters in case I ever wish to remind myself of what transpired. A week ago yesterday, (February 1st), the word came that Germany was to turn "mad dog" again, and sink all s.h.i.+ps going within her war zone.

This was the question, of course, taken up at the meeting of the Cabinet on February 2nd. The President opened by saying that this notice was an "astounding surprise." He had received no intimation of such a reversal of policy. Indeed, Zimmermann, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, had within ten days told Gerard that such a thing was an "impossibility." At this point Lansing said that he had good reason to believe that Bernstorff had the note for fully ten days before delivering it, and had held it off because of the President's Peace Message to Congress, which had made it seem inadvisable to deliver it then. In answer to a question as to which side he wished to see win, the President said that he didn't wish to see either side win,--for both had been equally indifferent to the rights of neutrals--though Germany had been brutal in taking life, and England only in taking property.

He would like to see the neutrals unite. I ventured the expression that to ask them to do this would be idle, as they could not afford to join with us if it meant the insistence on their rights to the point of war. He thought we might coordinate the neutral forces, but was persuaded that an effort to do this publicly, as he proposed, would put some of the small powers in a delicate position. We talked the world situation over. I spoke of the likelihood of a German-Russian-j.a.panese alliance as the natural thing at the end of the war because they all were nearly in the same stage of development. He thought the Russian peasant might save the world this misfortune. The fact that Russia had been, but a short time since, on the verge of an independent peace with Germany was brought out as evidencing the possibility of a break on the Allies' side. His conclusion was that nothing should be done now,--awaiting the "overt act" by Germany, which would take him to Congress to ask for power.

At the next meeting of the Cabinet on February 6th, the main question discussed was whether we should convoy, or arm, our merchant s.h.i.+ps. Secretary Baker said that unless we did our s.h.i.+ps would stay in American ports, and thus Germany would have us effectively locked up by her threat. The St. Louis, of the American line, wanted to go out with mail but asked the right to arm and the use of guns and gunners. After a long discussion, the decision of the President was that we should not convoy because that made a double hazard,--this being the report of the Navy,-- but that s.h.i.+ps should be told that they MIGHT arm, but that without new power from Congress they should not be furnished with guns and gunners.

The President said that he was "pa.s.sionately" determined not to over-step the slightest punctilio of honor in dealing with Germany, or interned Germans, or the property of Germans. He would not take the interned s.h.i.+ps, not even though they were being gutted of their machinery. He wished an announcement made that all property of Germans would be held inviolate, and that interned sailors on merchant s.h.i.+ps could enter the United States. If we are to have war we must go in with our hands clean and without any basis for criticism against us. The fact that before Bernstorff gave the note telling of the new warfare, the s.h.i.+ps had been dismantled as to their machinery, was not to move us to any act that would look like hostility.

February 10

Yesterday we talked of the holding of Gerard as a hostage. Lansing said there was no doubt of it. He thought it an act of war in itself. But did not know on what theory it was done, except that Germany was doing what she thought we would do. Germany evidently was excited over her sailors here, fearing that they would be interned, and over her s.h.i.+ps, fearing that they would be taken. I said that it seemed to be established that Germany meant to do what she said she would do, and that we might as well act on that a.s.sumption. The President said that he had always believed this, but thought that there were chances of her modifying her position, and that he could do nothing, in good faith toward Congress, without going before that body. He felt that in a few days something would be done that would make this necessary.

So there you are up to date--in a sc.r.a.ppy way. Now don't tell what you know. Ned is flying at Newport News. He sent me a telegram saying that the President could go as far as he liked, "the bunch"

would back him up. Strange how warlike young fellows are, especially if they think that they are preparing for some usefulness in war. That's the militaristic spirit that is bad.

Much love to you and Frances. Give me good long letters telling me what is in the back of that wise old head.

F. K.

To George W. Lane

February 16, [1917]

MY DEAR GEORGE,--That letter and proposed wire were received and your spirit is mine--the form of your letter could not be improved upon--and you are absolutely sound as to policy.

At the last meeting of the Cabinet, we again urged that we should convoy our own s.h.i.+ps, but the President said that this was not possible without going to Congress, and he was not ready to do that now. The Navy people say that to convoy would be foolish because it would make a double target, but it seems to me the right thing to risk a naval s.h.i.+p in the enforcement of our right.

At our dinner to the President last night he said he was not in sympathy with any great preparedness--that Europe would be man and money poor by the end of the war. I think he is dead wrong in this, and as I am a member of the National Council of Defense, I am pus.h.i.+ng for everything possible. This week we have had a meeting of the Council every day--the Secretary of War, Navy, Interior, Commerce, and Labor--with an Advisory Commission consisting of seven business men. We are developing a plan for the mobilization of all our national industries and resources so that we may be ready for getting guns, munitions, trucks, supplies, airplanes, and other material things as soon as war comes--IF NOT TOO SOON. It is a great organization of industry and resources. I think that I shall urge Hoover as the head of the work. His Belgian experience has made him the most competent man in this country for such work. He has promised to come to me as one of my a.s.sistants but the other work is the larger, and I can get on with a smaller man. He will correlate the industrial life of the nation against the day of danger and immediate need. France seems to be ahead in this work. The essentials are to commandeer all material resources of certain kinds (steel, copper, rubber, nickel, etc.); then have ready all drawings, machines, etc., necessary in advance for all munitions and supplies; and know the plant that can produce these on a standard basis.

The Army and Navy are so set and stereotyped and stand-pat that I am almost hopeless as to moving them to do the wise, large, wholesale job. They are governed by red-tape,--worse than any Union.

The Chief of Staff fell asleep at our meeting to-day--Mars and Morpheus in one!

To-day's meeting has resulted in nothing, though in Mexico, Cuba, Costa Rica, and Europe we have trouble. The country is growing tired of delay, and without positive leaders.h.i.+p is losing its keenness of conscience and becoming inured to insult. Our Amba.s.sador in Berlin is held as a hostage for days--our Consuls'

wives are stripped naked at the border, our s.h.i.+ps are sunk, our people killed--and yet we wait and wait! What for I do not know.

Germany is winning by her bluff, for she has our s.h.i.+ps interned in our own harbors.

Well, dear boy, I'm not a pacifist as you see. Much love,

FRANK

To George W. Lane

Was.h.i.+ngton, February 20, [1917]

DEAR GEORGE,--Another Cabinet meeting and no light yet on what our policy will be as to Germany. We evidently are waiting for the "overt act," which I think Germany will not commit. We are all, with the exception of one or two pro-Germans, feeling humiliated by the situation, but nothing can be done.

McAdoo brought up the matter of s.h.i.+pping being held in our ports.

It appears that something more than half of the normal number of s.h.i.+ps has gone out since February 1st, and they all seem to be getting over the first scare, because Germany is not doing more than her former amount of damage.

We were told of intercepted cables to the Wolfe News Agency, in Berlin, in which the American people were represented as being against war under any circ.u.mstances--sympathizing strongly with a neutrality that would keep all Americans off the seas. Thus does the Kaiser learn of American sentiment! No wonder he sizes us up as cowards! ...

F. K. L.

To Frank I. Cobb

Was.h.i.+ngton, February 21, 1917

MY DEAR COBB,--I have told Henry Hall that he should come down here and give the story of how Bernstorff handled the newspaper men, and thus worked the American people, ... He ought to get out of the newspaper men themselves, and he can, the whole atmosphere of the Was.h.i.+ngton situation since Dernberg left,--Bernstorff's little knot of society friends, chiefly women, the dinners that they had, his appeals for sympathy, the manner in which he would offset whatever the State Department was attempting to get before the American people. He would give away to newspaper men news that he got from his own government before it got to the State Department. He would give away also the news that he got from the State Department before the State Department itself gave it out, and he had a regular room in which he received these newspaper men, and handed them cigars and so on, and carried on a propaganda against the policy of the United States while acting as Amba.s.sador for Germany, the like of which n.o.body has carried on since Genet; and worse than his, because it was carried on secretly and cunningly. ...

Hall will be able to get a ripping good story, I am satisfied,--a good two pages on "Modern Diplomacy," which will reveal how long- suffering the United States has been. Cordially yours,

FRANKLIN K. LANE

To George W. Lane

Was.h.i.+ngton, February 25, 1917

MY DEAR GEORGE,--On Friday we had one of the most animated sessions of the Cabinet that I suppose has ever been held under this or any other President. It all arose out of a very innocent question of mine as to whether it was true that the wives of American Consuls on leaving Germany had been stripped naked, given an acid bath to detect writing on their flesh, and subjected to other indignities. Lansing answered that it was true. Then I asked Houston about the bread riots in New York, as to whether there was shortage of food because of car shortage due to vessels not going out with exports. This led to a discussion of the great problem which we all had been afraid to raise--Why shouldn't we send our s.h.i.+ps out with guns or convoys? Daniels said we must not convoy-- that would be dangerous. (Think of a Secretary of the Navy talking of danger!) The President said that the country was not willing that we should take any risks of war. I said that I got no such sentiment out of the country, but if the country knew that our Consuls' wives had been treated so outrageously that there would be no question as to the sentiment. This, the President took as a suggestion that we should work up a propaganda of hatred against Germany. Of course, I said I had no such idea, but that I felt that in a Democracy the people were ent.i.tled to know the facts.

McAdoo, Houston, and Redfield joined me. The President turned on them bitterly, especially on McAdoo, and reproached all of us with appealing to the spirit of the Code Duello. We couldn't get the idea out of his head that we were bent on pus.h.i.+ng the country into war. Houston talked of resigning after the meeting. McAdoo will-- within a year, I believe. I tried to smooth them down by recalling our past experiences with the President. We have had to push, and push, and push, to get him to take any forward step--the Trade Commission, the Tariff Commission. He comes out right but he is slower than a glacier--and things are mighty disagreeable, whenever anything has to be done.

Now he is being abused by the Republicans for being slow, and this will probably help a bit, though it may make him more obstinate.

He wants no extra session, and the Republicans fear that he will submit to anything in the way of indignity or national humiliation without "getting back," so they are standing for an extra session.

The President believes, I think, that the munitions makers are back of the Republican plan. But I doubt this. They simply want to have a "say"; and the President wants to be alone and unbothered.

He probably would not call Cabinet meetings if Congress adjourned.

Then I would go to Honolulu, where the land problem vexes.

I don't know whether the President is an internationalist or a pacifist, he seems to be very mildly national--his patriotism is covered over with a film of philosophic humanitarianism, that certainly doesn't make for "punch" at such a time as this.

My love to you old man,--do write me oftener and tell me if you get all my letters.

F. K L.