The Great Speeches and Orations of Daniel Webster Part 76

And in his recent despatch to Mr. Fox his Lords.h.i.+p further says: "That the President might be a.s.sured that Great Britain would always respect the just claims of the United States. That the British government made no pretension to interfere in any manner whatever, either by detention, visit, or search, with vessels of the United States, known or believed to be such, but that it still maintained, and would exercise when necessary, its own right to ascertain the genuineness of any flag which a suspected vessel might bear; that if, in the exercise of this right, either from involuntary error, or in spite of every precaution, loss or injury should be sustained, a prompt reparation would be afforded; but that it should entertain, for a single instant, the notion of abandoning the right itself, would be quite impossible."

This, then, is the British claim, as a.s.serted by her Majesty's government.

In his remarks in the speech already referred to, in the House of Commons, the first minister of the crown said: "There is nothing more distinct than the right of visit is from the right of search. Search is a belligerent right, and not to be exercised in time of peace, except when it has been conceded by treaty. The right of search extends not only to the vessel, but to the cargo also. The right of visit is quite distinct from this, though the two are often unfounded. The right of search, with respect to American vessels, we entirely and utterly disclaim; nay, more, if we knew that an American vessel were furnished with all the materials requisite for the slave-trade, if we knew that the decks were prepared to receive hundreds of human beings within a s.p.a.ce in which life is almost impossible, still we should be bound to let that American vessel pa.s.s on. But the right we claim is to know whether a vessel pretending to be American, and hoisting the American flag, be _bona fide_ American."

The President's message is regarded as holding opinions in opposition to these.

The British government, then, supposes that the right of visit and the right of search are essentially distinct in their nature, and that this difference is well known and generally acknowledged; that the difference between them consists in their different objects and purposes: one, the visit, having for its object nothing but to ascertain the nationality of the vessel; the other, the search, by an inquisition, not only into the nationality of the vessel, but the nature and object of her voyage, and the true owners.h.i.+p of her cargo.

The government of the United States, on the other hand, maintains that there is no such well-known and acknowledged, nor, indeed, any broad and generic difference between what has been usually called visit, and what has been usually called search; that the right of visit, to be effectual, must come, in the end, to include search; and thus to exercise, in peace, an authority which the law of nations only allows in times of war. If such well-known distinction exists, where are the proofs of it? What writers of authority on public law, what adjudications in courts of admiralty, what public treaties, recognize it? No such recognition has presented itself to the government of the United States; but, on the contrary, it understands that public writers, courts of law, and solemn treaties have, for two centuries, used the words "visit" and "search" in the same sense. What Great Britain and the United States mean by the "right of search," in its broadest sense, is called by Continental writers and jurists by no other name than the "right of visit." Visit, therefore, as it has been understood, implies not only a right to inquire into the national character, but to detain the vessel, to stop the progress of the voyage, to examine papers, to decide on their regularity and authenticity, and to make inquisition on board for enemy's property, and into the business which the vessel is engaged in. In other words, it describes the entire right of belligerent visitation and search. Such a right is justly disclaimed by the British government in time of peace. They, nevertheless, insist on a right which they denominate a right of visit, and by that word describe the claim which they a.s.sert. It is proper, and due to the importance and delicacy of the questions involved, to take care that, in discussing them, both governments understand the terms which may be used in the same sense.

If, indeed, it should be manifest that the difference between the parties is only verbal, it might be hoped that no harm would be done; but the government of the United States thinks itself not justly chargeable with excessive jealousy, or with too great scrupulosity in the use of words, in insisting on its opinion that there is no such distinction as the British government maintains between visit and search; and that there is no right to visit in time of peace, except in the execution of revenue laws or other munic.i.p.al regulations, in which cases the right is usually exercised near the coast, or within the marine league, or where the vessel is justly suspected of violating the law of nations by piratical aggression; but, wherever exercised, it is a right of search.

Nor can the United States government agree that the term "right" is justly applied to such exercise of power as the British government thinks it indispensable to maintain in certain cases. The right a.s.serted is a right to ascertain whether a merchant-vessel is justly ent.i.tled to the protection of the flag which she may happen to have hoisted, such vessel being in circ.u.mstances which render her liable to the suspicion, first, that she is not ent.i.tled to the protection of the flag; and secondly, that, if not ent.i.tled to it, she is, either by the law of England, as an English vessel, or under the provisions of treaties with certain European powers, subject to the supervision and search of British cruisers. And yet Lord Aberdeen says, "that if, in the exercise of this right, either from involuntary error, or in spite of every precaution, loss or injury should be sustained, a prompt reparation would be afforded."

It is not easy to perceive how these consequences can be admitted justly to flow from the fair exercise of a clear right. If injury be produced by the exercise of a right, it would seem strange that it should be repaired, as if it had been the effect of a wrongful act. The general rule of law certainly is, that, in the proper and prudent exercise of his own right, no one is answerable for undesigned injuries. It may be said that the right is a qualified right; that it is a right to do certain acts of force at the risk of turning out to be wrong-doers, and of being made answerable for all damages. But such an argument would prove every trespa.s.s to be matter of right, subject only to just responsibility. If force were allowed to such reasoning in other cases, it would follow that an individual's right in his own property was hardly more than a well-founded claim for compensation if he should be deprived of it. But compensation is that which is rendered for injury, and is not commutation, or forced equivalent, for acknowledged rights.

It implies, at least in its general interpretation the commission of some wrongful act.

But, without pressing further these inquiries into the accuracy and propriety of definitions and the use of words, I proceed to draw your attention to the thing itself, and to consider what these acts are which the British government insists its cruisers have a right to perform, and to what consequences they naturally and necessarily tend. An eminent member of the House of Commons[1] thus states the British claim, and his statement is acquiesced in and adopted by the first minister of the crown:--

"The claim of this country is for the right of our cruisers to ascertain whether a merchant-vessel is justly ent.i.tled to the protection of the flag which she may happen to have hoisted, such vessel being in circ.u.mstances which rendered her liable to the suspicion, first, that she was not ent.i.tled to the protection of the flag; and, secondly, if not ent.i.tled to it, she was, either under the law of nations or the provisions of treaties, subject to the supervision and control of our cruisers."

Now the question is, _By what means_ is this ascertainment to be effected?

As we understand the general and settled rules of public law, in respect to s.h.i.+ps of war sailing under the authority of their government, "to arrest pirates and other public offenders," there is no reason why they may not approach any vessels descried at sea for the purpose of ascertaining their real characters. Such a right of approach seems indispensable for the fair and discreet exercise of their authority; and the use of it cannot he justly deemed indicative of any design to insult or injure those they approach, or to impede them in their lawful commerce. On the other hand, it is as clear that no s.h.i.+p is, under such circ.u.mstances, bound to lie by or wait the approach of any other s.h.i.+p.

She is at full liberty to pursue her voyage in her own way, and to use all necessary precautions to avoid any suspected sinister enterprise or hostile attack. Her right to the free use of the ocean is as perfect as that of any other s.h.i.+p. An entire equality is presumed to exist. She has a right to consult her own safety, but at the same time she must take care not to violate the rights of others. She may use any precautions dictated by the prudence or fears of her officers, either as to delay, or the progress or course of her voyage; but she is not at liberty to inflict injuries upon other innocent parties simply because of conjectural dangers.

But if the vessel thus approached attempts to avoid the vessel approaching, or does not comply with her commander's order to send him her papers for his inspection, nor consent to be visited or detained, what is next to be done? Is force to be used? And if force be used, may that force be lawfully repelled? These questions lead at once to the elemental principle, the essence of the British claim. Suppose the merchant-vessel be in truth an American vessel engaged in lawful commerce, and that she does not choose to be detained. Suppose she resists the visit. What is the consequence? In all cases in which the belligerent right of visit exists, resistance to the exercise of that right is regarded as just cause of condemnation, both of vessel and cargo. Is that penalty, or what other penalty, to be incurred by resistance to visit in time of peace? Or suppose that force be met by force, gun returned for gun, and the commander of the cruiser, or some of his seamen be killed; what description of offence will have been committed? It would be said, in behalf of the commander of the cruiser, that he mistook the vessel for a vessel of England, Brazil, or Portugal; but does this mistake of his take away from the American vessel the right of self-defence? The writers of authority declare it to be a principle of natural law, that the privilege of self-defence exists against an a.s.sailant who mistakes the object of his attack for another whom he had a right to a.s.sail.

Lord Aberdeen cannot fail to see, therefore, what serious consequences might ensue, if it were to be admitted that this claim to visit, in time of peace, however limited or defined, should be permitted to exist as a strict matter of right; for if it exist as a right, it must be followed by corresponding duties and obligations, and the failure to fulfil those duties would naturally draw penal consequences after it, till erelong it would become, in truth, little less, or little other, than the belligerent right of search.

If visit or visitation be not accompanied by search, it will be in most cases merely idle. A sight of papers may be demanded, and papers may be produced. But it is known that slave-traders carry false papers, and different sets of papers. A search for other papers, then, must be made where suspicion justifies it, or else the whole proceeding would be nugatory. In suspicious cases, the language and general appearance of the crew are among the means of ascertaining the national character of the vessel. The cargo on board, also, often indicates the country from which she comes. Her log-books, showing the previous course and events of her voyage, her internal fitting up and equipment, are all evidences for her, or against her, on her allegation of character. These matters, it is obvious, can only be ascertained by rigorous search.

It may be asked, If a vessel may not be called on to show her papers, why does she carry papers? No doubt she may be called on to show her papers; but the question is, Where, when, and by whom? Not in time of peace, on the high seas, where her rights are equal to the rights of any other vessel, and where none has a right to molest her. The use of her papers is, in time of war, to prove her neutrality when visited by belligerent cruisers; and in both peace and war, to show her national character, and the lawfulness of her voyage, in those ports of other countries to which she may proceed for purposes of trade.

It appears to the government of the United States, that the view of this whole subject which is the most naturally taken is also the most legal, and most in a.n.a.logy with other cases. British cruisers have a right to detain British merchantmen for certain purposes; and they have a right, acquired by treaty, to detain merchant-vessels of several other nations for the same purposes. But they have no right at all to detain an American merchant-vessel. This Lord Aberdeen admits in the fullest manner. Any detention of an American vessel by a British cruiser is therefore a wrong, a trespa.s.s; although it may be done under the belief that she was a British vessel, or that she belonged to a nation which had conceded the right of such detention to the British cruisers, and the trespa.s.s therefore an involuntary trespa.s.s. If a s.h.i.+p of war, in thick weather, or in the darkness of the night, fire upon and sink a neutral vessel, under the belief that she is an enemy's vessel, this is a trespa.s.s, a mere wrong; and cannot be said to be an act done under any right, accompanied by responsibility for damages. So if a civil officer on land have process against one individual, and through mistake arrest another, this arrest is wholly tortious; no one would think of saying that it was done under any lawful exercise of authority, subject only to responsibility, or that it was any thing but a mere trespa.s.s, though an unintentional trespa.s.s. The munic.i.p.al law does not undertake to lay down beforehand any rule for the government of such cases; and as little, in the opinion of the government of the United States, does the public law of the world lay down beforehand any rule for the government of cases of involuntary trespa.s.ses, detentions, and injuries at sea; except that in both cla.s.ses of cases law and reason make a distinction between injuries committed through mistake and injuries committed by design, the former being ent.i.tled to fair and just compensation, the latter demanding exemplary damages, and sometimes personal punishment. The government of the United States has frequently made known its opinion, which it now repeats, that the practice of detaining American vessels, though subject to just compensation if such detention afterward turn out to have been without good cause, however guarded by instructions, or however cautiously exercised, necessarily leads to serious inconvenience and injury. The amount of loss cannot be always well ascertained.

Compensation, if it be adequate in the amount, may still necessarily be long delayed; and the pendency of such claims always proves troublesome to the governments of both countries. These detentions, too, frequently irritate individuals, cause warm blood, and produce nothing but ill effects on the amicable relations existing between the countries. We wish, therefore, to put an end to them, and to avoid all occasions for their recurrence.

On the whole, the government of the United States, while it has not conceded a mutual right of visit or search, as has been done by the parties to the quintuple treaty of December, 1841, does not admit that, by the law and practice of nations, there is any such thing as a right of visit, distinguished by well-known rules and definitions from the right of search.

It does not admit that visit of American merchant-vessels by British cruisers is founded on any right, notwithstanding the cruiser may suppose such vessel to be British, Brazilian, or Portuguese. We cannot but see that the detention and examination of American vessels by British cruisers has already led to consequences, and fear that, if continued, it would still lead to further consequences, highly injurious to the lawful commerce of the United States.

At the same time, the government of the United States fully admits that its flag can give no immunity to pirates, nor to any other than to regularly doc.u.mented American vessels. It was upon this view of the whole case, and with a firm conviction of the truth of these sentiments, that it cheerfully a.s.sumed the duties contained in the treaty of Was.h.i.+ngton; in the hope that thereby causes of difficulty and difference might be altogether removed, and that the two powers might be enabled to act concurrently, cordially, and effectually for the suppression of a traffic which both regard as a reproach upon the civilization of the age, and at war with every principle of humanity and every Christian sentiment.

The government of the United States has no interest, nor is it under the influence of any opinions, which should lead it to desire any derogation of the just authority and rights of maritime power. But in the convictions which it entertains, and in the measures which it has adopted, it has been governed solely by a sincere desire to support those principles and those practices which it believes to be conformable to public law, and favorable to the peace and harmony of nations.

Both houses of Congress, with a remarkable degree of unanimity, have made express provisions for carrying into effect the eighth article of the treaty. An American squadron will immediately proceed to the coast of Africa. Instructions for its commander are in the course of preparation, and copies will be furnished to the British government; and the President confidently believes, that the cordial concurrence of the two governments in the mode agreed on will be more effectual than any efforts yet made for the suppression of the slave-trade.

You will read this despatch to Lord Aberdeen, and, if he desire it, give him a copy.

I am, Sir, &c., &c.

DANIEL WEBSTER.

EDWARD EVERETT, ESQ., &c., &c., &c.

[Footnote 1: Mr. Wood, now Sir Charles Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer.]

LETTERS TO GENERAL Ca.s.s ON THE TREATY OF WAs.h.i.+NGTON.

_Mr. Webster to General Ca.s.s._

Department of State, Was.h.i.+ngton, August 29, 1842.

Sir,--You will see by the enclosed the result of the negotiations lately had in this city between this department and Lord Ashburton. The treaty has been ratified by the President and Senate.

In communicating to you this treaty, I am directed by the President to draw your particular attention to those articles which relate to the suppression of the African slave-trade.

After full and anxious consideration of this very delicate subject, the government of the United States has come to the conclusion which you will see expressed in the President's message to the Senate accompanying the treaty.

Without intending or desiring to influence the policy of other governments on this important subject, this government has reflected on what was due to its own character and position, as the leading maritime power on the American continent, left free to make choice of such means for the fulfilment of its duties as it should deem best suited to its dignity. The result of its reflections has been, that it does not concur in measures which, for whatever benevolent purpose they may be adopted, or with whatever care and moderation they may be exercised, have yet a tendency to place the police of the seas in the hands of a single power.

It chooses rather to follow its own laws with its own sanction, and to carry them into execution by its own authority. Disposed to act in the spirit of the most cordial concurrence with other nations for the suppression of the African slave-trade, that great reproach of our times, it deems it to be right, nevertheless, that this action, though concurrent, should be independent, and it believes that from this independence it will derive a greater degree of efficiency.

You will perceive, however, that, in the opinion of this government, cruising against slave-dealers on the coast of Africa is not all which is necessary to be done in order to put an end to the traffic. There are markets for slaves, or the unhappy natives of Africa would not be seized, chained, and carried over the ocean into slavery. These markets ought to be shut. And, in the treaty now communicated to you, the high contracting parties have stipulated "that they will unite, in all becoming representations and remonstrances, with any and all powers within whose dominions such markets are allowed to exist; and that they will urge upon all such powers the propriety and duty of closing such markets effectually, at once and for ever."

You are furnished, then, with the American policy in regard to this interesting subject. First, independent but cordially concurrent efforts of maritime states to suppress, as far as possible, the trade on the coast, by means of competent and well-appointed squadrons, to watch the sh.o.r.es and scour the neighboring seas. Secondly, concurrent, becoming remonstrance with all governments who tolerate within their territories markets for the purchase of African negroes. There is much reason to believe that, if other states, professing equal hostility to this nefarious traffic, would give their own powerful concurrence and co-operation to these remonstrances, the general effect would be satisfactory, and that the cupidity and crimes of individuals would at length cease to find both their temptation and their reward in the bosom of Christian states, and in the permission of Christian governments.

It will still remain for each government to revise, execute, and make more effectual its own munic.i.p.al laws against its subjects or citizens who shall be concerned in, or in any way give aid or countenance to others concerned in this traffic.

You are at liberty to make the contents of this despatch known to the French government.

I have, &c.

DANIEL WEBSTER.

LEWIS Ca.s.s, ESQ., &c., &c., &c.

_Mr. F. Webster to General Ca.s.s._

Department of State, Was.h.i.+ngton, October 11, 1842.