The Life of John Marshall Volume II Part 8

[149] _Ib._, 86.

[150] _Ib._, 132-33.

[151] Marshall, ii, 192.

[152] Money was exceedingly scarce. Even Was.h.i.+ngton had to borrow to travel to New York for his inauguration, and Patrick Henry could not attend the Federal Const.i.tutional Convention for want of cash. (Conway, 132.)

[153] "First Report on the Public Credit"; _Works_: Lodge, ii, 227 _et seq._ The above a.n.a.lysis, while not technically precise, is sufficiently accurate to give a rough idea of Hamilton's plan. (See Marshall's a.n.a.lysis; Marshall, ii, 178-80.)

[154] This, indeed, was a portion of Hamilton's plan and he succeeded in it as he did in other parts of his broad purpose to combine as much strength as possible in support of the National Government. "The northern states and the commercial and monied people are zealously attached to ... the new government." (Wolcott to his father, Feb. 12, 1791; Gibbs, i, 62.)

[155] This was emphatically true. From the National point of view it was the best feature of Hamilton's plan.

[156] In his old age, John Adams, Hamilton's most venomous and unforgiving enemy, while unsparing in his personal abuse, paid high tribute to the wisdom and necessity of Hamilton's financial statesmans.h.i.+p. "I know not," writes Adams, "how Hamilton could have done otherwise." (Adams to Rush, Aug. 23, 1805; _Old Family Letters_, 75.) "The sudden rise of public securities, after the establishment of the funding system was no misfortune to the Public but an advantage. The necessity of that system arose from the inconsistency of the People in contracting debts and then refusing to pay them." (Same to same, Jan.

25, 1806; _ib._, 93.)

Fisher Ames thus states the different interests of the sections: "The funding system, they [Southern members of Congress] say, is in favor of the moneyed interest--oppressive to the land; that is, favorable to us [Northern people], hard on them. They pay tribute, they say, and the middle and eastern people ... receive it. And here is the burden of the song, almost all the little [certificates of State or Continental debts]

that they had and which cost them twenty s.h.i.+llings, for supplies or services, has been bought up, at a low rate, and now they pay more tax towards the interest than they received for the paper. This _tribute_, they say, is aggravating." (Ames to Minot, Nov. 30, 1791; _Works_: Ames, i, 104.)

[157] Marshall, ii, 181. The attack on Hamilton's financial plan and especially on a.s.sumption was the beginning of the definite organization of the Republican Party. (Was.h.i.+ngton's _Diary_: Lossing, 166.)

[158] Gore to King, July 25, 1790; King, i, 392; and see McMaster, ii, 22.

[159] At one time, when it appeared that a.s.sumption was defeated, Sedgwick of Ma.s.sachusetts intimated that his section might secede.

(_Annals_, 1st Cong., April 12, 1790, pp. 1577-78; and see Rives, iii, 90 _et seq._)

[160] Marshall's statement of the debate is the best and fairest brief account of this historic conflict. (See Marshall, ii, 181-90. See entire debate in _Annals_, 1st Cong., i, ii, under caption "Public Debt.")

[161] "This despicable grog-shop contest, whether the taverns of New York or Philadelphia shall get the custom of Congress, keeps us in discord and covers us all with disgrace." (Ames to Dwight, June 11, 1790; _Works_: Ames, i, 80.)

[162] Jefferson to Monroe, June 20, 1790; _Works_: Ford, vi, 78-80; and see _ib._, 76; to Gilmer, June 27, _ib._, 83; to Rutledge, July 4, _ib._, 87-88; to Harvie, July 25, _ib._, 108.

[163] _Ib._; and see also Jefferson to Eppes, July 25, _ib._, 106; to Randolph, March 28, _ib._, 37; to same, April 18, _ib._, 47; to Lee, April 26, _ib._, 53; to Mason, June 13, _ib._, 75; to Randolph, June 20, _ib._, 76-77; to Monroe, June 20, _ib._, 79; to Dumas, June 23, _ib._, 82; to Rutledge, July 4, _ib._, 87-88; to Dumas, July 13, _ib._, 96.

Compare these letters with Jefferson's statement, February, 1793; _ib._, vii, 224-26; and with the "Anas," _ib._, i, 171-78. Jefferson then declared that "I was really a stranger to the whole subject." (_Ib._, 176.)

[164] Jefferson's statement; _Works_: Ford, vii, 224-26, and i, 175-77.

[165] Gibbs, i, 32; and see Marshall, ii, 190-91.

[166] Henry, ii, 453. But Marshall says that more votes would have changed had that been necessary to consummate the bargain. (See Marshall, ii, footnote to 191.)

[167] _Ib._, 192.

[168] Marshall, ii, 191-92.

[169] Henry, ii, 453-55.

[170] Journal, H.D. (1790), 35.

[171] Journal, H.D. (1790), 35.

[172] _Ib._

[173] _Ib._, 80-81.

[174] Journal, H.D. (1790), 80-81; and see _Am. St. Prs., Finance_, i, 90-91. The economic distinction is here clearly drawn. Jefferson, who later made this a chief part of his attack, had not yet raised the point.

[175] Ames to Minot, Feb. 16, 1792; _Works_: Ames, i, 113.

[176] This was the sentence which declared that Hamilton's reasoning would result in "fict.i.tious wealth through a paper medium," referring to his plan for making the transferable certificates of the National debt serve as currency.

[177] Journal, H.D. (1790), 141.

[178] Hamilton to Jay, Nov. 13, 1790; _Works_: Lodge, ix, 473-74.

Virginia was becoming very hostile to the new Government. First, there was a report that Congress was about to emanc.i.p.ate the slaves. Then came the news of the a.s.sumption of the State debts, with the presence in Virginia of speculators from other States buying up State securities; and this added gall to the bitter cup which Virginians felt the National Government was forcing them to drink. Finally the tidings that the Senate had defeated the motion for public sessions inflamed the public mind still more. (Stuart to Was.h.i.+ngton, June 2, 1790; _Writings_: Ford, xi, footnote to 482.)

Even close friends of Was.h.i.+ngton deeply deplored a "spirit so subversive of the true principles of the const.i.tution.... If Mr. Henry has sufficient boldness to aim the blow at its [Const.i.tution's] existence, which he has threatened, I think he can never meet with a more favorable opportunity if the a.s.sumption should take place." (_Ib._)

Was.h.i.+ngton replied that Stuart's letter pained him. "The public mind in Virginia ... seems to be more irritable, sour, and discontented than ...

it is in any other State in the Union except Ma.s.sachusetts." (Was.h.i.+ngton to Stuart, June 15, 1790; _ib._, 481-82.)

Marshall's father most inaccurately reported to Was.h.i.+ngton that Kentucky favored the measures of the Administration; and the President, thanking him for the welcome news, asked the elder Marshall for "any information of a public or private nature ... from your district." (Was.h.i.+ngton to Thomas Marshall, Feb., 1791; Was.h.i.+ngton's Letter Book, MS., Lib. Cong.) Kentucky was at that time in strong opposition and this continued to grow.

[179] Taylor's "An Enquiry, etc.," as quoted in Beard: _Econ. O. J. D._, 209. (_Ib._, chap. vii.) Taylor's pamphlet was revised by Pendleton and then sent to Madison before publication. (Monroe to Madison, May 18, 1793; Monroe's _Writings_: Hamilton, i, 254.) Taylor wanted "banks ...

demolished" and bankers "excluded from public councils." (Beard: _Econ.

O. J. D._, 209.)

[180] Marshall, ii, 192.

[181] In Jefferson's letters, already cited, not the faintest suggestion appears that he thought the law unconst.i.tutional. Not until Patrick Henry's resolution, and the address of the Virginia Legislature to Congress based thereon, made the point that a.s.sumption was in violation of this instrument, because the power to pa.s.s such a law was not expressly given in the Const.i.tution, did Jefferson take his stand against implied powers.

[182] "Whether ... right or wrong, abstractedly, more attention should be paid to the general opinion." (Jefferson to Mason, Feb. 4, 1791; _Works_: Ford, vi, 186.)

[183] Monroe had advised Madison of the hostility of Virginia to a.s.sumption and incidentally asked for an office for his own brother-in-law. (Monroe to Madison, July 2, 1790; Monroe's _Writings_: Hamilton, i, 208; and see Monroe to Jefferson, July 3, 1790; _ib._, 209.)

[184] Anderson, 21.

[185] Jefferson himself, a year after he helped pa.s.s the a.s.sumption Act, had in a Cabinet paper fiercely attacked Hamilton's plan; and the latter answered in a formal statement to the President. These two doc.u.ments are the ablest summaries of the opposing sides of this great controversy.

(See Jefferson to President, May 23, 1792; _Works_: Ford, vi, 487-95; and Hamilton to Was.h.i.+ngton, Aug. 18, 1792; _Works_: Lodge, ii, 426-72.)

[186] Ames to Minot, March 8, 1792; _Works_: Ames, i, 114.

[187] Tenth Amendment, as ratified.

[188] "Opinion on the Const.i.tutionality of a National Bank of the United States"; _Works_: Ford, vi, 198; and see Madison's argument against the const.i.tutionality of the Bank Act in _Annals_, 1st Cong., Feb. 2, 1791, pp. 1944-52; Feb. 8, 2008-12; also, _Writings_: Hunt, vi, 19-42. This argument best shows Madison's sudden and radical change from an extreme Nationalist to an advocate of the most restricted National powers.

[189] Hamilton's "Opinion as to the Const.i.tutionality of the Bank of the United States"; _Works_: Lodge, iii, 445-93. Adams took the same view.

(See Adams to Rush, Dec. 27, 1810; _Old Family Letters_, 272.)