A History of Spain Part 19

Meanwhile, the religious question in Germany had all along been considered by Charles as one of his most important problems. The first war with France prevented any action on his part until 1529, since he needed the support of the Protestant princes. The movement therefore had time to gather headway, and it was evident that Charles would meet with determined opposition whenever he should decide to face the issue.

Various factors entered in to complicate the matter, such, for example, as the fear on the part of many princes of the growing Hapsburg power and the belief that Charles meant to make the imperial succession hereditary in his family. A temporary adjustment of the religious situation was made by the imperial Diet held at Spires in 1526, when it was agreed that every prince should decide for himself in matters of religion. With the close of the war with France in 1529, Charles caused the Diet to meet again at Spires, on which occasion the previous decision was revoked. The princes devoted to the reform ideas protested, giving rise to the name "Protestant," but without avail. The Diet was called for the next year at Augsburg, when Charles sat in judgment between the two parties. The Protestants presented their side in a doc.u.ment which became known as the confession of Augsburg. The Catholic theologians replied, and Charles accepted their view, ordering the Protestant leaders to submit, and threatening to employ force unless they should do so. The international situation again operated to protect the reform movement, for the Turks became threatening, and, indeed, what with the wars with France and his numerous other difficulties Charles was unable to proceed resolutely to a solution of the religious problem until the year 1545. At last he was ready to declare war. In 1547 he won what seemed to be a decisive victory in the Battle of Muhlberg, resulting in the subjection of the Protestant princes to the Roman Church. They protested anew, and, aided by the opposition to Charles on other grounds,--for example, because of his introduction of Italian and Spanish soldiery into what was regarded as a domestic quarrel,--were able to present a warlike front again. This time they were joined by Charles' former powerful ally, Maurice of Saxony, through whose a.s.sistance they successfully defended themselves. Peace was made at Pa.s.sau in 1552, ratified by the Diet of Augsburg in 1555, whereby the Protestant princes obtained equal rights with the Catholic lords as to their freedom in religious beliefs.

[Sidenote: Other failures of Charles and his abdication.]

Great as were to be the results of Charles' reign on its European side, it had nevertheless been a failure so far as Spain and Charles' own objects were concerned. Yet other disappointments were to fall to his lot. He aspired to the imperial t.i.tle for his son Philip. In this he was opposed both by the Germanic n.o.bility, who saw in it an attempt to foist upon them a Spanish-controlled absolutism, and by his brother Ferdinand, who held the Austrian dominions as a fief of the empire and aimed to become emperor himself. Unable to prevail in his own policy Charles eventually supported Ferdinand. For many years, too, he thought of establis.h.i.+ng an independent Burgundian kingdom as a counterpoise to France, but changed his mind to take up a plan for uniting England and the Low Countries, with the same object in view. For this latter purpose he procured the hand of Queen Mary of England for his son Philip. The marriage proved childless, and Philip was both unpopular and without power in England. The death of Mary in 1558 ended this prospect. At last Charles' spirit was broken. For nearly forty years he had battled for ideals which he was unable to bring to fulfilment; so he resolved to retire from public life. In 1555 he renounced his t.i.tle to the Low Countries in favor of Philip. In 1556 he abdicated in Spain, and went to live at the monastery of Yuste in Caceres. He was unable to drop out of political life completely, however, and was wont to intervene in the affairs of Spain from his monastic retreat. In 1558 he gave up his imperial crown, to which his brother Ferdinand was elected. Thus Spain was separated from Austria, but she retained the Burgundian inheritance and the Italian possessions of Aragon. The marriage of Philip the Handsome and Juana la Loca was still to be productive of fatal consequences to Spain, for together with the Burgundian domains there remained the feeling of Hapsburg solidarity.

[Sidenote: Greatness of Charles in the history of Spain and Spanish America.]

Charles had failed in Europe, but in Spain and especially in the Americas he had done more than enough to compensate for his European reverses. His achievements in Spain belong to the field of inst.i.tutional development rather than to that of political narrative, however. As for the Americas his reign was characterized by such a series of remarkable mainland conquests that it is often treated as a distinct epoch in American history, the era of the _conquistadores_, and Spanish America is, after all, the princ.i.p.al monument to the greatness of his reign. The Emperor Charles V was a failure; but King Charles I of Spain gave the Americas to European civilization.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE REIGN OF PHILIP II, 1556-1598

[Sidenote: Resemblance of the reign of Philip II to that of Charles I.]

In underlying essentials the reign of Philip II was a reproduction of that of Charles I. There were scattered dominions and family prestige to maintain, the enemies of the Catholic Church to combat, the dominant place of Spain in Europe to a.s.sure, the strain on Spanish resources, and, as glorious offsets to general failure in Europe, the acquisition of some European domains and the advance of the colonial conquests. Only the details varied. Philip had a more compact nation behind him than had fallen to the lot of Charles, although there was still much to be desired in that respect; France was hostile, though less powerful than formerly, but England and Philip's rebellious Protestant Netherlands more than made up for the weakness of France; issues in Germany no longer called for great attention, but family politics were not forgotten; on the other hand Philip achieved the ideal of peninsula unity through the acquisition of Portugal, carrying with it that country's colonies; and, finally, his conquests in the new world, though less spectacular than those of Charles, compared favorably with them in actual fact.

[Sidenote: Education and character of Philip II.]

Historians have often gone to extremes in their judgments of Philip II.

Some have been ardently pro-Philip, while others were as bitterly condemnatory. Recently, opinions have been more moderately expressed. In addition to native ability and intelligence Philip had the benefit of an unusually good education in preparation for government. Charles himself was one of the youth's instructors, and, long before his various abdications, had given Philip political practice in various ways,--for example, by making him co-regent of Spain with Cardinal Tavera during Charles' own absence in Germany. Philip also travelled extensively in the lands which he one day hoped to govern,--in Italy (1548), the Low Countries (1549), and Germany (1550). In 1543 he married a Portuguese princess, Maria, his first cousin. One son, Charles, was born of this marriage, but the mother died in childbirth. His fruitless marriage with Mary Tudor, in 1553, has already been mentioned. He remained in England until 1555, when he went to the Low Countries to be crowned, and thence to Spain, of which country he became king in 1556, being at that time twenty-nine years old. His abilities as king of Spain were offset in a measure by certain unfortunate traits and practices. He was of a vacillating type of mind; delays in his administration were often long and fatal, and more than once he let slip a golden opportunity for victory, because he could not make up his mind to strike. Of a suspicious nature, he was too little inclined to rely upon men from whose abilities he might have profited. A tremendous worker, he was too much in the habit of trying to do everything himself, with the result that greater affairs were held up, while the king of Spain worked over details. Finally, he was extremely rigorous with heretics, from motives of religion and of political policy.

[Sidenote: War with the pope.]

The princ.i.p.al aim of Philip's life was the triumph of Catholicism, but this did not hinder his distinguis.h.i.+ng clearly between the interests of the church and those of the popes as rulers of the Papal States. Thus it was not strange that Philip's reign should begin with a war against Pope Paul IV. The latter excommunicated both Charles and Philip, and procured alliances with France and, curious to relate, the sultan of Turkey, head of the Moslem world. The pope was defeated, but it was not until the accession of Pius IV, in 1559, that the bans of excommunication were raised.

[Sidenote: Wars with France.]

There was a constant succession of war and peace with France throughout the reign, with the campaigns being fought more often in northern France from the vantage ground of Flanders than in Italy as in the time of Charles. In 1557 Philip might have been able to take Paris, but he hesitated, and the chance was lost. Many other times Philip's generals won victories, but attacks from other quarters of Europe would cause a diversion, or funds would give out, or Philip himself would change his plans. France was usually on the defensive, because she was weakened during most of the period by the domestic strife between Catholics and Protestants. When in 1589 the Protestant leader became ent.i.tled to the throne as Henry IV, Philip and the uncompromising wing of the French Catholic party endeavored to prevent his actual accession to power. At one time it was planned to make Philip himself king of France, but, as this idea did not meet with favor, various others were suggested, including the proposal of Philip's daughter for the crown, or the part.i.tion of France between Philip and others. Henry IV settled the matter in 1594 by becoming a Catholic, wherefore he received the adhesion of the Catholic party. Philip was not dissatisfied, for it seemed that he had rid himself of a dangerous Protestant neighbor. Had he but known it, Henry IV was to accomplish the regeneration of a France which was to strike the decisive blow, under Louis XIV, to remove Spain from the ranks of the first-rate powers.

[Sidenote: War with the Granadine Moriscos.]

While Philip had no such widespread discontent in Spain to deal with as had characterized the early years of the reign of Charles, there was one problem leading to a serious civil war in southern Spain. The Moriscos of Granada had proved to be an industrious and loyal element, supporting Charles in the war of the communities, but there was reason to doubt the sincerity of their conversion to Christianity. The populace generally and the clergy in particular were very bitter against them, and procured the pa.s.sage of laws which were increasingly severe in their treatment of the Moriscos. An edict of 1526 prohibited the use of Arabic speech or dress, the taking of baths (a Moslem custom), the bearing of arms, the employment of non-Christian names, and the giving of lodging in their houses to Mohammedans whether free or slave. The Moriscos were also subjected to oppressive inspections to prevent Mohammedan religious practices; they were obliged to send their children to Christian schools; and a branch of the Inquisition was established in Granada to execute, with all the rigors of that inst.i.tution, the laws against apostasy. The full effect of the edict was avoided by means of a financial gift to the king, but the Inquisition was not withdrawn. For many years the situation underwent no substantial change. The clergy, and the Christian element generally, continued to accuse the Moriscos, and the latter complained of the confiscations and severity of the Inquisition. In 1567, however, the edict of 1526 was renewed, but in harsher form, amplifying the prohibitions. When attempts were made to put the law into effect, and especially when agents came to take the Morisco children to Christian schools, by force if necessary, an uprising was not long in breaking out. The war lasted four years. The Moriscos were aided by the mountainous character of the country, and they received help from the Moslems of northern Africa and even from the Turks. The decisive campaign was fought in 1570, when Spanish troops under Philip's half-brother, Juan (or Don John) of Austria, an illegitimate son of Charles I, defeated the Moriscos, although the war dragged on to the following year. The surviving Moriscos, including those who had not taken up arms, were deported _en ma.s.se_ and distributed in other parts of Castilian Spain.

[Sidenote: Wars with the Turks.]

[Sidenote: Juan of Austria.]

The external peril from the Moslem peoples had not confined itself to the period of the Morisco war. Piracy still existed in the western Mediterranean, and the Turkish Empire continued to advance its conquests in northern Africa. Philip gained great victories, notably when he compelled the Turks to raise the siege of Malta in 1564, and especially in 1571, when he won the naval battle of Lepanto, in which nearly 80,000 Christians were engaged, most of them Spaniards. These victories were very important in their European bearings, for they broke the Turkish naval power, and perhaps saved Europe, but from the standpoint of Spain alone they were of less consequence. Philip failed to follow them up, partly because of the pressure of other affairs, and in part because of his suspicions of the victor of Lepanto, the same Juan of Austria who had just previously defeated the Moriscos. Juan of Austria was at the same time a visionary and a capable man of affairs. He was ambitious to pursue the Turks to Constantinople, capture that city, and restore the Byzantine Empire, with himself as ruler. Philip withdrew his support, whereupon Juan devised a new project of a great North African empire.

Juan even captured Tunis in pursuance of his plan, but Philip would give him no help, and Juan was obliged to retire, thus permitting of a Turkish reconquest. Philip was always able to offer the excuse of lack of funds,--and, indeed, the expenditures in the wars with Turkey, with all the effects they carried in their train, were the princ.i.p.al result to the peninsula of these campaigns.

[Sidenote: Wars in the Low Countries.]

The greatest of Philip's difficulties, and one which bulked large in its importance in European history, was the warfare with his rebellious provinces in the Low Countries. Its princ.i.p.al bearing in Spanish history was that it caused the most continuous and very likely the heaviest drain on the royal treasury of any of Philip's problems. The war lasted the entire reign, and was to be a factor for more than a half century after Philip's death. It got to be in essence a religious struggle between the Protestants of what became the Netherlands and Philip, in which the latter was supported to a certain extent by the provinces of the Catholic Netherlands, or modern Belgium. Religion, however, was not the initial, or at any time the sole, matter in controversy. At the outset the causes were such practices as the Castilian communities had objected to in the reign of Charles, namely: the appointments of foreigners to office; the presence of foreign (Spanish) troops; measures which were regarded as the forerunner to an extension of the Spanish Inquisition to the Low Countries (against which the n.o.bles and the clergy alike, practically all of whom were Catholic at that time, made strenuous objections); Philip's policy of centralization and absolutism; the popular aversion for Philip as a Spaniard (just as Spaniards had objected to Charles as a Fleming); and the excessive rigors employed in the suppression of heresy. The early leaders were Catholics, many of them members of the clergy, and the hotbed of rebellion was rather in the Catholic south than in the Protestant north. It was this situation which gave the Protestants a chance to strike on their own behalf. The war, or rather series of wars, was characterized by deeds of valor and by extreme cruelty. Philip was even more harsh in his instructions for dealing with heretics than his generals were in executing them. Alba (noted for his severity), Requesens (an able man who followed a more moderate policy), Juan of Austria (builder of air castles, but winner of battles), and the able Farnese,--these were the Spanish rulers of the period, all of them military men. The elder and the younger William of Orange were the princ.i.p.al Protestant leaders. In open combat the Spanish infantry was almost invincible, but its victories were nullified, sometimes because it was drawn away to wage war in France, but more often because money and supplies were lacking. On various occasions the troops were left unpaid for so long a time that they took matters into their own hands. Then, terrible scenes of riot and pillage were enacted, without distinction as to the religious faith of the sufferers, for even Catholic churches were sacked by the soldiery. The outcome for the Low Countries was the virtual independence of the Protestant Netherlands, although Spain did not yet acknowledge it. For Spain the result was the same as that of her other ventures in European politics, only greater in degree than most of them,--exhausting expenditures.

[Sidenote: The annexation of Portugal.]

In the middle years of Philip's reign there was one project of great moment in Spanish history which he pushed to a successful conclusion,--the annexation of Portugal. While the ultimate importance of this event was to be lessened by the later separation of the two kingdoms, they were united long enough (sixty years) for notable effects to be felt in Spain and more particularly in the Americas. The desire for peninsula unity had long been an aspiration of the Castilian kings, and its consummation from the standpoint of the acquisition of Portugal had several times been attempted, though without success. The death of King Sebastian in 1578 without issue left the Portuguese throne to Cardinal Henry, who was already very old, and whom in any event the pope refused to release from his religious vows. This caused various claimants to the succession to announce themselves, among whom were the d.u.c.h.ess of Braganza, Antonio (the prior of Crato), and Philip. The first-named had the best hereditary claim, since she was descended from a son (the youngest) of King Manuel, a predecessor of Sebastian. Antonio of Crato was son of another of King Manuel's sons, but was of illegitimate birth; nevertheless, he was the favorite of the regular clergy, the popular cla.s.ses, some n.o.bles, and the pope, and was the only serious rival Philip had to consider. Philip's mother was the eldest daughter of the same King Manuel. With this foundation for his claim he pushed his candidacy with great ability, aided by the skilful diplomacy of his special amba.s.sador, Cristobal de Moura. One of the master strokes was the public announcement of Philip's proposed governmental policy in Portugal, promising among other things to respect the autonomy of the kingdom, recognizing it as a separate political ent.i.ty from Spain. A Portuguese _Cortes_ of 1580 voted for the succession of Philip, for the n.o.ble and ecclesiastical branches supported him, against the opposition of the third estate. A few days later King Henry died, and Philip prepared to take possession. The partisans of Antonio resisted, but Philip, who had long been in readiness for the emergency, sent an army into Portugal under the Duke of Alba, and he easily routed the forces of Antonio. In keeping with his desire to avoid giving offence to the Portuguese, Philip gave Alba the strictest orders to punish any infractions of discipline or improper acts of the soldiery against the inhabitants, and these commands were carefully complied with,--in striking contrast with the policy which had been followed while Alba was governor in the Low Countries. Thus it was that a Portuguese _Cortes_ of 1581 solemnly recognized Philip as king of Portugal. Philip took oath not to appoint any Spaniards to Portuguese offices, and he kept his word to the end of his reign. Portugal had now come into the peninsula union in much the same fas.h.i.+on that Aragon had joined with Castile. With her came the vast area and great wealth of the Portuguese colonies of Asia, Africa, and more particularly Brazil. If only the Spanish kings might hold the country long enough, it appeared inevitable that a real amalgamation of such kindred peoples would one day take place.

Furthermore, if only the kings would have, or could have, confined themselves to a Pan-Hispanic policy, embracing Spain and Portugal and their colonies, the opportunity for the continued greatness of the peninsula seemed striking. The case was a different one from that of the union of Castile and Aragon, however, for a strong feeling of Portuguese nationality had already developed, based largely on a hatred of Spaniards. This spirit had something to feed upon from the outset in the defeat of the popular Antonio of Crato and in the discontent of many n.o.bles, who did not profit as much by Philip's accession as they had been led to expect. It was necessary to put strong garrisons in Portuguese cities and to fortify strategic points. Nevertheless, Philip experienced no serious trouble and was able to leave Portugal to his immediate successor.

[Sidenote: Causes of the war with England.]

Philip's relations with England, in which the outstanding event was the defeat of the Spanish Armada, had elements of importance as affecting Spanish history, especially in so far as they concerned English depredations in the Americas. They were more important to England, however, than to Spain, and the story from the English standpoint has become a familiar one. From the moment of Protestant Elizabeth's accession to the English throne in 1558, in succession to Catholic Mary, there was a constant atmosphere of impending conflict between Spain and England. Greatest of the motives in Philip's mind was that her rule meant a Protestant England, a serious break in the authority of Catholic Christianity, but there were other causes for war as well. English aid of an unofficial but substantial character was helping to sustain the Protestant Netherlands in revolt against Spain. In the Americas "beyond the line" (of Tordesillas) the two countries were virtually at war, although in the main it was a conflict of piratical attacks and the sacking of cities on the part of the English, with acts of retaliation by the Spaniards. This was the age of Drake's and Hawkins' exploits along the Spanish Main (in the Caribbean area), but it was also the age of Gilbert and Raleigh, and the first, though ineffectual, attempts of England to despoil Spain of her American dominions through the founding of colonies in the Spanish-claimed new world. Incidents of a special character served to accentuate the feeling engendered by these more permanent causes,--such, for example, as Elizabeth's appropriation of the treasure which Philip was sending to the Low Countries as pay for his soldiers: the Spanish vessels took shelter in an English port to escape from pirates, whereupon Elizabeth proceeded to "borrow," as she termed it, the wealth they were carrying. Hard pressed for funds as Philip always was, this was indeed a severe blow.

[Sidenote: Why a declaration of war was delayed.]

Nevertheless, a declaration of war was postponed for nearly thirty years. English historians ascribe the delay to the diplomatic skill of their favorite queen, but, while there is no need to deny her resourcefulness in that respect, there were reasons in plenty why Philip himself was desirous of deferring hostilities, or better still, avoiding them. In view of his existing troubles with France and the Low Countries he drew back before the enormous expense that a war with England would entail, to say nothing of the military difficulties of attacking an island power. Though he received frequent invitations from the Catholics of England and Scotland to effect an invasion, these projects were too often linked with similar proposals to the kings of France, the leading European opponents of the Spanish monarch. Philip wished to break the power of Elizabeth and of Protestantism if possible, however, and gave encouragement to plots against the life of the English queen or to schemes for revolutionary uprisings in favor of Mary Stuart, a Catholic and Elizabeth's rival, but none of these designs met with success. Many Spanish leaders urged a descent upon England, among them Juan of Austria, who wished to lead the expeditionary force himself, dreaming possibly of an English crown for his reward, but it was not until 1583 that Philip viewed these proposals with favor.

[Sidenote: Preparations for a descent upon England.]

Once having decided upon an expedition Philip began to lay his plans.

Mary Stuart was persuaded to disinherit her son, who was a Protestant (the later James I of England), and to make Philip her heir. The pope was induced to lend both financial and moral support to the undertaking, although it was necessary to deceive him as to Philip's intentions to acquire England for himself; the pope was told that Philip's daughter was to be made queen of England. The proposed descent upon England was no secret to Elizabeth, who made ready to resist. With a view to delaying Philip's preparations, Drake made an attack upon Cadiz in 1587, on which occasion he burned all the s.h.i.+pping in the bay. This only strengthened Philip's resolutions with regard to the undertaking, and tended to make him impatient for its early execution. Plans were made which proved to be in many cases ill considered. The first mistake occurred when Philip did not entertain a proposition of the Scotch and French Catholics that he should work in concert with them, thus declining an opportunity to avail himself of ports and bases of supply near the point of attack; political reasons were the foundation for his att.i.tude in this matter. Against advice he also decided to divide the expedition into a naval and a military section, the troops to come from the Low Countries after the arrival of the fleet there to transport them. The worst error of all was that of Philip's insistence on directing the organization of the fleet himself. All details had to be pa.s.sed upon by the king from his palace of the Escorial near Madrid, which necessarily involved both delay and a faulty execution of orders.

Evil practices and incompetence were manifest on every hand; quant.i.ties of the supplies purchased proved to be useless; and the officers and men were badly chosen, many of the former being without naval experience. A great mistake was made in the appointment of the Duke of Medina Sidonia to lead the expedition; the princ.i.p.al recommendation of the duke was that of his family prestige, for he was absolutely lacking in knowledge of maritime affairs, and said as much to the king, but the latter insisted that he should take command.

[Sidenote: Defeat of the Armada.]

At length the fleet was able to leave Lisbon, and later Coruna, in the year 1588. Because of its great size it was termed the _Armada Invencible_ (the Invincible Fleet), a name which has been taken over into English as the Spanish, or the Invincible, Armada. In all there were 131 s.h.i.+ps, with over 25,000 sailors, soldiers, and officers. The evil effect of Philip's management followed the Armada to sea. He had given detailed instructions what to do, and the commander-in-chief would not vary from them. Many officers thought it would be best to make an attack on Plymouth, to secure that port as a base of operations, but Philip had given orders that the fleet should first go to the Low Countries to effect a junction with the troops held in readiness there.

The story of the battle with the English fleet is well known. The contest was altogether one-sided, for the English s.h.i.+ps were both superior in speed and equipped with longer range artillery.

Nevertheless, storms contributed more than the enemy to the Spanish defeat. The Armada was utterly dispersed, and many vessels were wrecked.

Only 65 s.h.i.+ps and some 10,000 men were able to return to Spain.

[Sidenote: Domestic troubles and death of Philip.]

The decisive blow had been struck, and Spain was the loser. The English war went on into the next reign, and there were several spectacular military events, not all of them unfavorable to Spanish arms, but they affected the general situation only in that they continued the strain on the royal exchequer. In the final a.n.a.lysis Philip had failed in this as in so many other enterprises. This fact was clear, even at the time, although the eventualities of later years were to make the outcome appear the more decisive. Philip's evil star did not confine its effects to his international policies. His eldest son, Charles, proved to be of feeble body and unbalanced mind. Getting into difficulties with his father, he was placed in prison by the latter's orders, and was never seen again, dying in 1568. Charges have been made that Philip caused his death, but he was probably blameless, although he did plan to disinherit him. Philip had no other son until 1571, when his eventual successor was born, by his fourth wife. Certain other domestic troubles, not divorced from scandal (although the evidence is in no case conclusive), may be pa.s.sed over, except to mention the crowning grief of all. It early became clear that his son and heir, the later Philip III, was a weak character. "G.o.d, who has given me so many kingdoms," Philip is reported to have said, "has denied me a son capable of ruling them." In 1598 Philip died. His last days were pa.s.sed in extreme physical suffering, which he endured with admirable resignation. Philip, like the Emperor Charles, his father, had been indeed a great king, but he was a victim, as Charles had been, of a mistaken policy. Nevertheless, they had ruled Spain in her century of greatness, when Spain was not only the leading power in Europe, but was planting her inst.i.tutions, for all time, in the vast domains of the Americas.

CHAPTER XXIV

A CENTURY OF DECLINE, 1598-1700

[Sidenote: Spanish defeats of the sixteenth century.]

The unfortunate policies of Charles I and Philip II were continued during the seventeenth century in the reigns of Philip III, Philip IV, and Charles II, but Spain was no longer able to hold her front rank position in European affairs, especially after the buffets of fortune which fell to her lot in the reign of Philip IV. Not only that, but a decline also set in which affected Spanish civilization in all its phases. The impetus of Spain's greatness in the sixteenth century carried her along to yet loftier heights in some manifestations of her inner life, notably in art and literature, but even in these characteristics the decline was rapid and almost complete by the end of the reign of Charles II. Italy, France, and the Low Countries continued to absorb Spanish effort, but now it was Spain's turn to acknowledge defeat, while France, the great power of the century, took toll for the losses she had suffered at the hands of Charles I and Philip II. The unsuccessful Catalan revolt and the victorious war of the Portuguese for independence a.s.sisted to drain Spain of her resources, financial and otherwise, while the last-named event destroyed peninsula unity, carrying with it such of the Portuguese colonies as had not already been lost. Spain yielded the aggressive to her strongest opponent, and endeavored herself to maintain the defence. Nevertheless, great achievements were still the rule in the colonies, even if of a less showy type than formerly. Spain was still the conqueror and civilizer.

On the other hand, the efforts of other nations to found colonies in lands claimed by Spain began to be successful, and this movement gathered force throughout the century, together with the direct annexation of some lands which were already Spanish.

[Sidenote: Philip III and Spanish relations with England, the Low Countries, and the Empire.]

Philip III (1598-1621) was the first of three sovereigns, each of whom was weaker than his predecessor. The fifteenth-century practice of government by favorites was restored. Philip III turned over the political management of his kingdom to the Duke of Lerma, while he himself indulged in wasteful extravagances, punctuated by an equal excess in religious devotions. He had inherited wars with England and the Protestant Netherlands, but the first of these was brought to an end in 1604, shortly after the accession of James I of England. The war in the Low Countries was characterized by the same features which had marked its progress in the previous reign. Philip II had endeavored to solve the problem by making an independent kingdom of that region, under his daughter and her husband as the rulers, with a proviso for a reversion to Spain in case of a failure of the line. This measure was practically without effect, for Spanish troops and Spanish moneys continued to be the basis for the wars against the Dutch, or Protestant, element. Before the end of Philip III's reign the decision for a reversion to Spanish authority had already been made and accepted. There were two factors in the Dutch wars of the period worthy of mention. For one thing the Dutch became more bold on the seas, and began a remarkable career of maritime conquest which was to last well over half a century.

As affecting Spain this new activity manifested itself mainly in piratical attacks on Spanish s.h.i.+ps, or in descents upon Spanish coasts, but a number of Philip's Portuguese colonies were picked up by the Dutch. The Dutch wars also produced a man who was both a great soldier (a not uncommon type in that day of Spanish military importance) and a great statesman, who sensed the evil course which Spain was following in her European relations and argued against it, all to no avail. This man was Ambrosio Spinola. Spinola won victory upon victory from the Dutch, but was often obliged to rely on his personal estate for the funds with which to carry on the campaigns; so when the Dutch asked for a truce he favored the idea, and on this occasion his views were allowed to prevail. A twelve-year truce was agreed upon in 1609, one condition of which was the recognition of the independence of the Protestant states.

In 1618 the great conflict which has become known as the Thirty Years'

War broke out in Germany, having its beginnings in a dispute between the Hapsburg emperor, Ferdinand, and the Protestant elector of the Palatinate. Spain entered the war on the side of Ferdinand, largely because of family reasons, but also in support of Catholicism. Spinola was sent into the Palatinate with a Spanish army, where he swept everything before him. Thus casually did Spain enter a war which was to be a thirty-nine years' conflict for her (1620-1659) and productive of her own undoing.