A History of Spain Part 23

[Sidenote: The Inquisition as an instrument of the kings and an agency to suppress heresy.]

The two princ.i.p.al instruments employed to combat heresy were the Inquisition and the Jesuit order. So far as the former concerned itself with matters of the faith, it had the support of the Spanish people, who equally with the kings were desirous of the establishment and maintenance of religious unity. The Inquisition had acquired various powers and privileges, however, which were not directly connected with its princ.i.p.al office. Papal bulls had been procured giving it jurisdiction in cases of usury, crimes against nature, and improper solicitations of confessors; it claimed exemption for its officers and servants from the operation of the civil law courts; and its relations with these courts, made necessary by the legal incapacity of the Inquisition to execute its own sentences, often gave rise to conflicts and misunderstandings. The people of Spain were perfectly able to distinguish between the Inquisition as an instrument of the faith and the Inquisition in these extra-jurisdictional phases, and protested vigorously against that body in the latter sense. The various _Cortes_ of Castile, Aragon, and Catalonia presented many a pet.i.tion on this score to the kings, and it was a prominent factor in the Catalan revolt of 1640. Nevertheless, the kings consistently sustained the Inquisition.

When the Aragonese _Cortes_ secured a papal license reducing the Inquisition to the same footing as the other ecclesiastical courts, Charles I procured the withdrawal of the license. Philip II prohibited all appeals from or complaints against the Inquisition before the _audiencias_ or the _Consejo Real_. The decisions of the Inquisition thus became final, although it is true that cases of appeal and the recourse of _fuerza_ (also forbidden by Philip) were occasionally allowed to go beyond that body. When there seemed to be a likelihood that the Council of Trent might deprive the Inquisition of some of its authority, Charles I used every effort to cause a failure of the project. In fact the Inquisition was virtually an instrument of the kings, who did not hesitate to direct its action as if it were legally subject to them, and who were always able to procure the appointment of members of the _Consejo Real_ to the Council of the Inquisition. As regards heresy the period, naturally, was exceedingly fruitful in prosecutions and was marked by an excess of suspicion, such that individuals whose purity of faith was hardly open to question were not infrequently brought to trial,--among others, Ignacio de Loyola (Saint Ignatius), and Teresa de Jesus, who, like Loyola, was later canonized.

Extreme rigor was displayed in placing the ban on unorthodox books and in expurgating those which were allowed to circulate. Charles I required all books to have the authorization of the _Consejo Real_ before they could be published. Foreign books were also scrutinized carefully, and libraries were made subject to inspection. The grant of a license by the _Consejo Real_ did not mean that a book might not be placed on the Inquisition's _Index_ of forbidden works. It is worthy of note, too, that the Spanish _Index_ and that of the Inquisition of Rome often varied from each other in their lists; thus a book condemned at Rome might circulate in Spain, and vice versa, but this of course was not the general rule. The Spanish Inquisition did not make its way to Spain's Italian possessions, but was established in the Low Countries, where it was very active, and in the Americas.

[Sidenote: Ignacio de Loyola and the founding of the Jesuit order.]

The other important agency of the Spanish Counter-Reformation, the Jesuit order, was the creation of a Spaniard, Ignacio de Loyola (1491 or 1495-1556), who became Saint Ignatius (San Ignacio) with his canonization in 1609. As a youth Loyola led the somewhat wild life of a soldier. Wounded in 1521 during the defence of Pamplona from an attack of the French, he was a long time in recovering his health, devoting the period of his convalescence to the reading of religious works. He thereupon resolved to dedicate his life to religion, and as soon as he was restored to health made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Upon his return he pursued religious studies at the universities of Barcelona, Alcala, Salamanca, and Paris. While at Alcala, where he and several companions made a practice of wearing sackcloth and preaching in the streets, he was arrested by the Inquisition, but was set free without other penalty than an order to give up his sackcloth and his preaching. A similar fate befell him in Salamanca. Eventually Loyola and his companions found their way to Rome, where they continued their street preaching, despite the opposition of the Augustinian order and some of the cardinals. They applied to themselves the name "Company of Jesus" (hence Jesuits), and in 1539 organized an order in military form, vowing implicit obedience to their superiors,--especially to the pope,--prescribing the rule of a general for life, and pledging themselves to the founding of colleges.

The new order was formally approved by the pope in 1540, and Loyola became the first general.

[Sidenote: Characteristics of the Jesuit order.]

While an extended discussion of the characteristics of the Jesuit order is not necessary, some of the respects in which it differed from the others should be pointed out, in order to make clear the effect of the Jesuit appearance in Spain and the Americas. Great emphasis was placed on the military side; Loyola was wont to say that he had never ceased to be a soldier,--he had merely become a soldier of G.o.d. Obedience to superiors and to the pope was not a new idea, but with the Jesuits it was as rigidly literal as in an army. They became one of the princ.i.p.al supports of the popes at a time when many church leaders were advocating the reform of the papacy with a view to limiting the powers of the head of the church. Like soldiers, they attacked the enemies of the pope, church, and the Catholic religion, and were charged with employing methods which gave rise to the term "Jesuitry" in an opprobrious sense.

They did not stay in convents, but went forth among the people to fight for the principles for which they stood. There was no election of their leaders; the attainment of office came through appointment by the general, who even chose his own successor. Education was their princ.i.p.al weapon,--education of the high and the low. In other respects the Jesuits were at the same time more simple and more mundane in their exterior practices--at least in the beginning--than the other orders.

They opposed choral singing, the wearing of a distinctive habit, partic.i.p.ation in religious processions, the monastic life, and asceticism. They believed in the individual poverty of their members, but were willing that the order and its separate inst.i.tutions should prosper in a material way. In other words they were going into the world, not away from it, and were desirous of the best equipment for the struggle which lay before them.

[Sidenote: Spanish opposition to the Jesuits.]

The influence of the new order soon made itself felt throughout the world. At first Spaniards were in the majority, and it was natural that the Jesuits should establish themselves in Spain's dominions. By 1547 they had five inst.i.tutions in Spain, and by 1566 sixteen. Soon afterward they began to appear in the Americas, where they became one of the princ.i.p.al agencies of the Spanish crown in the conversion and subjection of the natives, being perhaps the most effective of the missionary orders. Not only as missionaries but also as theologians, scientists, and men of letters the Spanish Jesuits were among the most distinguished men of the age. They were not welcomed by their fellow-countrymen in Spain, however; rather, they had to contend against some of the most powerful elements in the peninsula. Members of the clergy, both regular and secular, were opposed to them,--notably the Dominicans, Franciscans, Augustinians, and the officers of the Inquisition, the first named especially,--while the universities and at the outset the kings were also hostile. Melchor Cano, a Dominican and one of the most influential men of his day, charged the Jesuits with heresy, claiming that their vows savored of the doctrines of the _Iluminados_. The archbishop of Toledo, Cardinal Siliceo, forbade them to preach, confess, say ma.s.s, or administer sacraments, but was obliged by the pope to retract his decrees. Arias Montano attacked them in the preface of his polyglot Bible, a.s.serting that the Jesuits claimed that they alone had knowledge and that they were the nearest of all men to Jesus. These are but a few instances out of many, showing the difficulties encountered by the Jesuits in establis.h.i.+ng themselves in Spain. It seems likely that jealousy may have entered into much of the resistance to them, for they early began to outrank and even supersede other elements in teaching and in learning. Charles I and Philip II objected to them because they placed the pope ahead of the king, not acknowledging the latter's authority over them, and this was not altogether in accordance with the royal ideal of centralization. Furthermore, the Jesuits were such an aggressive factor that they were hard to manage. The Inquisition took exception among other things to the Jesuit claim of a right to absolve their own members from the charge of heresy, and imprisoned the Jesuit _provincial_, or commanding official, in Spain, together with other members of the order. Philip II took sides with the Inquisition, but the pope sustained the Jesuits. By the seventeenth century the Jesuits had succeeded in overcoming their rivals, although they never ceased to have enemies. Their success was due in the first place to the continued support of the popes; in the second to the change of heart experienced by Philip II late in life, when he began to realize that they were one of the most effective instruments for the religious unification of his dominions, and in so much furthered his ideal of centralization; in the third place to the backing of the opponents of their enemies, especially those who were hostile to the Inquisition; and, finally, and perhaps most of all, to their own superior attainments, whereby they were able to win a devoted following among all ranks of society. The successors of Philip II followed the later policy of that king, with the result that the seventeenth century was the most prosperous era in the history of the Jesuit order.

[Sidenote: _Limpieza de sangre_ and the fervor of Spanish Catholicism.]

One thing Spanish kings failed to do elsewhere in Europe they achieved in Spain,--their ideal of religious unity. At the same time that they were suppressing heresy they were giving a welcome to Catholics fleeing to Spain from Protestant persecution, notably to the Irish, who came to the peninsula in great numbers. The ideal of Catholic unity was carried to an excess which transcended unity itself through an extension of the inst.i.tution of _limpieza de sangre_. Certificates of _limpieza de sangre_ (that is to say, sworn statements that the bearer had no Jewish, Moslem, or heretic antecedents) now began to be required for the holding of various church offices or for entry into religious orders and often also for admission to the guilds. As a matter of fact there were few families which could have withstood a close examination of their ancestry; the upper cla.s.ses would almost surely have been found to contain Jewish blood, and the ma.s.ses, certainly in the east and south, would have had a Moslem admixture in their veins. The attainment of religious unity and the extreme suspicion in which non-Catholics were held did not succeed in making the Spanish people respond to the moral code of their faith. Not only such licentious practices as have already been alluded to were in vogue, but also a surprising lack of reverence was displayed, as exemplified by the improper use of sacred places and sacred objects and the mixture of the human and the divine in masquerades. Nevertheless, it is not too much to say that the princ.i.p.al preoccupation of Spaniards in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries was the salvation of their souls. The worst of men would want to confess and seek absolution before they died, and many of them no doubt believed themselves to be good Catholics, even though their every-day life would not have borne inspection. One notable religious manifestation of the era was the ardent insistence of Spaniards on the mystery of the Immaculate Conception at a time when Catholics of other countries were not yet ready to accept that view.

[Sidenote: Conflict of the kings with the popes in matters of temporal import.]

In distinguis.h.i.+ng between the spiritual and the temporal phases of papal authority the kings of the House of Austria followed the policy of the Catholic Kings, but surpa.s.sed the latter in their claims of the superiority, or independence, as the case might be, of the royal power.

Various factors contributed to this att.i.tude in Spain. The monarchical ideal of a centralized absolutism, now that it had triumphed over the n.o.bility and the towns, sought out the church in its civil aspects as the next outstanding element to dominate; the interests of the Spanish kings in Italy continued to bring them into opposition to the popes as sovereigns of the Papal States; and the problems of ecclesiastical reform often found the kings and the popes widely, even bitterly, apart.

Charles I had frequent conflicts with the papacy, but Philip II had even more serious contests, in which he displayed yet more unyielding resistance than his father to what he regarded as the unwarranted intrusions of the popes into the sphere of Spanish politics. When in 1556 it seemed likely that Philip would be excommunicated and his kingdom laid under an interdict, Philip created a special council to exercise in Spain such functions as were customarily in the hands of the pope. In this as in his other disputes of a political nature with the papacy he was able to count on the support of the Spanish clergy. One doc.u.ment reciting Philip's grievances against Pope Paul IV, applying harsh epithets to him, and expressing doubt as to the legitimacy of his election, is believed to have been written by a member of the clergy.

Another doc.u.ment, the _Parecer_, or opinion, of Melchor Cano, a Dominican, argued the lawfulness of making war on the pope, and said that in such cases, when communication with Rome was insecure, the bishops might decide ecclesiastical questions which were ordinarily left to the pope.

[Sidenote: Interference of Charles I and Philip II in papal elections.]

To avoid such disputes and to a.s.sure Spain of an ally in Italian affairs Charles I and Philip II bent their efforts to procure the election of popes who would be favorable to them. Charles had much to do with the choice in 1522 of Adrian VI, who as a cardinal had been one of his princ.i.p.al administrative officers during his own absence from the peninsula in the early years of his reign. Philip was successful in the same way when in 1559 he was able to cause the elevation of his candidate to the papal throne. This pope, Pius IV, proceeded to annul the action of his predecessor, Paul IV, against Charles and Philip, and condemned to death two members of the deceased pope's family, one of them a cardinal. At the election of 1590 Philip was again fortunate, but the new pontiff, Urban VII, lived only thirteen days. A fresh conclave was held, at which Philip went to the extreme not only of excluding the candidates whom he opposed but also of naming seven Spanish churchmen as the only ones from among whom the cardinals were to choose. One of the seven was elected, taking the name Gregory XIV, and no pope of the century was more unconditionally favorable to the wishes of a Spanish king. This constant intrusion of Philip ended by exasperating the high authorities of the church, who a few years later under another pope condemned Philip's practices and declared him _ipso facto_ excommunicated. This proved to be a decisive blow to the influence of the Spanish crown.

[Sidenote: The _pase regio_ as an aid to the kings in the conflict with the popes.]

One of the princ.i.p.al struggles between the popes and the kings was the royal claim of the _pase regio_, or the right to examine papal bulls and pontifical letters and, if deemed advisable, to retain them, prohibiting their publication and therefore their execution in Spanish domains. The origin of this claim on the part of the Spanish monarchs seems to date from the period of the Great Schism, when Urban VI (1378-1389) granted such a privilege to the princes allied with him. It was not officially decreed in Spain until the early years of Charles I, when provision for the _pase regio_ in all Spanish dominions was made in a doc.u.ment drawn up by Cardinal Ximenez. According to this arrangement papal communications were to be examined in the _Consejo Real_, and if found to be contrary to the royal prerogative or otherwise objectionable their circulation was to be postponed and the pope asked to change or withdraw his dispositions. Usually the retention of such doc.u.ments took place without giving official notice to the pope,--which in the case of a hostile pontiff would have been in any event unavailing. If the popes insisted on their point of view the royal prohibitions were nevertheless continued. If any subjects of the king resisted his will in this matter, even though they were churchmen, they might incur the penalty of a loss of goods or banishment or both, and notaries or attorneys might even be condemned to death. When Paul IV excommunicated Charles I and Philip II, the latter put into effect the _pase regio_. Unable to procure the publication of his bull in Spain, Paul IV summoned to Rome two Spanish bishops who were intensely royalist in their sympathies. Philip II protected them by retaining the papal order, so that the individuals did not learn officially of the summons. Not only in serious contests of this character but also in matters of comparatively little moment the kings exercised the right of retention,--for example, in the case of a bull of Sixtus V about the dress and maintenance of the clergy. The above are only a few instances out of many. One of the most bitter conflicts was waged by Philip II in opposition to a bull of Pius V excommunicating those who retained papal dispositions. Philip II retained this bull, and punished some bishops of Spain's Italian domains who had published it within their dioceses. The pope threatened to put Spain under an interdict, but Philip declined to yield. The bull was never published in the peninsula, and the pope did not make use of the interdict.

[Sidenote: The case of Cardinal Borja.]

[Sidenote: Interference of Charles I and Philip II in matters of church reform.]

The successors of Philip II were equally insistent upon the royal prerogative in their relations with the church. One of the most curious incidents in the disputes of the kings and the popes occurred in the reign of Philip IV. Cardinal Borja and several other Spanish cardinals were sent to Rome to present the king's grievances against the pontiff arising out of matters connected with the wars against the Protestants.

Borja was roughly handled on making his protest; it is said that Cardinal San Onofre punched him in the face by direction of the pope.

When this event was reported in Spain a general meeting of royal councillors was held, in which it was even discussed whether it would be lawful to challenge the pope to settle the matter by means of a duel!

In this and other matters there was talk of an appeal from the pope to a church council. As the royalist att.i.tude toward the popes was often defended in books, many of them by churchmen, a practice sprang up at Rome of placing such works in the _Index_ as writings which the faithful were forbidden to read, but these volumes did not appear in the _Index_ of the Spanish Inquisition. Finally the att.i.tude of superiority on the part of the monarchs made itself evident, as already indicated, in questions of the reform of the church. Charles and Philip II labored to establish their views at the Council of Trent not only in matters of administration but also in those of doctrine. Indeed, many Catholics believed that it was the duty of the kings to remedy the evils of the church. With the conclusion of the Council of Trent, Philip II hesitated for a year before publis.h.i.+ng its decisions, because of his belief that some of the provisions of the council diminished, or might diminish, his royal authority. When he at length did publish them, he did so with the reservation that they were not to be considered as introducing any variation from the usual jurisdiction of the king. Consequently, various canons of the council remained without effect in Spain and her possessions.

[Sidenote: Royal restrictions on the powers of papal nuncios and the nunciature.]

The same conflict of authority between the church and the monarch manifested itself in the relations of the kings with papal nuncios, who in the reign of Charles I began to reside at the Spanish court as permanent amba.s.sadors. In 1537 Charles I obtained a license from the pope for the creation of the tribunal of the nunciature, or court of the papal emba.s.sy in Spain. This court, composed in part at least of Spanish officials, was to hear the numerous cases in ecclesiastical law which had customarily been settled at Rome. At the same time, the nuncio was empowered to grant the benefices which formerly lay within the jurisdiction of the popes. The nuncio also collected the considerable sums which went to the popes from ecclesiastical prebends, or livings, from the _expolios_ of deceased bishops and archbishops (accretions in their benefices which they had procured out of rents), and from the income of _vacantes_, or vacant benefices (that which accrued between the death of a bishop or archbishop and the appointment of his successor). Once having transferred authority from the pope to the nuncio and nunciature the kings proceeded to attack these elements near at hand so as to reduce their power of interference with the royal authority. In this they were aided by all cla.s.ses. The churchmen were royalist and at the same time opposed to papal intervention in ecclesiastical administration in Spain. People generally objected to such wide jurisdiction being in the hands of a foreigner, for the nuncios were usually Italians. There were frequent complaints that the nunciature was guilty of the advocacy of lawsuits and the collection of excessive costs, with the result that the court was sustained out of Spanish funds instead of by the popes. All of these matters were the subject of criticism in both the _Cortes_ and the _Consejo Real_, and the inevitable result was the employment of restrictive measures. The _pase regio_ was applied to the directions by the popes to the nuncios, and the intervention of the nunciature in ecclesiastical cases in first instance was prohibited. There were times when the relations of the kings with the nuncio were indeed strained; Philip II went to the extreme of expelling a nuncio who had endeavored to publish a papal bull which the king had decided to retain; the same thing happened under Philip IV, who closed the papal emba.s.sy. Matters were arranged in 1640 by the Fachenetti concordat, or agreement of the nuncio of that name with the king. This doc.u.ment reduced the procedure of the nunciature and the attributes of the nuncio to writing, and although it did not remove all the causes of dispute served as the basis for diplomatic relations with the papal emba.s.sy until the middle of the eighteenth century.

[Sidenote: Subjection of the ecclesiastical organization in Spain to the royal will.]

The relations of the kings with the popes and nuncios formed only part of the former's royalist policy with the church. The same course was followed with the ecclesiastical organization in Spain. The gradual reduction of the clergy to a tributary state as regards payment of taxes has already been referred to. Charles I procured various grants of a financial nature from the popes, such as the right to sell certain ecclesiastical holdings (whose proceeds were to be devoted to the war with the Turks), the collection of various church rents yielding over 1,000,000 ducats (some $15,000,000), and finally the gift of _expolios_ and _vacantes_. On the other hand, despite the pet.i.tions of the _Cortes_ and the opinions of leading jurisconsults, the kings declined to prevent the giving of lands in mortmain, or in other words the acquisition of estates by the church. The most serious conflicts arose over questions of immunities, growing out of the survival of ecclesiastical jurisdictions of a seigniorial character and out of the relations of the church courts to those of the king and to the royal authority in general. Many of the seigniorial groups were incorporated into the crown, especially by Philip II. As regards the legal immunity of churchmen it came to be accepted as the rule that it could be claimed only in cases within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. This was diminished still further by royal invasions of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as by limiting the scope of the church courts, prohibiting (under severe penalties) the intrusions of their judges in civil affairs, and intervening to correct abuses, real or alleged. The king reserved a right of inspection of the ecclesiastical courts, exercised for him by members of the _Consejo Real_ or the _audiencias_, and if anybody were unduly aggrieved by a decision of the church courts he might make use of the recourse of _fuerza_ to bring an appeal before the Consejo Real, the _Camara_, or the _audiencias_. The effect of this was to suspend the execution of an ecclesiastical sentence, subordinating the church courts to the royal will. Many matters of a religious character were taken over into the exclusive jurisdiction of the _Consejo Real_ or the _Camara_, such as the inspections of convents of the regular clergy and the action taken as a result thereof and the execution of the decisions of the Council of Trent. Laws relative to the recourse of _fuerza_ were amplified so as to prohibit ecclesiastical judges from trying cases which were considered by any of the litigants concerned as belonging to the civil law; other laws forbade the summoning of Spaniards before foreign judges; and still others diminished the number of appeals to Rome. Even churchmen took advantage of the recourse of _fuerza_ to have their cases removed to the royal courts when it suited their convenience, despite the attempts of the popes to check the practice. In such instances, as in so many others, the _pase regio_ was employed to prevent effectual action by the popes.

Even in the case of the provincial councils of the Spanish church the king sent delegates, on the ground that no conventions or congresses of any sort could be held without the consent of the king and the attendance of his representatives. In 1581 Pope Gregory XIII ordered the archbishop of Toledo not to admit anybody to a council about to be held at that time who was not a member of the clergy. Philip II sent his delegate, nevertheless, and his successors followed his example. In like manner religious processions were forbidden unless authorized by the civil authorities.

[Sidenote: The _patronato real_ as a source of royal authority over the clergy.]

The royal authority over the Spanish church is largely explained by the inst.i.tution of the _patronato real_, or royal patronage. Charles I early gained a right to make nominations to most of the bishoprics and abbacies in Spain, although the pope had to approve before the appointment should take effect. Even in the case of benefices still reserved by the pope the kings insisted that the appointees should be Spaniards. As regards the Americas the church was yet more completely under the king's control, thus giving still other lucrative posts into his power to grant. Under these circ.u.mstances it is not surprising that the Spanish clergy should favor the king, to whom they owed their rents and dignities, rather than the pope, and should even consent to diminutions in the privileges of Spanish churchmen. Indeed, faithful service as a councillor might be the stepping-stone to a bishopric.

Nevertheless the kings did not allow churchmen to intrude in political affairs without being asked, and instances of official reproof on this score were numerous, despite which fact the clergy took a prominent part in political intrigues, and were possibly the princ.i.p.al factor in the Portuguese war of independence from Spain. Furthermore, the solicitation of inheritances by churchmen was insistently forbidden by the king; on one occasion when accusations of this character were made against the Jesuits of Flanders the Duke of Alba annulled all testamentary dispositions to that order and provided for the inheritance of the legal heirs.

CHAPTER XXVIII

ECONOMIC FACTORS, 1516-1700

[Sidenote: Comparative backwardness of Spain in economic development.]

While this era was marked by a brief period of prosperity, and while there was a noteworthy advance out of medievalism in the evolution of mercantile machinery, the keynote of the times was the failure of Spain to keep pace in material welfare with her high standing in other aspects of life. Spain continued to be a raw material country, although artificial attempts were still made to create a thriving industrial development. These efforts, when they did not fail altogether, accrued to the advantage of foreigners or resulted in establishments which were of slight consequence in comparison with those of other European lands.

A combination of evils at length sank Spain to such a state of economic degradation and misery as comported ill with her political reputation in European affairs and with the opportunities she had had and failed to employ to advantage. Nevertheless, Spain's decadence, overwhelming though it was, is to be viewed from a relative standpoint. Medieval Spain at its best, except possibly during the Moslem era, did not attain to an equally flouris.h.i.+ng state with the Spain of the seventeenth century, which marks the lowest point to which she has fallen in modern times. On the other hand, with relation to other countries in the seventeenth century and with due regard to the needs which an expanded civilization had by that time developed, Spain came to be economically about the most backward land in western Europe. This occurred, in spite of the fact that Spaniards found and developed such extraordinary wealth in their new world possessions that their colonies were the envy of Europe. Spain did indeed get rich returns from her overseas investment, but these funds and others were squandered in the ways which have already been pointed out.

[Sidenote: Relative prosperity in the early years of the era.]

[Sidenote: The American trade.]

[Sidenote: Industrial wealth of Seville.]

[Sidenote: Grazing.]

[Sidenote: Fis.h.i.+ng.]

[Sidenote: Mining.]

At the outset there was a period of undoubted prosperity, due in part to a continuation of the favoring legislation of the era of the Catholic Kings, but more particularly to the enormously increased demand resulting from the rapid and extensive colonization of the Americas, whose commerce was restricted by law to favored regions of the Spanish kingdom. The American trade and to some extent the considerable fortunes gained in the colonies themselves provided capital for a yet further expansion of the industrial wealth of the peninsula. The effects were felt princ.i.p.ally in Castile, but were reflected also in Aragon and Valencia. Seville, as the sole port of the American trade, became extraordinarily rich in its industrial life, and many other cities shared in the general prosperity. Woollen goods and silks were manufactured on a large scale, and many other articles, such as hats, gloves, soap, leathers, arms, and furniture were also made. Grazing and fis.h.i.+ng were notably productive industries. When Philip II ascended the Spanish throne in 1556, it is said that the corporation of the _Mesta_ possessed seven million sheep. Part of the wool which they produced was supplied to Spanish manufacturers, though other sources were also drawn upon by the makers of woollen goods, but vast quant.i.ties of wool were sent abroad. In 1512 about 50,000 quintals were exported; in 1557 some 150,000; and in 1610 the amount had reached 180,000 quintals. The whale-fisheries off the northern and northwestern coasts of Spain, at that time a rich field for this occupation, and the catching of tunny-fish in the Mediterranean furnished profitable employment to the people of the coasts, who also made voyages to distant waters, even to Newfoundland, on fis.h.i.+ng ventures. The wars of the reign of Philip II and the scarcity of boats soon tended to check this phase of economic expansion. Mining produced but little, in part because the possessors of _latifundia_--n.o.bles and churchmen--did not care to develop their estates in this respect and in part because private individuals generally could not be certain that they would be allowed to enjoy any profit they might make. Philip II, desirous of remedying this situation, incorporated all mines into the crown, and encouraged prospecting for mineral wealth, though exacting certain tributes from those who should discover and work mines, but even under these circ.u.mstances little was done.

[Sidenote: Relative character of Spanish industrial prosperity.]

[Sidenote: Its duration in time.]

There has been a tendency to exaggerate the state of prosperity to which Spain attained and to treat it as if it suddenly collapsed. In fact Spain's industrial wealth was only great by comparison with what it once had been and with what it was presently to be in the period of decline.

The manufacture of cloth in the entire kingdom in the most flouris.h.i.+ng epoch did not equal the output of the single city of Bruges. That the growth of manufacturing was only ephemeral and did not take root in the peninsula is attested by the fact that it was usually necessary, even in the era of greatest industrial expansion, to depend upon imports to supply Spain's needs, while the considerable exports of raw materials, especially wool, show that the domestic demand could not have been great. Undoubtedly a good industrial beginning was made, which might have resulted in the economic independence of Spain. It did not continue, however, and the question arises: How long did the era of relative industrial prosperity endure? A precise answer is impossible, because some industries flourished longer than others, or the same industry prospered in one place after it had ceased to do so in another.

Conflicting accounts began to appear about the middle of the reign of Charles I, and even in the first half of the seventeenth century there were doc.u.ments which testified to instances of prosperity. Speaking generally, the decline may be said to have made itself felt in the reign of Philip II and to have become clearly apparent by the middle of the reign of Philip IV.

[Sidenote: Handicaps on agriculture.]