A History of Spain Part 30

Nevertheless, the Bourbons were more democratic in their manner than the less autocratic kings of the House of Austria. It is said that Philip V was the first to inaugurate the practice of allowing his higher government officials to be seated while talking business with him, whereas the Hapsburg custom had been to require them to remain on their knees. The kings' advisers now became veritable ministers, with a more frank partic.i.p.ation in government than had been the case with the secretaries and favorites of the preceding era. Furthermore, the Bourbons represented the "enlightened despotism," which had so many remarkable manifestations in eighteenth century western Europe. In keeping with this ideal the kings showed marked interest in social, economic, and intellectual reforms of a philanthropic character, without yielding an iota of their political prerogative. A great revolution took place, having a fundamental groundwork of democracy in it (which was to find expression at a later time in the field of politics), but which was accomplished wholly from above. The idea might have been expressed: "Everything _for_ the people, but nothing _by_ them." The only exception to this rule was the royal program whereby the popular element gained an entrance to the _ayuntamientos_, or munic.i.p.al governing bodies.

[Sidenote: Unimportance of the Cortes and the suppression of democratic machinery.]

Naturally, all machinery of a democratic character was viewed with suspicion, and such was the case with the _Cortes_. Only at the accession of Luis I was a _Cortes_ called to swear in the new king, although that body was several times asked to acknowledge the princes of Asturias. The _Cortes_ of Castile was summoned four times by Philip V and once each by Charles III and Charles IV, but in two of the meetings under Philip not all of the elements were called, and in the dismissal of the _Cortes_ of Charles IV it was made apparent that the n.o.bles and clergy had no necessary inclusion in that body. Furthermore, the _Cortes_ was called to perform some specific act,--such as the recognition of the princes above-named, the making and later the revocation of the so-called Salic law, and the approval of Philip's renunciation of his rights to the French throne,--after which it was dismissed, without having an opportunity to discuss other matters. When the _Cortes_ of 1789 was retained in session to treat of certain economic questions, some of the deputies formulated pet.i.tions concerning affairs of government,--whereupon the authorities hastened to bring the sittings to a close. The _Cortes_ of other regions were equally lacking in importance. The _Cortes_ of Aragon met once, and that of Valencia not at all; both were incorporated into the Castilian _Cortes_ in 1709. The _Cortes_ of Catalonia met twice, but after 1724 it followed the course already taken in the case of Aragon and Valencia, and the same was true of the representatives from Majorca. The _Cortes_ of Navarre continued to meet separately, being called eleven times, but it took no action of conspicuous importance. Nevertheless, the memory of the former power of the _Cortes_ was not dead, and many persons saw in its restoration, possibly with new functions, a means for the reform of the country. In addition to having rendered the _Cortes_ completely innocuous the kings took other steps to check popular intervention in national affairs. It had been the custom for the munic.i.p.alities to send special commissioners to the capital to negotiate for them with the crown. This practice (which reminds one of the colonial agent of American history) was forbidden by a law of 1715 (repeated in 1804), on the alleged ground of avoiding unnecessary expense to the towns. A law of 1777 allowed the sending of special agents, however, for one purpose,--that of witnessing the births of royal children! Thus did the kings contribute both to the security and to the glamour of royalty.

[Sidenote: Royal opposition to the entry of the encyclopedist and revolutionary ideas from France.]

If the Spanish kings were so careful to avoid any diminution in their authority through the restoration of the former powers of the _Cortes_, it may well be imagined that they were alarmed over the political ideas of the French encyclopedists of the later eighteenth century and still more so over those of the French revolutionaries after 1789. The works of such French writers as Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Mirabeau, or of the Englishmen Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and others were in many libraries of Spain, and some of them were translated. The Encyclopedia itself found its way into the peninsula. High Spanish officials, like Aranda, maintained correspondence with some of the French reformers, as did also some of the great Spanish n.o.bles,--for example, the Duke of Alba with Rousseau, and the Marquis of Miranda with Voltaire. It was the fas.h.i.+on, too, for Spaniards to get part of their education in France, or for French professors, French laborers, and, later, French revolutionary propagandists to cross the Pyrenees. Thus the new ideas gained a footing in Spain, where they were taken up at educational inst.i.tutions, especially at the University of Salamanca, and by some newspapers (for that type of periodical had begun to appear), although expressions were naturally somewhat guarded. With the outbreak of the French Revolution, Floridablanca sent troops to the northern frontier to prevent the entry of political agitators. The Inquisition issued edicts against the introduction of prohibited books, and published a new index in 1790, followed by a supplement in 1805, for the rationalist ideas of the French reformers were not in accord with those of the church. The civil authorities took similar action; the Encyclopedia was barred in 1784, and many other works at other times; in 1792 officials were placed at customs-houses to examine all writings, whether printed or ma.n.u.script; and in 1805 a tribunal of printing (_Juzgado de Imprenta_) was created, independent of the _Consejo_ and the Inquisition. These measures failed to prevent the dissemination of French literature and thought, but were successful in checking any effective expression of democratic or republican ideals during this period. While men of influence approved the philanthropic side of the new ideas, very few of them accepted their political tenets. It was quite the usual thing for men to say that the contract between monarch and people was equally binding on both, or to express admiration for the freedom of thought permitted in England, while they opposed the forming of deliberative a.s.semblies in Spain, and stood solidly behind the principle of absolutism. Some of the younger men went completely over to revolutionary ideas, and in 1795 some republican clubs were discovered, while many of the inhabitants of Guipuzcoa gave substantial aid to the French army of invasion in 1794. The reaction came quickly, as a result of the tyrannical conduct of the French military authorities. Thus the spirit of democracy in Spain seemed crushed, but it was not in fact destroyed, as was amply proved a few years later in the radical outburst of the _Cortes_ of Cadiz.

[Sidenote: p.r.o.nounced acceleration of the tendencies toward a centralized state.]

Side by side with the development of absolutism there had been an effort on the part of the kings for many centuries to promote the centralization of political and administrative authority in the state as represented by the crown, and to bring about uniformity in the law.

These tendencies were accelerated by the Bourbons, whose first opportunity came as a result of the War of the Spanish Succession, when Philip V was opposed by many of the non-Castilian parts of Spain. In 1707 the special statutes and privileges of Aragon and Valencia were abolished and their place taken by the laws and practices of Castile. In both regions a royally appointed _audiencia_ and captain-general were set up. This action was not taken for Catalonia until 1716. In that year it was provided by the so-called decree of the "new plan" (_Nueva Planta_) that the laws and customs of Castile were to apply in Catalonia; that the Catalan language was not to be used in the administration of justice; that an _audiencia_ and captain-general of royal selection were to serve as the princ.i.p.al governmental agencies of the region; that Catalonia was to be divided into twelve districts, over which _corregidores_ named by the king should rule; and that the twenty-four _regidores_ (councilmen) of the _ayuntamiento_ of Barcelona, which city had been deprived of its former type of government, should also be royally appointed. The decree of 1716 did not attempt to establish complete unification with Castile, however. Many former Catalan rights continued to exist until the nineteenth century,--such, for example, as the Catalan system of criminal law and the issue of Catalan coins. Furthermore, there was no appeal from the decisions of the _audiencia_ to the central government,--an exceptional case.

Nevertheless, the principles of centralization and unification had been in the main attained, and later measures tended to secure these ends still more completely. Philip's opponents in the War of the Spanish Succession were persecuted, and the royal ideas were furthered by the acts of the influential partisans of the king; in 1717 the bishop of Gerona, Taverner, summoned a provincial council with a view to "threatening with the wrath of G.o.d and the excommunication of the church" whoever should be unfaithful to Philip V and to ordering confessors to treat such infidelity as a sin. In Majorca the king placed an _audiencia_ and a commandant-general, appointing also the local councillors of Palma and Alcudia, while the _audiencia_ named those of the other towns. The special privileges of the Basque provinces were respected in theory, but, without apparent change in the laws, the central government gradually obtained control through the inspection or the intervention of ministers of state and the _Consejos_. Much the same course was followed with Navarre, in which the former agencies of government were left apparently undisturbed. The policy of centralization was also manifested in other respects than those of a purely regional application. Thus exemptions from military service were limited; the reversion of seigniorial rights to the king was facilitated; and, in fine, the tendency was to reduce all forms of jurisdiction, territorial or otherwise, to the king or his representatives in the central administration. Many regions continued to have at least the vestiges of their former inst.i.tutions, but enough was done so that the Spanish kingdom may fairly be said to have become unitary for the first time in history.

[Sidenote: Changes in administrative machinery.]

The most notable change in the machinery of government concerned the development of the secretariats. There got to be five of them, corresponding to the more important of the _Consejos_ under the _Consejo de Castilla_, as follows: state (_Estado_); grace and justice (_Gracia y Justicia_); war and finance (_Guerra y Hacienda_); navy (_Marina_); and the Indies (_Indias_). There were variations from this arrangement at different times; for example, the navy and the Indies were often a single secretariat in the first half century of the era. Gradually it became the custom to call the secretaries ministers, and these officials began to absorb the powers formerly confided to the _Consejos_, presaging the disappearance of the latter and the development of modern ministries. As already pointed out, they also acquired a greater liberty and initiative in the performance of their duties, especially in the reigns of Ferdinand VI and Charles III. It was customary for them to consult with the king every morning, however. No new _Consejos_, or councils, were added in this period, and the _Consejo de Aragon_, last of the councils of the former crown of Aragon, was suppressed in 1707.

Essentially, the _Consejos_ continued to exercise the same functions as formerly, although losing ground to the rapidly advancing secretaries, or ministers. The _Consejo de Castilla_ retained its importance, however, and its president, or governor, was the leading officer of state. It is to be noted that both the _Consejo_ and the _Camara_, despite their retention of the name Castile, dealt with the affairs of other regions of the peninsula, quite as much as did the councils with more general names. Except for Navarre, which continued to be a viceroyalty, the other regions of Spain apart from New Castile (Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Majorca, Granada, Andalusia, Old Castile, Galicia, Asturias, Extremadura, and the Canary Islands) were placed under captain-generals or commandant-generals with military and administrative powers. A number of _audiencias_ were added, until now there were eleven such bodies (Valladolid, Granada, Galicia, Seville, the Canaries, Majorca, Valencia, Saragossa, Barcelona, Asturias, and Extremadura), exercising both civil and judicial functions. In 1718 the inst.i.tution of the intendancies was created to take over financial administration in the various regions, although this reform was not put into effect definitely until 1749. There were twenty-three intendants, of whom six were military. Under the captain-generals there were smaller districts ruled by _corregidores_, most of whom were civilians. The judicial functions of the _corregidor_ were gradually taken over by _alcaldes mayores_, who ranked under the _corregidores_, leaving the executive power in the hands of the latter. In some cases these lesser districts were ruled over by officials called military governors. The term "province" was applied to districts of very unequal size. While there were only eight in the combined realms of Aragon, Navarre, and the Basque provinces, there were twenty-four in Castile. Charles III planned to divide Spain into a number of provinces of about the same size, but did not carry out his idea.

[Sidenote: Increased royal control over the towns and the democratization of local political machinery.]

While munic.i.p.al life as a virile factor which might withstand the king had long since been dead, there was too much local authority still in existence to please the autocratic Bourbons. Furthermore, abuses in administration had developed which caused the kings to be philanthropically desirous of a remedy. To accomplish these ends they aimed at a more complete subjection of the towns to the royal authority and the democratization of the _ayuntamientos_. The princ.i.p.al difficulty in the way of these objectives was the fact that many munic.i.p.al offices were held as a perpetual right by specific families, especially in the case of the _regidores_,--for which state of affairs the kings of the House of Austria had not infrequently been responsible by their sales of such privileges. This resulted in an aristocratic control of the munic.i.p.alities, with consequent usurpations of land by the rich and the placing of the burdens of taxation on the poor. Unable to buy up these hereditary rights the royal government chose to follow what was in effect a policy of legal confiscation. This was easily accomplished for Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and Majorca; as already pointed out, the king took advantage of the outcome of the War of the Spanish Succession to take all of these appointments into his own hands or into those of the _audiencias_. As for Castile, laws were pa.s.sed requiring the approval of the central authorities before an heir to munic.i.p.al office could succeed to such an inheritance. As a result the government was enabled to refuse its a.s.sent in a number of cases. Meanwhile, the _alcaldes_ continued to be appointed by the king or by the lord, according as they were royal (_realengos_) or seigniorial (_senorios_) towns. Even the seigniorial towns were attacked, for a law of 1802 provided with regard to them that the servants or dependents of the lord could not exercise jurisdiction in his place; that the royal inst.i.tution of the _residencia_ was never to be dispensed with; and that the _alcaldes mayores_ of the large towns must be lawyers who had been licensed to practice by the royal _consejos_ or _audiencias_. No attempt was made to disturb the composition of the _ayuntamientos_ of Navarre and the Basque provinces, although these regions, like the rest of Spain, were subject to laws of a general character concerning munic.i.p.alities. One such general law, in 1751, required all munic.i.p.alities to send their accounts annually to the _Camara de Castilla_ for inspection, and this was supplemented by a law of 1764, ordering them to deposit their surplus funds with the royal intendant of the province. Another decree, dated 1760, a.s.signed the direction of munic.i.p.al finance to the _Consejo_. Yet other laws were enacted, the total effect of which, together with those just mentioned, was to place the whole question of munic.i.p.al income and expenditures in royal hands.

The initiative for the democratization of the _ayuntamientos_ came in the reign of Charles III. In 1766 he created the post of deputy of the common people (_diputado del comun_), which official was empowered to examine the financial accounts of the towns. These officers, of whom there were to be two in the smaller towns and four in the larger, were chosen by a body of men who had previously been elected by the people.

In like manner a popular syndic (_sindico_) was elected who represented the ma.s.ses before the _ayuntamiento_, with a right to take part in deliberations and to propose reforms. At the same time, the office of _regidor_ was thrown open to plebeians. This law was a blow at the _caballero_ cla.s.s of the n.o.bility, which had monopolized the holding of munic.i.p.al office. There was much dissatisfaction over the enactment, and the Basque provinces went so far as to protest. Nevertheless, there was no outward resistance; the aristocracy of the towns limited itself to opposing the election of plebeians and to hindering their action in office.

[Sidenote: Important ministers of the first half century of Bourbon rule.]

Despite the thoroughgoing nature of the Bourbon absolutism, it is fitting for the first time to award special credit to the secretaries of state, or ministers, although the kings were responsible for their selection as well as for their acts. This was an age of great reformers.

The initiative came from France on the accession of Philip V, and the first great name is that of a Frenchman, Orry. When he came to Spain, in 1701, he found that the income of the state was about 142,000,000 _reales_ ($8,875,000) while expenditures were 247,000,000 ($15,437,500).

The outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession made the situation still worse. Yet he displayed such ability that national receipts actually advanced in course of the war, and were some 160,000,000 ($10,000,000) at its end. Amelot, another Frenchman, was an even more remarkable figure. He cooperated with Orry to increase the revenues, and reorganized and bettered the administration of the army. The Italian Alberoni and the Dutchman Ripperda were less notable as reformers. With the fall of the latter in 1726 there began an era of great ministers of Spanish birth. First of these was Patino, who, though born in Italy, was of a Galician family. He was especially prominent for his financial reforms, but was also noteworthy for his measures to develop commerce and improve the army and navy. In an age when graft was general, and in a country which has rarely been backward in this particular, Patino was able to achieve the distinction of dying poor; his death occurred in 1736. The next notable financial reformer was Campillo, an Asturian who had been born poor, though of _hidalgo_ rank. More important, however, was Somodevilla, a Castilian of very humble birth who became Marquis of Ensenada, by which name he is more generally known. The period of his power was from 1743 to 1754, and his reforms covered the same matters as those mentioned above in the case of Patino, although he was especially remarkable in his endeavors on behalf of the Spanish navy. His fall in 1754 (as a result of his disagreement with Ferdinand VI with regard to the treaty with Portugal concerning Sacramento and Paraguay) was received with rejoicing in England; the English amba.s.sador reported exultingly that Spain would build no more s.h.i.+ps. Ensenada was responsible, also, for the construction of important public works, and once suggested the idea of single tax as worthy of trial in Spain.

[Sidenote: Great reformers of the reigns of Charles III and IV.]

The greatest reformers, however, belonged to the reign of Charles III and the early years of Charles IV. Earlier ministers had increased the national revenues and cut down expenses, but the deficit had not been wiped out. One of the great names of both of the above-named reigns was that of the Count of Aranda, of a distinguished Aragonese n.o.ble family.

Aranda was obstinate, brutal in speech, aggressive, and energetic, but a man of vast information and clear foresight,--as witness his prediction, in 1775, of the future greatness of the yet unborn United States. Aside from his connection with Spain's foreign policies he particularly distinguished himself while president of the _Consejo de Castilla_ by the reforms, already referred to, whereby Madrid became a clean and acceptable city. Yet more famous was Jose Monino, son of an ecclesiastical notary of Murcia, who was enn.o.bled as the Count of Floridablanca. An honorable man in every sense of the word, just, intelligent, and solicitous for his friends, he was hot-tempered, and unbending in his hostility to his opponents. His action made itself felt in the improvement of the means of communication in the peninsula and in his economic reforms of a commercial nature, such as the great free trade decree of 1778, which abandoned certain phases of the narrowly monopolistic policy which Spain had always followed in her trade with the colonies. Campomanes was an Asturian and, like Somodevilla, of very humble birth, but he rose to be, many hold, the greatest of the men who labored for the social and economic regeneration of Spain in the eighteenth century. He was also the most representative of his age, for, in addition to his measures to develop a better system of internal communications and to foster industry, commerce, and technical popular education, he was a determined royalist,--the embodiment, therefore, of the ideal of the enlightened despotism. Like Aranda and Floridablanca he served for a time under Charles IV, although his greatest work belonged to the reign of Charles III. Three names deserve mention for the reign of Charles IV. Jovellanos was an Asturian of an ill.u.s.trious family. He distinguished himself by his reforms in finance in conjunction with one Saavedra, but both were early deprived of their posts, as a result of the hostility of G.o.doy. The third name is that of G.o.doy, who introduced notable reforms in public instruction and in the organization of the army and navy,--whatever may be the judgment with regard to his foreign policy. The names of some of the great ministers of the Indies are also worthy of record. In addition to Patino and Ensenada the most noteworthy were Julian de Arriaga (1750 or 1751-1776) and Jose de Galvez (1776-1787), especially the former. The results, in terms of revenue, of the activities of the great ministers may serve to give some indication of the effectiveness of their work. In 1766, receipts exceeded expenditures by about 133,000,000 _reales_ ($8,312,500). In 1778 revenues amounted to 630,000,000 ($39,375,000); in 1784 to 685,000,000 ($42,812,500); and in 1787 to 616,000,000 ($38,500,000). Though annual expenditures were much less, the government was never able to overcome the deficit, although the national debt reached its lowest point in the reign of Charles III. In 1791 revenues were some 800,000,000 ($50,000,000), but they fell to a general level of about 600,000,000 ($37,500,000) in the years 1793 to 1795, while expenditures, which had reached 708,000,000 ($44,250,000) in 1793, were 1,030,000,000 ($64,375,000) in 1795. Thus the deficit began to increase again, and in 1808 it was over 7,200,000,000 _reales_ ($450,000,000), an enormous sum as national indebtedness went then.

[Sidenote: Opposition of vested interests to the reforms.]

The efforts made by the great reformers appear the more commendable when one considers the difficulties they had to overcome. Great changes always run counter to vested interests, but this was more than usually the case in Spain.

[Sidenote: Prevalence of graft.]

[Sidenote: Difficulties over questions of etiquette and of jurisdiction.]

The n.o.bles and the church were the most powerful elements in opposition; even though their authority was but little, as compared with that of earlier years, they were still able to hinder the execution of laws which damaged their interests. Nearly everyone seemed to have an exemption from taxation, or desired it, but the reformers set themselves resolutely against that state of affairs. Their success against the force of vested interests was only fair, for that element was too great to overcome; the very bureaucracy itself displayed a weakness in this particular, for it insisted on the maintenance of a custom which had sprung up that government officials might buy certain articles at a fixed price, whatever the charge to others. This calls to mind the overwhelming evil of graft, which it seemed impossible to eliminate; indeed, high officials were altogether too p.r.o.ne to regard it as a more or less legitimate perquisite, and did not hesitate to accept large gifts of money from foreign diplomats. Difficulties over questions of etiquette, inherent in a centralized bureaucratic government, also stood in the way of the proper execution of the laws. For example, a serious dispute arose in 1745 between the bishop of Murcia and the Inquisition, when the latter claimed that the members of that body should have a better place in church than others. It was at length decided that they should not. In 1782 the commandant-general of Majorca complained that the wives of the _oidores_ of the _audiencia_ had not called on his wife on the occasion of the king's birthday. He was sustained, and the _regente_ (regent, or president) of the _audiencia_ was imprisoned for a number of months by way of punishment. Several years later the ladies of Palma complained that the wife of the commandant-general was in the habit of going out in the street with an armed escort and demanding a military salute. This time the ladies were upheld, and the escort was prohibited. These are only a few instances out of thousands, and if there was so much stir over such trifling matters it can well be imagined how much more serious the problem was in the case of disputes between officials as to jurisdiction. Official etiquette is an important matter in all countries, but Spaniards have always been insistent on the letter of their rights and very sensitive over the omission of any act to which their position ent.i.tles them. Furthermore, these controversies carried in their train vast files of papers, of charges, answers and countercharges, and the evidence of witnesses. These questions had to be resolved, causing great expenditure in both time and money. No country was ever more diligent than Spain in the multiplication of state papers over affairs which ranged from those of vital importance to the most trivial incidents. The historian may have cause to rejoice over the existence of so much material, but the nation suffered,--although it is difficult to see how its contemporary acc.u.mulation could have been avoided in an absolutism like that of the Spanish Bourbons.

[Sidenote: Improvement of the army and ineffectual attempts at additional reforms.]

One of the princ.i.p.al objects of the reforms was the rehabilitation of the army and navy so that Spain might be in a better position in international affairs. In the army the volunteer system was employed for a while, but it was effective only in procuring contingents of foreign mercenaries and in filling the ranks of the royal guard. Gradually the idea of the draft came into favor, and it was tried several times, becoming a definitive law in the reign of Charles III. The law of Charles III provided that one man in every five--hence the term _quinta_ for this inst.i.tution--should become subject to military service for a term of eight years. This system was resisted in all parts of the peninsula, but was allowed to stand, although it proved impossible of enforcement. Through graft or favor, whether of the local officials charged with administering the law or of doctors who examined the individual drawn, practically n.o.body was required to serve except those totally lacking in influence. It was customary to seize tramps and petty criminals and send them instead of the legitimately drafted men. The government itself adopted the principle of forced levies, or impressment, of vagabonds and bad characters, but these men proved to be poor soldiers and deserted frequently. Thus the number of troops was not great, but in any event it would have been difficult to support more numerous contingents, owing to the lack of funds; even as matters were it was customary to grant a four months' furlough at the season when crops were gathered. In times of war, rigorous methods were used to get the needed men, or else they came forward voluntarily, out of patriotism. The reserve was formed by regional bodies of militia, which did not draw back when their services were needed in war. At the beginning of the era it is said that there were 20,000 poorly equipped soldiers in the Spanish army; in 1737 the total of infantry and cavalry was 42,920; in 1758 the total of all arms, 108,777. Numbers increased under Charles III, but declined under Charles IV. In 1808, at the moment of the outbreak against Napoleon, there were from 136,000 to 147,000 but only about 100,000 effective troops, and even these were badly armed.

The situation becomes clear in the light of the expense involved; the army of 1758, in a time of peace, cost some 205,000,000 _reales_ ($12,812,500), a saving of 34,000,000 ($2,125,000) over the expenditures required prior to the enactment of certain reforms by Ferdinand VI. It will be seen that a considerable portion of the annual revenue was needed. In this period the hierarchy of officials (from the captain-generals down through the various grades of generals, colonels, captains, and lieutenants) and of military units (such as brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies) was established in, broadly speaking, the form it has retained ever since. The gun with the bayonet had now become the princ.i.p.al infantry weapon, and artillery had been developed to a high point as compared with the previous era. Flags and uniforms varied; the latter were picturesque, but adapted more to encouraging the soldier's morale than to developing his freedom of action. A number of military schools were founded for the different branches of the service,--the infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers.

[Sidenote: Birth of a real Spanish navy, but difficulties attending its improvement.]

The eighteenth century marked the birth of a real Spanish navy. At the outset, and during the great war which opened the era, there was virtually none at all, but in 1714 Orry took steps, which were later furthered by Alberoni, Patino, and especially by Ensenada, to develop an effective fleet. In 1761 there were 49 men-of-war (_navios_), 22 frigates, and a number of smaller s.h.i.+ps; in 1788, 64 men-of-war, 53 frigates, and 60 boats of other types, with 50,000 sailors, 20,000 infantry, 3000 artillerymen, and numerous officials of the navy department. Each war with England during the century resulted in the destruction of a considerable portion of the fleet, and the battle of Trafalgar, in 1805, destroyed it as a fighting unit, even though Spain still had 42 men-of-war, 30 frigates, and 146 other s.h.i.+ps in 1806. The man-of-war was the princ.i.p.al type of vessel employed in this era, carrying from sixty to a hundred cannon, while the faster sailing frigate had from thirty to fifty cannon. Many auxiliary vessels--transports and smaller fighting s.h.i.+ps, such as brigs and sloops of war--were used. The galley went out of service, although one was built as late as 1794. The Spanish navy suffered from a number of defects, however, which made it distinctly inferior to the English, or even to the French. The wood for the masts was fragile and the material for the sails was of bad quality, while boats were so poorly taken care of, that they deteriorated rapidly. The provision of food supplies and effects for the men was faulty, and the men on board, especially the artillerymen and the infantry, were of very poor calibre. Ensenada remarked that the Spanish navy of his day was all appearances, without substance, but set about to the best of his ability to rectify the situation. He improved s.h.i.+pyards, sent officers of talent abroad to study the methods employed elsewhere, gave inducements to English s.h.i.+pbuilders to come to Spain, built shops for the making of rigging and other equipment needed on s.h.i.+ps of war, endeavored to improve the personnel of Spanish crews, and surrounded himself with the most competent naval men he could find. Ensenada and the other reformers did a great deal, but they could not overcome the never-ending difficulties in the way of obtaining men in sufficient numbers and of suitable quality for the requirements of the navy. The fishermen of the Spanish coasts continued to be drafted as sailors, and became less unwilling to serve than formerly when efforts were made to be punctual in payments of wages and to protect the families of the mariners. The recruiting of marine infantry and artillerymen, however, suffered from the same evil as the raising of the land forces, with one important result, which was that Spanish cannon were badly served.

[Sidenote: Legislation of the era and the _Novisima recopilacion_.]

Naturally, a period so rich in reforms as this was bound to have a great body of legislation. In Castile this was almost exclusively in the various forms of royal orders, recording the directions given by the king and his ministers, and the decisions of the _Consejos_. Thus the work of the _Nueva Recopilacion_ of 1567 got to be out of date, although five new editions were published in the eighteenth century, with the addition of some of the recent laws. Finally, a proposal for another codification was approved, and the compilation was made by Juan de la Reguera, who brought it out in twelve books, under the t.i.tle of the _Novisima recopilacion de las leyes de Espana_ (Newest, or Latest, Compilation of the Laws of Spain). Reguera claimed to have solved the problem of the concentration of legal material, but in fact his work suffered from the same defects as the earlier codes of Montalvo and Arrieta. His distribution of the laws was faulty, and he failed to indicate many important acts which were still in force. Furthermore, he reproduced the ordinance of Alcala (1348), repeated in the laws of Toro and the _Nueva Recopilacion_, according to which the laws of various earlier codes, such as the _Fuero Real_, remained in effect in so far as they had not been repealed by later legislation, and the _Partidas_ was valid as supplementary law. Thus the old evils of the lack of unity of the law and lack of clearness subsisted. n.o.body could be certain whether a law was still in effect or not, and it remained the practice to cite textbooks and the ancient codes of Justinian on the ground that they might have a bearing as supplementary law, unless there was something clearly stated to the contrary in the _Novisima Recopilacion_. In Catalonia there was a new codification in 1704, and in Navarre in 1735.

In most of the formerly separate legal jurisdictions, however, the laws of Castile applied, henceforth, as a result of the changes brought about, as already mentioned, at the close of the War of the Spanish Succession.

[Sidenote: Reforms in the Americas and their results.]

It remains to deal with the relations of the crown and the church, to which the next chapter is devoted, and to allude to the important reforms in the Americas. Much that was beneficial to the colonies at the time was achieved, and much else which in fact helped them to be the better prepared in the approaching combat with the mother country. In the main, however, the policies of subjection and of the development of the revenues in the supposed interests of Spain were followed, with the result that resentments were kept alive and ultimate disaster invited.

CHAPTER x.x.xVI

STATE AND CHURCH, 1700-1808

[Sidenote: p.r.o.nounced zeal of the Bourbons in subjecting the church.]

[Sidenote: The elements in controversy.]

If the kings of the House of Austria had displayed zeal in diminis.h.i.+ng the range of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the Bourbon monarchs, with their accentuated ideal of absolutism, were even more insistent in that respect. The kings were a.s.sisted by elements to which they themselves were otherwise hostile, such as the Jansenists[63] and the encyclopedists, whose partisans furnished arguments for the royal authority, because they opposed the rule of the church. Nevertheless, the monarchical ideal of the kings was sufficient to induce them to attack the church, except as concerned the purely spiritual interests of the Catholic religion, and the absolute patronage which the kings enjoyed in the Americas became the model of what they wished to establish in Spain. There were two princ.i.p.al angles to the problem, that of overcoming the intervention of the popes in the affairs of the Spanish church, and that of lessening the power and the privileges of the Spanish clergy. As for the intervention of the popes, they exercised the right of appointment to Spanish benefices which became vacant in any of the so-called eight "apostolic months," and also to those vacated in the four "ordinary months" (March, June, September, and December) if the death of the holder occurred at Rome; considerable sums of money were also collected for papal dispensations to marry, papal pardons, and other papal acts of an irregularly recurring character, although government officials charged that a large part of these moneys remained in the hands of Spanish and Italian intermediaries without reaching the coffers of the pope; the tribunal of the nunciature, despite the provisions of the papal brief of 1537, had come to be composed of foreign priests, and besides exercising its judicial functions independently of the royal courts administered the rents of vacant benefices (_vacantes_), which gave rise to accusations of abuses in the management of the funds; the tribunal of the _Cruzada_, for the collection of the tax of that name, was still in papal hands, although the income had frequently in the past been granted to the kings of Spain; and finally, there existed the old question of the _pase regio_, about the necessity for royal consent prior to the publication of papal bulls and briefs, or in fact even for the delivery of pontifical letters. As concerned the relations with the local clergy, the kings were preoccupied with such matters as the great numbers of churchmen (especially the regular clergy), the immunities they enjoyed, the immensity of their landed estates held in mortmain, the extent of the right of asylum in ecclesiastical edifices, and the power of the Inquisition and, far more, that of the Jesuits.

[Sidenote: Conflict of the kings with the popes in the first half century of the era.]

The conflict with the papacy began at the outset of the reign of Philip V, for the popes favored the candidacy of the Archduke Charles to the Spanish throne. Philip V expelled the nuncio, suspended the court of the nunciature, and gave orders against the circulation of papal bulls in Spain. These measures were only temporary, during the course of the war.

Nevertheless, Alberoni, who restored matters to their former basis, had occasion, even though he was a cardinal himself, to banish the newly appointed nuncio. Finally, an agreement was reached in the concordat of 1737 from which the crown obtained some advantages, such as the suppression of the right of asylum in some cases and its restriction in others, the limitation of the number of churchmen with rights of personal immunity, and the giving of guarantees against false allegations with a view to extending the immunities of church estates, together with the derogation of this right for such properties as the church should acquire in future. The concordat satisfied n.o.body, and moreover most of its provisions were not observed. When Ferdinand VI ascended the throne, he took steps to procure a more acceptable arrangement, for though an exceedingly devout Catholic he was unbending as concerned matters affecting the royal authority. The result was a fresh concordat with the pope, dated 1753. Several important rights were gained at this time: in return for a heavy money indemnity Ferdinand obtained a recognition of the royal right of patronage in appointments to all church offices, except some fifty-two dignities and the naming of bishops to benefices vacated in the four "ordinary months"; various kinds of papal taxes were renounced in favor of Spain; the tax of the _cruzada_ was granted in perpetuity to the crown; and the right of exemption from the taxation of lands held in mortmain was abolished.

Nevertheless, the partisans of royalty were not yet satisfied.

[Sidenote: Success of Charles III in the conflict with the popes.]

[Sidenote: Subjection of the Spanish church by Charles III.]

Charles III was a pious Catholic, but carried the reform movement against the church further than any of his predecessors. The first step was taken as a result of a papal brief against a book written by Mesenghi, a French theologian. When the Spanish Inquisition was about to publish the condemnatory doc.u.ment, the king issued a decree of prohibition. This was followed by royal orders of 1761 and 1762 making the following enactments: that no papal bull, brief, or other pontifical letter should be allowed to circulate or be obeyed, whatever might be its subject-matter, unless it should previously have been presented to the king, or in certain cases of lesser moment to the _Consejo_, so that a decision might be reached whether it interfered with the royal prerogative, before a license to publish would be granted; that the Inquisition should publish only such edicts as were forwarded to it by the king; and that it should condemn no book without giving the author a chance to defend himself. Through the influence of his mother, Isabel Farnesio, Charles was persuaded to suspend these decrees, but they were put into effect in 1768 when the pope issued a bull censuring the Bourbon Duke of Parma, a relative of Charles III, for his application of the _pase regio_ in his domain. A further step was taken in 1771, when the pope consented to the reform of the nunciature, whereby that tribunal, henceforth called the _Rota_, was to be composed of six Spanish judges nominated by the king and appointed by the pope. A great many measures were also undertaken in this reign to subject the Spanish clergy to the royal authority, and to better economic and religious conditions. The following enactments were representative of this phase of the royal policy: the recourse of _fuerza_ was frequently employed in cases of conflict of laws between the civil and the ecclesiastical courts, and the jurisdiction of the former was favored; a law of 1766 required bishops to exercise vigilance to see that priests should say nothing against the government or the members of the royal family, and even the _alcaldes_ were given authority to a.s.sist in this regard in conserving the good name of the state and its rulers; the rights of asylum in churches and the personal immunities of churchmen were limited, as by a law of 1774, according to which such rights were not to obtain in the case of those guilty of partic.i.p.ation in riots; in 1780 it was ordered that the profits of vacant rural benefices should be applied to the repair of churches of the diocese or to the repopulation of abandoned districts; bishops were prohibited by a law of 1781 from appointing vicars without the prior consent of the king; an attempt was made in 1786 to do away with the custom of burying deceased persons in churches, but the effort was unsuccessful, owing to the opposition of the clergy; in the same year ecclesiastical judges were forbidden to handle the temporal aspects of matrimonial cases, being restricted to decisions affecting the canonical bonds established by marriage; and in 1787 all cases of smuggling were removed from the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, even though a churchman were involved. In the reign of Charles IV there were intervals when the church was less rigorously dealt with, but the majority of the ministers followed the tradition of their predecessors.

[Sidenote: Royal action diminis.h.i.+ng the power of the Inquisition.]

There had been many complaints against the Inquisition in the period of the Hapsburg kings, but they became more frequent in the far more tolerant eighteenth century, and now that the monarchs no longer regarded the danger of heresy as serious they were reinforced by the royal policy of reducing all outstanding phases of authority. The conflict with the Inquisition was fought out over the following issues: questions of jurisdiction between the civil courts and that of the Inquisition; abuse of power by the Inquisition, which was accused of using its authority in matters of religion as a political arm; decrees of the Inquisition inconsistent with those of the king, or failures to observe the royal claims of a right to apply the _pase regio_; arbitrary condemnations of books by the Inquisition; and the extraordinary amplitude of cases falling within the purview of its tribunals, such as those of usury, smuggling, the importation of coin into the kingdom, and the raising of horses, all of which were far removed from the primary objects of the inst.i.tution. Not much was done until the reign of Charles III. That monarch had already shown himself hostile to the Inquisition while king of Naples, prior to his accession to the throne of Spain. One of his earliest acts as king of Spain was the banishment of the inquisitor general when the latter protested against the royal edict in the already mentioned Mesenghi case, followed by the legislation of 1761 and 1762 referred to above. When the inquisitor was allowed to return, Charles warned the other officers of the Inquisition not to disobey the king in future. In 1770 many of the cases of a secular character were removed from inquisitorial jurisdiction, and in 1784 it was ordered that all processes against grandees or the ministers or employes of the king should be submitted to the monarch. The reduction of the Inquisition was carried still further under Charles IV. G.o.doy, Jovellanos, and Urquijo thought of abolis.h.i.+ng it, but fortunate turns in the political situation intervened to postpone such action. It was provided in 1799 that no subject of the king should be arrested by the Inquisition without royal authorization, and the methods of trial employed by that inst.i.tution were modified in the interests of doing away with the former secrecy and the seclusion of the accused. In 1804 the king banished several members of the Inquisition who had opposed the freeing of an individual whom one of the lesser branches of that organization had p.r.o.nounced guiltless.

Its decline was also evidenced by the falling off in its revenues as compared with the yield of earlier times. Many of its buildings were in a state of bad repair, and its employees often died in poverty.

Nevertheless, its properties were said to be worth nearly 170,000,000 _reales_ (over $10,000,000) at the end of the era, and a state offer of 2,000,000 a year ($125,000), in exchange for its right to confiscate the goods of persons convicted of crimes against religion, was refused. In addition, there was the wealth of the Inquisition in the colonies; the great German traveler and naturalist, Alexander von Humboldt, estimated that the annual income of the Inquisition in New Spain alone was 800,000 _reales_ ($50,000). Although the Inquisition of the eighteenth century had but a shadow of its former power, it was able to bring influential persons to trial, including great churchmen, members of the higher n.o.bility, and ministers of state, but it did not always take effective action in these cases. G.o.doy was accused on three occasions, being charged with atheism, immorality, and bigamy, but the queen would not consent to his arrest, and he was able to procure the banishment of several of those who had intervened in this matter.

[Sidenote: Increased hostility against the Jesuits.]