Dio's Rome Volume VI Part 11

16.[Sidenote: B.C. 321 (_a.u._ 433)] --The Romans after vanquis.h.i.+ng the Samnites sent the captives in their turn under the yoke, regarding as satisfactory to their honor a repayment of similar disgrace. So did Fortune for both parties in the briefest time reverse her position and by treating the Samnites to the same humiliation at the hands of their outraged foes show clearly that here, too, she was all-supreme. (Mai, p.

164. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 319 (_a.u._ 435)] 17. -- Papirius made a campaign against the Samnites and having reduced them to a state of siege entrenched himself before them. At this time some one reproached him with excessive use of wine, whereupon he replied: "That I am not intoxicated is clear to every one from the fact that I am up at the peep of dawn and lie down to rest latest of all. But on account of having public affairs on my mind day and night alike, and not being able to obtain sleep easily, I take a little wine to lull me to rest." (Mai, ib.)

18. -- The same man one day while making the rounds of the garrison became angry on not finding the general from Praeneste at his post. He summoned him and bade him hand the axe to the lictor. Alarm and consternation at this was evident on the part of the general, and his fear sufficed. Papirius harmed him no further but merely gave orders to the lictor to cut off some roots growing beside the tents, so that they should not injure pa.s.sers-by. (Mai, ib.)

19. -- In numerous cases instances of good fortune are not at all constant, but lead many aside into paths of carelessness and ruin them.[Footnote: Cp. Livy, IX, 18, 8.] (Mai, p. 165.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 310 (_a.u._ 444)] 20. -- The men of the city put forward Papirius as dictator, and fearing that Rullus might be unwilling to name him on account of his own experiences while master of the horse, they sent for him and begged him to put the common weal before a private grudge. And he gave the envoys, indeed, no response, but when night had come (according to ancient custom it was quite necessary that the dictator be appointed at night), he named Papirius and secured by this act the greatest renown.(Valesius, p. 585.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 296 (_a.u._)] 21. -- Appius the Blind and Volumnius became at variance each with the other: and it was owing to this that Volumnius once, when Appius charged him in the a.s.sembly with showing no grat.i.tude for the progress he had made in wisdom through Appius's instruction, answered that he had indeed grown wiser and was likewise ready to admit it, but that Appius had not advanced at all in matters pertaining to war. (Mai, p. 165.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 296 (_a.u._ 458)] 22. -- As regards the prophecy the mult.i.tude was not capable for the time being of either believing or disbelieving him.[Footnote: I.e., Manius, an Etruscan.] It neither wished to hope for everything, inasmuch as it did not desire to see everything fulfilled, nor did it dare to refuse belief in all points inasmuch as it wished to be victorious, but was placed in an extremely painful position, as it were between confusion and fear. As each single event occurred they applied the interpretation to it according to the actual result, and the man himself undertook to a.s.sume some reputation for skill with regard to the foreknowledge of the unseen. (Mai, p. 165.

Cp. Zonaras, 8, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 293 (_a.u._ 461)] 23. -- The Samnites, enraged at what occurred and deeming it highly disgraceful to be defeated, resorted to extreme daring and folly with the intention of either conquering or being utterly destroyed. They a.s.sembled all their men that were of military age, threatening with death all that should remain at home, and they bound themselves with frightful oaths to the effect that no man should flee from the contest but should slaughter any person that might undertake to do so. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 292 (_a.u._ 462)] 24. -- The Romans on hearing that their consul Fabius had been worsted in the war became terribly angry and summoned him to stand trial. A vehement denunciation of the man was made before the people,--and, indeed, he was depressed by the injury to his father's reputation even more than by the complaints,--and no opportunity was afforded the object of the attack for reply. Nor did the elder man make a set defence of his son, but by enumerating his own services and those of his ancestors, and by promising furthermore that his son would do nothing unworthy of them, he abated the people's wrath, especially since he urged his son's youth. Moreover, he joined him at once in the campaign, overthrew the Samnites in battle, though they were elated by their victory, and captured their camp and great booty. The Romans therefore extolled him and ordered that his son also should command for the future with consular powers, and still employ his father as lieutenant. The latter managed and arranged everything for him, sparing his old age not a whit, and the allied forces readily a.s.sisted the father in remembrance of his old-time deeds. He made it clear, however, that he was not executing the business on his own responsibility, but he a.s.sociated with his son as if actually in the capacity of counselor and under-officer, while he moderated his temperament and a.s.signed to him the glory of the exploits. (Valesius, p.

585. Zonaras, 8, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 291 (_a.u._ 463)] 25. -- The soldiers with Junius who took the field along with Postumius fell sick on the way, and thought that their trouble was due to the felling of the grove. He was recalled for these reasons, but showed contempt for them even at this juncture, declaring that the senate was not his master but that he was master of the senate [lacuna] Envio [lacuna] and the [lacuna] men much [lacuna]

ambition [lacuna] [Words of Postumius Megillus: Cp. Dionys. Hal. Ant.

Rom. 16, [Footnote: The famous Apollonius of Tyana.]. (Mai, p. 167.)

[Frag. x.x.xIV]

-- Gaius Fabricius in most respects was like Rufinus, but in incorruptibility far superior. He was very firm against bribes, and on that account did not please Rufinus, but was always at variance with him. Yet the latter chose Fabricius, thinking that he was a most proper person to meet the requirements of the war, and making his personal enmity of little account in comparison with the advantage of the commonwealth.

[Frag. x.x.xIV]

As a result he gained some reputation for having shown himself above jealousy, which springs up in the hearts of many of the best men by reason of emulation. Since he was a thorough patriot and did not practice virtue for a show he thought it a matter of indifference whether the State were benefited by him or through some other man, even if that man should be an opponent. (Valesius, p.586.)

[Frag. x.x.xV]

--Cornelius Fabricius, when asked why he had entrusted the business to his foe, [lacuna][Footnote: See Niebuhr, Rh. Mus., 1828, p.600, or _Kleine Schriften_, 2, p.241.] the general excellence of Rufius and added that to be spoiled by the citizen is preferable to being bought and sold by the enemy. [This anecdote concerns Fabricius Luscinus, mentioned by Cicero, de orat. 2, 66, 268; Quintilian 12, 1, 43; Gellius 4, 48.]

[Frag. x.x.xVI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 290 (_a.u._ 464)] --Curius, in defence of his conduct in the popular a.s.sembly, said that he had acquired so much land [lacuna]

and had hunted for so many men [lacuna] country [lacuna] [The person referred to is Manius Curius Dentatus. Cp. Auct. de Viris. Ill.u.s.tr., c.

33.

--After Niebuhr, Rh. Mus. 1828, p.579.]

[Frag. x.x.xVII]

--When the tribunes moved an annulment of debts, the law was often proposed without avail, since the lenders were by no means willing to accept it and the tribunes granted the n.o.bles the choice of either putting this law to the vote or following that of Stolo, by which they were to reckon the previous interest toward the princ.i.p.al and receive the remainder in triennial payments. [Footnote: The opening portion of this fragment is based largely on conjectures of Niebuhr (Rhein. Mus., 1828, p.579ff.)] And for the time being the weaker party, dreading lest it might lose all, paid court to them, and the wealthier cla.s.s, encouraged to think it would not be compelled to adopt either course, maintained a hostile att.i.tude. But when the revolted [Footnote: A doubtful reading.] party proceeded to press matters somewhat, both sides changed their positions. The debtors were no longer satisfied with either plan, and the n.o.bles thought themselves lucky if they should not be deprived of their princ.i.p.al. Hence the dispute was not decided immediately, but subsequently they prolonged their rivalry in a spirit of contentiousness, and did not act at all in their usual character.

Finally the people made peace in spite of the fact that the n.o.bles were unwilling to remit much more than they had originally expected; however, the more they beheld their creditors yielding, the more were they emboldened, as if they were successful by a kind of right; and consequently they regarded the various concessions almost as matters of course and strove for yet more, using as a stepping-stone to that end the fact that they had already obtained something. (Mai, p.167. Zonaras, 8,2.)

[Frag. x.x.xVIII]

--When the opposite side [Footnote: The Tuscans, Senones, and Gauls appear to be meant.] saw also another general approaching, they ceased to heed the common interests of their force but each cast about to secure his individual safety, as a common practice of those who form a union uncemented by kindred blood, or who make a campaign without common grievances, or who have not one commander. While good fortune attends them their views are harmonious, but in disaster each one sees before him only matters of individual concern. They betook themselves to flight as soon as it had grown dark, without having communicated to one another their intention. In a body they thought it would be impossible for them to force their way out or for their defection to pa.s.s unnoticed, but if they should leave each on his own account and, as they believed, alone, they would more easily escape. And so, to his own party,--each one of them [lacuna] they will think that accomplis.h.i.+ng their flight with the greatest security [lacuna] (Mai, p.167.)

[Frag. x.x.xIX]

[Sidenote: B.C. 283 (_a.u._ 471)] 1. The Romans had learned that the Tarentini and some others were making ready to war against them, and had despatched Fabricius as an envoy to the allied cities to prevent them from committing any revolutionary act: but they had him arrested, and by sending men to the Etruscans and Umbrians and Gauls they caused a number of them also to secede, some immediately and some a little later.

(Ursinus, p.375. Zonaras, 8, 2-Vol. II, p.174, 4 sq.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 283 (_a.u._ 471)] 2. --The Tarentini, although they had themselves initiated the war, nevertheless were sheltered from fear. For the Romans, who understood what they were doing, pretended not to know it on account of temporary embarra.s.sments. Hereupon the Tarentini, thinking that they either could mock [Footnote: Verb adopted from Boissevain's conjecture [Greek: _diasilloun_] (cp. the same word in Book Fifty-nine, chapter 25). at Rome or were entirely un.o.bserved because they were receiving no complaints behaved still more insolently and involved the Romans even contrary to their own wishes in a war. This proved the saying that even good fortune, when a disproportionately large portion of it falls to the lot of any individuals, becomes the cause of disaster to them; it entices them on to a state of frenzy (since moderation refuses to cohabit with vanity) and ruins their greatest interests. So these Tarentini, too, after rising to an unexampled height of prosperity in turn met with a misfortune that was an equivalent return for their wantonness. (Mai, p.168 and 536.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 282 (_a.u._ 472)] 3. Dio in Book 9: "Lucius Valerius, [Footnote: Appian (Samnite Wars, VII, 1) gives the second name as Cornelius.] who was admiral of the Romans and had been despatched on some errand by them." (Bekker, Anecd. p.158, 25. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

4. --Lucius was despatched by the Romans to Tarentum. Now the Tarentini were celebrating the Dionysia, and sitting gorged with wine in the theatre of an afternoon suspected that he was sailing against them as an enemy. Immediately in a pa.s.sion and partly under the influence of their intoxication they set sail in turn: so without any show of force on his part or the slightest expectation of any hostile act they attacked and sent to the bottom both him and many others. When the Romans heard of this they naturally were angry, but did not choose to take the field against Tarentum at once. However, they despatched envoys in order not to seem to have pa.s.sed over the affair in silence and by that means render them more impudent. But the Tarentini, so far from receiving them decently or even sending them back with an answer in any way suitable, at once, before so much as granting them an audience, made sport of their dress and general appearance. It was the city garb, which we use in the Forum; and this the envoys had put on, either for the sake of stateliness or else through fear, thinking that this at least would cause the foreigners to respect their position. Bands of revelers accordingly jeered at them,--they were still celebrating the festival, which, although they were at no time noted for temperate behavior, rendered them still more wanton,--and finally a man planted himself in the road of Postumius and, with a forward inclination, threw him down and soiled his clothing. At this an uproar arose from all the rest, who praised the fellow as if he had performed some remarkable deed, and they sang many scurrilous anapaests upon the Romans, accompanied by applause and capering steps. But Postumius cried: "Laugh, laugh while you may!

For long will be the period of your weeping, when you shall wash this garment clean with your blood." (Ursinus, p.375. Mai, 168. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

5. Hearing this they ceased their jests but could accomplish nothing towards obtaining pardon for their insult: however, they took to themselves credit for a kindness in the fact that they let the amba.s.sadors withdraw unharmed. (Mai, ib.)

6. --Meton, failing to persuade the Tarentini not to engage in hostilities with the Romans, retired un.o.bserved from the a.s.sembly, put garlands on his head, and returned along with some fellow-revelers and a flute girl. At the sight of him singing and dancing the kordax, they gave up the business in hand to accompany his movements with shouts and hand-clapping, as is often done under such circ.u.mstances. But he, after reducing them to silence, spoke: "Now it is yours both to be drunken and to revel, but if you accomplish what you plan to do, we shall be slaves." (Mai, p.169.)

[Frag. XL]

[Sidenote: B.C. 281 (_a.u._ 473)] --King Pyrrhus was not only king of the district called Epirus, but had made the larger part of the Greek world his own, partly by kindness and partly by fear. The aetolians, who at that period possessed great power, and Philip [Footnote: The son of Ca.s.sander, who ruled only four months in B. C. 296.] the Macedonian, and the chief men in Illyric.u.m did his bidding. By natural brilliancy and force of education and experience in affairs he far surpa.s.sed all, so as to be esteemed far beyond what was warranted by his own powers and those of his allies, although these powers were great. (Valesius, p.589.

Zonaras, 8, 2.)

2. --Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, had a particularly high opinion of his powers in that he was deemed by foreign nations a match for the Romans: and he believed that it would be opportune to a.s.sist the fugitives who had taken refuge with him, especially as they were Greeks, and at the same time to antic.i.p.ate the Romans with some plausible excuse before he received any damage at their hands. So careful was he about a fair pretext that though he had long had his eye on Sicily and had been considering how he could overthrow the Roman dominion, he shrank from taking the initiative in hostilities, when no wrong had been done him.

(Mai, p.169. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

3. --King Pyrrhus was said to have captured more cities by Cineas than by his own spear. For the latter, says Plutarch, [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, chapter 14.] was skilled in speaking,--the only one in fact to be compared in skill with Demosthenes. Notwithstanding, as a sensible man, he spoke in opposition to Pyrrhus, pointing out to him the folly of the expedition. For the king intended by his prowess to rule the whole earth, whereas Cineas urged him to be satisfied with his own possessions, which were sufficient for enjoyment. But the man's fondness for war and fondness for leaders.h.i.+p prevailed against the advice of Cineas and caused him to depart in disgrace from both Sicily and Italy, after losing in all of the battles many myriads of his own forces.

(Valesius, p.586.)

4. --Pyrrhus sent to Dodona and enquired of the oracle about the expedition. And a response having come to him: "You, if you cross into Italy, Romans shall conquer," he construed it according to his wish (for desire has mighty power to deceive any one) and would not even await the coming of spring. (Mai, p.169.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 280 (_a.u._ 474)] 5. --The Rhegians had asked of the Romans a garrison, and Decius [Footnote: _Decius Vibellius_.] was the leader of it. The majority of these guards, accordingly, as a result of the excess of supplies and general easy habits,--for they enjoyed a far less strenuous existence than they had known at home,--through the persuasion of Decius formed the desire to kill the foremost Rhegians and occupy the city. It seemed as though they might be quite free to perform whatever they pleased, unconcerned about the Romans, who were busied with the Tarentini and with Pyrrhus. Decius was further enabled to persuade them by the fact that they saw Messana in the power of the Mamertines. The latter, who were Campanians and had been appointed to garrison it by Agathocles, the lord of Sicily, had slaughtered the natives and occupied the town.

The conspirators did not, however, make their attempt openly, since they were decidedly inferior in numbers. Letters were forged by Decius, purporting to have been written to Pyrrhus by some citizens with a view to the betrayal of the city. He next a.s.sembled the soldiers and read these to them, stating that they had been intercepted, and by his talk (the character of which may easily be conceived) excited them greatly.

The effect was enhanced by the sudden announcement of a man (who had been a.s.signed to the role) that a portion of Pyrrhus's fleet had anch.o.r.ed somewhere off the coast, having come for a conference with the traitors. Others, who had been instructed, magnified the matter, and shouted out that they must antic.i.p.ate the Rhegians before some harm happened, and that the traitors, ignorant of what was being done, would find it difficult to resist them. So some rushed down to the landing places, and others broke into the houses and slaughtered great numbers,--save that a few had been invited to dinner by Decius and were slain there. (Valesius, p.589.)

6. --Decius, commander of the garrison, after slaying the Rhegians, ratified friends.h.i.+p with the Mamertines, thinking that the similar nature of their outrages would render them most trustworthy allies. He was well aware that a great many men find the ties resulting from some common transgression stronger to unite them than the obligations of lawful a.s.sociation or the bonds of kins.h.i.+p. (Mai, p.170.)

7. --The Romans suffered some reproach from them for a while, until such time as they took the field against them. For since they were busied with concerns that were greater and more urgent, what these men did seemed to some of comparatively little importance. (Mai, p.170.)

8. --The Romans, on learning that Pyrrhus was to come, stood in terror of him, since they had heard that he was a good warrior and had a large force by no means despicable as an adversary,--the sort of information, of course, that is always given to enquirers in regard to persons unknown to them who live at a very great distance. (Mai, p.170. Zonaras, 8,3.)

9. For it is impossible that persons not brought up under the same inst.i.tutions, nor filled with the same ambitions, nor regarding the same things as base or n.o.ble, should ever become friends with one another. [Footnote: Nos. 9, 10, and 11 are thought to be possibly from the speech made by Laevinus to the soldiers (Zonaras, VIII, 3, 6).]

(Mai, p. 537.)

10. --Ambition and distrust are always qualities of tyrants, and so it is inevitable that they should possess no real friend. A man who is distrusted and envied could not love any one sincerely. Moreover, a similarity of habits and a like station in life and the fact that the same objects are disastrous and beneficial to persons are the only forces that can create true, firm friends. Wherever any one of these conditions is lacking, you see a delusive appearance of comrades.h.i.+p, but find it to be without secure support. (Mai, p.170 and 537.)

11. --Generals.h.i.+p, if it is a.s.sisted by respectable forces of men, contributes greatly both to their preservation and their chances of victory, but by itself is worth nothing. Nor is there any other profession that is of weight without persons to cooperate and to aid in its administration. (Mai, p.171.)