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[Footnote 261: _Ibid._, p. 193.]
[Footnote 262: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 263: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 264: _U.S. Messages and Doc.u.ments, 1861-2_, p. 1431 Seward to Adams, Sept. 7, 1861.]
[Footnote 265: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 196. This speculation is not supported by any reference to doc.u.ments revealing such a purpose. While it may seem a reasonable speculation it does not appear to be borne out by the new British materials cited later in this chapter.]
[Footnote 266: C.F. Adams, "Seward and The Declaration of Paris" _Ma.s.s.
Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81.]
[Footnote 267: _Ibid._, p. 57. The quotation is from a despatch by Lyons of Dec. 6, 1861; but this is inexact language. It is true that Seward had refused to receive officially this despatch, but he had read and considered it in private. Hence he knew _privately_ the facts of Russell's proposal and that Lyons had no instructions to negotiate. The incident of this despatch has been treated by me in Chapter IV, where I regard Seward's refusal to receive officially the despatch as primarily a refusal to be notified of Great Britain's proclamation of neutrality.
Bancroft treats this incident as primarily a clever refusal by Seward to be approached officially by Lyons and Mercier in a joint representation, thus blocking a plan of joint action. (Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 181.) I agree with C.F. Adams that the only effect of this, so far as the negotiation is concerned was that "Seward, by what has always, for some reason not at once apparent, pa.s.sed for a very astute proceeding, caused a transfer of the whole negotiation from Was.h.i.+ngton to London and Paris." ("Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 50.)]
[Footnote 268: _Ibid._, p. 51.]
[Footnote 269: _Ibid._, p. 64.]
[Footnote 270: _Ibid._, p. 60.]
[Footnote 271: _Ibid._, p. 58.]
[Footnote 272: Bancroft says June 8. But see _ante_, p. 130.]
[Footnote 273: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 1. It was with reference to this that Palmerston, on May 5, wrote to Russell: "If any step were thought advisable, perhaps the best mode of our feeling our way would be to communicate confidentially with the South by the men who have come over here from thence, and with the North by Dallas, who is about to return in a few days. Dallas, it is true, is not a political friend of Lincoln, but on the contrary rather leans to the South; but still he might be an organ, if it should be deemed prudent to take any step." (Palmerston MS.)]
[Footnote 274: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, p. 1763.]
[Footnote 275: _Ibid._, pp. 1830-34.]
[Footnote 276: This instruction never got into the printed Parliamentary papers, nor did any others of the many containing the like suggestion, for they would have revealed a persistence by Russell against French advice--to which he ultimately was forced to yield--a persistence in seeking to bind the belligerents on the first article of the Declaration of Paris, as well as on articles two and three. The points at which Russell returned to this idea are indicated in this chapter.]
[Footnote 277: F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 563. Draft.]
[Footnote 278: F.O., France, Vol. 1390. No. 684. Cowley to Russell, May 9, 1861.]
[Footnote 279: F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No. 713. Cowley to Russell, May 13, 1861.]
[Footnote 280: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, II, p. 40.]
[Footnote 281: F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No. 733.]
[Footnote 282: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 5.]
[Footnote 283: _Ibid._, No. 6. Note that this and the preceding doc.u.ment are all that appeared in the Parliamentary Papers. Thouvenel's amendment of Russell's plan did not appear.]
[Footnote 284: _U.S. Messages and Doc.u.ments, 1861-2_, Adams to Seward, May 21, 1861.]
[Footnote 285: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 7.]
[Footnote 286: The text of these proclamations, transmitted by Lyons, had been officially received in London on May 10.]
[Footnote 287: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 8.]
[Footnote 288: F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 139. "Seen by Ld. P. and the Queen."]
[Footnote 289: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 4, 1861. (Printed in Newton, _Lyons_, I, 42.)]
[Footnote 290: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 12. Marked "Received," June 17.]
[Footnote 291: F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons to Russell, June 8, 1861. Also Russell Papers, June 10, 1861. This disinclination to act extended also to the matter of getting in touch with the South, which they also postponed. It appeared that Mercier was instructed to order the French Consul at New Orleans to go in person to President Davis.
Both diplomats were very fearful of an "outbreak" from Seward on this planned proposal to the Confederacy.]
[Footnote 292: F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 35. Draft. "Seen by Ld.
Palmerston and the Queen."]
[Footnote 293: In Was.h.i.+ngton, so different was the point of view, Lyons and Mercier were now convinced they could not let Seward know of the proposal to be made to the South. They feared he would send them their pa.s.sports. Mercier in informal talk had explained to Seward his instructions on the Declaration of Paris in so far as the North was concerned. Lyons and Mercier now planned a joint visit and representation to Seward--that which was actually attempted on June 15--but were decided to say nothing about the South, until they learned the effect of this "joint proposal." F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons to Russell, June 8, 1861.]
[Footnote 294: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 10. Russell to Grey, June 12, 1861.]
[Footnote 295: Stoeckl was writing his Government that the state to which the negotiation had come was full of danger and might lead to a serious quarrel. He thought Russia should keep out of it until results were clearer. On this report Gortchakoff margined "C'est aussi mon avis." (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., June 12-24, 1861. No. 1359.)]
[Footnote 296: F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 278.]
[Footnote 297: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 14. Lyons to Russell, June 17, 1861. "Recd. June 30." It was in this interview that Lyons discovered Seward's misconception as to the position of the proposed negotiation, and made clear to Seward that he had no instructions to sign a convention.]
[Footnote 298: F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 284.]
[Footnote 299: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 18, 1861.]
[Footnote 300: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, June 21, 1861.]
[Footnote 301: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 22. Writing privately on the same day Lyons comments on Mercier's "extreme caution"
in his relations with Seward. Lyons implied that all this personal, rather than official communication of doc.u.ments to Seward was Mercier's idea, and that he, Lyons, doubted the wisdom of this course, but had agreed to it because of the desire to act in perfect harmony with France. Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, July 8, 1861.]
[Footnote 302: Lyons Papers.]
[Footnote 303: F.O., Am., Vol 756. No. 227. On this same day Russell was writing privately to Edward Everett, in Boston, a clear statement of the British position, defending the Proclamation of Neutrality and adding, "It is not our practice to treat five millions of freemen as pirates, and to hang their sailors if they stop our merchantmen. But unless we mean to treat them as pirates and to hang them, we could not deny them belligerent rights." C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris,"
pp. 49-50.]