Great Britain and the American Civil War Part 16

As will have been noted, Lyons had foreseen the American decision against Bunch on purely personal grounds, had been relieved that this would be the issue, and had fore-warned Russell. His despatch just cited may be regarded as a suggestion of the proper British refutation of charges, but with acceptance of the American decision. Nevertheless he wrote gloomily on the same day of future relations with the United States[381]. At the same time Russell, also foreseeing Seward's action, was not disturbed. He thought it still "not off the cards that the Southern Confederates may return to the Union.... Our conduct must be strictly neutral, and it will be[382]." Upon receipt of Lyons' despatch and letter of October 28 Russell wrote to Palmerston, "I do not attach much importance to this letter of Lyons. It is the business of Seward to feed the mob with sacrifices every day, and we happen to be the most grateful food he can offer[383]." For Russell saw clearly that Great Britain could not object to the removal of Bunch on the purely personal grounds alleged by Seward. There followed in due course the formal notification by Adams on November 21, just six days before he learned of the _Trent_ affair, which had occurred on November 8. That alarming incident no doubt coloured the later communications of both parties, for while both Adams and Russell indulged in several lengthy argumentative papers, such as are dear to the hearts of lawyers and diplomats, the only point of possible further dispute was on the claim of Great Britain that future occasions might arise where, in defence of British interests, it would be absolutely necessary to communicate with the Confederacy. Adams acknowledged a British duty to protect its citizens, but rea.s.serted the American right to dismiss any British agent who should act as Bunch had done. On December 9, Russell closed the matter by stating that he did "not perceive that any advantage would be obtained by the continuance of this correspondence[384]." Bunch was expected to leave Charleston as soon as a safe conveyance could be provided for him, but this was not immediately forthcoming. In fact he remained at Charleston until February, 1863, actively engaged, but official papers were signed by his vice-consul. In the excitement over the _Trent_, he seems rapidly to have disappeared from the official as he did from the public horizon[385].

The Bunch controversy, seemingly of no great importance in so far as the alleged personal grounds of complaint are concerned, had its real significance in the effort of Great Britain to make contact with the Southern Government--an effort incautiously entered upon, and from which an attempt to withdraw had come too late. The result was British a.s.sertion of a right in case of necessity to make such contact, having recognized the South as a belligerent, but a discontinuance of the practice, under the American protest[386]. While this controversy was in progress the attention of the British Government was directed to a proposal urged by Mercier upon Lyons in Was.h.i.+ngton, which appeared to have the support of the French Government. On September 30, Mercier, so Lyons reported, had received a private letter from Thouvenel expressing great concern over the prospective scarcity of cotton from America, due to the blockade, and asking Mercier's advice. The latter now informed Lyons that his reply had outlined the following steps: first, complete harmony of action between England and France; second, recognition of Southern independence; third, refusal longer to recognize the blockade; fourth, England and France to be alert to seize the "favourable moment,"

when the North became disheartened, the present moment not being a good one[387]. This policy Mercier thought so "bold" that the North would be deterred from declaring war. The two diplomats held long argument over this suggestion. Lyons acknowledged the general pressure for cotton, but thought there was no need of great alarm as yet and also advanced the idea that in the end Europe would benefit by being forced to develop other sources of supply, thus being freed from such exclusive dependence on the United States. Mercier answered that France was in dire need and could not wait and he urged that mere recognition of the South would not secure cotton--it was necessary also to break the blockade. In comment to Russell, Lyons agreed that this was true, but thought the fact in itself an argument against accepting Mercier's ideas: "The time is far distant when the intervention of England and France in the quarrel would be welcomed, or, unless under compulsion, tolerated by the American peoples." The South had not yet "gone far enough in establis.h.i.+ng its independence to render a recognition of it either proper or desirable for European powers," and he stated with emphasis that recognition would _not_ end the war unless there was also an _alliance_ with the South[388].

In the British Cabinet also, at this same time, attention was being directed to the question of cotton, not, primarily, by any push from the British manufacturing interest, but because of queries addressed to it by the French Minister in London. Russell wrote to Palmerston, referring to the inquiry of Flahault, "I agree with you that the cotton question may become serious at the end of the year," but he added that Lindsay had informed him that in any case cotton could not be brought in the winter-time from the interior to the Southern ports[389]. In truth any serious thought given at this time to the question of cotton appears to be the result of the French arguments at London and Was.h.i.+ngton advocating a vigorous American policy. October 19, Lyons and Mercier renewed debate on exactly the same lines as previously, Mercier this time reading to Lyons an instruction from Thouvenel and his reply. Lyons insisted that the North would most certainly declare war on any power that recognized the South and a.s.serted that such a war would cause more suffering many times than all the suffering now caused by the shortage of cotton. Yet Lyons felt compelled to use caution and conciliation in dealing with Mercier, because of the desire to preserve close harmony of att.i.tude[390]. A few clays later Lyons' comments seemed wholly justified when Mercier reported to him the tone of a conversation with Seward, after having left with him a copy of Thouvenel's instruction. Seward said plainly that the United States would go to war with any foreign power that tried to interfere and that the only way in which France could get cotton was by a Northern conquest of the South. He acknowledged that the United States might be defeated, but he informed Mercier that France would at least know there had been a war. On his part Mercier told Seward that in his opinion there was but one possible outcome in America--separation--and that he had advised Thouvenel that the true policy of England and France was to recognize the South and "bring about a peaceful separation." Lyons' comment to Russell is that Seward had certainly taken a "high" tone--evident justification of Lyons' previously expressed opinion. Seward had been very eager to learn whether England knew of Thouvenel's instruction, to which Mercier replied "no," and was now anxious that Russell should not reveal to Adams that Lyons had known the contents before delivery to Seward--a caution with which Lyons was very content[391].

Lyons' first report of Mercier's ideas had been received in London at a rather critical moment. On October 17, just after Adams' complaint about Bunch and Russell's answer, while waiting to see whether Seward would magnify that incident into a cause of rupture, and four days before Bunch's "unsatisfactory explanation" had been received, Russell wrote to Palmerston:

"There is much good sense in Mercier's observations.

But we must wait. I am persuaded that if we do anything, it must be on a grand scale. It will not do for England and France to break a blockade for the sake of getting cotton. But, in Europe, powers have often said to belligerents, Make up your quarrels. We propose to give terms of pacification which we think fair and equitable. If you accept them, well and good. But, if your adversary accepts them and you refuse them, our mediation is at an end, and you may expect to see us your enemies. France would be quite ready to hold this language with us.

"If such a policy were to be adopted the time for it would be the end of the year, or immediately before the meeting of Parliament[392]."

Apparently Russell under the irritations of the moment was somewhat carried away by Mercier's suggestion. That it was but a briefly held thought has been shown by expressions from him already cited[393]. Nor was he alone in ministerial uncertainty[394], but Palmerston was not inclined to alter British policy. October 18, he replied to Russell:

"As to North America, our best and true policy seems to be to go on as we have begun, and to keep quite clear of the conflict between North and South.... The only excuse [for intervention] would be the danger to the intervening parties if the conflict went on; but in the American case this can not be pleaded by the Powers of Europe.

"I quite agree with you that the want of cotton would not justify such a proceeding, unless, indeed, the distress created by that want was far more serious than it is likely to be. The probability is that some cotton will find its way to us from America, and that we shall get a greater supply than usual from other quarters.

"The only thing to do seems to be to lie on our oars and to give no pretext to the Was.h.i.+ngtonians to quarrel with us, while, on the other hand, we maintain our rights and those of our fellow countrymen[395]."

In Was.h.i.+ngton the result of Mercier's conversation with Seward, outlining Thouvenel's suggestions, was a long and carefully prepared despatch to Dayton, in Paris, which the biographer of Seward thinks was one of his "great despatches; perhaps it was his greatest, if we consider his perfect balance and the diplomatic way in which he seemed to ignore what was menacing, while he adroitly let Thouvenel see what the result would be if the implied threats should be carried out[396]."

Seward argued with skill the entire matter of cotton, but he was none the less firm in diplomatic defiance of foreign intervention. Since Great Britain had taken no part in the French scheme--a point which Seward was careful to make clear to Dayton--the despatch needs no expanded treatment here. Its significance is that when reported to Lyons by Mercier (for Seward had read it to the latter) the British Minister could pride himself on having already pointed out to both Mercier and Russell that Seward's line was exactly that which he had prophesied.

Mercier again was very anxious that his confidences to Lyons should not become known, and Lyons was glad indeed to be wholly free from any share in the discussion[397].

Two days after thus describing events, Lyons, on November 6, had still another communication, and apparently a last on this topic, with Mercier, in which the two men again went over the whole ground of national policy toward America, and in which their divergent views became very apparent. The arguments were the same, but expressed with more vigour. Mercier seems, indeed, to have attempted to "rush" Lyons into acquiescence in his policy. Lyons finally observed to him that he "had no reason to suppose that Her Majesty's Government considered the time was come for entertaining at all the question of recognizing the South" and asked what good such a step would do anyway. Mercier replied that he did not believe that the North would declare war, and so it would be a step toward settlement. To this Lyons took positive exception[398]. Lyons' report of this conversation was written on November 8, a date which was soon to stand out as that on which occurred an event more immediately threatening to British-American relations than any other during the Civil War.

The battle of Bull Run had left on British minds an impression of Northern incapacity in war--even a doubt of Northern courage and determination. On August 19 the Declaration of Paris negotiation, a favourable result from which was eagerly desired by Russell, had failed, as he well knew when he attached to the convention that explanatory statement limiting its action in point of time. In the end Russell felt that Britain had just escaped a "trap." Two weeks after this Russell learned of the arrest of Mure, and soon of the demand for Bunch's recall, finally and formally made by Adams on November 21. Just six days later, on November 27, London heard of the _Trent_ affair of November 8.

It is small wonder that Russell and his colleagues felt an increasing uncertainty as to the intent of the United States, and also an increasing irritation at having to guard their steps with such care in a situation where they sincerely believed the only possible outcome was the dissolution of the American Union. But up to the moment when the news of the _Trent_ affair was received they had pursued a policy, so they believed, of strict and upright neutrality, and were fixed in the determination not to permit minor controversies or economic advantage to divert them from it.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 319: _Economist_, May 18, 1861.]

[Footnote 320: _Ibid._, June 29, 1861.]

[Footnote 321: J.L. Motley, _The Causes of the American Civil War_.

Published as a pamphlet. N.Y., 1861.]

[Footnote 322: _Daily News_, July 19, 1861.]

[Footnote 323: Russell, _My Diary, North and South_, p. 159, Boston, 1863. This work is in effect a condensation of Russell's letters to the _Times_, but contains many intimate descriptions not given in the newspaper.]

[Footnote 324: _Ibid._, p. 315.]

[Footnote 325: The _Times_, August 10, 1861.]

[Footnote 326: Russell, _My Diary_, London, 1863, II, p. 296. This edition varies somewhat from that published at Boston and previously cited. The _New York Times_ became Russell's most vicious critic, labelling him "Bull Run Russell," a name which stuck, and beginning its first article on his sins "The terrible epistle has been read with quite as much avidity as an average President's message. We scarcely exaggerate the fact when we say, the first and foremost thought on the minds of a very large portion of our people after the repulse at _Bull's Run_ was, what will Russell say?" _Ibid._, p. 297. As to his recall Russell afterwards a.s.serted that it was really due to a variance of opinion with Delane, the former being really pro-Northern in sympathy and in conviction of ultimate victory. This will be examined later when Russell's position as an independent editor in London becomes important.]

[Footnote 327: For similar German impressions see G.H. Putnam, _Memories of My Youth_, N.Y., 1914, p. 187.]

[Footnote 328: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, I, p. 48. In the same view Russell wrote to Lyons, August 16. "The defeat of Mana.s.sas or Bull's Run seems to me to show a great want of zeal. For I cannot believe the descendants of the men of 1776 and indeed of 1815 to be totally wanting in courage."

(Lyons Papers.)]

[Footnote 329: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 31. August 20, 1861.]

[Footnote 330: Gladstone Papers, August 29, 1861.]

[Footnote 331: _Economist_, Aug. 17, 1861.]

[Footnote 332: _Morning Star_, Sept. 10, 1861.]

[Footnote 333: _John Bull_, Sept. 14, 1861.]

[Footnote 334: To be discussed fully in Chapter XVIII.]

[Footnote 335: Sept. 13, 1861. Dasent, _Delane_, II, p. 34.]

[Footnote 336: Darwin to Asa Gray, Sept. 17 and Dec. 11, 1861. Cited in _Rhodes_, III, p. 510.]

[Footnote 337: _Spectator_, Sept. 14, 1861.]

[Footnote 338: _Sat.u.r.day Review_, Sept. 14, 1861.]

[Footnote 339: _Spectator_, Sept. 21, 1861.]

[Footnote 340: _Daily News_, Sept. 17 and Oct. 10, 1861. The statement is in reply to an article in the _Times_ of October 9, arguing that even if the South were regarded as in the wrong, they had ten millions, a fact that was conclusive.]

[Footnote 341: _The Daily News Jubilee_. By Justin McCarthy and John E.

Robinson, pp. 69-77.]

[Footnote 342: _Spectator_, Sept. 28, 1861.]

[Footnote 343: _Sat.u.r.day Review_, Nov. 2, 1861.]

[Footnote 344: _Ibid._, Nov. 16. Spence's book rapidly went through many editions, was widely read, and furnished the argument for many a pro-Southern editorial. Spence himself soon became the intimate friend and adviser of Mason, the Confederate envoy to England.]

[Footnote 345: _Ibid._, Nov. 23, 1861. The inference from Bernard's la guage is perhaps permissible, but not inevitable.]

[Footnote 346: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 37. To his mother, Oct.

18, 1861.]

[Footnote 347: See _ante_, Ch. V.]

[Footnote 348: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.

"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 21 and Inclosure. Belligny was in fact the French agent at Charleston who acted with Bunch.]

[Footnote 349: F.O., Am., Vol. 768. No. 392. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 2, 1861. It is interesting to note that fourteen days were here required to transmit a letter that in ordinary times would have reached its destination in two days. Lyons states that he does not intend to inform Mercier of Russell's attempted recall of instructions.]