Great Britain and the American Civil War Part 25

[Footnote 560: Mason, _Mason_, pp. 257-8, Jan. 30, 1862.]

[Footnote 561: Mason Papers. Feb. 5, 1862.]

[Footnote 562: Mann sent this "confidential memorandum" to Jefferson Davis, Feb. 1, 1862 (Richardson, II, 160). There is no indication of how he obtained it. It was a fake pure and simple. To his astonishment Slidell soon learned from Thouvenel that France knew nothing of such a memorandum. It was probably sold to Mann by some enterprising "Southern friend" in need of money.]

[Footnote 563: Mason, _Mason_, p. 258. Mason to Hunter, Feb. 7, 1862.]

[Footnote 564: _Ibid._, pp. 260-62. Mason's despatch No. 4. Feb. 22, 1862. (This despatch is not given by Richardson.) Slidell was more warmly received by Thouvenel. He followed the same line of argument and apparently made a favourable impression. Cowley reported Thouvenel, after the interview, as expressing himself as "hoping that in two or three months matters would have reached such a crisis in America that both parties would be willing to accept a Mediation...."

(F.O., France., Vol. 1432. No. 132. Confidential. Cowley to Russell, Feb. 10, 1862.)]

[Footnote 565: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Feb. 13, 1862. This was that James Spence, author of _The American Union_, a work strongly espousing the Southern cause. This book was not only widely read in England but portions of it were translated into other languages for use on the Continent. Spence was a manufacturer and trader and also operated in the Liverpool Cotton Exchange. He made a strong impression on Mason, was early active in planning and administering Southern cotton loans in England, and was in constant touch with Mason. By Slidell he was much less favourably regarded and the impression created by his frequent letters to Mason is that of a man of second-rate calibre elated by the prominent part he seemed to be playing in what he took to be the birth of a new State.]

[Footnote 566: _Ibid._, Spence to Mason, Feb. 20, 1862.]

[Footnote 567: Mason, _Mason p_. 258.]

[Footnote 568: Slidell in France at first took the tack of urging that Continental interests and British interests in the blockade were "directly antagonistic," basing his argument on England's forward look as a sea power (Slidell to Hunter, Feb. 26, 1862. Richardson, II, p. 186).]

[Footnote 569: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Papers relating to the Blockade."]

[Footnote 570: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, pp. 1158-1230, and pp.

1233-43.]

[Footnote 571: Mason's authenticated statistics, unfortunately for his cause, only came down to Oct. 31, 1861, a fact which might imply that after that date the blockade was rapidly becoming effective and which certainly did indicate that it was at least sufficiently effective to prevent regular and frequent communications between the government at Richmond and its agents abroad. Did Russell have this in mind when he promptly incorporated Mason's figures in the papers presented to Parliament? These figures showed that according to reports from four Southern ports, sixty vessels had entered and cleared between April 29 and October 31, 1861; unauthenticated statistics extending to the date December 31, presented by Mason of vessels arrived at and departing from Cuban ports showed forty-eight vessels, each way engaged in blockade running. Seven of these were listed as "captured." Those reaching Cuba were described as twenty-six British, 14 Confederate, 3 Spanish, 3 American and 2 Mexican, but in none of these statistics were the names of the vessels given, for obvious reasons, in the printed paper though apparently included in the list submitted by Mason. These figures did in fact but reveal a situation existing even after 1861. The American blockading fleets had to be created from all sorts of available material and were slow in getting under way. Regular s.h.i.+ps of the old Navy could not enforce it being too few in number, and also, at first, directing their efforts to the capture of sh.o.r.e positions which would render a large blockading squadron unnecessary. This proved an abortive effort and it was not until 1862 that the development of a large fleet of blockaders was seriously undertaken. (See _Fox, Confid. Corresp._, I, pp. 110, 115, 119 and especially 122, which, May 31, 1862, pays tribute to the energy with which the South for "thirteen long months" had defended its important port sh.o.r.e lines.) If Gregory had been able to quote a report by Bunch from Charleston of April 5, 1862, he would have had a strong argument. "The blockade runners are doing a great business.... Everything is brought in in abundance. Not a day pa.s.ses without an arrival or a departure. The Richmond Government sent about a month ago an order to Na.s.sau for Medicines, Quinine, etc. It went from Na.s.sau to New York, was executed there, came back to Na.s.sau, thence here, and was on its way to Richmond in 21 days from the date of the order. Nearly all the trade is under the British flag. The vessels are all changed in Na.s.sau and Havana. Pa.s.sengers come and go freely and no one seems to think that there is the slightest risk--which, indeed, there is not." (Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, April 5, 1862).]

[Footnote 572: I have nowhere found any such statement by Seward.

Gregory's reference is to a note from Seward to Lyons of May 27, 1861, printed in the Blockade Papers. This merely holds that temporary absence of blockading s.h.i.+ps does not impair the blockade nor render "necessary a new notice of its existence."]

[Footnote 573: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 119-20. Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., March 15, 1862.]

[Footnote 574: This "three months" statement returned to plague Russell later, British merchants complaining that upon it they had based plans in the belief that the Government had something definite in view.

Spence's reference to this "three months" idea, after his conferences in London, would indicate that Russell was merely indulging in a generalization due to the expected financial collapse of the North. The Russian Amba.s.sador in London gave a different interpretation. He wrote that the Northern victories in the West had caused Great Britain to think the time near when the "border states," now tied to the Union by these victories, would lead in a pacification on lines of separation from the Southern slave states. "It is in this sense, and no other that Russell's 'three months' speech in the Lords is to be taken." (Brunow to F.O., March 3-15, 1862. No. 33). Brunow does not so state, but his despatch sounds as if this were the result of a talk with Russell. If so, it would indicate an attempt to interpret Lincoln's "border state policy" in a sense that would appear reasonable in the British view that there could be no real hope at Was.h.i.+ngton of restoring the Union.]

[Footnote 575: Mason, _Mason_, p. 264. Despatch No. 6. March 11, 1862.]

[Footnote 576: _Ibid._, p. 266. Fort Henry was taken by Grant on February 6 and Fort Donelson on the 15th. The capture of these two places gave an opening for the advance of the Western army southwards into Tennessee and Mississippi.]

[Footnote 577: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, March 18, 1862.]

[Footnote 578: Richardson, II, 207. Slidell to Hunter, March 26, 1862.]

[Footnote 579: Mason Papers.]

CHAPTER IX

ENTER MR. LINDSAY

The friendly atmosphere created by the lifting of the threatening _Trent_ episode, appears to have made Secretary Seward believe that the moment was opportune for a renewal of pressure on Great Britain and France for the recall of their Proclamations of Neutrality. Seizing upon the victories of Grant at Forts Henry and Donelson, he wrote to Adams on February 28 explaining that as a result the United States, now having access to the interior districts of Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas, "had determined to permit the restoration of trade upon our inland ways and waters" under certain limitations, and that if this experiment succeeded similar measures would be applied "to the country on the sea-coast, which would be some alleviation of the rigour of the blockade." He added that these "concessions" to foreign nations would "go much further and faster" if those nations would withdraw their "belligerent privileges heretofore so unnecessarily conceded, as we conceive, to the insurgents[580]." This was large talk for a relatively unchanged military situation. Grant had as yet but forced open the door in the West and was still far from having "access to the interior districts" of the states named. Lyons, being shown a copy of this despatch to Adams, commented to Russell that while it might be said the position and the spirit of the Northern armies were greatly improved and notable successes probable, it could not be maintained that hostilities were "so near their conclusion or are carried on upon so small a scale as to disqualify either party for the t.i.tle of Belligerents[581]." Lyons and Mercier were agreed that this was no time for the withdrawal of belligerent rights to the South, and when the hint was received that the purpose of making such a request was in Seward's mind, the news quite took Thouvenel's breath away[582]. As yet, however, Seward did no more than hint and Adams was quick to advise that the moment had not yet come "when such a proceeding might seem to me likely to be of use[583]."

Just at this time Seward was engaged in forwarding a measure no doubt intended to secure British anti-slavery sympathy for the North, yet also truly indicative of a Northern temper toward the South and its "domestic inst.i.tution." This was the negotiation of a Slave-Trade treaty with Great Britain, by which America joined, at last, the nations agreeing to unite their efforts in suppression of the African Slave Trade. The treaty was signed by Seward and Lyons at Was.h.i.+ngton on April 7. On the next day Seward wrote to Adams that had such a treaty been ratified "in 1808, there would now have been no sedition here, and no disagreement between the United States and foreign nations[584]," a melancholy reflection intended to suggest that the South alone had been responsible for the long delay of American partic.i.p.ation in a world humanitarian movement. But the real purpose of the treaty, Lyons thought, was "to save the credit of the President with the Party which elected him if he should make concessions to the South, with a view of reconstructing the Union[585]"--an erroneous view evincing a misconception of the intensity of both Northern and Southern feeling if regarded from our present knowledge, but a view natural enough to the foreign observer at the moment. Lyons, in this letter, correctly stated the rising determination of the North to restore the Union, but underestimated the rapid growth of an equal determination against a restoration with slavery. The real motive for Seward's eagerness to sign the Slave Trade treaty was the thought of its influence on foreign, not domestic, affairs. Lyons, being confident that Russell would approve, had taken "the risk of going a little faster" than his instructions had indicated[586].

In this same letter Lyons dwelt upon the Northern elation over recent military successes. The campaign in the West had been followed in the East by a great effort under McClellan to advance on Richmond up the peninsula of the James river and using Chesapeake Bay as a means of water transportation and supply. This campaign had been threatened by the appearance of the iron-clad ram _Merrimac_ and her attack on the wooden naval vessels operating in support of McClellan, but on March 9 the _Monitor_, a slow-moving floating iron-clad fortress, drove the _Merrimac_ from her helpless prey, and removed the Southern threat to McClellan's communications. More than any other one battle of the Civil War the duel between the _Merrimac_ and the _Monitor_ struck the imagination of the British people, and justly so because of its significance in relation to the power of the British Navy. It "has been the main talk of the town," wrote Adams, "ever since the news came, in Parliament, in the clubs, in the city, among the military and naval people. The impression is that it dates the commencement of a new era in warfare, and that Great Britain must consent to begin over again[587]."

The victory of the _Monitor_ was relatively unimportant in British eyes, but a fight between two completely armoured s.h.i.+ps, and especially the ease with which the _Merrimac_ had vanquished wooden s.h.i.+ps on the day previous, were cause of anxious consideration for the future.

Russell was more concerned over the immediate lessons of the battle.

"Only think," he wrote, "of our position if in case of the Yankees turning upon us they should by means of iron s.h.i.+ps renew the triumphs they achieved in 1812-13 by means of superior size and weight of metal[588]."

This, however, was but early and hasty speculation, and while American ingenuity and experiment in naval warfare had, indeed, sounded the death-knell of wooden s.h.i.+ps of war, no great change in the character of navies was immediately possible. Moreover British s.h.i.+pbuilders could surely keep pace in iron-clad construction with America or any other nation. The success of the _Monitor_ was soon regarded by the British Government as important mainly as indicative of a new energy in the North promising further and more important successes on land. The Government hoped for such Northern success not because of any belief that these would go to the extent of forcing the South into submission, for they were still, and for a long time to come, obsessed with the conviction that Southern independence must ultimately be achieved. The idea was, rather, that the North, having vindicated its fighting ability and realizing that the South, even though losing battle after battle, was stubborn in the will to independence, would reach the conclusion that the game was not worth the price and would consent to separation.

Russell wrote in this vein to Lyons, even though he thought that the "morale of the Southern army seems to be ruined for the time[589]." He believed that the end of the war would be hastened by Northern victories, and he therefore rejoiced in them.

Of somewhat like opinion up to the end of March, 1862, Lyons, in April, began to doubt his previous a.n.a.lysis of Northern temper and to write warnings that the end was not near. Grant's hard-won victory in the West at s.h.i.+loh, April 6-7, the first great pitched battle of the war, called out such a flood of Northern expressions of determination to drive the war to the bitter end as to startle Lyons and cause him, in a remarkably clear letter of survey, to recast his opinions. He wrote:

"The general opinion is that the Campaign of this Spring will clear up most of the doubts as to the result of the War. If the Military successes of the North continue, the determination of the South, will (it is a.s.serted) be at last really put to the test. If notwithstanding great Military reverses, the loss of the Border States, and the occupation of the most important points on the Coast, the Southern men hold out, if they destroy as they threaten to do, their cotton, tobacco and all other property which cannot be removed and then retire into the interior with their families and slaves, the Northern Conquests may prove to be but barren. The climate may be a fatal enemy to the Federal Armies. The Northern people may be unable or unwilling to continue the enormous expenditure. They may prefer Separation to protracting the War indefinitely. I confess, however, that I fear that a protraction of the War during another year or longer, is a not less probable result of the present posture of affairs, than either the immediate subjugation of the South or the immediate recognition of its independence[590]."

This itemization of Southern methods of resistance was in line with Confederate threats at a moment when the sky looked black. There was indeed much Southern talk of "retiring" into a hypothetical defensible interior which impressed Englishmen, but had no foundation in geographical fact. Meanwhile British attention was eagerly fixed on the Northern advance, and it was at least generally hoped that the projected attack on New Orleans and McClellan's advance up the peninsula toward Richmond would bring to a more definite status the conflict in America. Extreme Southern sympathizers scouted the possibility of any conclusive Northern success, ignoring, because ignorant, the importance of Grant's western campaign. They "were quite struck aback" by the news of the capture of New Orleans, April 25. "It took them three days to make up their minds to believe it[591]," but even the capture of this the most important commercial city of the South was not regarded as of great importance in view of the eastern effort toward Richmond.

News of the operations in the peninsula was as slow in reaching England as was McClellan's slow and cautious advance. It was during this advance and previous to the capture of New Orleans that two remarkable adventures toward a solution in America were made, apparently wholly on individual initiative, by a Frenchman in America and an Englishman in France. Mercier at Was.h.i.+ngton and Lindsay at Paris conceived, quite independently, that the time had come for projects of foreign mediation.

French opinion, like that expressed in England, appears to have been that the Northern successes in the spring of 1862 might result in such a rehabilitation of Northern self-esteem that suggestions of now recognizing the _facts_ of the situation and acknowledging the independence of the South would not be unfavourably received. In this sense Thouvenel wrote to Mercier, privately, on March 13, but was careful to state that the word "mediation" ought not to be uttered. His letter dilated, also, on French manufacturing difficulties at home due to the lack of cotton[592]. This was in no way an instruction to Mercier, but the ideas expressed were broached by him in a conversation with Seward, only to be met with such positive a.s.sertions of intention and ability soon to recover the South as somewhat to stagger the French Minister. He remarked, according to his report to Thouvenel, that he wished it were possible to visit Richmond and a.s.sure himself that there also they recognized the truth of Seward's statements, upon which the latter at once offered to further such a trip. Mercier a.s.serted to Thouvenel that he was taken by surprise, having foreseen no such eager acquiescence in a suggestion made _without previous thought_, but that on consideration he returned to Seward and accepted the proposal, outlining the substance of what he intended to say at Richmond. He should there make clear that the anxiety of France was above all directed toward peace as essential to French commercial interests; that France had always regarded the separation of North and South with regret; that the North was evidently determined in its will to restore the Union; and, in repet.i.tion, that France wished to aid in any way possible the early cessation of war. Seward, wrote Mercier, told him to add that he, personally, would welcome "the presence in the Senate" of any persons whom the South wished to elect[593].

Mercier, writes Bancroft, "from the first had been an impatient sympathizer with the Confederacy, and he was quite devoid of the balance and good judgment that characterized Lord Lyons." "Quite unnecessarily, Seward helped him to make the trip[594]." A circ.u.mstance apparently not known to Bancroft was Mercier's consultation with Lyons, before departure, in which were revealed an initiative of the adventure, and a proposed representation to the authorities in Richmond materially different from the report made by Mercier to Thouvenel. These merit expanded treatment as new light on a curious episode and especially as revealing the British policy of the moment, represented in the person of the British Minister in Was.h.i.+ngton[595].

On April 10 Mercier came to Lyons, told him that he was about to set out for Richmond and that he had "been for some little time thinking of making this journey." He told of _making the suggestion to Seward_, and that this "rather to his surprise" had been "eagerly" taken up.

"Monsieur Mercier observed that the object of vital importance to France, and to England also, as he supposed, was to put an end, as soon as possible, to the blockade, and generally to a state of things which caused so grievous an interruption of the trade between Europe and this country. It was, he said, possible that he might hasten the attainment of this object by conferring personally with the Secession leaders. He should frankly tell them that to all appearances their cause was desperate; that their Armies were beaten in all quarters; and that the time had arrived when they ought to come to some arrangement, which would put an end to a state of affairs ruinous to themselves and intolerable to Europe. It was useless to expect any countenance from the European Powers. Those Powers could but act on their avowed principles. They would recognize any people which established its independence, but they could not encourage the prolongation of a fruitless struggle.

"Monsieur Mercier thought that if the Confederates were very much discouraged by their recent reverses, such language from the Minister of a great European Power might be a knock-down blow ('Coup d'a.s.sommoir' was the expression he used) to them.

It might induce them to come to terms with the North. At all events it might lead to an Armistice, under which trade might be immediately resumed. He had (he told me) mentioned to Mr.

Seward his notion of using this language, and had added that of course as a Minister accredited to the United States, and visiting Richmond with the consent of the United States Government, he could not speak to the Southern men of any other terms for ending the War than a return to the Union.

"Monsieur Mercier proceeded to say that Mr. Seward entirely approved of the language he thus proposed to hold, and had authorized him to say to the Southern leaders, not of course from the United States Government, but from him Mr. Seward, personally, that they had no spirit of vengeance to apprehend, that they would be cordially welcomed back to their Seats in the Senate, and to their due share of political influence. Mr. Seward added that he had not said so much to any other person, but that he would tell Monsieur Mercier that he was willing to risk his own political station and reputation in pursuing a conciliatory course towards the South, that he was ready to make this his policy and to stand or fall by it."

This was certainly sufficiently strong language to have pleased the American Secretary of State, and if actually used at Richmond to have const.i.tuted Mercier a valuable Northern agent. It cannot be regarded as at all in harmony with Mercier's previous opinions, nor as expressive of Thouvenel's views. Lyons was careful to refrain from much comment on the matter of Mercier's proposed representations at Richmond. He was more concerned that the trip was to be made at all; was in fact much opposed to it, fearing that it would appear like a break in that unity of French-British att.i.tude which was so desirable. Nor was he without suspicion of a hidden French purpose to secure some special and separate advantages in the way of prospective commercial relations with the South. Mercier told Lyons that he knew he could not ask Lyons to accompany him because of American "extreme susceptibility" to any interference by Great Britain, but he thought of taking Stoeckl, the Russian Minister, and that Stoeckl was "pleased with the idea." Lyons frankly replied that he was glad to be relieved of the necessity of declining to go and was sorry Mercier was determined to proceed since this certainly looked like a break in "joint policy," and he objected positively on the same ground to Stoeckl's going[596]. Mercier yielded the latter point, but argued that by informing Seward of his consultation with Lyons, which he proposed doing, the former objection would be obviated. Finding that Mercier "was bent on going," Lyons thought it best not to object too much and confined his efforts to driving home the idea that no opening should be given for a "separate agreement" with the South.

"I therefore entered with him into the details of his plans, and made some suggestions as to his language and conduct. I said that one delusion which he might find it desirable to remove from the minds of men in the South, was that it would be possible to inveigle France or any other great European Power into an exclusive Alliance with them. I had reason to believe that some of them imagine that this might be effected by an offer of great commercial privileges to one Power, to the exclusion of others. I hardly supposed that Mr. Jefferson Davis himself, or men of his stamp could entertain so foolish a notion, but still it might be well to eradicate it from any mind in which it had found place[597]."

Lyons saw Mercier "two or three times" between the tenth and fourteenth and on the twelfth spoke to Seward about the trip, "without saying anything to lead him to suppose that I had any objection to it." This was intended to preserve the impression of close harmony with France, and Lyons wrote, "I consider that the result of my communications with M. Mercier ent.i.tles him to say that he makes his journey to Richmond with my acquiescence[598]." Nevertheless he both believed, and declared to Mercier, that the views expressed on Southern weakening of determination were wholly erroneous, and that neither North nor South was ready for any efforts, still less mediation, looking toward peace.

He prophesied failure of Mercier's avowed hopes. His prophecy proved well founded. On April 28 Lyons reported Mercier's account to him of the results of the journey. Mercier returned to Was.h.i.+ngton on April 24, reported at once to Seward the results of his trip, and on the same day called on Lyons. Having conversed with Benjamin, the new Confederate Secretary of State, he was now wholly convinced of the settled determination of the South to maintain its independence, even under extreme reverses. Upon enquiry by Lyons whether the South expected European a.s.sistance, Mercier "replied that the Confederate leaders professed to have abandoned all hope of succour from Europe," and that confident in their own power they "desired no aid." Cautiously adverting to his suspicion that Mercier's trip might have had in view French commercial advantage, Lyons asked whether France had received any proposals of benefit in return for recognition. Mercier answered with a simple negative. He then further developed the interview with Benjamin[599].

"He said that he had spoken while at Richmond as a friend of the Union, and a friend of all parties, but that the particular language which he had intended to hold was entirely inapplicable to the state of mind in which he found the Confederates one and all. It was idle to tell them that they were worsted on all sides; that the time was come for making terms with the North. What he had said to them about the recognition of their Independence was that the princ.i.p.al inducement to France to recognize it would be a hope that her doing so would have a great moral effect towards hastening peace; that at this moment it would certainly not have any such effect; that it would embroil France with the United States, and that would be all[600]."

Thus none of the strong representations intended to be made by Mercier to convince the South of the uselessness of further resistance had, in fact, been made. In his report to Thouvenel, Mercier stated that he had approached Benjamin with the simple declaration "that the purpose of my journey was merely to a.s.sure myself, for myself, of the true condition of things; and that I called to beg him to aid me in attaining it."

Since the proposed strong representations were not reported to Thouvenel, either, in the explanation given of the initiation of the trip, the doubt must be entertained that Mercier ever intended to make them. They bear the appearance of arguments to Seward--and in some degree also to Lyons--made to secure acquiescence in his plan. The report to Thouvenel omits also any reference to expressions, as narrated to Lyons, about recognition of the Confederacy, or a "princ.i.p.al inducement" thereto[601]. Mercier now declared to Lyons his own views on recognition:

"He was himself more than ever convinced that the restoration of the old Union was impossible. He believed that, if the Powers of Europe exercised no influence, the War would last for years. He conceived that the Independence of the South must be recognized sooner or later; and in his opinion the Governments of Europe should be on the watch for a favourable opportunity of doing this in such a manner as to end the War.

The present opportunity would however, he thought, be particularly unfavourable."