Great Britain and the American Civil War Part 27

Motions on recognition and on the blockade had been tried and had failed. Now the cry was to be "peaceful mediation" to put an end to a terrible war. Friends of the South were not united in this adventure.

Spence advised Lindsay to postpone it, but the latter seemed determined to make the effort[636]. Probably he was still smarting under his reverse of April. Possibly also he was aware of a sudden sharp personal clash between Palmerston and Adams that might not be without influence on governmental att.i.tude--perhaps might even indicate a governmental purpose to alter its policy.

This clash was caused by a personal letter written by Palmerston to Adams on the publication in the _Times_ of General Butler's famous order in New Orleans authorizing Federal soldiers to treat as "women of the town" those women who publicly insulted Northern troops. The British press indulged in an ecstasy of vicious writing about this order similar to that on the Northern "barbarity" of the Stone Fleet episode.

Palmerston's letters to Adams and the replies received need no further notice here, since they did not in fact affect British policy, than to explain that Palmerston wrote in extreme anger, apparently, and with great violence of language, and that Adams replied with equal anger, but in very dignified if irritating terms[637]. In British opinion Butler's order was an incitement to his soldiers to commit atrocities; Americans understood it as merely an authorization to return insult for insult. In fact the order promptly put a stop to attacks on Northern soldiers, whether by act or word, and all disorder ceased. Palmerston was quick to accept the British view, writing to Adams, "it is difficult if not impossible to express adequately the disgust which must be excited in the mind of every honourable man by the general order of General Butler...." "If the Federal government chooses to be served by men capable of such revolting outrages, they must submit to abide by the deserved opinion which mankind will form of their conduct[638]." This extraordinary letter was written on June 11. Adams was both angry and perturbed, since he thought the letter might indicate an intention to change British policy and that Palmerston was but laying the ground for some "vigorous" utterance in Parliament, after his wont when striking out on a new line. He was further confirmed in this view by an editorial in the _Times_ on June 12, hinting at a coming mediation, and by news from France that Persigny was on his way to London to arrange such a step. But however much personally aggrieved, Adams was cool as a diplomat. His first step was to write a brief note to Palmerston enquiring whether he was to consider the letter as addressed to him "officially ... or purely as a private expression of sentiment between gentlemen[639]."

There is no evidence that Palmerston and Russell were contemplating a change of policy--rather the reverse. But it does appear that Palmerston wished to be able to state in Parliament that he had taken Adams to task for Butler's order, so that he might meet an enquiry already placed on the question paper as to the Ministry's intentions in the matter. This question was due for the sitting of June 13, and on that day Russell wrote to Palmerston that he should call Butler's order "brutal" and that Palmerston might use the term "infamous" if preferred, adding, "I do not see why we should not represent in a friendly way that the usages of war do not sanction such conduct[640]." This was very different from the tone used by Palmerston. His letter was certainly no "friendly way."

Again on the same day Russell wrote to Palmerston:

"Adams has been here in a dreadful state about the letter you have written him about Butler.

I declined to give him any opinion and asked him to do nothing more till I had seen or written to you.

What you say of Butler is true enough, tho' he denies your interpretation of the order.

But it is not clear that the President approves of the order, and I think if you could add something to the effect that you respect the Government of President Lincoln, and do not wish to impute to them the fault of Butler it might soothe him.

If you could withdraw the letter altogether it would be the best. But this you may not like to do[641]."

It is apparent that Russell did not approve of Palmerston's move against Adams nor of any "vigorous" language in Parliament, and as to the last, he had his way, for the Government, while disapproving Butler's order, was decidedly mild in comment. As to the letter, Adams, the suspicion proving unfounded that an immediate change of policy was intended, returned to the attack as a matter of personal prestige. It was not until June 15 that Palmerston replied to Adams and then in far different language seeking to smooth the Minister's ruffled feathers, yet making no apology and not answering Adams' question. Adams promptly responded with vigour, June 16, again asking his question as to the letter being official or personal, and characterizing Palmerston's previous a.s.sertions as "offensive imputations." He also again approached Russell, who stated that he too had written to Palmerston about his letter, but had received no reply, and he acknowledged that Palmerston's proceeding was "altogether irregular[642]." In the end Palmerston was brought, June 19, to write a long and somewhat rambling reply to Adams, in effect still evading the question put him, though acknowledging that the "Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is the regular official organ for communications...." In conclusion he expressed gratification that reports from Lord Lyons showed Butler's authority at New Orleans had been curtailed by Lincoln. The next day Adams answered interpreting Palmerston as withdrawing his "imputations" but stating plainly that he would not again submit "to entertain any similar correspondence[643]."

Adams had been cautious in pus.h.i.+ng for an answer until he knew there was to be no change in British policy. Indeed Palmerston's whole move may even have been intended to ease the pressure for a change in that policy. On the very day of Adams' first talk with Russell, friends of the South thought the _Times_ editorial indicated "that some movement is to be made at last, and I doubt not we are to thank the Emperor for it[644]." But on this day also Russell was advising Palmerston to state in Parliament that "We have not received at present any proposal from France to offer mediation and no intention at present exists to offer it on our part[645]." This was the exact language used by Palmerston in reply to Hopwood[646]. Mason again saw his hopes dwindling, but was a.s.sured by Lindsay that all was not yet lost, and that he would "still hold his motion under consideration[647]." Lindsay, according to his own account, had talked very large in a letter to Russell, but knew privately, and so informed Mason, that the Commons would not vote for his motion if opposed by the Government, and so intended to postpone it[648]. The proposed motion was now one for recognition instead of mediation, a temporary change of plan due to Palmerston's answer to Hopwood on June 13. But whatever the terms of the motion favourable to the South, it was evident the Government did not wish discussion at the moment, and hesitancy came over pro-Southern friends. Slidell, in despair, declared that for his part he intended, no matter with what prospect of success, to _demand_ recognition from France[649]. This alarmed Mason's English advisers, and he wrote at once strongly urging against such a step, for if the demand were presented and refused there would be no recourse but to depart for home[650]. He thought Lindsay's motion dying away for on consultation with "different parties, including Disraeli, Seymour Fitzgerald and Roebuck," it "has been so far reduced and diluted ... as to make it only expressive of the opinion of the House that the present posture of affairs in America made the question of the recognition of the Confederate States worth the serious consideration of the Government. It was so modified to prevent the Ministry making an issue upon it...." There was "no a.s.surance that it would be sustained ... even in that form." Lindsay had determined to postpone his motion "for a fortnight, so that all expectation from this quarter for the present is dished, and we must wait for 'King Cotton' to turn the screw still further[651]." On June, 20 Lindsay gave this notice of postponement, and no parliamentary comment was made[652]. It was a moment of extreme depression for the Confederate agents in Europe.

Slidell, yielding to Mason's pleas, gave up his idea of demanding recognition and wrote:

"The position of our representatives in Europe is painful and almost humiliating; it might be tolerated if they could be consoled by the reflection that their presence was in any way advantageous to their cause but I am disposed to believe that we would have done better to withdraw after our first interview with Russell and Thouvenel[653]."

[Ill.u.s.tration: PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH (_From a photograph by Elliott & Fry, Ltd._)]

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 580: _U.S. Messages and Doc.u.ments, 1862-63_, Pt. I, p. 41.]

[Footnote 581: F.O., Am., Vol. 826. Nos. 154 and 155. March 3, 1862.]

[Footnote 582: F.O., France, Vol. 1435. No. 362. Cowley to Russell, March 18, 1862.]

[Footnote 583: _U.S. Messages and Doc.u.ments, 1862-63_, Pt. I, p. 54.

Adams to Seward, March 27, 1862.]

[Footnote 584: _Ibid._, p. 65.]

[Footnote 585: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. April 8, 1862.]

[Footnote 586: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 587: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 123. To his son, April 4, 1862.]

[Footnote 588: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, March 31, 1862.]

[Footnote 589: Lyons Papers. March 22, 1862.]

[Footnote 590: F.O., Am., Vol. 827. No. 244. Extract. Lyons to Russell, April 11, 1802.]

[Footnote 591: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 143. Adams to his son, May 16, 1862.]

[Footnote 592: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, p. 247.]

[Footnote 593: _Doc.u.ments Diplomatiques_, 1862, pp. 120-122. Mercicr to Thouvenel, April 13, 1862. A translation of this despatch was printed, with some minor inaccuracies, in the New York _Tribune_, Feb. 5, 1863, and of Mercier's report, April 28, on his return from Richmond, on Feb.

9, under the caption "The Yellow Book." It is interesting that the concluding paragraphs of this report of April 28, as printed in the _Tribune_, are not given in the printed volume of _Doc.u.ments Diplomatiques_, 1862. These refer to difficulties about cotton and to certain pledges given by Seward as to cessation of illegal interferences with French vessels. How the _Tribune_ secured these paragraphs, if authentic, is not clear. The whole purpose of the publication was an attack by Horace Greeley, editor, on Seward in an effort to cause his removal from the Cabinet. See Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 371-2.]

[Footnote 594: Bancroft, _Seward_. II, 298-99. Bancroft's account is based on the _Tribune_ translation and on Seward's own comments to Weed and Bigelow. _Ibid._, 371-72.]

[Footnote 595: Newton. _Lord Lyons_, I, pp. 82-85, gives an account of the initiation of Mercier's trip and prints Lyons' private letter to Russell of April 25, describing the results, but does not bring out sufficiently Lyons' objections and misgivings. Newton thinks that Mercier "whether instructed from home or not ... after the manner of French diplomatists of the period ... was probably unable to resist the temptation of trying to effect a striking _coup_...."]

[Footnote 596: Stoeckl's report does not agree with Mercier's statement.

He wrote that he had been asked to accompany Mercier but had refused and reported a conversation with Seward in which the latter declared the time had not yet come for mediation, that in any case France would not be accepted in that role, and that if ever mediation should become acceptable, Russia would be asked to act (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., April 23-May 5, 1862. No. 927).]

[Footnote 597: F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 250. Confidential. Lyons to Russell, April 14, 1862.]

[Footnote 598: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 599: This suspicion was a natural one but that it was unfounded is indicated by Benjamin's report to Slidell of Mercier's visit, describing the language used in almost exactly the same terms that Lyons reported to Russell. That little importance was attached by Benjamin to Mercier's visit is also indicated by the fact that he did not write to Slidell about it until July. Richardson, II, 260. Benjamin to Slidell, July 19, 1862.]

[Footnote 600: F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 284. Confidential. Lyons to Russell, April 24, 1862.]

[Footnote 601: _Doc.u.ments Diplomatiques, 1862_, pp. 122-124.]

[Footnote 602: F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 284. Confidential. Lyons to Russell, April 28, 1862.]

[Footnote 603: F.O., Am., Vol. 829. No. 315. Confidential. Lyons to Russell, May 9, 1862.]

[Footnote 604: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, May 10, 1862.]

[Footnote 605: F.O., France, Vol. 1427. No. 544. Cowley to Russell, April 28, 1862.]

[Footnote 606: _Ibid._, Vol. 1438. No. 563. To Russell. Mercier's conduct appeared to Cowley as "want of courtesy" and "tardy confidence"

to Lyons. _Ibid._, No. 566. May 1, 1862. To Russell.]

[Footnote 607: _Ibid._, No. 574. Cowley to Russell, May 2, 1862.]

[Footnote 608: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, p. 299.]

[Footnote 609: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, May 3, 14 and 16, 1862.

Mason to Slidell, May 5, 14 and 16, 1862.]

[Footnote 610: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, May 16, 1862. Billault was a member of the French Ministry, but without portfolio.]

[Footnote 611: Several accounts have been given of this episode. The two known to me treating it at greatest length are (1) Callahan, _Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy_ and (2) Sears, _A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III_. Am. Hist. Rev., Jan., 1921. Both writers drew their information wholly from Confederate doc.u.ments, using, especially, the private correspondence of Mason and Slidell, and neither treats the matter from the English view point. I have therefore based my account on the unused letters of British officials, citing other materials only where they offer a side light. The princ.i.p.al new sources are Cowley's private and official letters to Russell.]