Great Britain and the American Civil War Part 49

[Footnote 1125: State Department, Eng., Vol. 84, No. 557. Adams to Seward, Dec. 17, 1863.]

[Footnote 1126: Hotze Correspondence. McHenry to Hotze, Dec. 1, 1863.]

[Footnote 1127: McHenry, _The Cotton Trade_, London, 1863. The preface in the form of a long letter to W.H. Gregory is dated August 31, 1863.

For a comprehensive note on McHenry see C.F. Adams in Ma.s.s. Hist. Soc.

_Proceedings_, March, 1914, Vol. XLVII, 279 _seq_.]

[Footnote 1128: Mason Papers.]

CHAPTER XV

THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE a.s.sOCIATION

Northern friends in England were early active in organizing public meetings and after the second emanc.i.p.ation proclamation of January 1, 1863, these became both numerous and notable. Southern friends, confident in the ultimate success of the Confederacy and equally confident that they had with them the great bulk of upper-cla.s.s opinion in England, at first thought it unnecessary to be active in public expressions aside from such as were made through the newspapers. Up to November, 1862, _The Index_ records no Southern public meeting. But by the summer of 1863, the indefatigable Spence had come to the conclusion that something must be done to offset the efforts of Bright and others, especially in the manufacturing districts where a strong Northern sympathy had been created. On June 16, he wrote to Mason that on his initiative a Southern Club had been organized in Manchester and that others were now forming in Oldham, Blackburn and Stockport. In Manchester the Club members had "smashed up the last Abolitionist meeting in the Free Trade Hall":

"These parties are not the rich spinners but young men of energy with a taste for agitation but little money. It appears to my judgment that it would be wise not to stint money in aiding this effort to expose cant and diffuse the truth. Manchester is naturally the centre of such a move and you will see there are here the germs of important work--but they need to be tended and fostered. I have supplied a good deal of money individually but I see room for the use of 30 or 40 a month or more[1129]."

The appeal for funds (though Spence wrote that he would advance the required amounts on the chance of reimburs.e.m.e.nt from the Confederate secret service fund) is interesting in comparison with the contributions willingly made by Bright's friends. "Young men of energy with a taste for agitation but little money" reveals a source of support somewhat dubious in persistent zeal and requiring more than a heavy list of patrons' names to keep up a public interest. Nevertheless, Spence succeeded, for a short time, in arousing a show of energy. November 24, 1863, Mason wrote to Mann that measures were "in progress and in course of execution" to hold public meetings, memorialize Parliament, and form an a.s.sociation for the promotion of Southern independence "under the auspices of such men as the Marquis of Lothian, Lord Robert Cecil, M.P., Lord Wharncliffe, Lord Eustace Cecil, Messrs. Haliburton, Lindsay, Peac.o.c.ke, Van St.i.ttart, M.P., Beresford Hope, Robert Bourke, and others[1130]...." A fortnight later, Spence reported his efforts and postulated that in them, leading to European intervention, lay the princ.i.p.al, if not the only hope, of Southern independence--a view never _publicly_ acknowledged by any devoted friend of the South:

"The news is gloomy--very, and I really do not see how the war is to be worked out to success without the action of Europe. That is stopped by our Government but there is a power that will move the latter, if it can only be stirred up, and that, of course, is public opinion. I had a most agreeable and successful visit to Glasgow upon a requisition signed by the citizens. The enemy placarded the walls and brought all their forces to the meeting, in which out of 4,000 I think they were fully 1,000 strong, but we beat them completely, carrying a resolution which embraced a memorial to Lord Palmerston. We have now carried six public meetings, Sheffield, Oldham, Stockport, Preston, Ashton, Glasgow. We have three to come off now ready, Burnley, Bury, Macclesfield, and others in preparation. My plan is to work up through the secondary towns to the chief ones and take the latter, Liverpool, Manchester, London, etc., as we come upon the a.s.sembling of Parliament.... By dint of perseverance I think we shall succeed. The problem is simply to convert latent into active sympathy. There is ample power on our side to move the Cabinet--divided as it is, if we can only arouse that power. At any rate the object is worth the effort[1131]."

In the month of November, _The Index_ began to report these meetings. In nearly all, Northern partisans were present, attempted to heckle the speakers, and usually presented amendments to the address which were voted down. Spence was given great credit for his energy, being called "indefatigable":

"The commencement of the session will see Parliament flooded with pet.i.tions from every town and from every mill throughout the North. A loud protest will arise against the _faineant_ policy which declines to interfere while men of English blood are uselessly murdering each other by thousands, and while England's most important manufacture is thereby ruined.... It remains to be seen whether the voice of the North will have any effect upon the policy of the Government[1132]."

By "the North" was meant the manufacturing districts and an explanation was made of the difficulty of similar efforts in London because it was really a "congeries of cities," with no such solidarity of interests as characterized "the North[1133]." Without London, however, the movement lacked driving force and it was determined to create there an a.s.sociation which should become the main-spring of further activities.

Spence, Beresford Hope, and Lord Eustace Cecil were made a committee to draft a plan and preliminary address. Funds were now forthcoming from the big blockade-running firms

"Some time ago I saw friend Collie, who had made a terrific sum of money, and told him he must come out for the cause in proportion thereto. To this he responded like a brick, I was near saying, but I mean Briton--by offering at once to devote a percentage of cotton out of each steamer that runs the blockade, to the good of the cause. He has given me at once 500 on account of this--which I got to-day in a cheque and have sent on to Lord Eustace Cecil, our treasurer. Thus, you see, we are fairly afloat there[1134]."

Yet Spence was fighting against fear that all this agitation was too late:

"Nevertheless it is not to be disguised that the evil tidings make uphill work of it--very. Public opinion has quite veered round to the belief that the South will be exhausted. The _Times_ correspondent's letters do great harm--more especially Gallenga's--who replaced Chas. Mackay at New York.

I have, however, taken a berth for Mackay by Sat.u.r.day's boat, so he will soon be out again and he is dead for our side[1135]."

Again Spence a.s.serted the one great hope to be in European intervention:

"I am now clear in my own mind that unless we get Europe to move--or some improbable convulsion occur in the North--the end will be a sad one. It seems to me therefore, impossible that too strenuous an effort can be made to move our Government and I cannot understand the Southerners who say: 'Oh, what can you make of it?' I have known a man brought back to life two hours after he seemed stone-dead--the efforts at first seemed hopeless, but in case of life or death what effort should be spared[1136]?"

The Manchester Southern Club was the most active of those organized by Spence and was the centre for operations in the manufacturing districts.

On December 15, a great gathering (as described by _The Index_) took place there with delegates from many of the near-by towns[1137]. Forster referred to this and other meetings as "spasmodic and convulsive efforts being made by Southern Clubs to cause England to interfere in American affairs[1138]," but the enthusiasm at Manchester was unquestioned and plans were on foot to bombard with pet.i.tions the Queen, Palmerston, Russell and others in authority, but more especially the members of Parliament as a body. These pet.i.tions were "in process of being signed in every town and almost in every cotton-mill throughout the district[1139]." It was high time for London, if it was desired that she should lead and _control_ these activities, to perfect her own Club.

"Next week," wrote Lindsay, on January 8, 1864, it would be formally launched under the name of "The Southern Independence a.s.sociation[1140]," and would be in working order before the rea.s.sembling of Parliament.

The organization of meetings by Spence and the formation of the Southern Independence a.s.sociation were attempts to do for the South what Bright and others had done earlier and so successfully for the North. Tardily the realization had come that public opinion, even though but slightly represented in Parliament, was yet a powerful weapon with which to influence the Government. Unenfranchised England now received from Southern friends a degree of attention hitherto withheld from it by those gentry who had been confident that the goodwill of the bulk of their own cla.s.s was sufficient support to the Southern cause. Early in the war one little Southern society had indeed been organized, but on so diffident a basis as almost to escape notice. This was the _London Confederate States Aid a.s.sociation_ which came to the attention of Adams and his friends in December, 1862, through the attendance at an early meeting of one, W.A. Jackson ("Jefferson Davis' ex-coachman"), who reported the proceedings to George Thompson. The meeting was held at 3 Devons.h.i.+re Street, Portland Place, was attended by some fifty persons and was addressed by Dr. Lempriere. A Mr. Beals, evidently an unwelcome guest, interrupted the speaker, was forcibly ejected by a policeman and got revenge by arranging a demonstration against Mason (who was present), confronting him, on leaving the house, with a placard showing a negro in chains[1141]. There was no "public effort" contemplated in such a meeting, although funds were to be solicited to aid the South.

Adams reported the a.s.sociation as a sort of Club planning to hold regular Wednesday evening meetings of its members, the dues being a s.h.i.+lling a week and the rules providing for loss of members.h.i.+p for non-attendance[1142].

Nothing more is heard of this a.s.sociation after December, 1862. Possibly its puerilities killed it and in any case it was not intended to appeal to the public[1143]. But the launching of the Southern Independence a.s.sociation betokened the new policy of constructive effort in London to match and guide that already started in the provinces. A long and carefully worded const.i.tution and address depicted the heroic struggles of the Confederates and the "general sympathy" of England for their cause; dwelt upon the "governmental tyranny, corruption in high places, ruthlessness in war, untruthfulness of speech, and causeless animosity toward Great Britain" of the North; and declared that the interests of America and of the world would be best served by the independence of the South. The effect of a full year's penetration in England of Lincoln's emanc.i.p.ation proclamation is shown in the necessity felt by the framers of this const.i.tution to meet that issue. This required delicate handling and was destined to cause some heart-burnings. The concluding section of the const.i.tution read:

"The a.s.sociation will also devote itself to the cultivation of kindly feelings between the people of Great Britain and of the Confederate States; and it will, in particular, steadily but kindly represent to the Southern States, that recognition by Europe must necessarily lead to a revision of the system of servile labour, unhappily bequeathed to them by England, in accordance with the spirit of the age, so as to combine the gradual extinction of slavery with the preservation of property, the maintenance of the civil polity, and the true civilization of the negro race[1144]."

The a.s.sociation was unquestionably armed with distinguished guns of heavy calibre in its Committee and officers, and its members.h.i.+p fee (one guinea annually) was large enough to attract the elite, but it remained to be seen whether all this equipment would be sent into action. As yet the vigour of the movement was centred at Manchester and even there a curious situation soon arose. Spence in various speeches, was declaring that the "Pet.i.tion to Parliament" movement was spreading rapidly. 30,000 at Ashton, he said, had agreed to memoralize the Government. But on January 30, 1864, Mason Jones, a pro-Northern speaker in the Free Trade Hall at Manchester, asked why Southern public meetings had come to a halt. "The Southerners," he declared, "had taken the Free Trade Hall in the outset with that intention and they were obliged to pay the rent of the room, though they did not use it. They knew that their resolutions would be outvoted and that amendments would pa.s.s against them[1145]." There must have been truth in the taunt for while _The Index_ in nearly every issue throughout the middle of 1864 reports great activity there, it does not give any account of a public meeting. The reports were of many applications for members.h.i.+p "from all quarters, from persons of rank and gentlemen of standing in their respective counties[1146]."

Just here lay the weakness of the Southern Independence a.s.sociation programme. It _did_ appeal to "persons of rank and gentlemen of standing," but by the very fact of the flocking to it of these cla.s.ses it precluded appeal to Radical and working-cla.s.s England--already largely committed to the cause of the North. Goldwin Smith, in his "Letter to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence a.s.sociation," made the point very clear[1147]. In this pamphlet, probably the strongest presentation of the Northern side and the most severe castigation of Southern sympathizers that appeared throughout the whole war, Smith appealed to old Whig ideas of political liberty, attacked the aristocracy and the Church of England, and attempted to make the Radicals of England feel that the Northern cause was their cause.

Printing the const.i.tution and address of the a.s.sociation, with the list of signers, he characterized the movement as fostered by "men of t.i.tle and family," with "a good sprinkling of clergymen," and as having for its object the plunging of Great Britain into war with the North[1148].

It is significant, in view of Mason Jones' taunt to the Southern Independence a.s.sociation at Manchester, that _The Index_, from the end of March to August, 1864, was unable to report a single Southern public meeting. The London a.s.sociation, having completed its top-heavy organization, was content with that act and showed no life. The first move by the a.s.sociation was planned to be made in connection with the _Alexandra_ case when, as was expected, the Exchequer Court should render a decision against the Government's right to detain her. On January 8, 1864, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had arranged for the public launching of the a.s.sociation "next week," that he had again seen the Chief Baron who a.s.sured him the Court would decide "that the Government is entirely wrong":

"I told him that if the judgment was clear, and if the Government persisted in proceeding further, that our a.s.sociation (which he was pleased to learn had been formed) would take up the matter in Parliament and out of it, for if we had no right to seize these s.h.i.+ps, it was most unjust that we should detain them by raising legal quibbles for the purpose of keeping them here till the time arrived when the South might not require them. I think public opinion will go with us on this point, for John Bull--with all his failings--loves fair play[1149]."

It is apparent from the language used by Lindsay that he was thinking of the Laird Rams and other s.h.i.+ps fully as much as of the _Alexandra_[1150], and hoped much from an attack on the Government's policy in detaining Southern vessels. Earl Russell was to be made to bear the brunt of this attack on the rea.s.sembling of Parliament. In an _Index_ editorial, Adams was pictured as having driven Russell into a corner by "threats which would not have been endured for an hour by a Pitt or a Canning"; the Foreign Secretary as invariably yielding to the "acknowledged mastery of the Yankee Minister":

"Mr. Adams' pretensions are extravagant, his logic is blundering, his threats laughable; but he has. .h.i.t his mark.

We can trace his influence in the detention of the _Alexandra_ and the protracted judicial proceedings which have arisen out of it; in the sudden raid upon the rams at Birkenhead; in the announced intention of the Government to alter the Foreign Enlistment Act of this country in accordance with the views of the United States Cabinet. When one knows the calibre of Mr. Adams one feels inclined to marvel at his success. The astonishment ceases when one reflects that the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs is Earl Russell[1151]."

But when, on February 23, the debate on the Laird Rams occurred[1152], the Tory leaders, upon whom Lindsay and others depended to drive home the meaning of the _Alexandra_ decision, carefully avoided urging the Government to change its policy and contented themselves with an effort, very much in line with that initiated by _The Index_, to belittle Russell as yielding to a threat. Adams was even applauded by the Tories for his discretion and his anxiety to keep the two countries out of war. The Southern Independence a.s.sociation remained quiescent.

Very evidently someone, presumably Derby or Disraeli, had put a quietus on the plan to make an issue of the stoppage of Southern s.h.i.+p-building.

Russell's reply to his accusers was but a curt denial without going into details, in itself testimony that he had no fear of a party attack on the _policy_ of stopping the s.h.i.+ps. He was disgusted with the result of the _Alexandra_ trial and in conversation with Adams reflected upon "the uncertainty and caprice incident everywhere to the administration of justice[1153]."

As between Russell and Seward the waters formerly troubled by the stiff manner and tone of the one statesman and the flamboyance of the other were now unusually calm. Russell was less officious and less eager to protest on minor matters and Seward was less belligerent in language.

Seward now radiated supreme confidence in the ultimate victory of the North. He had heard rumours of a movement to be made in Parliament for interposition to bring the war to an end by a reunion of North and South on a basis of Abolition and of a Northern a.s.sumption of the Confederate debts. Commenting on this to Lyons he merely remarked that the Northern answer could be put briefly as: (1) determination to crush rebellion by force of arms and resentment of any "interposition"; (2) the slaves were already free and would not be made the subject of any bargain; (3) "As to the Confederate debt the United States, Mr. Seward said, would never pay a dollar of it[1154]." That there was public animosity to Great Britain, Lyons did not deny and reported a movement in Congress for ending the reciprocity treaty with Canada but, on Seward's advice, paid no attention to this, acknowledging that Seward was very wise in political manipulation and depending on his opposition to the measure[1155]. Some alarm was indeed caused through a recurrence by Seward to an idea dating back to the very beginning of the war of establis.h.i.+ng s.h.i.+ps off the Southern ports which should collect duties on imports. He told Lyons that he had sent a special agent to Adams to explain the proposal with a view to requesting the approval of Great Britain. Lyons urged that no such request be made as it was sure to be refused, interpreting the plan as intended to secure a British withdrawal of belligerent rights to the South, to be followed by a bold Northern defiance to France if she objected[1156]. Adams did discuss the project with Russell but easily agreed to postpone consideration of it and in this Seward quietly acquiesced[1157]. Apparently this was less a matured plan than a "feeler," put out to sound British att.i.tude and to learn, if possible, whether the tie previously binding England and France in their joint policy toward America was still strong. Certainly at this same time Seward was making it plain to Lyons that while opposed to current Congressional expressions of antagonism to Napoleon's Mexican policy, he was himself in favour, once the Civil War was ended, of helping the republican Juarez drive the French from Mexico[1158].

For nearly three years Russell, like nearly all Englishmen, had held a firm belief that the South could not be conquered and that ultimately the North must accept the bitter pill of Southern independence. Now he began to doubt, yet still held to the theory that even if conquered the South would never yield peaceful obedience to the Federal Government.

As a reasoning and reasonable statesman he wished that the North could be made to see this.

"... It is a pity," he wrote to Lyons, "the Federals think it worth their while to go on with the war. The obedience they are ever likely to obtain from the South will not be quiet or lasting, and they must spend much money and blood to get it.

If they can obtain the right bank of the Mississippi, and New Orleans, they might as well leave to the Confederates Charleston and Savannah[1159]."

This was but private speculation with no intention of urging it upon the United States. Yet it indicated a change in the view held as to the warlike _power_ of the North. Similarly the _Quarterly Review_, long confident of Southern success and still prophesying it, was acknowledging that "the unholy [Northern] dream of universal empire"

must first have pa.s.sed[1160]. Throughout these spring months of 1864, Lyons continued to dwell upon the now thoroughly developed readiness of the United States for a foreign war and urged the sending of a military expert to report on American preparations[1161]. He was disturbed by the arrogance manifested by various members of Lincoln's Cabinet, especially by Welles, Secretary of the Navy, with whom Seward, so Lyons wrote, often had difficulty in demonstrating the unfortunate diplomatic bearing of the acts of naval officers. Seward was as anxious as was Lyons to avoid irritating incidents, "but he is not as much listened to as he ought to be by his colleagues in the War and Navy Departments[1162]."

Such an act by a naval officer, defiant of British authority and disregardful of her law, occurred in connection with a matter already attracting the attention of the British public and causing some anxiety to Russell--the alleged securing in Ireland of enlistments for the Northern forces. The war in America had taken from the ranks of industry in the North great numbers of men and at the same time had created an increased demand for labour. But the war had also abruptly checked, in large part, that emigration from Europe which, since the middle 'forties, had been counted upon as a regular source of labour supply, easily absorbed in the steady growth of productive enterprise. A few Northern emissaries of the Government early sent abroad to revive immigration were soon reinforced by private labour agents and by the efforts of steams.h.i.+p companies[1163]. This resulted in a rapid resumption of emigration in 1863, and in several cases groups of Irishmen signed contracts of such a nature (with non-governmental agents) that on arrival in America they were virtually black-jacked into the army. The agents thereby secured large profits from the sums offered under the bounty system of some of the Eastern states for each recruit.

Lyons soon found himself called upon to protest, on appeal from a few of these hoodwinked British citizens, and Seward did the best he could to secure redress, though the process was usually a long one owing to red-tape and also to the resistance of army officers.

As soon as the scheme of "bounty profiteers" was discovered prompt steps were taken to defeat it by the American Secretary of State. But the few cases occurring, combined with the acknowledged and encouraged agents of _bona fide_ labour emigration from Ireland, gave ground for accusations in Parliament that Ireland was being used against the law as a place of enlistments. Russell had early taken up the matter with Adams, investigation had followed, and on it appearing that no authorized Northern agent was engaged in recruiting in Ireland the subject had been dropped[1164]. There could be and was no objection to encourage labour emigration, and this was generally recognized as the basis of the sudden increase of the numbers going to America[1165]. But diplomatic and public quiescence was disturbed when the United States war vessel _Kearsarge_, while in port at Queenstown, November, 1863, took on board fifteen Irishmen and sailed away with them. Russell at once received indirectly from Mason (who was now in France), charges that these men had been enlisted and in the presence of the American consul at Queenstown; he was prompt in investigation but before this was well under way the _Kearsarge_ sailed into Queenstown again and landed the men. She had gone to a French port and no doubt Adams was quick to give orders for her return. Adams was soon able to disprove the accusation against the consul but it still remained a question whether the commander of the vessel was guilty of a bold defiance of British neutrality. On March 31, 1864, the Irishmen, on trial at Cork, pleaded guilty to violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, but the question of the commander's responsibility was permitted to drop on Adams' promise, April 11, of further investigation[1166].

The _Kearsarge_ case occurred as Parliament was drawing to a close in 1863, and at a time when Southern efforts were at low ebb. It was not, therefore, until some months later when a gentleman with a shady past, named Patrick Phinney, succeeded in evading British laws and in carrying off to America a group of Irishmen who found themselves, unwillingly, forced into the Northern army, that the two cases were made the subject of a Southern and Tory attack on Russell. The accusations were sharply made that Russell was not sufficiently active in defending British law and British honour[1167], but these were rather individual accusations than concerted and do not indicate any idea of making an issue with the Government[1168]. Whenever opportunity arose some inquiry up to July, 1864, would be made intended to bring out the alleged timidity of Russell's policy towards the North--a method then also being employed on many other matters with the evident intention of weakening the Ministry for the great Tory attack now being organized on the question of Danish policy.

In truth from the beginning of 1864, America had been pushed to one side in public and parliamentary interest by the threatening Danish question which had long been brewing but which did not come into sharp prominence until March. A year earlier it had become known that Frederick VII of Denmark, in antic.i.p.ation of a change which, under the operations of the Salic law, would come at his death in the const.i.tutional relations of Denmark to Schleswig-Holstein, was preparing by a new "const.i.tutional act" to secure for his successor the retention of these districts. The law was enacted on November 13, 1863, and Frederick VII died two days later. His successor, Christian IX, promptly declared his intention to hold the duchies in spite of their supposed desire to separate from Denmark and to have their own Prince in the German Confederation. The Federal Diet of the Confederation had early protested the purpose of Denmark and Russell had at first upheld the German arguments but had given no pledges of support to anyone[1169]. But Palmerston on various occasions had gone out of his way to express in Parliament his favour for the Danish cause and had used incautious language even to the point of virtually threatening British aid against German ambitions[1170]. A distinct crisis was thus gradually created, coming to a head when Prussia, under Bismarck's guiding hand, dragging Austria in with her, thrust the Federal Diet of the Confederation to one side, and a.s.sumed command of the movement to wrest Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark.

This occurred in February, 1864, and by this time Palmerston's utterances, made against the wish of the majority of his Cabinet colleagues (though this was not known), had so far aroused the British public as to have created a feeling, widely voiced, that Great Britain could not sit idly by while Prussia and Austria worked their will on Denmark. There was excellent ground for a party attack to unseat the Ministry on the score of a humiliating "Danish policy," at one time threatening vigorous British action, then resorting to weak and unsuccessful diplomatic manoeuvres. For three months the Government laboured to bring about through a European council some solution that should both save something for Denmark and save its own prestige.

Repeatedly Palmerston, in the many parliamentary debates on Denmark, broke loose from his Cabinet colleagues and indulged in threats which could not fail to give an excellent handle to opponents when once it became clear that the Ministry had no intention of coming in arms to the defence of the Danish King.

From February to June, 1864, this issue was to the fore. In its earlier stages it did not appear to Southern sympathizers to have any essential bearing on the American question, though they were soon to believe that in it lay a great hope. Having set the Southern Independence a.s.sociation on its feet in London and hoping much from its planned activities, Lindsay, in March, was momentarily excited over rumours of some new move by Napoleon. Being undeceived[1171] he gave a ready ear to other rumours, received privately through Delane of the _Times_, that an important Southern victory would soon be forthcoming[1172]. Donoughmore, the herald of this glad news also wrote:

"Our political prospects here are still very uncertain. The Conference on the Danish question will either make or mar the Government. If they can patch up a peace they will remain in office. If they fail, out they go[1173]."

Here was early expressed the real hope of one faction of extreme Southern friends in the Danish question. But Lindsay had not yet made clear where he stood on a possible use of a European situation to affect the cause of the South. Now, as always, he was the princ.i.p.al confidant and friend of Mason in England, but he was on ordinary political questions not in sympathy with Tory principles or measures. He was soon disgusted with the apathy of the London Independence a.s.sociation and threatened to resign members.h.i.+p if this organization, started with much trumpeting of intended activity, did not come out boldly in a public demand for the recognition of the South[1174]. He had already let it be known that another motion would be made in Parliament for mediation and recognition and was indignant that the a.s.sociation did not at once declare its adherence. Evidently there were internal difficulties.