The Journal of Negro History Volume II Part 38

Hemingway, was an a.s.sured fact. The Democrats, however, had decided that the time had come for the State to be "_redeemed_," peaceably and fairly if possible, violently and unfairly if necessary. With George M. Buchanan as the Republican candidate, it was necessary to employ means which Mr. Rhodes so much regretted, but which he justifies because, as he understands it, they were employed in the interest of good government.

Was that true? Let us see. Buchanan, of course, was declared defeated and Hemingway declared elected. Mississippi was thus "_redeemed_, for which all lovers of good government must rejoice," but Mr. Rhodes failed to record the fact that this man who was the representative of the _redemption_ of the State had been in office a comparatively brief period when the discovery was made that he was a defaulter to the amount of $315,612.19.[405] It would be a reflection upon Mr. Rhodes's intelligence to a.s.sume that he was ignorant of this important fact.

Oh, no! he must have known about it, but to make any allusion to it would be out of harmony with the purposes he evidently had in view. It is safe to a.s.sume that, if the will of a majority of the legal voters of the State had not been violently suppressed in the interest of _good_ and _honest_ government, which would have resulted in the election of honest George M. Buchanan, while the State would not have been _redeemed_, it would have been saved from the loss of $315,612.19. The writer of these lines has never believed that Hemingway was the personal beneficiary of this money or any part thereof, but that he was the instrument in the hands of others. Still he was the official representative of the _redemption_ of the State for which "all lovers of good government must rejoice."

That there was a material increase in the population and in the wealth of the State will not be denied. These results would have followed, even if the State had never been _redeemed_. They were not due to _redemption_ but in spite of it. In fact, there was a marked increase in population and in wealth before as well as subsequent to the _redemption_. But when the author states that the bonded indebtedness and taxation are low, the impression necessarily made, and intended to be made upon the mind of the reader, is that after the _redemption_ took place and as a result thereof, the _rate_ of taxation was reduced, the volume of money paid into the State treasury annually for the support of the government was less than it had been before, and that there had been a material reduction in the bonded debt of the State, neither of which is true.[406] If Mr. Rhodes had been disposed to record the truth and nothing but the truth, which is presumed to be the aim of an impartial historian, he could have easily obtained the facts, because they are matters of record. To give the reader an idea of what the facts were and are, I will take, for purposes of comparison, one year prior and one subsequent to the _redemption_ of the State. In 1875, the year that the _redemption_ took place, the a.s.sessed value of taxable property was $119,313,834. The receipts from all sources that year amounted to $1,801,129.12. Disburs.e.m.e.nts for the same year, $1,430,192.83. In 1907 the a.s.sessed value of taxable property was reported to be $373,584,960. Receipts from all sources, same year, $3,391,127.15. Disburs.e.m.e.nts, same year, $3,730,343.29. The above figures speak for themselves. They are from the official records, the accuracy of which cannot be questioned.[407] The records show too that during the administration of Governor Ames, which was about half over when the _redemption_ took place, the rate of taxation had been reduced from seven mills to four mills and that a material reduction had been made in the bonded debt of the State and that after the _redemption_ took place the tax rate was increased from four mills to six mills and that by 1907 $732,890.74 had been added to the bonded debt of the State. And yet in the opinion of Mr. Rhodes, these are conditions for the deliverance from which the employment of regrettable means was necessary, at which, however, "all lovers of good government should rejoice," since their employment resulted in the _redemption_ of the State.

But another evidence of Mr. Rhodes's careless and reckless manner of stating alleged historical facts will be found in a paragraph on page 132 of his seventh volume. In speaking of Governor Ames's unsuccessful efforts to have troops sent to the State to a.s.sist in maintaining order and insuring a fair and peaceable election, he says: "A number of the white Republicans of Mississippi who had quarrelled or differed with Ames, among whom were both the United States senators, used their influence against the sending of federal troops to Mississippi and none were sent." The two United States Senators at that time were J.L.

Alcorn and B.K. Bruce. Bruce was a strong friend and loyal supporter of Ames and did all in his power to have Ames's request granted. This statement is based upon my own knowledge. Senator Alcorn was one of the few white Republicans who had quarrelled with Ames. In fact, he ran as an Independent for governor against Ames in 1873. But he was a Republican United States Senator and as such he had no sympathy with the Democratic party. My relations with both senators were cordial. If Alcorn had used his influence to prevent having federal troops sent to the State, I am sure I would have known it. If he raised his voice or used his pen for such purpose, that fact was never brought to my notice and I am satisfied it was never done. My own opinion is that he remained reticent and refused to take sides. The true reason why troops were not sent in compliance with the request of Governor Ames was that, although the President once directed that the requisition be complied with, he later rescinded the order when informed by Republicans from Ohio that such interference would cause the loss of Ohio to the Republicans at the October election and would not save Mississippi.[408]

Referring to the Reconstruction policy, Mr. Rhodes says: "Stevens'

Reconstruction Acts, ostensibly in the interest of freedom, were an attack on civilization.[409] In my judgment Sumner did not show wise constructive statesmans.h.i.+p in forcing unqualified Negro Suffrage on the South."[410] The truth is that Stevens and Sumner were wiser than their day and generation. They were not favorable to an immediate restoration of the States lately in rebellion upon any conditions.

They knew that after the cessation of hostilities, the flower of the Confederate Army, an army which it took the entire North with all of its numbers, immense wealth and almost limitless resources four years to conquer, would be at the South and that upon the completion of Reconstruction and the withdrawal of the federal troops, that army could be utilized to bring about practically the same conditions that existed before the war. They, therefore, opposed immediate restoration. This is what Mr. Rhodes characterizes as an attack on civilization. To what civilization does he refer? He surely could not have had in mind the civilization which believed in the divine right of slavery and which recognized and sanctioned the right of one man to hold another as his property; and yet this was the only civilization upon which the rebuilding of the rebellious governments was an attack.

But for the adoption of the Congressional plan of Reconstruction and the subsequent legislation of the nation along the same line, the abolition of slavery through the ratification of the 13th Amendment would have been in name only, a legal and const.i.tutional myth. This is the civilization, however, an attack upon which Mr. Rhodes so deeply deplores. It is fortunate for the country that a majority of Mr.

Rhodes's fellow citizens did not and do not agree with him along these lines.

Since Stevens and Sumner could not secure the adoption of the plan advocated by them, they proceeded to secure the adoption of the best one that it was possible to obtain under conditions as they then existed. Hence they insisted, successfully, as was then believed, that the legislation, including the 14th Amendment, should be so framed as not only to create national citizens.h.i.+p, as distinguished from State citizens.h.i.+p, but that it should be made the duty of the Federal Government to protect its own citizens, when necessary, against domestic violence, to protect its citizens at home as well as when they are abroad. The closing clause of the 14th Amendment, therefore, declares that Congress shall have power to enforce the provisions of the amendment by appropriate legislation.

But Mr. Rhodes says the Congressional plan of Reconstruction was a failure. The defeat of the Republican party at the North, especially in 1874, he believes "was due to the failure of the Southern policy of the Republican party." In speaking of the action of President Hayes, he says: "Indeed it was the final admission of the Republican party that their policy of forcing Negro suffrage upon the South was a failure." Is it true that Reconstruction was a failure? That depends upon the view one takes of it. Admitting that some of the things expected of it by many of its friends and supporters were not fully realized, its failure even to that extent was, in a large measure, one of the _results_ but not one of the contributory _causes_ of the Democratic national victory of 1874. On the contrary, that policy was a grand and brilliant success.

In the first place, when the split between Congress and President Johnson took place, there was soon developed the fact that the enfranchis.e.m.e.nt of the blacks was the only plan which could be adopted and by which the one advocated by the President could be defeated. It had been seen and frankly admitted that the war for the preservation of the Union could not have been brought to a successful conclusion without putting the musket in the hands of the loyal blacks. The fact was now made plain that the fruits of the victory that had been won on the battlefield could not be preserved without putting the ballot in their hands. Hence, it was done.

Was this a mistake? Mr. Rhodes says it was; but the results prove that it was not. But for the enfranchis.e.m.e.nt of the blacks at the South at the time and in the way it was done the 14th and subsequently the 15th Amendment to the Federal Const.i.tution never could have been ratified.

The ratification of these two measures alone vindicated the wisdom of that legislation. The 14th Amendment, among other things, made the colored people American citizens. It was, in effect, a recall of the famous Dred Scott decision. The 15th Amendment gave the colored American access to the ballot box, in every State in the Union. The fundamental principles that were carried into effect through the Reconstruction acts of Congress were embodied in these two amendments.

After the ratification of these measures, what had previously been local to the South became national. No State north, south, east or west can now legally and const.i.tutionally make or enforce any law making race or color the basis of discrimination in the exercise and enjoyment of civil and public rights and privileges, nor can it make race or color the basis of discrimination in prescribing the qualification of electors. By the ratification of those amendments the right of an American citizen to the exercise and enjoyment of civil and political rights and the right to vote ceased to be local and became national. But it is claimed by some that because the 15th Amendment has been successfully evaded in certain States, it is, for that reason, a failure. I will state here in pa.s.sing, however, that there has never been made nor can be made any law or const.i.tution that can not at certain times and in some places be successfully evaded.

But this does not necessarily prove that the law or const.i.tution in question was a mistake and should, for that reason, be repealed. To this extent and for the reasons and purposes above stated, the wisdom of the Reconstruction Acts of Congress has been more than vindicated.

The failure of the Reconstruction legislation was not due so much to the change of sentiment in the North as to an unwise interpretation of these laws. This started with two unfortunate decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court, the result of two unwise appointments to seats on the bench made by President Grant. The Judges referred to are Waite of Ohio, and Bradley of New Jersey. Both were supposed to be Republicans and believed to be in accord with the other leaders and const.i.tutional lawyers in the Republican party in their construction of the War Amendments to the Federal Const.i.tution. But they proved to be strong States' Rights men and, therefore, strict constructionists.

Those two, with the other States' Rights men already on the bench, const.i.tuted a majority of that tribunal. The result was that the court declared unconst.i.tutional and void, not only the national civil rights act, but also the princ.i.p.al sections of the different enforcement acts which provided for the protection of individual citizens by the Federal Government against domestic violence. National citizens.h.i.+p had been created by the 14th Amendment and the Federal Government had been clothed with power to enforce the provisions of that amendment.

Legislation for that purpose had been placed upon the statute books and they were being enforced whenever and wherever necessary, as in the case of the lawless and criminal organization called the Ku Klux Klan. But the Supreme Court, very much to the surprise of every one, stepped in and tied the hands of the national administration and prevented any further prosecutions for violence upon the person of a citizen of the United States, if committed within the limits of any one of the States of the Union. In other words, if the State in which a citizen of the United States may reside can not, does not or will not protect him in the exercise and enjoyment of his personal, civil and political rights, he is without a remedy. The result is that the Federal Government is placed in the awkward and anomalous position of exacting support and allegiance from its citizens, to whom it can not in return afford protection, unless they should be outside the boundaries of their own country. By those unfortunate and fatal decisions the vicious and mischievous doctrine of States' Rights, called by some State sovereignty, by others local self government, which was believed to have perished upon the battlefields of the country, was given new life, strength and audacity, and fostered by the preaching of the fear of "Negro domination." The decision declaring the Civil Rights Law unconst.i.tutional was rendered by Mr.

Justice Bradley, and nearly all of those by which the princ.i.p.al sections of the different enforcement laws were nullified, were rendered by Chief Justice Waite.

If in every southern State today no attempt were made to violate or evade the 15th Amendment and colored men were allowed free and unrestricted access to the ballot boxes and their votes were fairly and honestly counted, there would be no more danger of "Negro domination" in any one of these States than there is of female domination in States where women have the right to vote. All that colored men have ever insisted upon, was not to dominate but to partic.i.p.ate, not to rule but to have a voice in the selection of those who are to rule. In view of their numerical strength the probabilities are that more of them would be officially recognized than in other sections of the country, but never out of proportion to their fitness and capacity, unless there should be a repet.i.tion of conditions that existed in the early days of Reconstruction, which is improbable. The dominant element in the Democratic party in that section at that time adopted, as stated above, the policy of "masterly inactivity" which was intended to prevent white men, through intimidation, from taking any part in the organization and reconstruction of the State governments, with a view of making the governments thus organized as odious and as objectionable as possible, in other words, to make them as far as possible "Negro governments." This policy proved to be somewhat effective in many localities. The result was the colored men found much difficulty in finding desirable white men outside of the Democratic party for the different local positions to be filled. This made it necessary in some instances for colored men to be selected to fill certain positions for which white men would have been chosen. But under the present order of things, a repet.i.tion of any thing of this sort would be wholly out of the question.

I can not close this article without giving expression to the hope that a fair, just and impartial historian will, some day, write a history covering the Reconstruction period, in which an accurate account based upon actual facts of what took place at that time will be given, instead of a compilation and condensation of untrue, unreliable and grossly exaggerated statements taken from political campaign literature.

JOHN R. LYNCH, Author of "The Facts of Reconstruction."

4352 FORRESTVILLE AVENUE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

FOOTNOTES:

[402] Lynch, "The Facts of Reconstruction," Chapter XI.

[403] The speech of R. B. Elliott in reply to A. H. Stephens in the debate on the Civil Rights Bill was admitted to be one of the most eloquent and scholarly speeches ever delivered in Congress. But Mr.

Rhodes's preconceived opinions and prejudices were so firmly fixed that he was incapable of detecting anything in the acts or utterances of any colored member of either branch of Congress that deserved to be commended or favorably noticed.

[404] Rhodes, "History of United States," VII, 141.

[405] See Chapter 16 of Lynch, "The Facts of Reconstruction."

[406] See Chapter 8 of Lynch, "The Facts of Reconstruction."

[407] _Ibid._

[408] Lynch, "Facts of Reconstruction," pp. 150-151.

[409] Rhodes, "History of the United States," VI, 35.

[410] Rhodes, "History of the United States," VI, 40.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE RECOGNITION OF HAITI AND LIBERIA AS INDEPENDENT REPUBLICS

The doctrine of recognition as a principle of International law appeared in definite form at the close of the American Revolution. New states had arisen and successful revolutions had given birth to new governments.[411] In Was.h.i.+ngton's Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, the French Republic was recognized and the neutral position of America was announced.[412] These principles, developed later by Adams and Jefferson through application to the South American colonies which had declared their independence of Spain, marked the beginning of the well-defined international principle of recognition.[413]

Between 1810 and 1825, the Spanish colonies of Mexico, New Granada (Columbia), Venezuela, Peru, Buenos Ayres, Chile, Ecuador and Upper Peru (Bolivia) had revolted and rejected Spanish dominion.[414] In 1824, England recognized the independence of Buenos Ayres, Mexico and Columbia, and gave no heed to the a.s.sertion that this "tended to encourage the revolutionary spirit which it had been found so difficult to restrain in Europe."[415]

But before the Spanish colonies had gained their independence, and the spirit of democracy had begun to diffuse its light, movements were on foot to secure the recognition of Haiti. After its discovery by Columbus in 1492, Haitian soil was drenched with the blood of the Spaniard and the native. Civil wars were begun and b.l.o.o.d.y scenes were enacted.[416] In 1533, peace came between the natives and the Spaniards. Soon thereafter, other Europeans began to arrive. The French and the English were attracted by the stories of riches and their chances for gain. The b.l.o.o.d.y struggles between these nations and the natives fill many pages of Haitian history.[417] The inhabitants took now the one side, now the other.

Led by Toussaint L'Ouverture, the cause of the French was championed.

Finding the French yoke as heavy as the Spanish yoke, Toussaint struck for absolute liberty.[418] He was not, in a real sense, the liberator of the Haitians, as commonly supposed, but he was the precursor of their liberty.[419] His deportation aroused them to struggle with new vigor. Under Dessalines, one of the generals in the army of Toussaint L'Ouverture, the rebellion grew more successful, and on January 1, 1804, the army swore to abjure their allegiance to France forever, and thereupon declared the independence of Haiti.[420] Dessalines was chosen Governor-General and upon abolis.h.i.+ng the name "Santo Domingo,"

the aboriginal name "Haiti" was reestablished.

The history of Haiti after 1804 is concerned with internal dissensions, and contentions with foreign powers. Haiti was not immediately recognized nor was she welcomed into the family of nations. Retaliatory measures were taken by her government to compel the powers to see the advantage in this recognition. Christophe, a contender for power with Petion, one of the founders of the republic, issued in 1816 the proclamation that no negotiation would be entered upon with France unless the independence of the kingdom of Haiti,[421]

political as well as commercial, be previously recognized.[422]

In 1823, the independence of Mexico, Columbia, and others was recognized by Great Britain, but Haiti after nineteen years of independence was not given this consideration.[423] As a result the British trade privileges were abolished and the import tax of 12 per cent. was levied on the products of all nations.[424]

Early indications of American commercial relations with Haiti and of an unsatisfactory condition may be discerned in the following resolutions, the first of which was submitted in the Senate, January 11, 1819:

"_Resolved:_ that the President of the United States be requested to communicate to the Senate any information in his possession and which, in his opinion, the public interest may permit to disclose, relating to the seizure and detention of the property of American citizens by the government of Haiti, and the state of any negotiations to procure rest.i.tution."[425]

On December 31, 1822, the following resolution was submitted in the House:

"_Resolved:_ that the committee on commerce be instructed to inquire into the present state of the trade and intercourse between the United States and the Island of Haiti, and report what measures would be necessary to improve the commerce between the two countries."[426]

As a matter of fact, the trade with Haiti was very important during this period. By the report of the Register's Office, 1825, Haiti ranked twenty-ninth in the list of countries trading with the United States.[427]

The actual presentation of the question to the country as a whole grew out of an invitation to attend the Panama Congress. In 1825, General Bolivar, leader of the South American revolutionists, invited the states north and south of the Isthmus to send delegates to a congress which would a.s.semble at Panama. Formal invitations to attend the congress were received from Mexico, Guatemala and Columbia and others.

The following suggestions were made as to questions to be considered: the interference of European powers in America, the recognition of Haiti, the slave trade and the formation of an American league.[428]

That the recognition of Haiti was one of the objects of consideration is so stated among the lists of subjects in the _Official Gazette_ of Columbia. The congress was to determine on what footing should be placed the political and commercial relations of those portions of our hemisphere, which had obtained their independence, but whose independence had not been recognized by any American or European power, as was for many years the case with Haiti.[429] Other evidence is found in a letter of the Columbian minister, Salazar: "On what basis the relations of Haiti, and of other parts of our Hemisphere that shall hereafter be in like circ.u.mstances, are to be placed," said he, "is a question simple at first view, but attended with serious difficulties when closely examined. These arise from the different manner of regarding Africans, and from their different rights in Haiti, the United States and in other American states. This question will be determined at the Isthmus, and if possible, an uniform rule of conduct adopted in regard to it, or those modifications that may be demanded by circ.u.mstances."[430]

A special message was sent to Congress by President Adams on December 26, naming the delegates to this congress, and asking for an appropriation for expenses. Both Clay, then Secretary of State, and President Adams wished to extend the commercial power of the United States over the Americas, and they welcomed this opportunity. They disclaimed any desire to enter any league, but left poorly defined the objects which would be considered.[431]

The southern point of view, as expressed in the debates on this question, was that disaster awaited the Southern States, if the United States should send delegates to a congress in which Haitian representatives would sit, and which would consider the separation of Cuba and Porto Rico from Spain and the cessation of slavery. This viewpoint was expressed by Benton of Missouri, saying: "We buy coffee from her, and pay for it; but we interchange no consuls or ministers.