World's War Events Volume III Part 30

[Sidenote: Germans fall back.]

[Sidenote: The Forty-second relieves the Twenty-sixth.]

[Sidenote: Third and Fourth Advance.]

On the 24th, after the Germans had fallen back from Trugney and Epieds, our Forty-second Division, which had been brought over from the Champagne, relieved the Twenty-sixth and, fighting its way through the Foret de Fere, overwhelmed the nest of machine guns in its path. By the 27th it had reached the Ourcq, whence the Third and Fourth Divisions were already advancing, while the French divisions with which we were cooperating were moving forward at other points.

[Sidenote: The Forty-second and Thirty-second.]

[Sidenote: The Twenty-eighth and the Seventy-seventh.]

The Third Division had made its advance into Roncheres Wood on the 29th and was relieved for rest by a brigade of the Thirty-second. The Forty-second and Thirty-second undertook the task of conquering the heights beyond Cierges, the Forty-second capturing Sergy and the Thirty-second capturing Hill 230, both American divisions joining in the pursuit of the enemy to the Vesle, and thus the operation of reducing the salient was finished. Meanwhile the Forty-second was relieved by the Fourth at Chery-Chartreuve, and the Thirty-second by the Twenty-eighth, while the Seventy-seventh Division took up a position on the Vesle. The operations of these divisions on the Vesle were under the Third Corps, Major General Robert L. Bullard, commanding.

[Sidenote: The First Army is organized.]

[Sidenote: The American sector is extended.]

With the reduction of the Marne salient we could look forward to the concentration of our divisions in our own zone. In view of the forthcoming operation against the St. Mihiel salient, which had long been planned as our first offensive action on a large scale, the First Army was organized on August 10 under my personal command. While American units had held different divisional and corps sectors along the western front, there had not been up to this time, for obvious reasons, a distinct American sector; but, in view of the important parts the American forces were now to play, it was necessary to take over a permanent portion of the line. Accordingly, on August 30, the line beginning at Port sur Seille, east of the Moselle and extending to the west through St. Mihiel, thence north to a point opposite Verdun, was placed under my command. The American sector was afterwards extended across the Meuse to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, and included the Second Colonial French, which held the point of the salient, and the Seventeenth French Corps, which occupied the heights above Verdun.

[Sidenote: Large troop movements.]

The preparation for a complicated operation against the formidable defenses in front of us included the a.s.sembling of divisions and of corps and army artillery, transport, aircraft, tanks, ambulances, the location of hospitals, and the molding together of all the elements of a great modern army with its own railheads, supplied directly by our Service of Supply. The concentration for this operation, which was to be a surprise, involved the movement, mostly at night, of approximately 600,000 troops, and required for its success the most careful attention to every detail.

[Sidenote: Heavy guns can reach Metz.]

The French were generous in giving us a.s.sistance in corps and army artillery, with its personnel, and we were confident from the start of our superiority over the enemy in guns of all calibers. Our heavy guns were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with German rail movements. The French Independent Air Force was placed under my command which, together with the British bombing squadrons and our air forces, gave us the largest a.s.sembly of aviation that had ever been engaged in one operation on the western front.

[Sidenote: The First Corps.]

[Sidenote: The Third Corps.]

[Sidenote: The Fifth Corps.]

[Sidenote: Reserves.]

From Les Eparges around the nose of the salient at St. Mihiel to the Moselle River the line was roughly 40 miles long and situated on commanding ground greatly strengthened by artificial defenses. Our First Corps (Eighty-second, Ninetieth, Fifth, and Second Divisions) under command of Major General Hunter Liggett, restrung its right on Pont-a-Mousson, with its left joining our Third Corps (the Eighty-ninth, Forty-second, and First Divisions), under Major General Joseph T.

d.i.c.kman, in line to Xivray, were to swing in toward Vigneulles on the pivot of the Moselle River for the initial a.s.sault. From Xivray to Mouilly the Second Colonial French Corps was in line in the center and our Fifth Corps, under command of Major General George H. Cameron, with our Twenty-sixth Division and a French division at the western base of the salient, were to attack three difficult hills--Les Eparges, Combres, and Amaranthe. Our First Corps had in reserve the Seventy-eighth Division, our Fourth Corps the Third Division, and our First Army the Thirty-fifth and Ninety-first Divisions, with the Eightieth and Thirty-third available. It should be understood that our corps organizations are very elastic, and that we have at no time had permanent a.s.signments of divisions to corps.

[Sidenote: The attack on St. Mihiel begins.]

[Sidenote: Breaking the barbed-wire defenses.]

After four hours' artillery preparation, the seven American divisions in the front line advanced at 5 a.m., on September 12, a.s.sisted by a limited number of tanks manned partly by Americans and partly by the French. These divisions, accompanied by groups of wire cutters and others armed with bangalore torpedoes, went through the successive bands of barbed wire that protected the enemy's front line and support trenches, in irresistible waves on schedule time, breaking down all defense of an enemy demoralized by the great volume of our artillery fire and our sudden approach out of the fog.

[Sidenote: The First Army takes the salient.]

[Sidenote: Many prisoners and guns taken.]

Our First Corps advanced to Thiaucourt, while our Fourth Corps curved back to the southwest through Nonsard. The Second Colonial French Corps made the slight advance required of it on very difficult ground, and the Fifth Corps took its three ridges and repulsed a counterattack. A rapid march brought reserve regiments of a Division of the Fifth Corps into Vigneulles in the early morning, where it linked up with patrols of our Fourth Corps, closing the salient and forming a new line west of Thiaucourt to Vigneulles, and beyond Fresnes-en-Woevre. At the cost of only 7,000 casualties, mostly light, we had taken 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns, a great quant.i.ty of material, released the inhabitants of many villages from enemy domination, and established our lines in a position to threaten Metz. This signal success of the American First Army in its first offensive was of prime importance. The Allies found they had a formidable army to aid them, and the enemy learned finally that he had one to reckon with.

[Ill.u.s.tration: AMERICAN ATTACK ON THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT]

[Sidenote: Movement to cut German railway connections.]

On the day after we had taken the St. Mihiel salient, much of our Corps and Army artillery which had operated at St. Mihiel, and our Divisions in reserve at other points, were already on the move toward the area back of the line between the Meuse River and the western edge of the forest of Argonne. With the exception of St. Mihiel, the old German front line from Switzerland to the east of Rheims was still intact. In the general attack all along the line, the operation a.s.signed the American Army as the hinge of this Allied offensive was directed toward the important railroad communications of the German armies through Mezieres and Sedan. The enemy must hold fast to this part of his lines or the withdrawal of his forces with four years' acc.u.mulation of plants and material would be dangerously imperiled.

[Sidenote: German Army not demoralized.]

The German Army had as yet shown no demoralization and, while the ma.s.s of its troops had suffered in morale, its first-cla.s.s divisions and notably its machine-gun defense were exhibiting remarkable tactical efficiency as well as courage. The German General Staff was fully aware of the consequences of a success on the Meuse-Argonne line. Certain that he would do everything in his power to oppose us, the action was planned with as much secrecy as possible and was undertaken with the determination to use all our Divisions in forcing decision. We expected to draw the best German divisions to our front and to consume them while the enemy was held under grave apprehension lest our attack should break his line, which it was our firm purpose to do.

[Sidenote: The Argonne Forest considered impregnable.]

[Sidenote: American order of battle.]

Our right flank was protected by the Meuse, while our left embraced the Argonne Forest whose ravines, hills, and elaborate defense screened by dense thickets had been generally considered impregnable. Our order of battle from right to left was the Third Corps from the Meuse to Malancourt, with the Thirty-third, Eightieth, and Fourth Divisions in line, and the Third Division as corps reserve; the Fifth Corps from Malancourt to Vauquois, with Seventy-ninth, Eighty-seventh, and Ninety-first Divisions in line, and the Thirty-second in corps reserve; and the First Corps, from Vauquois to Vienne le Chateau, with Thirty-fifth, Twenty-eighth, and Seventy-seventh Divisions in line, and the Ninety-second in corps reserve. The Army reserve consisted of the First, Twenty-ninth, and Eighty-second Divisions.

[Sidenote: Attack begins on September 25.]

[Sidenote: Montfaucon is taken.]

On the night of September 25 our troops quietly took the place of the French who thinly held the line in this sector which had long been inactive. In the attack which began on the 26th we drove through the barbed wire entanglements and the sea of sh.e.l.l craters across No Man's Land, mastering all the first-line defenses. Continuing on the 27th and 28th, against machine guns and artillery of an increasing number of enemy reserve divisions, we penetrated to a depth of from 3 to 7 miles, and took the village of Montfaucon and its commanding hill and Exermont, Gercourt, Cuisy, Septsarges, Malancourt, Ivoiry, Epinonville, Charpentry, Very, and other villages. East of the Meuse one of our Divisions, which was with the Second Colonial French Corps, captured Marcheville and Rieville, giving further protection to the flank of our main body. We had taken 10,000 prisoners, we had gained our point of forcing the battle into the open and were prepared for the enemy's reaction, which was bound to come as he had good roads and ample railroad facilities for bringing up his artillery and reserves.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FACSIMILE OF PERs.h.i.+NG'S SECRET BATTLE MAP SHOWN AT NATIONAL MUSEUM

There is on exhibition in the United States National Museum at Was.h.i.+ngton what is probably the most interesting and valuable single record of America's part in the Great War--General Pers.h.i.+ng's own secret battle map, transported here from his headquarters in France and set up in the museum exactly as it was there.

It was General Pers.h.i.+ng's own idea to have the map displayed to the public to show the people of the United States the actual military results obtained by their armies. For instance, at the hour the armistice was signed the United States forces were holding 145 kilometers of front, of which 134 kilometers were active. This is made plain on the map by the colored pins and tags by which the different allied and enemy armies are shown.

The map itself shows the location of all divisions, both the enemy and allied, on the western front; the correct battle line, commanding generals, location of headquarters and boundaries down to include armies, and various other information concerning divisions, as, for example, whether they were fresh or tired. The map was developed and kept posted to date daily by the third section of General Pers.h.i.+ng's staff, and used by them and other superior officers during active operations for strategical studies and purposes of general information.

It is evident that during the war the information which this map contained was such that the enemy would have spared no pains to secure it. Every precaution was taken to insure its secrecy, and to this end the map was always kept locked up, and in addition was kept in a small compartment formed by a closed screen. Furthermore, access to this map was had by only the half dozen chiefs of the general headquarters staff sections whose work was directly affected by the changes shown on the map. This map appears to have been unique. The staff officers from the different allied headquarters who had occasion to see the map declared that it was the most complete representation of the opposing forces that they had seen.

General Pers.h.i.+ng, in his letter to the adjutant general suggesting the public display of the map in the National Museum, says:

"It has occurred to me that this particular map with its accompanying installation will have a great historical value. It will be of intense interest to future generations, not only because it was the only map of its kind used at these headquarters, but because it shows in a vivid fas.h.i.+on the exact situation at the hour of the armistice."]

[Sidenote: Difficult tasks of engineers and gunners.]

In the chill rain of dark nights our engineers had to build new roads across spongy, sh.e.l.l-torn areas, repair broken roads beyond No Man's Land, and build bridges. Our gunners, with no thought of sleep, put their shoulders to wheels and dragropes to bring their guns through the mire in support of the infantry, now under the increasing fire of the enemy's artillery. Our attack had taken the enemy by surprise, but, quickly recovering himself, he began to fire counterattacks in strong force, supported by heavy bombardments, with large quant.i.ties of gas.

From September 28 until October 4 we maintained the offensive against patches of woods defended by snipers and continuous lines of machine guns, and pushed forward our guns and transport, seizing strategical points in preparation for further attacks.

[Sidenote: The Twenty-seventh and the Thirtieth with the British.]

Other Divisions attached to the Allied armies were doing their part. It was the fortune of our Second Corps, composed of the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth Divisions, which had remained with the British, to have a place of honor in cooperation with the Australian Corps on September 29 and October 1 in the a.s.sault on the Hindenburg line where the St.

Quentin Ca.n.a.l pa.s.ses through a tunnel under a ridge. The Thirtieth Division speedily broke through the main line of defense for all its objectives, while the Twenty-seventh pushed on impetuously through the main line until some of its elements reached Gouy. In the midst of the maze of trenches and sh.e.l.l craters and under cross fire from machine guns the other elements fought desperately against odds. In this and in later actions, from October 6 to October 19, our Second Corps captured over 6,000 prisoners and advanced over 13 miles. The spirit and aggressiveness of these Divisions have been highly praised by the British Army commander under whom they served.

[Sidenote: Second and Thirty-sixth with the French.]

On October 2 to 9 our Second and Thirty-sixth Divisions were sent to a.s.sist the French in an important attack against the old German positions before Rheims. The Second conquered the complicated defense works on their front against a persistent defense worthy of the grimmest period of trench warfare and attacked the strongly held wooded hill of Blanc Mont, which they captured in a second a.s.sault, sweeping over it with consummate dash and skill. This Division then repulsed strong counterattacks before the village and cemetery of Ste. Etienne and took the town, forcing the Germans to fall back from before Rheims and yield positions they had held since September, 1914. On October 9 the Thirty-sixth Division relieved the Second and, in its first experience under fire, withstood very severe artillery bombardment and rapidly took up the pursuit of the enemy, now retiring behind the Aisne.