World's War Events Volume III Part 35

[Sidenote: The oil pipe line across Scotland.]

_A United States Naval Pipe-line Unit_ has completed important service in the construction of a fuel-oil pipe line across Scotland, and is understood to have been asked for by the French to do some work of the same kind for them.

(_a_) There are yet to be inspected and observed the following activities, which have not so far been mentioned:

[Sidenote: Additional naval bases.]

United States naval base at Cardiff, Subchaser Detachment Two, based on Corfu, Captain C.P. Nelson, United States naval air stations in Italy.

(_b_) It is not deemed practicable to visit the United States naval forces based at Gibraltar (Rear Admiral Niblack), nor the United States naval forces based on the Azores, because of difficulties of transportation, as is also the case in regard to the U.S.S. _Olympia_ in northern Russia.

V. UNITED STATES NAVAL AVIATION IN EUROPE.

[Sidenote: Aviation Headquarters in Paris and London.]

(_a_) The establishment of United States naval aviation in Europe has been one of the most difficult and involved tasks which have had to be undertaken and brought into effect. Captain H.I. Cone arrived in Europe for this work about October 1, 1917, and has continued in charge of it ever since. He maintained headquarters in Paris until about August 1, 1918, when he removed to London and was designated as aid for aviation on staff of the commander of United States naval forces in Europe.

[Sidenote: Supplies arranged for by cable.]

(_b_) There were arrangements to be made with the French and the British as to locations for stations that would be best adapted for cooperation.

There were further arrangements to be made as to the procurement of sites or the taking over of the stations already in operation or in process of construction. The Navy Department had also to be communicated with, largely by cable, as to design, quant.i.ties, and s.h.i.+pments of material, which upon receipt had to be allocated with a view to completing certain stations as soon as possible while not delaying the progress of the general scheme any more than could be helped.

[Sidenote: Coastwise transportation difficult.]

(_c_) Delays and mistakes in the s.h.i.+pment of aviation material probably caused more trouble than any other one thing, for when material once arrives in a European port it has been, and still is, a very difficult matter to arrange for coastwise transportation.

[Sidenote: Creditable progress.]

(_d_) Taking into consideration the necessary scope of the project, the difficulties inherent in providing for establishments on foreign soil, and the delays which the magnitude of the undertakings caused in the production and s.h.i.+pment of material (and personnel) from the United States, the state of progress is considered highly creditable to Captain Cone and to his a.s.sistants.

VI. Y.M.C.A. AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES.

[Sidenote: Y.M.C.A. activities.]

(_a_) It was satisfactory to note that in practically all cases--whether our own naval facilities provided reading, writing, and amus.e.m.e.nt facilities for the personnel or not--the Y.M.C.A. was in evidence.

Their arrangements were, in many places, all that could be expected in the way of cheerful and comfortable quarters; and, in those places where the facilities were not so good, inquiry usually revealed the fact that a suitable building was either under way or soon would be.

[Sidenote: Knights of Columbus.]

(_b_) In at least one place the Knights of Columbus were found established in a commodious building with all in readiness to duplicate the character of the work generally a.s.sociated with Y.M.C.A. activities.

(_c_) All a.s.sistance of this character, from whatever source, has been gladly taken advantage of by the officers in charge, and is much used and appreciated by the men.

VII. HOSPITAL FACILITIES, SICK QUARTERS, ETC.

[Sidenote: Excellent hospitals at naval bases.]

It is deemed worthy of note that the arrangements and facilities for caring for the sick and injured Navy personnel are almost more than ample. In many of the naval-base hospitals the majority of the patients are, consequently, of other services--both the United States and the allied. The provisions of the United States Navy in this respect are so complete in their facilities and so efficient in their readiness as to excite the admiration of all the foreign services, military as well as naval.

[Sidenote: Hearty cooperation with British and French.]

As has already been said at the beginning of this report, cooperation with the British and the French had been the chief method of work for the United States naval forces in European waters. That cooperation has been effected with such cordial appreciation and the few minor difficulties have yielded so readily to sympathetic understanding that all zeal displayed was in the common interest of "winning the war" that there is and can be nothing but reciprocal praise for each other's efforts, which will be of lasting benefit in future when the present compelling community of interest is no longer operative. The United States and the allies know each other better individually and collectively and are and will continue to be the greater and better friends for the experience that has come out of the cordial cooperation and coordination required by the common interest in this war.

[Sidenote: Spirit of men and officers.]

There is ample evidence on every hand, from the north of Scotland to the sh.o.r.es of the Mediterranean, that officers and men of the naval service, regular and reserve alike and together, have "turned to" on the work in hand, inspired by the guiding idea of doing all in their power, however humble the task, of "helping to win the war." Officers whose preference is for duty at sea, men who came over with a view to doing battle with the enemy, one and all, have done and are doing the work that comes to hand, even to the digging of ditches, with a will and with a cheery readiness for more of the same kind, for anything that will help to "get on with the war," that is an inspiration to all who work with them and of vast satisfaction to those over them who will know what their preferences in the matter of war employment are. They are a credit to the service and to their country.

[Sidenote: High standard of conduct.]

Furthermore, this large body of men, which occupies the position of the advance guard of the Navy, as a whole have so conducted themselves as to earn the highly favorable comment of the citizens in whose country they found themselves and whose guests they are in some measure. It is believed that it may well be said that the men on duty in Europe, far away from home ties and influences, will return to their own country unharmed by the temptations and pitfalls which their relatives and friends may have feared. They are a fine, upstanding lot of men, and their adaptability and efficiency have been so apparent as to fully warrant the oft-made statement that the men of the United States Navy, which includes the Marine Corps, can do anything, anywhere, and at any time.

[Sidenote: The _President Lincoln_ is torpedoed.]

On May 31, 1918, the _President Lincoln_ was returning to America from a voyage to France, and was in line formation with the U.S.S.

_Susquehanna_, the U.S.S. _Antigone_, and the U.S.S. _Ryndam_, the latter being on the left flank of the formation and about 800 yards from the _President Lincoln_. The weather was pleasant, the sun s.h.i.+ning brightly, with a choppy sea. The s.h.i.+ps were about 500 miles from the coast of France and had pa.s.sed through what was considered to be the most dangerous part of the war zone. At about 9 a.m. a terrific explosion occurred on the port side of the s.h.i.+p about 120 feet from the bow and immediately afterwards another explosion occurred on the port side about 120 feet from the stern of the s.h.i.+p, these explosions being immediately identified as coming from torpedoes fired by a German submarine.

It was found that the s.h.i.+p was struck by three torpedoes, which had been fired as one salvo from the submarine, two of the torpedoes striking practically together near the bow of the s.h.i.+p and the third striking near the stern. The wake of the torpedoes had been sighted by the officers and lookouts on watch, but the torpedoes were so close to the s.h.i.+p as to make it impossible to avoid them; and it was also found that the submarine at the time of firing was only about 800 yards from the _President Lincoln_.

There were at the time 715 persons on board, including about 30 officers and men of the Army. Some of these were sick and two soldiers were totally paralyzed.

The alarm was immediately sounded and everyone went to his proper station which had been designated at previous drills. There was not the slightest confusion and the crew and pa.s.sengers waited for and acted on orders from the commanding officer with a coolness which was truly inspiring.

[Sidenote: No confusion in leaving s.h.i.+p.]

Inspections were made below decks and it was found that the s.h.i.+p was rapidly filling with water, both forward and aft, and that there was little likelihood that she would remain afloat. The boats were lowered and the life rafts were placed in the water and about 15 minutes after the s.h.i.+p was struck all hands except the guns' crews were ordered to abandon the s.h.i.+p.

[Sidenote: Saving the sick and wounded.]

It had been previously planned that in order to avoid the losses which have occurred in such instances by filling the boats at the davits before lowering them, that only one officer and five men would get into the boats before lowering and that everyone else would get into the water and get on the life rafts and then be picked up by the boats, this being entirely feasible, as everyone was provided with an efficient life-saving jacket. One exception was made to this plan, however, in that one boat was filled with the sick before being lowered and it was in this boat that the paralyzed soldiers were saved without difficulty.

[Sidenote: Courageous work of the gunners.]

The guns' crews were held at their stations hoping for an opportunity to fire on the submarine should it appear before the s.h.i.+p sank, and orders were given to the guns' crews to begin firing, hoping that this might prevent further attack. All the s.h.i.+p's company except the guns' crews and necessary officers were at that time in the boats and on the rafts near the s.h.i.+p, and when the guns' crews began firing the people in the boats set up a cheer to show that they were not downhearted. The guns'

crews only left their guns when ordered by the commanding officer just before the s.h.i.+p sank. The guns in the bow kept up firing until after the water was entirely over the main deck of the after half of the s.h.i.+p.

The state of discipline which existed and the coolness of the men is well ill.u.s.trated by what occurred when the boats were being lowered and were about half way from their davits to the water. At this particular time, there appeared some possibility of the s.h.i.+p not sinking immediately, and the commanding officer gave the order to stop lowering the boats. This order could not be understood, however, owing to the noise caused by escaping steam from the safety valves of the boilers which had been lifted to prevent explosion, but by motion of the hand from the commanding officer the crews stopped lowering the boats and held them in mid-air for a few minutes until at a further motion of the hand the boats were dropped into the water.

[Sidenote: Rafts tied together to prevent drifting.]

Immediately after the s.h.i.+p sank the boats pulled among the rafts and were loaded with men to their full capacity and the work of collecting the rafts and tying them together to prevent drifting apart and being lost was begun.