World's War Events Volume I Part 37

[Sidenote: Ravin des Cuisines.]

(4) _Sector of Le Mesnil._ It was to the north of Le Mesnil that we encountered the greatest resistance on the part of the adversary. In the course of the engagements of the preceding winter we had succeeded in securing a foothold on top of the hill numbered 196. The Germans remained a little to the east, in a ravine which we continued to call by its designation of the "Ravine of the Kitchens" (Ravin des Cuisines).

Our a.s.sault rendered us masters of it, but we could make no further progress.

[Sidenote: Fighting on the b.u.t.te du Mesnil.]

The German trenches are constructed on the northern slopes of Hill 196, and are concealed from field observation so that it is difficult for the artillery to play upon them. Moreover, they are flanked on one side by the twin heights of the Mamelles, on the other by the b.u.t.te du Mesnil.

To the eastward some of our units contrived on September 25, 1915, to penetrate into the trenches of the _b.u.t.te_ (knoll), but failed to maintain their ground, in consequence of a counter-attack supported by flank fires. Westward, it was not until the night of the 1st to the 2nd of October, 1915, that we captured the northern Mamelle, thus surrounding the works of the Trapeze which surmount the southern Mamelle.

[Sidenote: Rapid and brilliant advance.]

(5) _Sector of Beausejour._ The attacks launched north of Beausejour met with a more rapid and more brilliant success. The swarm of invaders throwing themselves on the first German lines captured one after the other the enemy works in the very spa.r.s.ely timbered woods called the Fer de Lance wood and the Demi-Lune wood, and afterwards all the works known as the Bastion. In one rush certain units gained the top of Maisons de Champagne, past several batteries, killing the artillerymen as they served their pieces. The same movement took the a.s.sailants across the intricate region of the mine "funnels" of Beausejour up to the extended wood intersected by the road to Maisons de Champagne. Our soldiers then came across German artillerymen engaged in unlimbering their guns. They killed the drivers and horses; the survivors surrendered.

[Sidenote: Cavalry supports the infantry.]

[Sidenote: Enemy counter-attacks.]

Further westward the left wing of the attacking troops advanced with greater difficulty, being hampered by small forts and covered works with which the trenches were everywhere protected. It was at this moment that the cavalry came unexpectedly to the support of the infantry. Two squadrons of hussars having crossed our old trenches in face of a heavy defensive artillery fire prepared to gallop against the German batteries north of Maisons de Champagne, when they reached that part of the lines where the Germans still maintained their position. The latter immediately directed the fire of their machine guns against the cavalrymen, several of whose horses were hit. The hussars dismounted and, with drawn sabres, made for the trenches, while favoured by this diversion, the infantrymen resumed their forward movement. The resistance of the enemy broke down; more than six hundred Germans were captured in this way. In the course of the afternoon and during the day of September 25, 1915, some enemy counter-attacks were made from the direction of Ripont, but were unsuccessful in ousting us from the summit of Maisons de Champagne.

On the following days a fierce struggle took place north of the summit in the region of a defensive work known as the "Ouvrage de la Defaite,"

which was captured by us, lost, then recaptured, and finally evacuated in consequence of an extremely violent bombardment.

[Sidenote: Heights of Ma.s.siges.]

(6) _Sector of Ma.s.siges._ The safety of our troops which had advanced as far as the extended wood and Maisons de Champagne was a.s.sured by the capture of the summits of the heights of Ma.s.siges. This sharply undulating upland, numbered 199 on the north and 191 on the south, const.i.tuted in the hands of the Germans a fortress which they believed to be impregnable and from the top of which they commanded our positions in several directions. At 9.15 a.m. the two first attacking parties marched out in columns. The men went forth gaily and deliberately, preceded by the firing of the field artillery. By 9.30 a.m. our infantry, before the enemy had had time to recover themselves, had reached the summit.

[Sidenote: Enemy machine gun fire.]

[Sidenote: Lines of grenadiers.]

From this moment, subject to machine gun and musketry fire, the men could only proceed slowly along the summits by the alleys of communication, with hand grenades, supported by the artillery, with whom they remained in constant touch by flag-signalling. As the advance of our grenadiers continued, the Germans surrendered in large numbers. An uninterrupted chain of grenade-bearers, like the chains of bucket-holders at a fire in former times, was established in the alleys of communication from Ma.s.siges forward, and each fresh arrival of grenades was accompanied by a fresh advance.

[Sidenote: Value of possessing the heights.]

From September 25 to October 3, 1915, the fight continued in this way and was carried on by our soldiers with fierce persistency. The Germans hurled upon the spot constant reinforcements and offered an obstinate resistance that has rarely been equalled. They stood up to be shot down--the machine-gun men at their guns, the grenadiers on their grenade chests. All attempts at a counter-attack remained equally unproductive.

The possession of the heights of Ma.s.siges enabled us to extend our gains towards Ville-sur-Tourbe, while taking in flank the trenches which we had failed to secure by a frontal attack.

The loss of the heights of Ma.s.siges appears to have particularly upset the German General Staff, which, after having denied the fact, represented that the ground which it had lost as a consequence of grenade fighting had been abandoned owing to artillery fire.

[Sidenote: Att.i.tude of the enemy.]

The att.i.tude of the enemy was characterized by: (1) Surprise; (2) disorganization; (3) a sudden and almost disorderly engagement of the reserves; (4) the exhaustion and demoralization of the soldiers.

[Sidenote: Reasons for surprise.]

(1) It is beyond doubt that the Germans were surprised by the extent and violence of our attacks. They were expecting a French offensive. The orders of the day of Generals von Fleck and Von Ditfurth prove this.

("The possibility of a great French offensive must be considered": Von Ditfurth, August 15. "The French Higher Command appears to be disposed to make another desperate effort": Von Fleck, September 26.) But the Germans foresaw neither the strength nor the success of the effort.

During our artillery preparation twenty-nine battalions only were brought back to Champagne (the 183rd Brigade, the 5th Division of the 3rd Corps, and one-half of the 43rd Division of Reserve). In thus limiting before the attack the reinforcements of its effectives the German General Staff showed that they did not suspect the vigour of the blow that was about to be delivered.

The same thing happened with regard to the subordinate forces. Inside the shelters in the second line officers were captured while lying down; they had an unwarranted confidence in the strength of their first line, and the interruption of telephone communications had prevented their being informed of the rapid progress of our offensive.

[Sidenote: Rapidity of French attack.]

(2) This rapidity of our attack explains the disorganization of the adversary on the morning of September 25. At some points certain officers and non-commissioned officers were able to continue the resistance until the investment, followed by capitulation. But elsewhere there were prompt surrenders. Men were also seen flying before our attacking troops and being killed while making for their second position.

[Sidenote: How the German reserves were utilized.]

(3) In order to make up for the insufficiency of the local reserves the German military authorities had to put in line not only the important units which they held at their disposal behind the front (10th Corps brought back from Russia), but the local reserves from other sectors (Soissonnais, Argonne, Woevre, Alsace), which were despatched to Champagne one battalion after another, and even in groups of double companies.

Nothing better indicates the disorganization of the German command and the significance of the check suffered than the conditions under which these reserves were engaged.

The units were despatched to the fight completely disa.s.sociated. Among the regiments of the 5th Division (3rd Corps), one, the 81st, was identified near Ma.s.siges, while a battalion of the 12th was at Tahure and a battalion of the 32nd at the Trou Bricot. It was the same as regards the 56th Division, of which the 88th and 35th Regiments were despatched to Ma.s.siges and the 91st to Souain, while a battalion of the 79th took up a position to the west of the b.u.t.te de Tahure.

[Sidenote: Haste increased German losses.]

Ill provided with food and munitions, the reinforcements were thrown into the engagement on an unknown terrain without indication as to the direction they had to take and without their junction with neighbouring units having been arranged. Through the haste with which they threw their reserves under the fire of our artillery and of our infantry, already in possession of the positions, the German General Staff considerably increased the number of their losses.

[Sidenote: Soldiers brought by motor-car.]

A letter taken from a soldier of the 118th Regiment furnishes us with proof of this: "We were put in a motor-car and proceeded at a headlong pace to Tahure, by way of Vouziers. Two hours' rest in the open air, with rain falling and then we had a six hours' march to take up our positions. On our way we were greeted by the fire of the enemy sh.e.l.ls, so that, for instance, out of 280 men of the second company, only 224 arrived safe and sound inside the trenches. These trenches, freshly dug, were barely from 35 to 50 centimetres deep. Continually surrounded by mines and bursting sh.e.l.ls, we had to remain in them and do the best we could with them for 118 hours without getting anything hot to eat.

"h.e.l.l itself could not be more terrible. To-day, at about twelve o'clock noon, 600 men, fresh troops, joined the regiment. In five days we have lost as many and more."

[Sidenote: Battalions from many regiments.]

The disorder amid which the reinforcements were engaged appears clearly from this fact, that on the only part of the front included between Maisons de Champagne and Hill 189 there were on October 2, 1915, thirty-two battalions belonging to twenty-one different regiments.

(4) The violence of the shock sustained, and the necessity of replacing in the fighting line units which had almost entirely disappeared, hampered the German military authorities. On the first day they were unable to respond effectively even with their artillery, the fire of which along the whole front was badly directed and as a rule poorly sustained. The loss of numerous batteries obviously deprived them of a portion of their resources.

[Sidenote: Enemy endeavors to stem advance.]

[Sidenote: Isolated battalion on the heights of Ma.s.siges.]

The following days the enemy seemed to have but one idea, to strengthen their second line to stem our advance. The counter-attacks were concentrated on a comparatively unimportant part of the battlefront in certain places, the loss of which appeared to them to be particularly dangerous. Therefore on the heights of Ma.s.siges the German military authorities threw in succession isolated battalions of the 123rd, 124th, and 120th regiments, of the 30th regular regiment and of the 2nd regiment of Ersatz Reserve (16th Corps), which were each in turn decimated, for these counter-attacks, hastily and crudely prepared, all resulted in sanguinary failures. Generally speaking, the offensive capacity of the Germans appeared to be broken. The following order of the day of General von Ditfurth bears witness to this:

[Sidenote: General von Ditfurth's order.]

"It seemed to me that the infantry at certain points was confining its action to a mere defensive. . . . I cannot protest too strongly against such an idea, which necessarily results in destroying the spirit of offensive in our own troops and in arousing and strengthening in the mind of the enemy a feeling of his superiority.

"The enemy is left full liberty of action and our own action is subjected to the will of the enemy."

[Sidenote: Prisoners exhausted.]

(5) In an engagement in the open the number of prisoners is an indication of the spirit of the enemy. In Champagne the Germans surrendered in const.i.tuted units (sections or companies), and even in groups of several hundred men. They confessed that they were worn out.

They had been, for the most part, without supplies for several days and had suffered more particularly from thirst. They all showed that they had been greatly impressed by our uninterrupted artillery fire, the feeble response of their own guns, and the extent of their losses.

Here by way of specimen is what was set down by a reserve lieutenant of the 90th Regiment of infantry (10th Corps):

"Yesterday I had sixteen men killed by high explosive bombs. The trench was nearly filled up. Extreme activity of the French howitzers. Our artillery fires shrapnel, but unfortunately does not get the range.