World's War Events Volume II Part 9

[Sidenote: The enemy's efforts to hold the ridge.]

We then entered upon a contest lasting for many weeks, during which the enemy, having found his strongest defenses unavailing, and now fully alive to his danger, put forth his utmost efforts to keep his hold of the main ridge. This stage of the battle const.i.tuted a prolonged and severe struggle for mastery between the contending armies, in which, although progress was slow and difficult, the confidence of our troops in their ability to win was never shaken. Their tenacity and determination proved more than equal to their task, and by the first week in September they had established a fighting superiority that has left its mark on the enemy, of which possession of the ridge was merely the visible proof.

[Sidenote: The plateau gained.]

[Sidenote: Successes of the French south of the Somme]

The way was then opened for the third phase, in which our advance was pushed down the forward slopes of the ridge and further extended on both flanks until, from Morval to Thiepval, the whole plateau and a good deal of ground beyond were in our possession. Meanwhile our gallant allies, in addition to great successes south of the Somme, had pushed their advance, against equally determined opposition and under most difficult tactical conditions, up the long slopes on our immediate right, and were now preparing to drive the enemy from the summit of the narrow and difficult portion of the main ridge which lies between the Combles Valley and the River Tortille, a stream flowing from the north into the Somme just below Peronne.

[Sidenote: Careful artillery preparation.]

Defenses of the nature described could only be attacked with any prospect of success after careful artillery preparation. It was accordingly decided that our bombardment should begin on June 24, 1916 and a large force of artillery was brought into action for the purpose.

[Sidenote: Gas discharges.]

Artillery bombardments were also carried out daily at different points on the rest of our front, and during the period from June 24 to July 1, 1916, gas was discharged with good effect at more than forty places along our line upon a frontage which in total amounted to over fifteen miles. Some seventy raids, too, were undertaken by our infantry between Gommecourt and our extreme left north of Ypres during the week preceding the attack, and these kept me well informed as to the enemy's dispositions, besides serving other useful purposes.

[Sidenote: Attack by the Royal Flying Corps.]

On June 25, 1916, the Royal Flying Corps carried out a general attack on the enemy's observation balloons, destroying nine of them, and depriving the enemy for the time being of this form of observation.

[Sidenote: British and French co-operate in attack.]

On July 1, 1916, at 7.30 a. m., after a final hour of exceptionally violent bombardment, our infantry a.s.sault was launched. Simultaneously the French attacked on both sides of the Somme, co-operating closely with us.

The British main front of attack extended from Maricourt on our right, round the salient at Fricourt, to the Ancre in front of St. Pierre Divion. To a.s.sist this main attack by holding the enemy's reserves and occupying his artillery, the enemy's trenches north of the Ancre, as far as Serre, inclusive, were to be a.s.saulted simultaneously, while further north a subsidiary attack was to be made on both sides of the salient at Gommecourt.

[Sidenote: Rawlinson and Allenby.]

I had intrusted the attack on the front from Maricourt to Serre to the Fourth Army, under the command of General Sir Henry S. Rawlinson, Bart., K. C. B., K. C. V. O., with five army corps at his disposal. The subsidiary attack at Gommecourt was carried out by troops from the army commanded by General Sir E. H. H. Allenby, K. C. B.

[Sidenote: Mines exploded under enemy lines.]

[Sidenote: Advance over open ground.]

[Sidenote: Trenches taken near Fricourt.]

Just prior to the attack the mines which had been prepared under the enemy's lines were exploded, and smoke was discharged at many places along our front. Through this smoke our infantry advanced to the attack with the utmost steadiness in spite of the very heavy barrage of the enemy's guns. On our right our troops met with immediate success, and rapid progress was made. Before midday Montauban had been carried, and shortly afterward the Briqueterie, to the east, and the whole of the ridge to the west of the village were in our hands. Opposite Mametz part of our a.s.sembly trenches had been practically leveled by the enemy artillery, making it necessary for our infantry to advance to the attack across 400 yards of open ground. None the less they forced their way into Mametz, and reached their objective in the valley beyond, first throwing out a defensive flank toward Fricourt on their left. At the same time the enemy's trenches were entered north of Fricourt, so that the enemy's garrison in that village was pressed on three sides. Further north, though the village of La Boisselle and Ovillers for the time being resisted our attack, our troops drove deeply into the German lines on the flanks of these strongholds, and so paved the way for their capture later.

[Sidenote: Fight for the Leipsic Salient.]

On the spur running south from Thiepval the work known as the Leipsic Salient was stormed, and severe fighting took place for the possession of the village and its defenses. Here and north of the valley of the Ancre, as far as Serre, on the left flank of our attack, our initial successes were not sustained. Striking progress was made at many points, and parties of troops penetrated the enemy's positions to the outer defenses of Grandcourt, and also to Pendant Copse and Serre; but the enemy's continued resistance at Thiepval and Beaumont Hamel made it impossible to forward reinforcements and ammunition, and in spite of their gallant efforts our troops were forced to withdraw during the night to their own lines.

[Sidenote: The attack at Gommecourt.]

The subsidiary attack at Gommecourt also forced its way into the enemy's positions, but there met with such vigorous opposition that as soon as it was considered that the attack had fulfilled its object our troops were withdrawn.

[Sidenote: Instructions to General Gough.]

In view of the general situation at the end of the first day's operations I decided that the best course was to press forward on a front extending from our junction with the French to a point half way between La Boisselle and Contalmaison, and to limit the offensive on our left for the present to a slow and methodical advance. North of the Ancre such preparations were to be made as would hold the enemy to his positions and enable the attack to be resumed there later if desirable.

In order that General Sir Henry Rawlinson might be left free to concentrate his attention on the portion of the front where the attack was to be pushed home, I also decided to place the operations against the front, La Boisselle to Serre, under the command of General Sir Hubert de la P. Gough, K. C. B., to whom I accordingly allotted the two northern corps of Sir Henry Rawlinson's army. My instructions to Sir Hubert Gough were that his army was to maintain a steady pressure on the front from La Boisselle to the Serre road and to act as a pivot on which our line could swing as our attacks on his right made progress toward the north.

[Sidenote: Fricourt to Contalmaison.]

During the succeeding days the attack was continued on these lines. In spite of strong counter-attacks on the Briqueterie and Montauban, by midday on July 2 our troops had captured Fricourt, and in the afternoon and evening stormed Fricourt Wood and the farm to the north. During July 3 and 4 Bernajay and Caterpillar woods were also captured, and our troops pushed forward to the railway north of Mametz. On these days the reduction of La Boisselle was completed after hard fighting, while the outskirts of Contalmaison were reached on July 5. North of La Boisselle also the enemy's forces opposite us were kept constantly engaged, and our holding in the Leipsic Salient was gradually increased.

[Sidenote: Result of five days' fighting.]

[Sidenote: Prisoners taken.]

To sum up the results of the fighting of these five days, on a front of over six miles, from the Briqueterie to La Boisselle, our troops had swept over the whole of the enemy's first and strongest system of defense, which he had done his utmost to render impregnable. They had driven him back over a distance of more than a mile, and had carried four elaborately fortified villages. The number of prisoners pa.s.sed back at the close of July 5, 1916, had already reached the total of ninety-four officers and 5,724 other ranks.

[Sidenote: Readjustments and reliefs.]

[Sidenote: Contalmaison and Mametz Wood.]

After the five days' heavy and continuous fighting just described it was essential to carry out certain readjustments and reliefs of the forces engaged. In normal conditions of enemy resistance the amount of progress that can be made at any time without a pause in the general advance is necessarily limited. Apart from the physical exhaustion of the attacking troops and the considerable distance separating the enemy's successive main systems of defense, special artillery preparation was required before a successful a.s.sault could be delivered. Meanwhile, however, local operations were continued in spite of much unfavorable weather.

The attack on Contalmaison and Mametz Wood was undertaken on July 7, 1916, and after three days' obstinate fighting, in the course of which the enemy delivered several powerful counterattacks, the village and the whole of the wood, except its northern border, were finally secured. On July 7 also a footing was gained in the other defenses of Ovillers, while on July 9, 1916, on our extreme right, Maltz Horn Farm--an important point on the spur north of Hardecourt--was secured.

[Sidenote: British troops in Trones Wood.]

A thousand yards north of this farm our troops had succeeded at the second attempt in establis.h.i.+ng themselves on July 8, 1916, in the southern end of Trones Wood. The enemy's positions in the northern and eastern parts of this wood were very strong, and no less than eight powerful German counterattacks were made here during the next five days.

In the course of this struggle portions of the wood changed hands several times; but we were left eventually, on July 13, 1916, in possession of the southern part of it.

[Sidenote: a.s.sault on the German second system of defense.]

Meanwhile Mametz Wood had been entirely cleared of the enemy, and with Trones Wood also practically in our possession we were in a position to undertake an a.s.sault upon the enemy's second system of defense.

Arrangements were accordingly made for an attack to be delivered at daybreak on the morning of July 14, 1916, against a front extending from Longueval to Bazentin-le-Pet.i.t Wood, both inclusive. Contalmaison Villa, on a spur 1,000 yards west of Bazentin-le-Pet.i.t Wood, had already been captured to secure the left flank of the attack, and advantage had been taken of the progress made by our infantry to move our artillery forward into new positions. The preliminary bombardment had opened on July 11, 1916. The opportunities offered by the ground for enfilading the enemy's lines were fully utilized, and did much to secure the success of our attack.

[Sidenote: A night operation of magnitude.]

In the early hours of July 4, 1916, the attacking troops moved out over the open for a distance of from about 1,000 to 1,400 yards, and lined up in the darkness just below the crest and some 300 to 500 yards from the enemy's trenches. Their advance was covered by strong patrols, and their correct deployment had been insured by careful previous preparations.

The whole movement was carried out un.o.bserved and without touch being lost in any case. The decision to attempt a night operation of this magnitude with an army, the bulk of which had been raised since the beginning of the war, was perhaps the highest tribute that could be paid to the quality of our troops. It would not have been possible but for the most careful preparation and forethought, as well as thorough reconnoissance of the ground, which was, in many cases, made personally by divisional, brigade, and battalion commanders and their staffs before framing their detailed orders for the advance.

[Sidenote: The a.s.sault on July 14.]

The actual a.s.sault was delivered at 3.25 a.m. on July 14, 1916, when there was just sufficient light to be able to distinguish friend from foe at short ranges, and along the whole front attacked our troops, preceded by a very effective artillery barrage, swept over the enemy's first trenches and on into the defenses beyond.

[Sidenote: Trones Wood cleared of the enemy.]

[Sidenote: Longueval occupied.]

On our right the enemy was driven from his last foothold in Trones Wood, and by 8 a.m. we had cleared the whole of it, relieving a body of 170 men who had maintained themselves all night in the northern corner of the wood, although completely surrounded by the enemy. Our position in the wood was finally consolidated, and strong patrols were sent out from it in the direction of Guillemont and Longueval. The southern half of this latter village was already in the hands of the troops who had advanced west of Trones Wood. The northern half, with the exception of two strong points, was captured by 4 p.m. after a severe struggle.

[Sidenote: The enemy counterattacks.]

In the centre of our attack Bazentin-le-Grand village and wood were also gained, and our troops pus.h.i.+ng northward captured Bazentin-le-Pet.i.t village and the cemetery to the east. Here the enemy counterattacked twice about midday without success, and again in the afternoon, on the latter occasion momentarily reoccupying the northern half of the village as far as the church. Our troops immediately returned to the attack and drove him out again with heavy losses. To the left of the village Bazentin-le-Pet.i.t Wood was cleared, in spite of the considerable resistance of the enemy along its western edge, where we successfully repulsed a counterattack. In the afternoon further ground was gained to the west of the wood, and posts were established immediately south of Pozieres.

[Sidenote: General Rawlinson employs cavalry.]