World's War Events Volume II Part 49

The officers and crew behaved splendidly. There was no excitement. The men went to their stations quietly and remained there all night, except when called away to handle lines.

[Sidenote: Efficiency of officers and men.]

The work of the executive officer, Lieutenant J. W. McClaran, and of the engineer officer, Lieutenant J. A. Saunders, is deserving of especial commendation. These two officers inspected magazines and s.p.a.ces below decks and superintended shoring of bulkheads and restaying of masts.

Lieutenant (Junior Grade) R. M. Parkinson did excellent work in getting an improvised radio set into commission. W. J. Murphy, chief electrician (radio), and F. R. Fisher, chief machinist's mate, are specifically mentioned in the commanding officer's report for their cool and efficient work.

Twenty-two enlisted men are mentioned by name as conspicuous for their coolness and leaders.h.i.+p.

[Sidenote: Luck in favor of the submarine.]

From the statement of all the officers it is evident that luck favored the submarine. The destroyer probably would have escaped being hit had not the torpedo broached twice and turned decidedly to the left both times--in other words, failed to function properly.

[Sidenote: The results of the explosion.]

The equivalent of 850 pounds of T. N. T. is estimated to have exploded in and upon the _Ca.s.sin's_ fantail; this includes the charges of the torpedo and of both depth mines. No. 4 gun, blown overboard, left the s.h.i.+p to port, although that was the side which the torpedo hit. The gun went over at a point well forward of her mount. The ma.s.s of the wreckage, however, went to starboard. Explosion of the depth charges, rather than that of the torpedo outward or in throwback, supposedly effected this. About five seconds elapsed between the torpedo's detonation and those of the mines. They probably went off close together, for accounts vary as to whether there were in all two or three explosions.

[Sidenote: The bulkhead buckles.]

Of the two after doors, that to port threatened to carry away soon after the seas began to pound in. The main ma.s.s of the wreckage which dropped off did so upward of an hour after the explosions. It was at this time that the bulkhead began to buckle and the port door and d.o.g.g.i.ng weaken.

It was sh.o.r.ed with mattresses under the personal direction of the executive. Up to this time and until the seas began to crumple the bulkhead completely, there was only a few inches of water in the two P.

O. compartments; and even when the _Ca.s.sin_ reached Queenstown, hardly more than three feet. None of the compartments directly under these three on the deck below--handling room, magazine, and oil tanks--were injured at all. The tanks were farthest aft, and were pumped out after docking.

[Sidenote: Freaks of flying metal.]

One piece of metal entered the wash room and before coming to rest completely circled it without touching a man who was standing in the center of the compartment. Another stray piece tore a six-inch hole in one of the stacks.

The destroyer within signal distance at the time of the attack was the U. S. S. _Porter_. It is believed that she saw the explosion, at least of the two depth charges, and thinking that the _Ca.s.sin_ was attacking a submarine, started off scouting before a signal could be sent and after the radio was out of commission.

[Sidenote: The _Alcedo's_ last voyage.]

[Sidenote: Low visibility hides convoy.]

At 4 p. m., November 4, 1917, the U. S. S. _Alcedo_ proceeded to sea from Quiberon Bay on escort duty to take convoy through the war zone.

Following the northbound convoy for Brest, when north of Belle Ile formation was taken with the _Alcedo_ on the starboard flank. At 5.45 p.

m. the _Alcedo_ took departure from Point Poulins Light. Darkness had fallen and owing to a haze visibility was poor, at times the convoy not being visible. About 11.30 visibility was such that the convoy was seen on the port bow of the _Alcedo_, the nearest s.h.i.+p, according to the commanding officer's estimate, being about 1,200 yards distant. Having written his night order, the commanding officer left the bridge and turned in.

The following is his report of the torpedoing:

[Sidenote: "Submarine, Captain."]

[Sidenote: Attempts to avoid the torpedo.]

At or about 1.45 a. m., November 5, while sleeping in emergency cabin, immediately under upper bridge, I was awakened by a commotion and immediately received a report from some man unknown, "Submarine, captain." I jumped out of bed and went to the upper bridge, and the officer of the deck, Lieutenant Paul, stated he had sounded "general quarters," had seen submarine on surface about 300 yards on port bow, and submarine had fired a torpedo, which was approaching. I took station on port wing of upper bridge and saw torpedo approaching about 200 feet distant. Lieutenant Paul had put the rudder full right before I arrived on bridge, hoping to avoid the torpedo. The s.h.i.+p answered slowly to her helm, however, and before any other action could be taken the torpedo I saw struck the s.h.i.+p's side immediately under the port forward chain plates, the detonation occurring instantly. I was thrown down and for a few seconds dazed by falling debris and water.

[Sidenote: Submarine alarm sounded on siren.]

Upon regaining my feet I sounded the submarine alarm on the siren, to call all hands if they had not heard the general alarm gong, and to direct the attention of the convoy and other escorting vessels. Called to the forward guns' crews to see if at stations, but by this time realized that gallant forecastle was practically awash. The foremast had fallen, carrying away radio aerial. I called out to abandon s.h.i.+p.

I then left the upper bridge and went into the chart house to obtain s.h.i.+p's position from the chart, but, as there was no light, could not see. I then went out of the chart house and met the navigator, Lieutenant Leonard, and asked him if he had sent any radio, and he replied "No." I then directed him and accompanied him to the main deck and told him to take charge of cutting away forward dories and life rafts.

I then proceeded along starboard gangway and found a man lying face down in gangway. I stooped and rolled him over and spoke to him, but received no reply and was unable to learn his ident.i.ty, owing to the darkness. It is my opinion that this man was dead.

[Sidenote: Dories and life rafts are cut away.]

I then continued to the after end of s.h.i.+p, took station on aftergun platform. I then realized that the s.h.i.+p was filling rapidly and her bulwarks amids.h.i.+ps were level with the water. I directed the after dories and life rafts to be cut away and thrown overboard and ordered the men in the immediate vicinity to jump over the side, intending to follow them.

[Sidenote: The s.h.i.+p sinks--Captain reaches a whaleboat.]

Before I could jump, however, the s.h.i.+p listed heavily to port, plunging by the head, and sunk, carrying me down with the suction. I experienced no difficulty, however, in getting clear, and when I came to the surface I swam a few yards to a life raft, to which were clinging three men. We climbed on board this raft and upon looking around observed Doyle, chief boatswain's mate, and one other man in the whaleboat. We paddled to the whaleboat and embarked from the life raft.

[Sidenote: Rescuing men from the water.]

The whaleboat was about half full of water, and we immediately started bailing and then to rescue men from wreckage, and quickly filled the whaleboat to more than its maximum capacity, so that no others could be taken aboard. We then picked up two overturned dories which were nested together, separated them and righted them, only to find that their sterns had been broken. We then located another nest of dories, which were separated and righted and found to be seaworthy. Transferred some men from the whaleboat into these dories and proceeded to pick up other men from wreckage. During this time cries were heard from two men in the water some distance away who were holding on to wreckage and calling for a.s.sistance. It is believed that these men were Ernest M. Harrison, mess attendant, and John Winne, jr., seaman. As soon as the dories were available we proceeded to where they were last seen, but could find no trace of them.

[Sidenote: Submarine of _U-27_ type approaches.]

About this time, which was probably an hour after the s.h.i.+p sank, a German submarine approached the scene of torpedoing and lay to near some of the dories and life rafts. She was in the light condition, and from my observation of her I am of the opinion that she was of the _U-27-31_ type. This has been confirmed by having a number of men and officers check the silhouette book. The submarine was probably 100 yards distant from my whaleboat, and I heard no remarks from anyone on the submarine, although I observed three persons standing on top of conning tower.

After laying on surface about half an hour the submarine steered off and submerged.

[Sidenote: Boats leave scene of disaster.]

I then proceeded with the whaleboat and two dories searching through the wreckage to make sure that no survivors were left in the water. No other people being seen, at 4.30 a. m. we started away from the scene of disaster.

The _Alcedo_ was sunk, as near as I can estimate, 75 miles west true of north end of Belle Ile. The torpedo struck s.h.i.+p at 1.46 by the officer of the deck's watch, and the same watch stopped at 1.54 a. m., November 5, this showing that the s.h.i.+p remained afloat eight minutes.

[Sidenote: A French torpedo boat rescues the Captain's party.]

The flare of Penmark Light was visible, and I headed for it and ascertained the course by Polaris to be approximately northeast. We rowed until 1.15, when Penmark Lighthouse was sighted. Continued rowing until 5.15 p. m. when Penmark Lighthouse was distant about 2 1/2 miles.

We were then picked up by French torpedo boat _275_, and upon going on board I requested the commanding officer to radio immediately to Brest reporting the fact of torpedoing and that 3 officers and 40 men were proceeding to Brest. The French gave all a.s.sistance possible for the comfort of the survivors. We arrived at Brest about 11 p. m. Those requiring medical attention were sent to the hospital and the others were sent off to the _Panther_ to be quartered.

[Sidenote: Crews of two other dories safe.]

Upon arrival at Brest I was informed that two other dories containing Lieutenant H. R. Leonard, Lieutenant H. A. Peterson, Pa.s.sed a.s.sistant Surgeon Paul O. M. Andreae, and 25 men had landed at Pen March Point.

This was my first intimation that these officers and men had been saved, as they had not been seen by any of my party at the scene of torpedoing.

[Sidenote: The destroyer _Jacob Jones_ is torpedoed.]

At 4.21 p. m. on December 6, 1917, in lat.i.tude 4923 north, longitude 613 west, clear weather, smooth sea, speed 13 knots zigzagging, the U.

S. S. _Jacob Jones_ was struck on the starboard side by a torpedo from an enemy submarine. The s.h.i.+p was one of six of an escorting group which were returning independently from off Brest to Queenstown. All other s.h.i.+ps of the group were out of sight ahead.

[Sidenote: Attempts to avoid the torpedo.]

I was in the chart house and heard some one call out "Torpedo!" I jumped at once to the bridge, and on the way up saw the torpedo about 800 yards from the s.h.i.+p approaching from about one point abaft the starboard beam headed for a point about mids.h.i.+ps, making a perfectly straight surface run (alternately broaching and submerging to apparently 4 or 5 feet), at an estimated speed of at least 40 knots. No periscope was sighted. When I reached the bridge I found that the officer of the deck had already put the rudder hard left and rung up emergency speed on the engine-room telegraph. The s.h.i.+p had already begun to swing to the left. I personally rang up emergency speed again and then turned to watch the torpedo. The executive officer, Lieutenant Norman Scott, left the chart house just ahead of me, saw the torpedo immediately on getting outside the door, and estimates that the torpedo when he sighted it was 1,000 yards away, approaching from one point, or slightly less, abaft the beam and making exceedingly high speed.

[Sidenote: Lieutenant Kalk acts promptly.]

After seeing the torpedo and realizing the straight run, line of approach, and high speed it was making, I was convinced that it was impossible to maneuver to avoid it. Lieutenant (Junior Grade) S. F. Kalk was officer of the deck at the time, and I consider that he took correct and especially prompt measures in maneuvering to avoid the torpedo.

Lieutenant Kalk was a very able officer, calm and collected in emergency. He had been attached to the s.h.i.+p for about two months and had shown especial apt.i.tude. His action in this emergency entirely justified my confidence in him. I deeply regret to state that he was lost as a result of the torpedoing of the s.h.i.+p, dying of exposure on one of the rafts.