The Middle Period 1817-1858 Part 27

{319} [Sidenote: The popularity of the Democratic position, and Mr.

Clay's letter of August 16th.]

In the beginning of June, the election of Mr. Clay seemed a certainty.

As the campaign wore on it became manifest that annexation was rapidly growing in the popular favor, and that Mr. Clay would lose some of his Southern support, unless the opinion which prevailed in that section concerning his opposition to annexation should be modified. With this in view, and under the belief that the state of feeling upon the subject at the North had become less hostile, Mr. Clay caused to be published in an Alabama newspaper, on August 16th, a letter defining again his att.i.tude toward annexation.

No sane and impartial mind can, at this day, see any material difference between the opinion expressed by Mr. Clay in his letter of April 17th, and that in his letter of August 16th. In the former, he took the ground that the United States ought not to annex Texas without the consent of Mexico, or against the decided opposition of a considerable and respectable portion of the Union. In the latter, he said he should be glad to see Texas annexed, if it could be done "without dishonor, without war, with the common consent of the Union, and upon just and fair terms." He added that he did not think the slavery question ought to enter into the consideration at all, that slavery was destined to become extinct in the United States, and that its duration would neither be lengthened nor shortened by the acquisition of Texas.

[Sidenote: The Abolitionists declare against Mr. Clay.]

The Abolitionists, however, could see the question only from a single point of view. They wanted Mr. Clay to say that the annexation of Texas meant permanent slavery extension, and that he opposed it upon that ground. They were not satisfied by Mr. Clay's causing another letter to be published, in the _National Intelligencer_, declaring that {320} his two former letters were entirely consistent with each other, and that he held inflexibly to the principles of the first one.

They even went so far in their extravagant fanaticism as to represent to the people that Mr. Clay's election would be more favorable to annexation than that of Mr. Polk.

[Sidenote: The triumph of Polk.]

It is usually said that Mr. Clay's Alabama letter turned a sufficient number of votes to the Abolitionist candidate, Mr. Birney, to cause Mr. Clay to lose the electoral votes of New York and Michigan, and thus insured the election of Mr. Polk, and consequently the annexation of Texas and the War with Mexico. It is probably true that it did cause the loss of New York and Michigan, but it is possible that it held North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee in line. The failure of Mr. Clay is, therefore, more probably to be ascribed to Abolitionist fanaticism than to his own blundering. At any rate, this was the view held by Mr. Greeley, a very competent observer. He said that "the triumph of annexation was secured by the indirect aid of the more intense partisans of abolition."

[Sidenote: Tyler's recommendation to annex Texas by a joint resolution or an act.]

The result of the election was regarded as the plebiscite upon the question of annexation, and also upon the Oregon question, but more especially upon the former. In his message to Congress at the opening of the session of 1844-45, President Tyler informed Congress that, since the rejection of the Treaty for annexation by the Senate, Mexico had threatened to renew war against Texas, and prosecute the same by barbarous means and methods, and that he had caused the Minister of the United States to Mexico to inform the Mexican Government that the question of annexation was still before the American people, and that, until their decision had been p.r.o.nounced, any serious invasion of Texas could not be {321} regarded by them with indifference. He declared that, in the late general election, the people had p.r.o.nounced for immediate annexation; and he recommended that Congress should incorporate the terms of the late agreement for annexation into the form of an act or a joint resolution, which should be binding upon both parties when adopted in like manner by the Texan Congress. He also informed Congress that negotiations had been opened with Great Britain relative to the respective rights of the two Powers in, and over, the Oregon territory.

[Sidenote: The resolution for annexation in the House of Representatives.]

That part of the message relating to the question of annexation was referred, in the House of Representatives, to the committee on Foreign Affairs, and, on December 12th, Mr. Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, reported from that committee the draft of a joint resolution for the annexation of Texas. It was simply the articles of the agreement of April 12th preceding put into that form. The princ.i.p.al points of it were, the cession of the territory of Texas to the United States, the transfer of the public lands of Texas to the Government of the United States, the pledge of the United States to a.s.sume the debt of Texas up to ten millions of dollars, the guarantee of liberty and property to the citizens of Texas, now to be citizens of the United States, and the accordance of Commonwealth local government to Texas as soon as consistent with the Const.i.tution of the United States.

As we have seen, the President and Mr. Calhoun had thought that the proper way to annex a foreign state to the United States was by means of a treaty, in which the foreign state should cede its territory to the United States; and that the matter of local government for the ceded territory and its population would then be a question of legislation. We have also seen that the {322} opponents of the proposed Treaty in the Senate took the ground, among other things, that Texas was already a state, seeking admission into the Union as a "State" (Commonwealth), and that this could be effected only by an act of Congress. But now the opposition in the House of Representatives to the joint resolution, expressed in the very words of the proposed Treaty, declared that the resolution provided for a cession of territory by a foreign state to the United States, which cession could be made and accepted only through the form of a treaty. The House had never, however, committed itself to the view of the Senate, and the friends of the resolution wasted no time in demonstrating the inconsistency, but sought to so amend the resolution as to make it an act for the formation of a new Commonwealth, or, as it is usually phrased, an act for the admission of a new "State" into this Union.

[Sidenote: Pa.s.sage of an enabling act for Texas by the House of Representatives.]

On January 25th, 1845, the House pa.s.sed a subst.i.tute for the committee's resolution, which subst.i.tute was a resolution for enabling the people of Texas to form a Commonwealth const.i.tution and government, preparatory to admission into this Union, and prescribing certain conditions for the a.s.sent of Congress to the same.

[Sidenote: The resolution in the Senate, and Mr. Archer's inconsistencies.]

When this resolution reached the Senate, it was referred to the committee of that body for Foreign Affairs, and on February 4th, Mr.

Archer, the chairman of the committee, presented a report from his committee, and a recommendation that the proposition from the House be rejected. The ground for this recommendation, as contained in the report, was that the House had undertaken to do by an act of Congress what could be done only by means of a treaty. And this was from that same Mr. Archer, who, on June 8th preceding, had opposed the {323} ratification of the Treaty, on the ground that what was proposed to be effected by a treaty could be done only by means of an act of Congress.

[Sidenote: The Senate's amendment to the resolution of the House.]

It was not to be expected that the Senate or the country would put up with any such inconsistent trifling. The Senators were, however, much concerned in preserving the treaty-making power of the Senate, and hesitated long, attempting to find the way out of the embarra.s.sment, which they had prepared for themselves, by their att.i.tude, during the preceding session, toward the proposed Treaty. At last, on February 27th, Mr. Walker, of Mississippi, offered an apparent method of escape. He moved to amend the resolution sent from the House by the provision that, if the President should deem it more advisable to negotiate with Texas for her admission into the Union than to submit the joint resolution as an overture to her, he might do so, and then might submit the agreements, which might thus be made, either to the Senate to be approved of as a treaty, or to both Houses to be approved of as an act. Everybody knew, of course, that this was a mere subterfuge to save appearances, and that the President would immediately communicate the joint resolution to the Texan authorities.

[Sidenote: The concurrence of the House in the Senate's amendment, and the pa.s.sage of the measure for Admission.]

The House of Representatives concurred in the Senate's amendment, and the President signed the measure on March 1st, 1845. He immediately submitted the resolution to the Texan authorities, and on December 29th, 1845, Texas was formally admitted as a "State" into this Union.

There is little question that the President and Mr. Calhoun were correct as regards the manner in which a foreign state should be annexed to the United States, but they can hardly be justly blamed or criticised for {324} following the method insisted upon by Congress as the const.i.tutional form and prescript.

[Sidenote: The British proposition in regard to Oregon.]

[Sidenote: The American proposition.]

In his first annual message President Polk informed Congress that when he came into office he found that Great Britain had proposed to settle the Oregon question by making the divisional line between the possessions of the two Powers, west of the Rocky Mountains, the forty-ninth parallel of lat.i.tude to the northeasternmost branch of the Columbia River, and, from this point, the course of the river to the Pacific; that his predecessor had refused this; that he himself had, upon invitation from the British plenipotentiary to make a proposition, offered the forty-ninth parallel from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific, although he believed the claim of the United States to the territory up to the parallel of fifty-four degrees and forty minutes to be good; and that this proposition had been rejected by the British minister.

[Sidenote: Polk's recommendation in regard to the matter.]

The President further declared that all attempts to compromise with Great Britain had failed, and he recommended that Congress should give the notice, required by the convention of joint occupancy, for the termination of that agreement, as the first step toward a.s.serting the power of the Government over the whole of Oregon. He also recommended the establishment of a line of posts along the Oregon route for the protection of emigrants to Oregon, and the immediate extension of the jurisdiction of the United States Government over the citizens of the United States in Oregon.

This was distinct enough and belligerent enough. The Abolitionists and anti-slavery Whigs, who had been twitting the Administration with indifference about Oregon, now that Texas had been secured, could {325} certainly find no fault with the President's att.i.tude toward the question. At any rate, it was a challenge to them which could not be ignored.

[Sidenote: The debate upon the President's recommendation.]

Both Houses entered immediately upon the discussion of the question of giving the notice. As the debate progressed the war fever became allayed, and the conviction grew that the claim to the line of fifty-four forty was extravagant. The majority, at least, saw that the claim by occupation and settlement was the right basis for the determination of the dispute, and that this claim would give the United States the territory only to the line of the northern watershed of the Columbia.

This line does, indeed, reach at points above the forty-ninth parallel, but the fact that this parallel was already the divisional line between the possessions of the two Powers from the Great Lakes to the Rockies, and that the United States had already proposed to Great Britain the continuation of this line to the Pacific, produced the general feeling that the United States should be satisfied with the forty-ninth parallel as the northern boundary of Oregon, rather than risk war for the more northern line. Still, the opponents of the Administration had been so quick to charge the President with indifference to the acquisition of territory, upon which non-slaveholding Commonwealths would be established, that they were now fairly ashamed to lag behind him.

[Sidenote: The conclusion reached by Congress.]

Owing to the course taken by the Senate, Congress did not, however, come to any conclusion upon the recommendation of the President until April 23rd, 1846, and then, in the resolution finally pa.s.sed, it almost emasculated the President's proposition. It empowered the President to give the notice, but explained that the purpose of the same was {326} to direct the attention of the two Governments toward the adoption of more earnest measures for the amicable settlement of the question, and it threw upon the President the responsibility as to the time of giving the notice, by placing that matter entirely within his discretion.

[Sidenote: The President's retort upon Congress.]

The President had already reopened negotiations with Great Britain upon the subject, and, on June 10th, he laid before the Senate a proposal, from the British Envoy, of the forty-ninth parallel for the boundary, and asked the Senate to advise him as to whether he should close with the offer. It was not customary to consult the Senate at this point of the negotiations, but there was precedent for it, and the letter of the Const.i.tution appears to warrant it, and the President was determined to retort upon the Senate, for its action in the matter of the notice, by throwing the responsibility upon that body of sacrificing the claims of the United States to territory above the forty-ninth parallel. He plainly informed the Senate that he would reject the offer unless advised by it to accept.

[Sidenote: The Oregon Treaty.]

The Senate was fairly caught in its own net, and had the good sense to refrain from a resistance which would have been only an undignified floundering in meshes prepared by itself. On the 12th, the Senate advised the President to accept the British overture. On the 15th, the President signed the treaty, and, on the 18th, the Senate ratified it by a large majority.

Not many realized, at the moment, that the extension of the sovereignty of the United States to the Pacific above the forty-second parallel of north lat.i.tude would require the like extension to the south of it. Once across the Rockies it was inevitable that the natural boundary in the southwest, as well as in the northwest, should be ultimately attained. It came sooner than anybody expected.

{327}

CHAPTER XVI.

THE WAR WITH MEXICO

Slidell's Mission to Mexico--The Failure of the Mission--The Concentration of the Mexican Forces at Matamoras--The United States Forces Ordered to the Rio Grande--Hostilities Opened--The Battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma--The Att.i.tude of Congress toward the War--Congressional Approval of the War--The Occupation of New Mexico and Upper California, and the Advance into Mexico--California's Importance--The Battle of Buena Vista--Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo--Contreras, San Antonio, and Cherubusco--The Plan for a Cession of Territory from Mexico--The Wilmot Proviso--The Fate of the Wilmot Proviso in the Senate--The Proviso Again Voted by the House of Representatives--The Upham Amendment in the Senate--The Amendment Defeated by the Efforts of Mr. Ca.s.s--The Wilmot Proviso Dropped in the House--The Mission of Mr. Trist--Rejection of Mr. Trist's Propositions by the Mexicans--Negotiations Broken off--Molino del Rey, Chapultepec, Mexico--The Recall of Mr. Trist, and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo--Ratification of the Treaty.

[Sidenote: Slidell's mission to Mexico.]

As we have seen, the Mexican Government had announced to the Government of the United States that the annexation of Texas would be regarded by Mexico as a _casus belli_. Consequently, as soon as the matter was concluded, the Mexican Envoy left Was.h.i.+ngton, and all diplomatic relations between the two Powers were suspended. Some six months later, President Polk made overtures for the resumption of these relations, and, upon meeting a somewhat friendly response, commissioned Mr. John Slidell, of Louisiana, to go to Mexico and negotiate a treaty, which should settle all the differences between the two Powers.

{328} Mr. Slidell arrived at Vera Cruz on November 30th, 1845, and found that President Herrera's Administration was afraid to receive him, because the military or war party in Mexico, led by General Paredes, was greatly excited by the att.i.tude of the Administration toward the United States, and threatened revolution. The Mexican Government actually refused audience to Mr. Slidell, on December 21st.

[Sidenote: The failure of the mission.]

Before the end of the year, President Herrera gave way to General Paredes, who a.s.sumed the presidency of the Republic, and, under direction from President Polk, Mr. Slidell announced himself to the new Administration. This was March 1st, 1846. On the 12th, he received the refusal of the Paredes Government to give him audience, and immediately left Mexico.