The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min Part 16

III.

Modern Cities with public utilities to be constructed in all Railway Centers, Termini, and alongside Harbors.

IV.

Water Power Development.

V.

Iron and Steel Works and Cement Works on the largest scale in order to supply the above needs.

VI.

Mineral Development.

VII.

Agricultural Development.

VIII.

Irrigational Work on the largest scale in Mongolia and Sinkiang.

IX.

Reforestation in Central and North China.

X.

Colonization in Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kokonor, and Thibet.(311)

The industrial revolution is to _min sheng_ what the present program of socialist construction is to the Marxians of the Soviet Union, what prosperity is to American democracy. Without industrialization _min sheng_ must remain an academic theory. Sun's program gives a definite physical gauge by means of which the success of his followers can be told, and the extent of China's progress estimated. It provides a material foundation to the social and political changes in China.

The theory of Sun Yat-sen in connection with the continuation of the old system is a significant one. His political doctrines, both ideological and programmatic, are original and not without great meaning in the development of an adequate and just state system in modern China. But this work might have been done, although perhaps not as well, by other leaders.

The significance of Sun in his own lifetime lay in his deliberate championing of the cause of industrial revolution as the _sine qua non_ of development in China. In the epoch of the first Republic he relinquished the Presidency in favor of Yuan s.h.i.+h-k'ai in order to be able to devote his whole time to the advancement of the railway program of the Republic.

In the years that he had to spend in exile, he constantly studied and preached the necessity of modernizing China. Of his slogan, "Modernization without Westernization!" modernization is the industrial revolution, and non-Westernization the rest of his programs and ideology. The unity of Sun Yat-sen's doctrines is apparent; they are inseparable; but if one part were to be plucked forth as his greatest contribution to the working politics of his own time, it might conceivably be his activities and plans for the industrial revolution.

He spoke feelingly and bitterly of the miserable lives which the vast majority of his countrymen had to lead, of the expensiveness and insecurity of their material existences, of the vast, tragic waste of human effort in the form of man-power in a world where machine-power had rendered muscular work unnecessary. "This miserable condition among the Chinese proletariat [he apparently means the whole working cla.s.s] is due to the non-development of the country, the crude methods of production, and the wastefulness of labor. The radical cure for all this is industrial development by foreign capital and experts for the benefit of the whole nation.... If foreign capital cannot be gotten, we will have to get at least their experts and inventors to make for us our own machinery...."(312) Howsoever the work was to be done, it had to be done.

In bringing China into the modern world, in modernizing her economy, in a.s.suring the justice of the new economy which was to emerge, Sun found the key in the physical advancement of China, in the building of vast railway systems, in creating ports "with future capacity equalling New York harbor," in re-making the whole face of Eastern Asia as a better home for his beloved race-nation.

The Social Revolution.

In considering the social revolution which was to form the third part of the program of _min sheng_, four questions appear, each requiring examination. It is in this field of Sun's programs that the terms of the Western ideology are most relevant, since the ideological distinctions to be found in old China as contrasted with the West do not apply so positively in problems that are to appear in a society which is to be industrially modern. Even in this, however, some of the old Chinese ideas may continue in use and give relevance to the terms with which Sun discusses the social revolution. Private property, that mysterious relation between an individual and certain goods and services, has been almost a fetish in the West; the Chinese, already subject to the collectivisms of the family, the village and the _hui_, does not have the deep attachment to this notion that Westerners-especially those who do have property-are apt to develop. Consequently, even though the discussion of Sun's programs with regard to distributive justice are remarkably like the discussions of the same problem to be found in the West, the possibility, at least, of certain minor though thoroughgoing differences must be allowed for, and not overlooked altogether. The four aspects to this problem which one may distinguish in Sun's program for _min sheng_ are: what is to be the sphere of state action? what is to be the treatment accorded private owners.h.i.+p of land? what is to be the position of private capital? and, what of the cla.s.s struggle?

Sun Yat-sen said: "In modern civilization, the material essentials of life are five, namely: food, clothing, shelter, means of locomotion, and the printed page."(313) At other times he may have made slightly different arrangements of these fundamental necessities, but the essential content of the demands remained the same.

Behind his demand for a program to carry out _min sheng_ there was the fundamental belief that a government which does not a.s.sure and promote the material welfare of the ma.s.ses of its citizens does not deserve to exist.

To him the problem of livelihood, the concrete aspect of _min sheng_, was one which had to be faced by every government, and was a means of judging the righteousness of a government. He could not tolerate a state which did not a.s.sure the people a fair subsistence. There was no political or ethical value higher than life itself. A government which did not see that its subjects were fed, sheltered, clothed, transported, and lettered to the degree which the economic level of its time permitted, was a government deserving of destruction. Sun Yat-sen was not a doctrinaire on the subject of cla.s.ses; he would tolerate inequality, so long as it could be shown not to militate against the welfare of the people. He was completely intolerant of any government, Eastern or Western, which permitted its subjects to starve or to be degraded into a nightmare existence of semi-starvation. Whatever the means, this end of popular livelihood, of a reasonable minimum on the scale of living for each and every citizen, had to prevail above all others.(314)

Within the limits of this supreme criterion, Sun Yat-sen left the government to its own choice in the matter of the sphere of state action.

If the system of private initiative could develop more efficiently than could the government in certain fields, then leave those fields to private effort. If and when private initiative failed to meet rigid requirements to be established by the government it was not merely the privilege, it was the obligation of the government to intervene. Sun Yat-sen seems to have believed that government action would in the long run be desirable anyhow, but to have been enough of a political realist at the same time to be willing to allow the government a considerable length of time in expanding its activities. In a developing country like China it seemed to him probable that the ends of _ming sheng_ could best be served in many fields by private enterprise. "All matters that can be and are better carried out by private enterprise should be left to private hands which should be encouraged and fully protected by liberal laws...."(315)

From the outset, Sun Yat-sen's plan of empirical collectivism demanded a fairly broad range of state action. "All matters that cannot be taken up by private concerns and those that possess monopolistic character should be taken up as national undertakings."(316) This view of his may be traced, among others, to three suppositions he entertained concerning Bismarck, concerning "war socialism," and concerning the industrial revolution in China. Sun shows a certain grudging admiration for Bismarck, whom he believed to have offset the rising tide of democratic socialism in Germany by introducing state socialism, in government control of railroads, etc. "By this preventive method he imperceptibly did away with the controversial issues, and since the people had no reason to fight, a social revolution was naturally averted. This was the very great anti-democratic move of Bismarck."(317) Secondly, he believed that the "... unification and nationalization of all the industries, which I might call the Second Industrial Revolution ..." on account of the world war would be even more significant than the first.(318) It intensified the four elements of recent economic progress, which tended to prove the falsity of the Marxian predictions of the future of capitalism, namely: "a. Social and industrial improvements (i. e. labor and welfare legislation); b. State owners.h.i.+p of the means of transportation and of communication; c. Direct taxes; d. Socialized distribution (the cooperative movement)."(319) Finally, Sun believed that the magnitude of the Chinese industrial revolution was such that no private capital could establish its foundations, and that the state had perforce to initiate the great undertakings of industrialism.

Concerning Sun's beliefs regarding the sphere of state action in economic matters, one may say that his ideology of empirical collectivism required a program calling for: 1) the protection of private enterprise and the simultaneous launching of great state enterprises at the beginning; 2) the intermediate pursuance of a policy by means of which the state would be the guarantor of the livelihood of the people, and establish the sphere of its own action according to whether or not private enterprise was sufficient to meet the needs of the people; and 3) a long range trend toward complete collectivism.

With respect to the question of land, Sun Yat-sen believed in his own version of the "single tax," which was not, in his programs, the single tax, since he foresaw other sources of revenue for the state (tariffs, revenue from state enterprises, etc.). According to the land-control system of Sun Yat-sen the land-owner would himself a.s.sess the value of his land. He would be prevented from over-a.s.sessing it by his own desire to avoid paying too high a tax; and under-a.s.sessment would be avoided by a provision that the state could at any time purchase the land at the price set by the owner. If the land were to go up in value the owner would have to pay the difference between the amount which he formerly a.s.sessed and the amount which he believed it to be worth at the later time. The money so paid would become "... a public fund as a reward, to all those who had improved the community and who had advanced industry and commerce around the land. The proposal that all future increment shall be given to the community is the 'equalization of land owners.h.i.+p' advocated by the Kuomintang; it is the _Min-sheng_ Principle. This form of the _Min-sheng_ Principle is communism, and since the members of the Kuomintang support the _San Min_ Principles they should not oppose communism." Continuing directly, Sun makes clear the nature of the empirical collectivism of his _min sheng_ program, which he calls communism. "The great aim of the Principle of Livelihood in our Three Principles is communism-a share in property by all. But the communism which we propose is a communism of the future, not of the present. This communism of the future is a very just proposal, and those who have had property in the past will not suffer at all by it. It is a very different thing from what is called in the West 'nationalization of property,' confiscation for the government's use of private property which the people already possess."(320) Sun Yat-sen declared that the solution to the land problem would be half of the solution of the problem of _min sheng_.(321)

Sun Yat-sen believed in the restriction of private capital in such a way as to a.s.sure its not becoming a socially disruptive force. That is a part of his ideology which we have already examined. In the matter of an actual program, he believed in the use of "harnessed capital."(322) He had no real fear of capital; imperialist foreign capital was one thing-the small native capital another. The former was a political enemy. The latter was not formidable. In a speech on Red Labor Day, 1924, when his sympathies were about as far Left as they ever were, in consideration for the kindliness of the Communist a.s.sistance to Canton, he said: "Chinese capitalists are not so strong that they could oppress the Chinese workers,"(323) and added that, the struggle being one with imperialism, the destruction of the Chinese capitalists would not solve the question.

The restriction of private capital to the point of keeping it harmless, and thus avoiding the evils which would lead to the cla.s.s war and a violent social revolution, was only half the story of capitalism in China which Sun Yat-sen wanted told in history. The other half was the advancement of the industrial revolution by the state, which was the only instrumentality capable of doing this great work. "China cannot be compared to foreign countries. It is not sufficient (for her) to impose restrictions upon capital. Foreign countries are rich, while China is poor.... For that reason China must not only restrict private capital, but she must also develop the capital of the State."(324) The restrictions to be placed upon private capital and upon private land speculation were negative; the development of state-owned capital and of capital which the state could trust politically were positive, as was the revenue which should be gained from the governmental seizure of unearned increment. In some cases the state would not even have to trouble itself to confiscate the unearned increment; it could itself develop the land and profit by its rise in value, applying the funds thus derived to the paying-off of foreign loans or some socially constructive enterprise.(325)

Ideologically, Sun Yat-sen was opposed to the intra-national cla.s.s war.

Cla.s.s war could, nevertheless, be justified in the programs of Sun in two ways: 1) if it were international cla.s.s war, of the oppressed against the oppressing nations; and 2) if it were the cla.s.s war of the nationalist Chinese workers against foreign imperialism. In these two cases Sun Yat-sen thought cla.s.s-war a good idea. He did not think cla.s.s war necessary in contemporary China, and hoped, by means of _min sheng_, to develop an economy so healthy that the pathological phenomena of the cla.s.s struggle would never appear. On the other hand, in justice to Sun, and to those Marxians who would apologize for him to their fellow-Marxians, there can be little doubt that Sun Yat-sen would have approved of the cla.s.s war, even in China, if he had thought that Chinese capitalism had risen to such power that it obstructed the way of the Chinese nation to freedom and economic health. Even in this he might not have set any particular virtue upon the proletariat as such; the capitalists would be the enemies of the nation, and it would be the whole nation which would have to dispose of them.

A finically Scrupulous and detailed examination of Sun Yat-sen's programs for _min sheng_ is intellectually unremunerative, since it has been established that _min sheng_ may be called empirical collectivism; collectivism which is empirical cannot be rigidly programmatic, or it loses its empirical character. Sun, not accepting the dialectics of historical materialism, and following the traditionally Chinese pragmatic way of thinking, could not orient his revolution in a world of economic predestinations. With the characteristic Chinese emphasis on men rather than on rules and principles, Sun Yat-sen knew that if China were ruled by the right sort of men, his programs would be carried through in accordance with the expediency of the moment. He does not appear to have considered, as do some of the left wing, that it was possible for the revolutionary movement to be diverted to the control of unworthy persons. Even had he foreseen such a possible state of affairs, he would not, in all probability, have settled his programs any more rigidly; he knew, from the most intimate and heart-breaking experience, how easy it is in China to pay lip-service to principles which are rejected. The first Republic had taught him that.

One must consequently regard the programs of national economic revolution, of industrial revolution, and of social revolution as tentative and general outlines of the course which Sun wished the Nationalist Kuomintang and state to follow in carrying out _min sheng_. Of these programs, the one least likely to be affected by political or personal changes was that of the industrial revolution, and it is this which is most detailed.(326) His great desire was that the Chinese race-nation continue, not merely to subsist, but to thrive and multiply and become great, so that it could restore the ancient morality and wisdom of China, as well as become proficient in the Western sciences.

A last suggestion may be made concerning the programs of Sun Yat-sen, before consideration of the Utopia which lay at the end of the road of _min sheng_. His plans may continue to go on in _min sheng_ because they are so empirical. His nationalism may be deflected or altered by the new situation in world politics. His optimism concerning the rapidity of democratic developments may not be justified by actual developments. The programs of _min sheng_ are so general that they can be followed to some degree by governments of almost any orientation along the Right-Left scale. The really important criterion in the programs of _min sheng_ is this: the people must live. It is a simple one to understand, and may be a great force in the continued development of his programs, to the last stage of _min sheng_.

The Utopia of _Min Sheng_.

Sun Yat-sen differs from the empirical collectivists of the West in that he has an end to his program, which is to be achieved over a considerable period of time. The means are such that he can be cla.s.sified with those Western thinkers; his goal is one which he took from the ideals in the old ideology and which he identified with those of the communists, although not necessarily with the Marxists. He said, at the end of his second lecture on _min sheng_:

Our way is community of industrial and social profits. We cannot say, then, that the doctrine of _min sheng_ is different from communism. The _San Min Chu I_ means a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people"-that is, the state is the common property of all the people, its politics are partic.i.p.ated in by all, and its profits are shared by all. Then there will be not only communism in property, but communism in everything else.

Such will be the ultimate end of _min sheng_, a state which Confucius calls _ta t'ung_ or the age of "great similarity."(327)

Perhaps no other pa.s.sage from the works of Sun Yat-sen in relation to _min sheng_ could ill.u.s.trate his position so aptly. He describes his doctrine.

He labels it "communism," although, as we have seen, it is quite another thing than Marxism. He cites Lincoln. In the end he calls upon the authority of Confucius.

To a Westerner, the ideal commonwealth of Sun Yat-sen bears a remarkable resemblance to the world projected in the ideals of the ancient Chinese.

Here again there is "great similarity," complete ideological harmony, and the presumable disappearance of state and law. Property, the fount of war, has been set aside, and men-animated by a profound and sincere appreciation of _jen_-work together, all for the common good. The Chinese will, in this Utopia, have struck down _might_ from the high places of the world, and inaugurated an era of _the kingly way_ throughout the earth.

Their ancient doctrines of benevolence and peace shall have succeeded in bringing about cosmospolitanism.

There are, however, differences from the old order of ideals. According to the Marxists, nationality, after it has served its purpose as an instrument in the long cla.s.s struggle, may be set aside. Speculation of this sort is rare among them, however, and it is difficult to envision their final system. To Sun Yat-sen, however, there was the definite ideal that the Chinese live on forever. This was an obligation imposed upon him and his ideology by the teleological element in the old ideology which required that humanity be immortal in the flesh and that it be immortal through clearly traceable lines of descent. The individual was settled in a genealogical web, reaching through time and s.p.a.ce, which gave him a sense of certainty that otherwise he might lack. This is inconsistent with the Marxian ideal, where the family system, a relic of brutal days, shall have vanished.

The physical immortality of the Chinese race was not the only sort of immortality Sun Yat-sen wished China to have. His stress on the peculiar virtues of the Chinese intellectual culture has been noted. The Chinese literati had sought an immortality of integrity and intellect, a continuity of civilization without which mere physical survival might seem brutish. In the teleology of Sun's ideal society, there would no doubt be these two factors: filial piety, emphasizing the survival of the flesh; and _jen_, emphasizing the continuity of wisdom and honor. Neither could aptly continue unless China remained Chinese, unless the particular virtues of the Chinese were brought once again to their full potency.(328)

The family system was to continue to the _min sheng_ Utopia. So too were the three natural orders of men. Sun Yat-sen never advocated that the false inequality of the present world be thrown down for the purpose of putting in its place a false equality which made no distinction between the geniuses, the apostles, and the unthinking. The Chinese world was to be Chinese to the end of time. In this the narrowness of Sun Yat-sen's ideals is apparent; it is, perhaps, a narrowness which limits his aspirations and gives them strength.

The Chinese Utopia which was to be at the end of _min sheng_ was to be established in a world, moreover, which might not have made a complete return to ideological control, in which the state might still survive. The requirements of an industrial economy certainly presupposes an enormous length of time before the ideology and the society shall have been completely adjusted to the peculiarities of life in a world not only of working men but of working machines. The state must continue until all men are disciplined to labor: "When all these vagrants will be done away with and when all will contribute to production, then clothing will be abundant and food sufficient; families will enjoy prosperity, and individuals will be satisfied.

"Then the question of the 'people's life' will be solved."(329)

Thus Sun Yat-sen concluded his last lecture on _min sheng_.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.